On February 24 Russian president Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, calling it “a special military operation with the objectives of protecting people who had been subjected to genocide in the previous eight years” and “to strive for the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine.”

Moscow’s move was not surprising. Russian troops had been massing on the border with Ukraine for months, and U.S. intelligence had repeatedly warned of an imminent invasion, though the Russian government had denied intent to invade as late as February 20. Additionally, according to a Western intelligence report quoted by the New York Times, in early February, Chinese government officials had asked their Russian counterparts not to invade Ukraine before the end of the Winter Olympics in Beijing. Yes, China was aware of Putin’s plans.

The timing of the invasion was not accidental. Putin is no doubt aware of the fact that Europe is just coming out of two years of pandemic with heavy restrictions that had a devastating impact on E.U. member states’ economies. This was supposed to be the beginning of a social and economic recovery for the Old Continent.

Putin is also well aware of Europe’s internal divisions in relation to foreign policy, its dependency on Russian gas, and the importance of economic ties between Western European countries and Russia. On one hand, as explained by Bruno Lété, a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels, to Al Jazeera: “Some EU nations have foreign policies which aim to appease Russia. Their aim is to break the Kremlin’s autocratic relation with China and also improve their own economic ties with Russia.” On the other hand, “countries in the EU’s eastern bloc, who have experienced the Kremlin’s threats in the past and had been under Soviet influence, have foreign policies which seek to respond to Russia through military solutions.”

The E.U. member states are divided and confused on what to do over Ukraine because Russia’s economic partnership is far more important to several of the older members than Ukraine is. So, what can the E.U. do? Not much beside pretending to have a common and coherent foreign policy.

For instance, on March 6 the French newspaper Le Figaro announced that two days before, President Macron and three of his ministers (Economy, Industry, and Agriculture) had a meeting with the representatives of major French companies such as Société Générale, Engie, Airbus, Safran, Arianespace, Thales, Auchan, and Danone. Macron advised them not to be in a hurry to leave Russia.

The whistleblower said that Macron provided these directives at the meeting: “We have been reminded that every company has the right to independently determine its strategy in the Russian market without notifying anyone.” A position that doesn’t exactly match with the tremendous sanctions announced by the E.U.

Just two days after the invasion, on February 26, Macron had stated that “the war would last.” In the meantime, Italy’s president of the Council of Ministers, Mario Draghi, immediately announced a “state of emergency for operations abroad” to last until December 31, 2022. It is worth clarifying that none of the countries bordering Ukraine have so far declared a “state of emergency,” and Italy is over 600 miles away from the conflict zone. 

European politicians are eager to exploit the Ukrainian crisis for domestic political aims. Draghi and Macron both tried to present themselves as potential mediators, but while Macron managed to some extent to maintain communication with Vladimir Putin and position France at the center of diplomacy in Europe, Draghi’s attempts were disastrous: Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio described Putin as “worse than an animal” and later apologized; moreover, diplomacy for peace doesn’t exactly go side by side with delivering loads of weapons worth around 150 million euros to Ukraine or moving more than 3,000 troops to Romania, which is what the Italian prime minister did despite strong opposition from many Parliament members. It is important to keep in mind that Article 11 of the Italian Constitution states that “Italy repudiates war as an instrument of offense to the freedom of other peoples and as a means of resolving international disputes”. 

Draghi was never elected by the Italian people, but he is part of a “unity government” that was mainly formed to face the pandemic. Consequently, these measures have generated turmoil within Italian political life, with plenty of anti-war demonstrations in various cities. Draghi was probably hoping to exploit the Ukrainian crisis to relaunch himself from an all-time low in popularity, after his draconian anti-Covid restrictions’ very negative impact on Italy’s economy and tourism industry. He did not succeed in being elected president of the Republic at the end of January, and his parliament coalition is in danger of crumbling due to unpopular measures often approved through confidence votes that neglect the Parliament.

The story is somewhat different when we look at Macron, who is ahead of anyone else in Europe in maintaining relations with Putin. But Macron has announced that he will run for a second term at the April 2022 presidential elections; a tough task considering the strong opposition shown by the massive street demonstrations that have been going on for months against his government and the pandemic restrictions, with the “gilet jaunes” (yellow vests) leading the way.

On February 21, an hour before Putin told the world about his decision to recognize the two rebel provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk, the Russian president called Macron to inform him of his decision. The relationship between the two dates back to the first week of Macron’s presidency in 2017, when he invited Putin to Paris; two years later he hosted Putin at his holiday residence in the Riviera, with the objective of re-establishing a close relationship with Russia.

Since the invasion of Ukraine started, Macron has kept contact with Putin, hoping to fill the gap left in December by Angela Merkel, who was Putin’s main interlocutor in the E.U. Now he is hoping to play this card for re-election, as explained by Rémi Lefebvre, a professor of political science at the University of Lille to Al Jazeera:

The tensions in Ukraine are very timely. Macron had originally planned to use the French presidency of the E.U. Council to restore his presidential stature ahead of the elections, to project strength and political will. Now, the situation in Ukraine enables him to ‘stand above the scrum’ and play a key role on the world stage…This crisis allows Macron to run a very short campaign, on ‘blitzkrieg mode’, which is precisely what he had hoped for.

As to Germany, it is worth noting its shift in defense policy, moving from a position of no support with lethal aid to countries at war (a legacy of the Second World War), to the shipment of weapons to Ukraine; a decision that generated discontent within the German political arena, just like in Italy. Berlin also froze the Nord Stream 2 project, but this move is temporary, and it would be utopic to think otherwise. Ukrainian president Zelensky is aware that he will get very little out of the E.U., and he has already accused Brussels of inaction.

One man who could really make a difference in the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia is the Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Benett. Israel has good relations with both countries. Zelensky is aware of this. In February, Zelensky repeatedly asked Benett to take a role in the negotiations. 

Israel has condemned the invasion of Ukraine but maintains strong ties with Russia, in part due to its vast Israeli-Russian community. Additionally, Israel maintains a close relationship with Russia due to Moscow’s support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Since Israel is operating against Iranian and Hezbollah targets on Syrian soil, it is important to keep contact with the Russians in order to avoid attacking each other.

Another actor who has positive relations with both Ukraine and Russia is the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. His spokesman, Ibrahim Kalin, stated on March 5 that Turkey was ready to help resolve the crisis. Russia’s ambassador to U.N. institutions in Geneva, Gennady Gatilov, welcomed Ankara’s proposal to set up a meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers during a diplomatic forum in Antalya on March 11-13. 

Putin’s objectives have been explicit, as explained by Luciano Bozzo, professor in International Relations at the University of Florence and scientific advisor for Centro Studi Machiavelli: solidify Russian control in Eastern Ukraine, create territorial contiguity between Ukrainian pro-independence provinces and the Crimean peninsula, and promote a “regime change” that is favorable to Russia and removes Kiev from Western influence.

General Paolo Inzerilli, Chief of Staff of SISMI and for 12 years commander of Gladio, a secret military structure belonging to the international Stay-behind network created to counter a possible invasion of Western Europe by the Soviet Union, reiterated that Putin does not want NATO on Russia’s borders: 

Russia, since its tsarist time, has always felt surrounded and blocked. It was the same with the Soviet Union and NATO was created to contrast a potential Soviet expansion. Today Russia is feeling surrounded by hostile countries and if Ukraine joined NATO, its missiles would be 180 km from Moscow, which is a ridiculous distance.

And again: “How to stop the hostilities at this point? I believe that right now nobody is willing to die in order to stop Putin. Therefore, NATO should grant Putin the demilitarization of Ukraine and an official declaration of non-entry into NATO.”

Both NATO and the E.U. have recently said that there were no plans for an inclusion of Ukraine, which enraged Zelensky, who is well aware that Russia remains a major partner for Europe.

The sanctions will harm Russia to some extent, but they will also damage European countries implementing them, so it is important to see how these measures develop. Sending weapons to Ukraine will only make things worse, as it will extend the conflict with the risk or goal of creating a new Afghanistan scenario in Europe, all at the expense of Ukrainian civilians.

This whole situation could have been prevented, but while NATO progressively turned from a military alliance to a political and bureaucratic body, the E.U. was busy with a green transition, gender fluidity, and political correctness, while imposing draconian Covid restrictions and going after the unvaccinated. Russia took advantage of this. Now a divided E.U. will need to be rebuilt from within and with a totally different premise.

Giovanni Giacalone is a researcher at Centro Studi Machiavelli and a senior analyst at the Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues and Managing Emergencies at the Catholic University of Milan.