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Politics Foreign Affairs Culture Fellows Program

The Kursk Offensive and the Risk of a Wider War

What is the point of this campaign, if not just to prolong the war?

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Credit: image via Shutterstock

As the Kursk offensive heads into its second week, Ukrainian forces now claim to control nearly 30 Russian villages comprising 1,000 square miles of Russian territory. In a meeting with security advisers at his residence in Novo-Ogaryovo on Monday, Russian President Vladimir Putin directed his ire at Ukraine’s sponsors, claiming, “The West is fighting us with the hands of the Ukrainians.” The Kursk offensive marks a significant escalation in the two-and-a-half-year-long conflict. 

So, what are some of the broader implications of the Kursk offensive? 

A few observations:

  1. The Kursk offensive highlights, among other things, the inherent risk of what I would call “non-allied allyship.” Washington has no treaty of alliance with Ukraine, yet the Biden administration persists in acting as though Ukraine is not just a treaty ally—it acts as though Ukraine’s survival in the form it took for three short decades (1992–2022) is essential to the national security of the United States. Washington’s granting of non-allied allyship to Ukraine has led Kiev to act in ways that are detrimental to its own survival—including through Kiev’s refusal to implement agreed-upon provisions of the Minsk Accords, which, if implemented, would probably have demonstrated to the Russians that waging a war of choice was unnecessary.
  2. The Kursk offensive also shows, once again, that the idea that “if the Russians are not stopped in Ukraine they will go on to conquer Eastern Europe” is patently absurd. Russia could not conquer Kiev in 2022 and has been fighting a costly war of attrition even since. 
  3. Russia remains, however, the world’s leading tactical nuclear power, and as such Ukraine’s raid on Kursk puts it and its military and financial backers, including the US and NATO member states, at risk for retaliation.
  4. Despite the success of the incursion and the loss of prestige suffered by Russia, it is important to remember that, on balance, Ukraine is losing the war. According to a new report in the Financial Times, “The amount of territory captured by Russian troops since early May is nearly double that which Ukraine’s military won back at heavy cost in terms of lives and military materiel with its summer offensive a year ago.”
  5. The decision by President Volodomyr Zelensky to bring the war to Russia—while no doubt viscerally satisfying to Ukraine and its many supporters here in Washington—will also demonstrate to Moscow that it has no one with whom to negotiate in Kiev and that the decapitation of the Ukrainian military and political leadership is a necessary precondition to achieving their ultimate war aim, namely, Ukrainian neutrality. Kursk is surely a morale boost to Ukraine and an embarrassment for Russia. It will also likely prolong the war. 
  6. The incursion into Russia shows once again that President Joe Biden and his national security adviser Jake Sullivan, far from being too cautious—as a number of high profile neocons have alleged— are, instead, facilitating Kiev’s journey up the escalatory ladder. It is a journey to an unknown destination. 
  7. Ukraine would not have been able to pull the offensive off without the approval and material support from Washington. As such, the U.S. and Europe are seen as complicit in this highly symbolic attack on Kursk, which is, after all, the site of the largest tank battle in history. The 1943 battle against the Nazis cost the Russians an estimated 800,000 casualties. The conclusion now being drawn in Moscow as they once again face German tanks on their territory is not difficult to surmise. 

In the end, the administration has not been honest about what is actually at stake in Ukraine. Now would be an opportune time for the president or the current vice president to articulate, and without recourse to received ideas such as those about defending “democracy,” why Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the matter of who governs a handful of Eastern Ukrainian provinces is worth risking a war with Russia. If Joe Biden and Kamala Harris do believe it is, they ought to explain why—perhaps during prime time at next week’s Democratic National Convention in Chicago.