Up until September 2024, Hezbollah, the Shia paramilitary group established in the early 1980s to fight Israel’s occupation of Lebanese territory, was Lebanon’s most powerful entity. With over 100,000 missiles and rockets in its arsenal and tens of thousands of fighters at its disposal, Hezbollah was arguably stronger than the Lebanese army. Politically, Hezbollah was a major mover-and-shaker, holding seats in the parliament and using its veto power to stall the selection of a president not to its liking. Its constellation of clinics and stores, not to the mention stipends and financial assistance dealt out to its supporters in the south, earned Hezbollah significant acclaim amongst a Shia plurality that was often overlooked in Beirut before the group emerged on the scene.
But that was then. Today, Hezbollah is in its weakest position ever. Israel’s two-month war against the group killed most of its leadership, including Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Thousands of fighters were killed and southern Lebanon, where most of Hezbollah’s base is located, sustained intense physical damage. Some of the very same supporters who happily accepted Hezbollah’s cash are now blaming the movement for perpetuating a war with Israel that Lebanon had no interest in fighting. As if to underscore just how much Hezbollah has fallen, the Lebanese parliament finally elected a president in January, ending a years-long stalemate, after Hezbollah-affiliated lawmakers stopped obstructing the proceedings.
If Israel’s war in Gaza is the definition of an unwinnable morass, its campaign in Lebanon was short, quick, and decisive. The Israelis managed to destroy much of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, so much so that Hezbollah’s leadership—or what is left of it—was pressured into signing a ceasefire agreement that mandated the group’s complete evacuation from its stronghold south of the Litani River, approximately 20 miles from Israel’s northern border. As a part of the deal, the Lebanese army re-deployed to the south as Hezbollah fighters moved north, taking their weapons into custody, destroying all weapons-manufacturing facilities, and dismantling “all infrastructure and military positions” previously held by Hezbollah.
In the nine months since, Hezbollah for the most part has implemented the accord. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however, continues to insist that the organization is operating in other parts of Lebanon and attempting to reconstitute what it lost. Hezbollah, in turn, argues that, because Israel hasn’t fully withdrawn from Lebanon (Israeli troops remain stationed at five points along the Israeli–Lebanese border), they aren’t going to contemplate disarmament and demobilization. The result has been a low-level showdown, with Israel frequently striking Hezbollah weapons caches and positions throughout Lebanon and Hezbollah issuing more barbed language about the need to resist the ongoing Israeli occupation. On July 29, the IDF said it conducted more than 500 airstrikes since the November ceasefire was instituted.
With its peace agenda in Gaza having been undercut by Netanyahu’s antics, the Trump administration has looked at Lebanon as a hopeful avenue to strike an accord. The White House and the State Department, with U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Thomas Barrack serving as the point man, believed that the months after the November 2024 ceasefire, coupled with Hezbollah’s dismal position, was the perfect opportunity to initiate negotiations between Israel and the Lebanese government on a formal peace treaty and demarcation of the land border.
Yet it’s difficult to see any Lebanese government, even one headed by a pro-U.S. figure like President Joseph Aoun, the former chief of the Lebanese army, talking with Israel on anything so substantive when Israeli troops continue to bomb Lebanon. Doing so would not only be highly unpopular amongst the Lebanese population writ large but runs the risk of minimizing Israel's military action against Lebanon’s sovereignty.
The Trump administration is therefore in a catch-22. It understands an Israel–Lebanon peace accord is highly unlikely unless Israel suspends airstrikes and the occasional ground raid. But it’s also highly unlikely Israel would consider such concessions until Hezbollah is disarmed or at least making significant progress towards disarmament, something Hezbollah has no intention of doing until the Israeli bombs stop falling.
Washington is becoming increasingly frustrated at the holdup. Barrack, who has turned into Trump’s troubleshooter in the Levant, read the Lebanese government the riot act last month, telling Aoun and his cabinet that they must issue a formal cabinet-level decision endorsing Hezbollah’s disarmament—as well as a plan for achieving it—if they want a full Israeli troop withdrawal and U.S.-endorsed foreign aid. The Trump administration hopes that by tying U.S. reconstruction aid to Hezbollah’s abolition, Aoun and his administration will find their way toward the right decision.
That calculation seems to have been the right one. According to preliminary reports, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced that Beirut ordered the Lebanese army to prepare a plan for ensuring it had a monopoly of force over the entire country by the end the of year. Whether this is a good enough result for Washington will depend on how specific the plan is and whether any deadlines are attached; if it’s open-ended, the Trump administration could dismiss it as a public-relations charade meant to hoodwink Washington into unlocking billions of dollars in foreign assistance.
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There is another problem as well: While Hezbollah may technically be a part of the Lebanese government, the Lebanese government doesn’t have the power to control Hezbollah’s decision-making. The group may be knocked back, but it’s not out of commission. Hezbollah’s leader Naim Qassem, Nasrallah’s replacement, has given several speeches opposing Hezbollah laying down its weapons, particularly under Israeli fire. And while Qassem’s view may be in the minority, there is a significant number of Lebanese Shiites—although certainly not the entire population—who would oppose the group’s effective surrender because they are beneficiaries of the movement, remain highly suspicious that other power-brokers back in Beirut will meet their needs, or believe the Lebanese state is too weak to resist hypothetical Israeli military aggression in the future.
The Lebanese army, particularly the grunts who carry the weapons, is unlikely to want to confront Hezbollah either. The last time the Lebanese government did so, back in 2008, Hezbollah fighters quickly overran West Beirut, resulting in four days of street clashes between the movement and pro-government militias. The Lebanese army, not wanting to contribute to intra-Lebanese civil strife, sat out of that confrontation and chose to mediate a solution from the sidelines. Unless Hezbollah voluntarily hands its guns, ammunition, rockets and whatever missiles it currently possesses to the state, the entire process could get hairy very quickly. Israel may not care about another civil war in Lebanon, but the Lebanese certainly do.
In short, what was thought to be a relatively smooth foreign policy file is turning out to be yet another headache for the White House. The Trump administration has only itself to blame for being overly optimistic. Nothing is easy or simple in the Middle East.
