Norbert Röttgen, a member of the German Bundestag and its Foreign Affairs Committee (which he chaired from 2014 to 2021), sat down for an exclusive interview with The American Conservative on the politics and foreign policy of Germany today.

Germany is undergoing a strategic revolution, or so the thinking goes. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s alteration of the debt brake signals a newly assertive Germany, ready to take up its natural hegemonic role in Europe. But in reality, how will that affect both German politics, and perception of Europe? Is the new German leadership willing to unilaterally lead, or will the new leadership will still be hamstrung by EU consensus politics?

To fully understand the magnitude of the change in Germany, one needs to know that the debt brake was formerly introduced by the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) as a consequence of the global financial crisis. It has now been lifted for only one specific area, namely defense spending, even before the new government has taken office. This shows how serious we are about assuming a new role in security and defense—and with a debt-to-GDP ratio of slightly above 60 percent we have the fiscal capacity to do so.

As Christian Democrats, we are ready to massively invest in European security out of our own strategic interests in response to Russia‘s imperialist war in Europe and in light of the changes we see in the United States. This readiness is personified by the CDU leader and likely new German chancellor, Friedrich Merz. 

But leadership in a European context must never again mean hegemony. For centuries European powers fought brutal wars, including two world wars, to assume hegemony. Following the Second World War and with the help of the United States, we have come to a new understanding of Europe as a common peace project. Hence, leadership in Europe can never be unilateral, but must take place in coordination with our European partners. 

Since defense continues to be a national competence within the EU framework, Germany is ready to pursue intergovernmental cooperation amongst like-minded states both aligned with and beyond the EU institutions. This framework is open to anyone willing and able to contribute to shaping a new European security order, with the prime objective of deterring further Russian aggression. 

Speaking of American retrenchment, allow me to ask you a few strategic questions. There seems to be a significant division between the new American administration, particularly the VP's office, and the new German government. What are the sources of this tension, and is there any possible alignment between the two sides?

As Germans we are long-term strategic partners of the United States, and I am confident that our future Chancellor Friedrich Merz will have a good working relationship with the new U.S. administration. This relationship should be based on a shared understanding of interests in primarily three areas: security, economy, and values.

In Germany and Europe, we fully understand that U.S. taxpayers are no longer willing to do the heavy lifting on European security. I absolutely concur that we should have acted on this earlier, but we have now taken major and unprecedented steps to make the money available that is necessary to massively ramp up European defense capabilities. This creates space for the United States to militarily focus on the Indo-Pacific and China, while maintaining Europe as a comprehensive strategic partner.  

With regards to economic and trade policy, we acknowledge that the United States pursues its own interests. So do we. We will define and defend our economic interests while remaining strongly convinced that our economic relationship isn’t bound to be zero-sum but bears huge potential to create win-win solutions. 

And finally, there is the topic of values. After centuries of warfare in Europe, culminating in two devastating world wars, we are proud of the liberal democracies we have become. In Germany this would not have been possible without the helping hand from the United States. 

Hence, when U.S. politicians challenge the fabric of our liberal democracies in supporting far-right extremist parties such as the AfD [Alternativ für Deutschland] in Germany, this is somewhat disturbing for us and not acceptable. These parties intentionally undermine our democracies. They are not only allies of Putin but are also strongly aligned with China. When U.S. Vice President Vance endorses these parties that openly sympathize with China, it becomes more difficult for us to explain to voters why we should reduce trade with China and bear the economic costs. 

As Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth commented recently, an ideal American strategy would be one where Europe takes the ownership of the “conventional deterrence,” and it is implied that the U.S. will provide the nuclear and naval umbrella needed. What is a good burden-sharing model in your opinion? 

I agree with Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth on this, and the necessary transition is taking place in Europe. This is in large part an American achievement as well. But after decades of dependency from the United States as our main security provider, some U.S. military capabilities cannot be substituted overnight. To transition successfully requires a bit of time. 

Given Russian and Chinese interest in the Arctic, a renewed American presence in Greenland is beneficial to both the U.S. and Europe. From what can be gathered, Europe is bending over backward to offer further mining, basing, and settlement rights to Americans in the northern hemisphere. In your opinion, are the Americans being too coercive in Greenland and will that lead to an adverse diplomatic effect?

The United States has long had a military base in Greenland. From my understanding neither Denmark nor Greenland as an autonomous territory had an issue with U.S. military or industrial presence. What has been counterproductive and led to major irritation in Greenland and across Europe is the coercive language used in relation to a NATO partner. I think the United States would find that a great deal of understanding exists in Denmark and Greenland if it simply talked to both about American and shared security interests instead of issuing threats. 

Chancellor Merz recently hinted that Taurus missiles might be used in Crimea, which resulted in some disagreement even among the coalition partners. How far is the new German leadership willing to escalate against Russia, given the very real possibility that there will be no American support if the Russians counter-escalate? Is Germany going to be part of the “coalition of the willing” trip-wire force in Ukraine, in the possibility of an American retrenchment? 

I disagree with the narrative that supporting Ukraine, in whatever way, constitutes an escalation against Russia. There is only one country that keeps escalating and continues to commit horrendous war crimes against Ukrainian civilians. This country is Russia. The United Kingdom, France, and the United States have already delivered long-range missiles to Ukraine. While the Kremlin has been verbally threatening them, we have seen no actual retaliation by Russia. This is because Putin has already fully escalated with all means available to Russia. Using nuclear weapons against Ukraine or its allies is a red line defined by Russia’s most important ally—China—that Russia cannot afford to lose.

This is not to say that we shouldn’t carefully weigh the risks involved when delivering new weapons systems. We must and will avoid becoming a party to the war ourselves. But after lots of deliberation I personally concluded that not (sufficiently) supporting Ukraine entails a much greater risk than supporting it. If Putin were to be even partially successful in Ukraine, he would feel emboldened to attack other countries such as Moldova or even one of the Baltic states. This is both in line with Russian imperialism as well as the level of military build-up we see in Russia which goes way beyond what is necessary to continue the war against Ukraine.

I am therefore in favor of a European coalition of the willing. This coalition needs to be willing to support Ukraine with all means available to ensure that Russia’s war fails. Sending German Taurus missiles in coordination with our allies should thus of course be on the table. But we should avoid discussions that are pointless at this moment in time and only disclose rifts amongst the allies. This applies to a potential European trip-wire force in Ukraine, as long as no one can say which troops would be deployed and what their exact mandate would be.

You are a notable China hawk in Germany. In that regard, you're perhaps the closest of all German politicians to the current U.S. political elite. But is the European Union too cozy to China when it comes to trade? If Europe has to choose between the U.S. and China on some of the core strategic questions of our times, will it be a unified decision, or will it be split and divided? Do you think the VP’s speech has pushed the European public opinion towards China?

The European Union has considerably toughened up on trade vis-à-vis China. The Commission actively advocates a derisking approach, which includes protecting our infrastructure against Chinese manipulation (i.e. 5G). At the end of last year, the EU issued tariffs against Chinese electric vehicles entering Europe. It did so against German opposition. Unfortunately, it has long been Germany with its export-oriented economy that has pushed back against a tougher EU China policy. 

However, given the painful and expensive experience we made with respect to our Russian energy dependency, the incoming CDU-led government is determined to reduce economic dependencies from China. Doing so is necessary to put ourselves in a position to withstand sanctions and counter-sanctions in the event of Chinese aggression against Taiwan. 

This policy shift reflects a newly found realism towards China both amongst German politicians as well as the general public. Hence, I do not believe that Vice President Vance’s Munich speech has pushed the public opinion towards China. But his siding with pro-China parties in Germany and Europe has caused some irritation.

You have been a rare German voice about the need for human rights and war crimes accountability, not just in Ukraine, but also elsewhere. Would you elaborate the position of Germany with regards to the Middle East, especially in regards to Syria, Palestine, and Turkey? 

Germany is an advocate of universal values as enshrined in the UN Human Rights Declaration. This entails that we do what is within our means to enforce those rights. Sometimes, and that is part of the truth, this is not a lot. 

With regards to Syria, Germany has always opposed the idea of a normalization of relations with the Assad regime, which was responsible for gross human rights violations, including the use of chemical weapons against its own population. We upheld far-reaching economic sanctions against the regime. With the new government now in place, we are carefully readjusting our posture. We are offering sanctions relief to allow for an economic recovery and political stabilization of the country, but with effective snap-back mechanisms in case the new leadership does not live up to its promises.

We have equally taken a tough stance on Iran, putting into effect new sanctions after the brutal government crackdown against peaceful protests following the death of Jina Mahsa Amini. Personally, I would like to go even further and put the Islamic Revolutionary Guard on the EU terror list. 

Regarding Israel, one of our closest allies, we are steadfast in our support of its right to self-defense. But this right does not entail a carte blanche, as jus in bello (the law that governs the way in which warfare is conducted) applies to the defending state as well. 

Berlin, as noted in these pages, and elsewhere, has the real European “special relationship” with America. A duopoly between Germany and the U.S. is not only needed, but is beneficial to surviving the coming great power competition, especially with a rising China and revanchist Russia. Should there be a rapprochement (for lack of a better word) and a new social compact between the two, and if so, what might be the steps and confidence building measures, to reach that new relationship, especially from a position of mutual respect and admiration? And what might be the German red-lines, related to American interference and meddling? 

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I share your assessment that U.S.-German relations are particularly important. They have a European dimension that extends beyond Germany, as we collectively want to keep the USA as a strong ally; and a geopolitical dimension that stems from Germany’s importance in positioning itself against a rising China and a revisionist Russia. Pursuing a relationship not based on military dependencies but mutual interests and benefits would be something new for both countries. For such an endeavor to be successful the conditions are easy to define: First, Germany must continue to match its words with actions and demonstrate that it is truly committed to its new stance on European security. 

Second, a new accord must be based on the shared assessment that China’s rise as a systemic rival and Russia’s persistent belligerent imperialism are the most pressing threats to regional and global security. It is a pressing but achievable task for the United States and Germany to design a coherent and joint policy to contain these security threats. 

Third, from a German and European perspective we consider any external support for extremist political parties that are aligned with powers that we perceive as threats to our national security as incompatible with such an approach.