The Middle East remains unfinished business for President Donald Trump. The explosion of negotiations with Iran over the replacement of the JCPOA nuclear deal in June has left the Americans and Iranians each with a difficult hand of cards to play. Neither party is in a rush to return to the table. It is difficult for the White House to make overtures without tacitly admitting that the air strikes that summarily concluded talks in June did not “obliterate” the Iranian nuclear program (an open secret in every world capital), let alone solve a long-term problem that is basically political rather than military. After the fanfare that followed those strikes in the U.S., such an admission would cause a significant loss of face and political capital for the Trump administration. On the Iranian side, while sanctions continue to be a persistent problem, coming back after getting blown up for the effort last time would result in a similar loss of domestic face. Nor are the mediators of the last round of talks feeling especially bullish that things would be different this time. 

The confounding variable that unites all these facts is the primacy of domestic politics over foreign policy. In America, this is a very old dynamic—Tocqueville identifies it quite early—and, in the short life of the Islamic Republic, it has been just as confounding, if somewhat different in its contours. Each side needs to present some sort of progress to the home constituency to buy more time and space to work out the ticky-tacky particulars of a U.S.–Iran accord. Either side giving off even a whiff of capitulation would be politically fatal. Nor is there a surfeit of trust on which to work out those particulars, especially right now on the Iranian side.

So we’re looking for something quick, cheap, and flashy that each side can bring to its constituents as a big win. A tall order. 

But maybe not impossible. Draft a one-page joint declaration. Call it “The Grand Bargain for the Middle East”—that seems like the sort of thing that gets attention at 1600 Penn. Have a few preambulatory lines about peace, love, and understanding, and then list a series of general axioms that both sides affirm as the basis for relations: Respect for national borders, internal affairs, and sovereignty. A disavowal of the use of force during negotiations. An affirmation of the sacrosanctity of diplomatic personnel. An affirmation of nuclear nonproliferation. Perhaps a disavowal of covert operations. These axioms would address mutual historical concerns—hostage-taking, political subversion—that constrain leaders’ action without requiring politically impossible groveling. (It is poorly understood in Iran how the hostage crisis of 1979–1981 continues to be preeminent and formative for how Americans think about the Islamic Republic; likewise, Americans are almost entirely unfamiliar with the list of historical grievances that shape Iranian attitudes toward the West.)

Paper is paper; such a document would not bind either side to specific doctrines or concrete courses of action that both have not theoretically affirmed elsewhere. (This is why it could be drafted, approved, and signed quickly and relatively easily.) But both sides putting pen to paper on a document articulating shared premises for engagement would create a mutual bond of political responsibility; to prove to their respective publics the efficacy of the charter—that is, to prove that producing and agreeing to such a document is in fact a substantive victory—politicians will be encouraged to stick to the particular negotiations that follow. In this sense, the broader and vaguer the affirmations, the better—each side can argue that the document stands for something much greater than the narrow focus of the JCPOA, which, particularly for Trump, would be a major political victory. This would in turn impart more momentum to efforts to find a real settlement.

The Grand Bargain for the Middle East would not be very grand if it were a mere bilateral agreement. Part of the problem with the JCPOA was that the rest of the region was not involved and started to agitate against it before the ink was dry. Every other nation with an interest in the region will be invited to sign on to the Grand Bargain; the longer the list of signatories, the greater the political cachet of being associated with it, and the harder to resist joining. 

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In the U.S., a charter would have the added benefit of clarifying American policy in the Middle East. The decrepitude of the Carter Doctrine has left the U.S. without much basis for evaluating its interests and policies in the region. While Elbridge Colby’s National Defense Strategy of 2018 laid out American interests with admirable clarity, it was not a document that burst into the discursive mainstream; it did not shape politics, even if it occasionally shaped policy. The Grand Bargain for the Middle East would focus Americans’ attention on just what we are doing, and, more importantly, why. 

There are historical precedents for such a document. The Atlantic Charter, signed in the depths of the war in 1941, provided a shared framework of premises for the postwar order in Europe. This created the political momentum for a settlement that, while grievously flawed in certain respects, did in fact help to preserve peace on the European continent for a long period. 

One paradox that bedevils American strategy in the Middle East seems, in principle, resolvable: Washington and Tehran struggle to find agreement despite compatible interests. The U.S. wants to leave the theater; American adversaries, particularly Iran, want the U.S. to leave the theater. The U.S. wants a deal with Iran to limit its nuclear program and its destabilizing activities in the region; Iran wants a deal with the U.S. to mitigate sanctions and normalize its economic integration in the region and the world. It is impossible for either side to accept what it wants concretely if it looks like a capitulation or a loss of face. But a grand bargain brings honor to all traders.