Alex Massie noticed this bit of silliness at National Review before remarking:

I’m sure you too are persuaded by the many parallels between London 1940 and the Afghan War today. As is customary, it’s not clear which is worse: the Churchill Fetish or the (presumably) deliberate hackery.

The Churchill Fetish is always worse, because it is always, always such uninformed, nostalgic hero-worship for a man his American admirers don’t know very well. A close second is the refusal to understand that we cannot possibly judge limited wars by the standards of earlier, global total wars, and we shouldn’t want to judge them this way. In many respects, it is better that the government has never been seeking total victory and unconditional surrender in Afghanistan. Not only would these things not be forthcoming without vastly greater losses and expense (and perhaps not even then), but the obsession with total victory and unconditional surrender inherited from WWII is something that prolongs wars for much longer than they need to go on. This is a legacy of the earlier era of mass mobilization and conscription for wars between whole nations, but these are not the wars that Western governments are fighting today. If we cannot adjust and lower our expectations of what limited wars can accomplish accordingly, it would be better if we avoided them all together.