The Trump administration may be following its predecessor’s policy in looking to NATO for assistance against China. Alas, expecting European military aid in the Pacific is a fool’s errand. The best way for America’s NATO allies to assist Washington would be to take over their own defense in Europe.

On his recent trip to Asia, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth provided a textbook example of mixed signals. When asked what kind of military role Europe should play in the Indo-Pacific, he responded a “big one.” The People’s Republic of China, Hegseth said, “does not appreciate the presence of other countries” there and it would be “useful” if the PRC had to consider their role when developing policy. At the same time, he allowed, “We would much prefer that the overwhelming balance of European investment be on that continent,” meaning Europe. Elbridge Colby, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, has taken a more forthright position that Europeans should worry about their region first.

Nevertheless, some European governments, reluctant to protect their own homelands, succumb to the “Weltmacht temptation” to exercise power on the world stage. For instance, French President Emmanuel Macron, ever busy creating security castles in the air, recently visited Asia and insisted that “France is an Indo-Pacific player.” Last month he issued “a call for action for Europe and Asia to work together on a coalition of independents.” This is “the basis of our Indo-Pacific strategy, which is how to preserve an open environment, rule-based order, in the region. And we want to be a reliable partner for that. This is the core of the bilateral commitment we have with Singapore, but with a lot of countries of the region.” Exactly what he had in mind was unclear, but he apparently envisioned a military role. He added, menacingly: “If China does not want NATO being involved in Southeast Asia or in Asia, they should prevent, clearly, the DPRK to be engaged on the European soil.” (He left unexplained how Beijing could prevent North Korea from cooperating with Russia.)

At least France, like the United Kingdom, has experience in deploying its navy to the Pacific. Most European states can only playact beyond their continent. For instance, Germany has a formal “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and four years ago sent the lone frigate Bayern on a Pacific cruise apparently intended to intimidate China—which contemptuously rejected Berlin’s request for a naval visit to Shanghai. Most European NATO members possess minimal navies. Even France and the UK have, respectively, only 22 and 16 principal surface combatants and 9 and 10 submarines. As for the others? The most numerous are Italy with 18 and eight, Turkey with 17 and 13, Greece with 13 and 10, Germany with 11 and six, and Spain with 11 and two. Moreover, Turkey’s and Greece’s fleets are directed at each other, and the quality of other nations’ ships and subs vary widely. Yet two years ago the European Union’s then-de facto foreign minister, Josep Borrell, issued a “call on European navies to patrol the Taiwan Strait to show Europe’s commitment to freedom of navigation in this absolutely crucial area.”

(The issue works the other way as well. Ousted South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol regularly attended NATO summits and cooperated with the transatlantic alliance, despite the far more pressing threat posed by North Korea and sporadic tensions with China. Newly elected President Lee Jae-myung indicated that he is likely to skip the upcoming alliance meeting, and seems less likely to make Europe’s defense a South Korean priority.)

Of course, the ideal would be European security partners able and willing to provide meaningful assistance to America in the event of a confrontation with China. Most important, however, would be a European coalition that possessed sufficient conventional and nuclear assets to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russia and any other unfriendly states in or near Europe. That is, to not insist on the U.S. maintaining tens of thousands of troops and massive amounts of materiel on the continent, backed by a formal security guarantee—seemingly forever.

If the continent took over its own defense, it also could prepare to cooperate economically with America and others in response to Chinese aggression against Taiwan or other regional states. This would be a major improvement over the current system, in which the U.S. is expected to patrol the Asia-Pacific and be prepared to rescue Europe from Russia. 

Another serious problem is Washington’s continued insistence on telling others what they should do. No government, even an ally, likes being ordered about as if it was equivalent to the Duchy of Grand Fenwick. Indeed, Macron told the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue: “we want to cooperate, but we do not want to depend. We want to cooperate, but we do not want to be instructed on a daily basis what is allowed, what is not allowed, and how our life will change because of the decision of a single person.” 

Instead of attempting to dictate to the Europeans, the U.S. should explain what it plans to do, while working with them as they craft a response. Although Europe’s decades of anemic military effort reflect calculated cheap-riding, continental governments and peoples also assess threats differently. Even during the Cold War most European NATO members feared a Soviet invasion less than did Washington. European governments insisted on building a natural gas pipeline to the USSR even as U.S. administrations deployed armored divisions, air wings, and tactical nuclear weapons to defend against the presumed Soviet threat.

No surprise, then, European politicians were not inclined to spend more money on their militaries to defend against a danger they believed to be overblown or even nonexistent. Their peoples understandably preferred to construct generous welfare states rather than deploy expansive militaries. These attitudes prevailed until Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Even now, many Europeans perceive little threat from Moscow. The latter has demonstrated neither the desire nor ability to march to the Atlantic, instead singling out Ukraine, which is not a member of NATO. If Russia continues to struggle to make small gains against Ukraine while suffering drone and missile attacks deep within its territory, who imagines that it could conquer the rest of Europe? Even major countries such as Spain and Italy continue to do as little as possible while seeking to avoid widespread censure. Some nominal allies probably would dismantle their militaries entirely if they thought doing so was feasible.

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Washington should set out its objective, European self-defense, and means, phased U.S. force withdrawal. European governments then would have to assess the perceived threat and develop their response. Future administrations could work with the Europeans while withdrawing American forces. The Europeans could spend as much or little as they wished, without interference from Washington. However, the latter must not abandon its departure plans, irrespective of the whining and wailing that would inevitably result.

The U.S. should still seek European support against China or involvement in other Asian contingencies as a matter of mutual interest. However, attempting to purchase European aid by treating the allies as helpless dependents in Europe is a losing game. For instance, a number of NATO governments offered limited backing for nonessential U.S. operations in Afghanistan (an official alliance mission) and Iraq (an unofficial multilateral project) in return for Americans’ willingness to risk nuclear war with Moscow on their behalf. That was a bad deal for the U.S. It would have been better for Washington if the Europeans deterred Russia, even if they didn’t participate in regime change operations elsewhere. Similarly, Americans remaining in Europe to defend the continent in the hope that next time Berlin might send two frigates to the Pacific would be a bad bargain.

Yes, it would be great if the Europeans took “a big role” in the Asia-Pacific. But only if the Europeans first take over the defense of Europe. To that end, Washington should stop telling them what to do and instead start telling them what the U.S. intends to do, which is to shift responsibility for the continent’s defense to them.