Peter Feaver challenges opponents of attacking Iran to do more to address the costs of containment:

Put another way, why do people who say military action to destroy the Iranian nuclear program is too hard also insist that it will be easy to contain Iran? Why can’t they acknowledge that it would be quite a daunting challenge to contain Iran? This would not preclude them from making the tough call in favor of containment over preventive strikes, though it might undermine the dogmatism of the argument.

First of all, I don’t know that it’s true that opponents of military action claim that containment will be easy. What opponents of attacking Iran usually do say is that containment is possible, and that it is therefore preferable to a major regional war. In their article for The National Interest, Colby and Long recognize that containment is anything but easy, but it is still the better option:

We acknowledge, of course, that containing a nuclear Iran would be costly and risky [bold mine-DL]. The United States would need to be strong, resolute and even fearsome in demonstrating to Iran the costs of aggression and assuring U.S. allies that staying the course with Washington represents a prudent strategy. Yet attacking Iran means rallying ordinary Iranians to a regime they dislike and many despise, and it risks a wider war in the region. And it would alienate key international actors, such as Russia, whose support would be necessary to ensure that an effective sanctions policy could work over time. And an attack would do all this without even providing a reasonable and plausible answer to the ultimate question Americans want answered before the United States goes to war: How does this end? Stealthy air strikes and massive earth-penetrating bombs are only tools, not answers. The United States cannot responsibly attack Iran and leave it at that, simply hoping for the best. A firm and resolute containment may be costly and risky, but it is a lot better than that.

Perhaps even better than simply trying to contain Iran would be an attempt to resume direct contacts with the Iranian government with the goal of re-establishing formal relations. In an op-ed ridiculing the idea of containing Iran, Daniel Schwammenthal points out an important difference between U.S.-Soviet relations and the relationship between the U.S. and Iran:

Crucially, a nuclear standoff with Iran would lack a key component that helped keep the Cold War from turning hot: a modicum of mutual trust. Although they were ideological enemies, the Soviet Union and the U.S. had full diplomatic relations and clear channels of communication. Remember those famous red telephones?

Restoring direct lines of communication to prevent misunderstandings and to reduce tensions during crises would be a valuable complement to any policy of containment, and it would help keep incidents from escalating out of control. It would be virtually impossible to do this in the wake of a military attack.

Update: Justin Logan responds to Feaver here.