Posting at Steven Cook’s blog, Karim Mezran offers additional reasons why recognizing the TNC as the Libyan government was a mistake:

There are, however, other reasons why the United States should not have offered official recognition to the TNC, notably the increased risks of splitting the country. The situation on the ground is stalled. The rebels in the western mountains are strong enough to control some villages, but definitely not enough to mount an attack on Tripoli. The forces in the East have made little real progress in weeks. The recent liberation of Brega though very important does not alter significantly the situation on the ground. Defectors from the Libyan army have expressed skepticism that the rebel army can ultimately prevail. All of this, coupled with the wavering European engagement, leads to affirm that the only way to get out of this impasse is to negotiate directly with Qaddafi.

Contrary to the general view that recognizing the TNC will help to hasten the end of the conflict, Mezran argues persuasively that it makes a negotiated settlement more difficult and may end up prolonging the war or possibly result in the break-up of the country in the worst-case scenario:

Anyone who knows the Libyan leader knows that he respects only one power, the United States of America. To be effective, the Americans should be able to exercise strong influence on both sides to force them to accept a negotiated solution, though recognition of the TNC has weakened Washington’s position. Recognizing the rebel’s government has outraged Qaddafi and his supporters, while at the same time depriving the United States of a powerful tool to pressure the TNC into accepting a possibly unpopular negotiated solution. Moreover one has to be wary that, the TNC may feel a duty to reward the people of the eastern provinces who have suffered much in the last month. In other words, while the situation on the ground remains stalled, the TNC may prefer to spend and invest resources in the reconstruction and strengthening of the liberated zones thus decreasing the war efforts to liberate Tripolitania. The unintended consequence of this policy would hasten the breakup of Libya. This would be the worst possible outcome of recognizing the TNC.