Opposition leader Lee Jae-myung triumphed in South Korea’s presidential election, giving the left-ish Democratic Party of Korea full control of the government. He won big, but only because a third party siphoned off a sizable number of votes.

He will face significant public pressure to focus on domestic issues. He occupies the Blue House, as the traditional presidential residence is called, only three years after losing a tight race to Yoon Suk-yeol, a right-wing prosecutor who entranced Washington’s Korea policy community with his karaoke rendition of “American Pie” while being entertained by President Joe Biden.

Lee’s first priority will be dealing with the deep social divisions which, in the words of one South Korean political scientist, “remain unresolved and are now exacerbated by intensifying political tribalism.” Those divisions were reflected in Yoon’s self-destructive declaration of martial law on December 3, which he was forced to abandon after only six hours. He called out the troops, intending to arrest his opponents and suspend the National Assembly.

However, many South Koreans who remember decades of brutal military control fought back. Legislators evaded Yoon’s praetorians and voted down the decree, people protested against the autogolpe, soldiers refused to treat civilians as the enemy, and even many in Yoon’s own party rejected his power grab. Despite a surprisingly devoted band of disciples, he was soon impeached, with his ouster confirmed by the Constitutional Court in May, leading to the special presidential poll.

Lee benefited from a split within the ruling PPP, which punished Yoon’s internal critics. The nominee, Kim Moon-soo, represented the hard right and launched unconvincing but splenetic attacks on Lee as a potential dictator. Lee Jun-seok, a youthful former chairman of the PPP, staged a third party run that garnered 8.3 percent of the vote.

During the campaign Lee raced to the center, even calling himself a conservative and presenting himself as someone to unite a fractured country. He focused on the public’s economic concerns and made a promise: “We will recover what has been shattered and lost in the wake of insurrection—people’s livelihoods, the economy, national security, peace and democracy—and we will build a society that grows and progresses sustainably.”

Now comes the difficult part, governing. During the campaign Lee pledged to “ferret out” and “punish” those involved in Yoon’s imposition of martial law—seen by some as payback for the latter’s prosecution of Lee and other DPK politicians. After the vote, the now-ruling party called for an investigation of PPP legislators for allegedly manipulating public opinion with “propaganda.”

The new president has endorsed political reform to weaken the president’s power and increase legislative oversight. However, under pressure from the triumphant DPK, the Constitutional Court affirmed Lee’s immunity from prosecution on pending criminal charges while in office. His party appears ready to further assert its control over the judiciary, by, for instance, expanding the Constitutional Court.

Lee argued that even “more urgent than domestic reform is improving the economic condition of the people.” The Republic of Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the industrialized world, suffers from slowing economic growth and stagnating manufacturing, and has lost substantial ground to China. Younger South Koreans face an especially tough employment market. Lee stated that “we must give more priority to growth,” though, he insisted, that “doesn’t mean that I have given up on welfare and distribution.”

Squaring the circle won’t be easy. Lee presented an active economic program, including funding reindustrialization, expanding welfare, strengthening shareholder protection, and improving inclusiveness. He promised to “make massive investments in cutting-edge industries like AI and semiconductors to transform Korea into a leading industrial power that shapes the future,” and he introduced a $22 billion budget supplemental to increase domestic consumption. Yet critics also worry about the ROK’s rising debt.

Lee’s success will be determined in Washington as well as Seoul. He called the U.S. an “occupying force” during his last presidential campaign and this time insisted that there was “no need for us to fully depend on the alliance,” which should be based on “national interest and practicality.” However, in his inaugural speech he promised to “strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance as the bedrock.”

The Trump administration congratulated him on his victory, but higher tariffs pose a substantial threat to Lee’s economic plans. Lee and Trump spoke two days after the former’s election, when Lee shamelessly praised Trump, expressing his hope that they would “meet for discussions often.” They were supposed to talk at the G7 summit, but Trump’s abrupt departure forced cancellation. They reportedly are working on new plans for a summit.

Like progressives before him, Lee affirmed that the bilateral alliance would be the foundation for his foreign policy. However, he set the stage for internal debate on the nature of Seoul’s ties with Washington. Reported KoreaPro: “Among his earliest appointments, the new president named Wi Sung-lac as national security adviser and Lee Jong-seok as director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Their shared history within the Roh Moo-hyun administration was marked by sharp ideological and institutional disagreements over the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance.”

In the end, Lee will be forced to address difficult policy choices which he avoided during the campaign. The first will be how much he is prepared to pay for the U.S. military presence if Trump follows through with his demand for $10 billion annually, a more than eight-fold increase in host nation support. During his first term Trump pressed the Moon Jae-in administration for a five-fold jump, leading to deadlock. The Biden administration accelerated negotiations last year in an attempt to take the issue away from Trump. However, Trump may insist on a renegotiation, which could get tangled up with the tariff talks.

Also at issue will be the South’s attitude toward the North. Lee’s initial national security appointments were experienced pragmatists who had dealt with North Korea. In the past Lee strongly pushed for engagement, and in his inaugural speech he stated, “we will keep channels of communication with North Korea open and pursue peace on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and cooperation.” However, he also promised to address human rights and humanitarian issues. His sentiments have led to speculation about renewing North-South ties. For instance, reported The Korea Herald, “A sense of hope is brewing among businesses for the revival of suspended inter-Korean economic projects.”

However, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea abandoned inter-Korean diplomacy after the collapse of the 2019 Trump-Kim summit. Since then Pyongyang ostentatiously dropped its commitment to reunification. To reduce tensions, the South’s new government is targeting leaflet deliveries to the DPRK, even making arrests for balloon launches. Seoul also suspended propaganda broadcasts along the DMZ as “a preemptive step to ease tensions.” The North ended its broadcasts the next day, which seems like an invitation to take further steps. However, the DPRK has offered no explicit encouragement to the South. Indeed, Pyongyang has continued to dismantle a hotel used for inter-Korean family reunions.

Lee hoped for a summit with Kim Jong-un but allowed that “I’m not sure it will be possible.” Lee is likely to follow Trump’s lead if the latter attempts to revive his summit diplomacy with the North. Nevertheless, even if Kim proves willing to talk, which is by no means certain, denuclearization looks like a dead end: Three years ago he declared Pyongyang’s nuclear status to be “irreversible” and that “there can be no bargaining over our nuclear weapons.” After the Trump administration’s illegal airstrikes on Iran, the likelihood of Kim disarming is infinitesimal.

Amid these challenges, Lee promoted defensive measures, stating, “We will enhance the U.S.-ROK extended deterrence system and our three-axis defense strategy, maintaining a strong combined posture to counter North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities.” If the DPRK continues its recalcitrant course, Lee may have to deal with greater pressure for a countervailing ROK nuke, which he opposes but featured in the final presidential debate.

Almost as controversial will be ROK relations with Japan and China. Lee sharply challenged Yoon for being “submissive” in his rapprochement with Tokyo. In the 2022 election campaign Lee denounced tripartite military cooperation as something which could “stimulate the military unity of North Korea, China and Russia.” However, this campaign he staged a dramatic pivot, calling Japan “an important partner” and in his inaugural remarks pledged to “solidify trilateral cooperation with Japan” and America. Lee’s second phone call was to Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, in which they agreed to develop a relationship “based on mutual respect and trust.” The two leaders met at the G7 summit, which, reported NKNews, demonstrated “Lee’s willingness to push forward military cooperation with Japan.”

Lee next spoke with Chinese President Xi Jinping. As expected, Lee plans a course correction, seeking to improve a relationship that became more fraught under Yoon. As Lee explained, “we should not put all our eggs in one basket.” Elevated ROK-PRC tensions go back to 2017, with South Korea’s deployment of the THAAD anti-missile batteries, which Lee later advocated cancelling, and resulting Chinese economic retaliation, since lifted. In their conversation, Xi pressed for “close bilateral cooperation.” Lee, reported his spokesman, expressed his “hope that Korea and China would continue pursuing active exchange and cooperation in a range of areas, including the economy, security, culture and people-to-people exchanges, under a spirit of equality and reciprocity.”

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However, Lee will face serious questions in Washington, reflected by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s sharp warning at the recent Shangri-la forum. The White House also included a curious criticism of Chinese election interference in its congratulatory election message, suggesting that Trump bought into conspiracy-mongering that Beijing rigged the presidential count to capture the ROK. Finally, Lee avoided the question as to what he would do if Beijing used military force against Taiwan and asked, “Why should it matter so much to us if China and Taiwan engage in conflict?”

Other international issues will also come to the fore. Lee attended the recent G7 meeting as an observer. By all accounts, his participation was a success: Lee “held nine bilateral summit meetings with the leaders of South Africa, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, India, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Japan, and Canada.” Although Lee skipped the NATO gathering, when meeting EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen he apparently affirmed the ROK’s support for a “free and sovereign Ukraine” and “tough sanctions” against Russia.

Lee has enjoyed a strong start, but South Korean politics is volatile. In 2017, progressive Moon Jae-in won against another fractured conservative field after the ouster of a conservative president. Five years later Yoon narrowly seized the presidency. Moreover, maintaining stability amid a potentially chaotic international economic and political environment will prove difficult. In particular, should conflict come to Asia, Seoul may find it difficult to satisfy both Washington and Beijing. Lee has ascended to the pinnacle of ROK politics. Today the won stops with him.