I’ve been following with interest Daniel McCarthy’s discussion of “declarationism” and its perils. If I understand the debate, “declarationism” is the contention that the Constitution was an expression of the core ideological convictions expressed in the Declaration of Independence (specifically, the “self-evident” truths about liberty and equality that open the second paragraph) and should be read in that light. This is a view made popular by the Civil War, sufficiently widespread that its adherents run the gamut from Brad Delong to Justice Clarence Thomas. And Gettysburg provides the usual ground for dispute on this point: if you don’t agree that there are some grounding ideals for the Constitution, then it’s not merely a compromise with evil but an embodiment thereof, having implicitly endorsed the permanence of slavery. And if those grounding ideals are to be found anywhere, surely they are to be found in the Declaration, the document that justified the creation of the United States in the first place, the Constitution merely being the document that organized its government in its permanent form.
Except, that’s not what the Declaration did. It didn’t bring the United States into being ex-nihilo. The various states already existed, as did the Continental Congress that was the germ of a central organizing authority. What the Declaration justified was severing the connection with the crown. That’s the context of those ringing words. The Declaration begins:
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.
The necessity to be demonstrated is not that Americans may organize themselves for self-government, but that they must dissolve the political bands that connected them with Britain. What must be declared is not the principles upon which the new government is founded but the causes which impel that separation. And then we get the famous phrases about self-evident truths and the proper purposes of government. These articulated ideals are part of the indictment of Britain, a preamble intended to provide a basis for understanding Britain’s “despotism” and “usurpations.”
The proper application of the Declaration to the great question of the Civil War was not “is it right for the Union to prosecute a war to end slavery?” but “does the Declaration provide an adequate justification for secession?” And it manifestly does not.
The Declaration does not say, “when in the course of human events, it becomes advantageous or profitable or popular or convenient for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another; it speaks of necessity. And that necessity pertains, in turn, to the proper purposes of government: the protection of those inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These ideals are a limiting principle – in their absence, the signers of the Declaration would effectively have been saying, “we declare our independence because we feel like it, and that’s all the justification we need.” Instead of doing that, they declared: “normally, what we are doing would be called treason, and so we provide this justification for our actions in terms of the most fundamental truths about the purpose of government.”
If the secessionist cause is to be justified in the Declaration’s terms, it must make one of two claims. Either there are no “political bands” of note to dissolve – the Union is a mere compact among sovereign entities, that any party may depart from at will. Or, if those bands are granted to exist, the election of Abraham Lincoln, whose party was committed to preventing the spread of slavery and to maximally restricting the entanglement of the free states and territories in the operation of that institution, was itself a sufficient threat to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” in the Southern states, and the culmination of a sufficiently extensive train of “abuses” and “usurpations” as to justify the dissolution of those bands.
The first of these contentions does not withstand minimal scrutiny, and is belied by essentially the entirety of the record of the debate over the Constitution. Clearly, the Constitution did not create a unitary structure where sovereignty resided entirely with the central government. But equally clearly, it was more than a compact among the states. Moreover, as a simple historical matter, most of the states of the Confederacy date to the period after 1787; only four of eleven were among the original thirteen colonies. All but one of the others (Texas being an exceptional case as always) came into being as states only through the mechanism of the Constitution.
So what of the second? Is it plausible on its face to claim that the election of Abraham Lincoln in and of itself justified secession as necessary? Is it plausible that the spread of slavery to new territories was necessary for the preservation of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” in the South? More to the point, how can a war expressly entered into for the preservation of a right to slavery (understood as a species of property), be described with a straight face as founded on the principle that “all men are created equal?”
The justification for the Union in prosecuting the war was simply that secession was illegal and treasonous. It required no deeper principle. It is the Southern states that required deep justification for their actions. And their justifications were manifestly inconsistent both with the principles of the Declaration and the historical record of the ratification of the Constitution.
Now, of course, Abraham Lincoln did make use of the Declaration to justify an expansion of the Civil War’s aims. That’s the kind of thing that happens in war, and one can unequivocally applaud the goal – the abolition of slavery – and even the means – war prosecuted to unconditional surrender – even as one can worry about how to limit a revolutionary principle once unleashed. But I can hold to that view while still arguing that the choice – in theory if not in practice – was never “Lincoln or Taney.” That is to say, it is not true that in order to reject the Dred Scott decision, you need to believe that the Constitution has to be read by the light of the Declaration of Independence.
Turning to Taney and his infamous decision in Dred Scott, what’s worth noting is that Taney’s opinion itself requires a search for “principles” behind the Constitution. He found those principles in the theoretical justification for slavery: the inherent inferiority of the black race. Words to that effect do not appear in the Constitution; what does appear is a recognition of slavery as an existing institution, and a description of how that institution is to be accommodated for the purpose of making the Constitution work. Changes in political and economic reality over time made those compromises less and less tenable from the perspective of the Slave Power. But that political problem was not the Court’s responsibility to resolve. Taney correctly discerned a threat to the institution of slavery in Dred Scott’s appeal. But it was Taney’s choice, and Taney’s choice alone, to decide that slavery was not merely assumed by the Constitution to exist, but understood to be right and proper. That extra-constitutional bridge could just have easily, and with far greater justification, been built to the Declaration, and would have resulted in an opposite conclusion. But even easier, from a theoretical perspective, would have been to build no such bridges, and to defer to Congress. Which also would have meant finding for the plaintiff.
Why did Taney come to the conclusion he did? Unquestionably, the primary reason was political. He was trying, in his way, to hold the Union together, convinced as he was that this could only be achieved on terms acceptable to the Slave Power. And he was probably right about that; the Union probably could not be held together other than by force (as it was) or by abject capitulation to the Slave Power’s demands. But in the background I discern another principle, a kind of idolatry of the Constitution that is as problematic as the idolatry of the Declaration that McCarthy warns against. Why, after all, did Taney feel the need to determine what the Constitution “thought” about the fitness of black people for citizenship? Why would anyone turn to a piece of paper to find out the answer to a question like that? The answer, it seems to me, is that otherwise it would be clear he was simply preferring his own view on this matter to the views of the Congress of the United States.
The Constitution is just a piece of paper, the result of a series of arguments and compromises between mortal men, motivated both by public spirit and more venal emotions and interests. If we venerate it, we do so primarily because that veneration serves the conservative political purpose of unifying the population across both space and time, much as does British veneration of the crown, and not because those men in Philadelphia were inspired with other-than-worldly wisdom. So, too, with the Declaration, which was also a political document with a specific rhetorical goal. There is wisdom there, and beauty, and much worth loving for its own qualities and not merely for this aforesaid conservative purpose; but that wisdom is a human wisdom, that beauty a human beauty, and we are also human beings, capable of being wise as well as foolish, beautiful as well as ugly. And when we read these documents, and interpret them, and thereby keep faith with both our ancestors and our descendants yet unborn, it behooves us to read them and interpret them with our best wisdom, our best stab at beauty, because that is the only wisdom and the only beauty at our disposal.



Millman asserts that the Declaration prohibited the secession of the southern States and that that secession is only lawful if based on a criterion of “necessity”.
Millman’s interpretation of how the Declaration of Independence relates to the question of secession is incorrect and his doctrine is not consistent with the principles of the Declaration or the Constitution.
The right to secede follows logically and necessarily from the right to self-government. If a political community has a right to self-government, this implies it has a right to secede from any confederation or Union which it voluntarily consents to join. The Declaration asserts that each colony has an inherent right to self-government, and because they have this right, they can exercise a right of secession and separate themselves from the political union with Great Britain. Following this secession, each colony is considered a free and independent State: a sovereign state with a right to self-government.
That the States established their separate sovereignty is demonstrated by the following facts:
• The people of each State established their own State constitutions and State governments to establish their self-government;
• Following the Declaration, each State voluntarily determined whether or not it would join a confederation with the other States or remain independent;
• The resulting Articles of Confederation affirm (in Article II) that “Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence”; and
• Each of the former colonies is recognized in the Treaty of Paris (1783) “to be free sovereign and independent States”.
Millman is incorrect in asserting that the Declaration establishes a limiting principle on when a State can lawfully exercise secession: not at a State’s discretion, but only on the basis of “necessity”, a necessity relating to “the proper purposes of government: the protection of those inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”
The Declaration discusses secession both in terms of “necessity” and of “prudence”. The important point is that whether the conditions of necessity and prudence are met is judged solely by the colonies at their discretion. The only limit on the exercise of secession is the judgment of the political community that decides to secede.
Millman erroneously asserts that the Declaration cannot support secession by the southern States in 1860-61 because this would require the Union to consist of no “political bands” and be a mere compact among sovereign entities. There is simply no reason why a compact among sovereign States excludes the existence of political bands among the States. Sovereign States can share common political bands within a confederation. The Articles disprove Millman’s assertion. Under the Articles, the States asserted their separate sovereignty, but because of common political concerns, they established a confederation.
The historical record demonstrates that the Constitution was considered a compact. The author of the Declaration, Thomas Jefferson, stated in the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 that the Constitution is a compact among States that reserve their right to self-government and have full authority under the Constitution to judge for themselves if the General Government has violated the Constitution and to determine the mode and measure of redress. Jefferson also believed that the States had the right to secede. So the Declaration’s author believed that the Constitution is a compact among sovereign entities that retained the right of secession with the decision on whether to secede resting solely at their discretion.
James Madison stated in the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 that the States are parties to the compact known as the Constitution. Madison composed an extensive defense of the Virginia resolutions – the Report of 1800 – that states: “the federal powers are derived from the Constitution and that the Constitution is a compact to which the states are parties”, with the understanding that the states are “the people composing those political societies in their highest sovereign capacity.” In doing so, Madison was simply repeating similar arguments that he made in Federalist 39.
That the Constitution is a compact among sovereign States follows necessarily from historical facts: in the Articles, the States assert their pre-existing sovereignty and nothing in the Constitution alters this sovereignty.
Article VII of the Constitution states that ratification of nine States is sufficient to establish the Constitution between the ratifying States. So the Constitution declares that it is an agreement (or compact) among the States.
Under the Constitution, the General Government possesses only those power delegated to it by the ratifying States. Where do governmental powers emanate from? These powers emanate from sovereignty. Since the States delegated the powers, the States are sovereign.
The Senate represents the sovereignty of the States. The ratification debates affirm that the Senate was designed to represent the sovereignty of the States. The States as sovereigns are equal, thus equal representation was required. Moreover, under the Constitution, no State can be deprived of its status as an equal sovereign in the Senate.
Article V allows for any amendment of the Constitution by three-fourths of the States. However, no amendment can remove a State’s equal suffrage in the Senate unless the State consents to this change. This protection of equal representation in the Senate derives from each State’s sovereignty.
Although the States had recently seceded from Great Britain, the Constitution contains no prohibition or limit on secession.
The only powers the General Government possesses are those delegated by the States, primarily in Article I, Section 8. There is no power given to the General Government to prohibit or limit secession by the States.
The only prohibitions on the exercise of power by the States are those expressly stated in Article I, Section 10. This Article contains no provision either prohibiting or limiting the exercise of secession by a State.
The Tenth Amendment emphasizes this understanding by declaring that all powers not delegated to the General Government nor prohibited to the States are reserved to the States. This implies both sovereignty in the States (they separately retain all powers not delegated) and a power to secede (a sovereign State has a right to self-government which includes the power to secede).
This understanding was explicitly affirmed by three States – Virginia, Rhode Island, and New York –in their ratification of the Constitution. They stated that the people may reassume all delegated powers whenever it becomes necessary to their happiness.
The Federalist and the ratification debates are replete with affirmations that the States retain their sovereignty under the Constitution. One of the main criticisms of the Constitution by the Anti-Federalists was that the Constitution destroyed the sovereignty of the States, an accusation vehemently denied by the Federalists. The dominant understanding of the Constitution when it was ratified was that it was a compact among sovereign States, implying that the States retained a right to secede. This understanding is expressed in the first comprehensive commentary on the Constitution after ratification, St. George Tucker’s View of the Constitution of the United States, published in 1803.
There is simply no basis for the assertion that the Constitution fundamentally and irrevocably limited State sovereignty.
Millman’s doctrine that a criterion of “necessity” has to be met in order for secession to lawfully occur is not only inconsistent with the text and history of the Constitution; it also establishes the basis for destroying constitutional order.
The Declaration is no more than a justification of secession from Britain; therefore, it logically follows that nothing in the Declaration can be construed as controlling the powers and rights of the States under the Constitution. Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that confers such controlling status on the Declaration. The States ratified the Constitution based on the terms of the Constitution, terms which in no manner limited the exercise of secession to a criterion of “necessity”. Under the Constitution, the States are only obligated to support the Constitution – not the Declaration – as the supreme law of the land. If there is any conflict between the Constitution and the principles of the Declaration, the Constitution is controlling by its status as the accepted supreme law of the land.
The Constitution cannot exist as a supreme law of the land – as establishing fixed limits on the power of the General Government and securing the reserved powers of the States – if the abstract principles of the Declaration are construed to control the powers of the General Government and the State governments. The attempt to establish an extra-constitutional source of higher law rooted in the Declaration and that controls the Constitution transforms the Constitution into a meaningless document through which vast expansions of power can be asserted by the General Government based on attempts to achieve the perceived ideals of the Declaration.
Millman’s argument is simply a variation on the ideology of the living Constitution. The abstract principles of the Declaration are the ideal goal to which the Constitution must evolve, which confers authority on the General Government to exercise whatever powers are necessary to reach these ideals, regardless of whether the States that ratified the Constitution delegated the powers or consented to the goals. These ideals replace the consent of the governed as the foundation of the Constitution. The Constitution is degraded from a supreme law to “just a piece of paper” that enables the General Government to expand its powers at its discretion, as long as this is interpreted as serving the abstract purposes of the Declaration.
The ratifying States did not consider the Constitution as “just a piece of paper”. They considered it as the supreme law of the land that had to be faithfully upheld in order to secure their right to self-government. As expressed by Jefferson, “the foundation of the Constitution” is in strictly limiting the General Government to a few defined delegated powers. This foundation is expressed in the ratification of the Bill of Rights, a set of “declaratory and restrictive clauses” intended “to prevent misconstruction or abuse” of the General Government’s powers. The purpose was to better secure each State’s right to self-government.
Millman’s doctrine essentially destroys the constitutional limits on the General Government’s power and undermines the States’ right to self-government. His doctrine establishes the basis for the General Government to, in Jefferson’s words, “take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.” It gives the General Government an unlimited rationale to allege a failure to conform to the abstract ideals of the Declaration and exercise whatever coercive powers are needed in order to better achieve these ideals.
If a State believes that the General Government is deliberately violating the Constitution, one of its options is to secede. Secession is the ultimate means for a State to preserve its right to self-government. This right is only effective if a State can secede at its discretion, based on its judgment. If you restrict or deny the right to secede, you not only deny a State’s right to self-government, you establish the basis upon which absolute power can be established in the General Government.
For these reasons, Millman’s doctrine of “necessity” should be rejected. However, even if one accepts Millman’s doctrine that secession must be limited to “necessity”, it begs the question of how the criterion is to be applied in practice.
To apply Millman’s doctrine, someone must judge whether a “sufficient” threat to “rights” has occurred in an “extensive” manner, thus justifying secession on the basis of “necessity”. The practical question is: who determines whether this criterion for secession has been met? There are only two possible answers: each State judges for itself, or the General Government judges. It is contradictory to make the General Government the judge of whether the criterion for secession has been met. A State that wants to secede is claiming that the General Government is threatening its rights in a manner that justifies secession. You cannot make the General Government the judge of whether it is guilty. The General Government, as the party accused of violating the Constitution, cannot objectively judge whether the accusation is true. The Government will never admit to its guilt. Therefore, if the General Government is the judge of “necessity”, the exercise of secession is impossible.
The only logical judge for whether the criterion of “necessity” is met is each State. Each State must judge for itself whether its rights are sufficiently threatened to justify secession. This judgment then resides entirely within the State’s discretion. Millman’s doctrine logically supports the unlimited discretion of a State in determining if “necessity” exists, so the doctrine cannot be used to limit the exercise of secession by a State, including the southern States in 1860-61.
Millman’s criterion for secession is not based on an accurate understanding of the Declaration or the Constitution. While even Alexander Hamilton stated that “to coerce the states is one of the maddest projects that was ever devised”, the purpose of Millman’s doctrine appears to be that of justifying such coercion. His doctrine appears to be merely an attempt to construct an extra-constitutional justification for Lincoln’s refusal to let the southern States peacefully secede. Before rejecting secession as “illegal and treasonous” and applauding “war prosecuted to unconditional surrender”, Millman might want to consider why Lord Acton, the great historian of liberty, considered the right of secession as the only means to check absolutism.
The central question of American history is how the decentralized, constitutionally limited federation of sovereign States that the Constitution was intended to secure degenerated into a highly centralized and consolidated national government asserting essentially unlimited power. One reason is the misinterpretation of the Constitution as an open-ended grant of discretionary power to the General Government in order to reshape the States into the realm of perfect equality in society. This revolutionary principle, once unleashed, cannot be limited.