In an upper middle class precinct of Northwest D.C., voting took and hour and a half at 11 in the morning, which bodes poorly for more challenged precincts at peak hours. An electronic machine broke down, people made snaking lines in the gymnasium, waiting to fill out paper ballots. Luckily everyone except me had a smartphone, so the world went on. One elderly woman collapsed on the floor; fortunately, after panicked calls for 911 and a doctor, she seemed to revive. Of course D.C. national votes are pretty meaningless. But if it’s like this across the river in Virginia, it would be real chaos. I wonder what people make of this–a report about a new GOP-installed “software patch” on the machines in Ohio. Anyone there with the tech savvy and legal knowledge to know whether this is a concern or nothing?
Of course, as in many things, the old ways were better. My first votes were cast on New York City voting machines, large green mechanical devices; you got to flip the levers to make marks alongside the names of your preferred candidates and then pull a big lever across width of the entire machine to record your vote. Pulling the big lever opened up the curtain behind you, while making a satisfying noise. Why on earth change it?
Lex 
Linda 
“I wonder what people make of this–a report about a new GOP-installed “software patch” on the machines in Ohio.”
Software patch is not accurate terminology. A patch is also called a “fix” because the software patch is correcting a software bug/problem. Ohio installed a new application that bypassed laws and generally accepted software controls.
The Judge denied the requested restraining order because the individuals testifying against the software had not actually reviewed/tested the software. Having worked in information security for 25 years, what I read is very concerning. Electronic voting in general is concerning because it is extremely difficult to prevent insiders (state employee) from altering data.
From the Court decision: “these counties will use the EXP software to generate a file that assigns an identifying number to each statewide candidate and issue. The counties will then save the EXP output files to a “jump drive” (also known as a flash drive), transport the drive to a computer that is connected to the Secretary’s election night reporting system, insert the jump drive into the computer, sign into the system and upload the EXP file. The counties will then review the results and transmit their vote totals to the Secretary.”
The methodology is inherently insecure. The data is in CVS format which is extremely easily to alter by anyone familiar with Microsoft Excel. Search & replace.
The defense argument, “The product does not have any ability to alter any voting data” ignores the fact that the data could easily be changed before it is uploaded.
An audit of internal controls (IT & manual) to protect the data is needed. Can the data that is uploaded to the Secretary’s election night reporting system be reconciled back to the original data?
I read all the court filings. http://tinyurl.com/am2byvx
Without a doubt, Republican Ohio Secretary of State Husted used the word “experimental” in an attempt to bypass laws. They did not follow anything close to software change controls to ensure the software worked properly and the data was secure.
Husted is also trying to not count provisional ballots that did not include the type of ID used by the voter, even though the poll worker was supposed to complete the information