The new issue of TAC is online. Glenn Greenwald discusses the general uniformity of the political and media class when it comes to Israel’s operation in Gaza. Prof. Mearsheimer has the cover story, which I found very interesting in light of this remark by Shimon Peres as reported by The Jerusalem Post (via Andrew):

Israel’s aim, he [Peres] said, was to provide a strong blow to the people of Gaza so that they would lose their appetite for shooting at Israel.

This “strong blow” is what Friedman the other day preferred to call “education.” Note how the story reports that Peres identifies the rocket attacks with the people of Gaza as a whole, as if they all had the “appetite for shooting” and as if being subjected to attack would make them lose it. One thing seems certain–many who did not have such an appetite are going to acquire it, and those who already had it are unlikely to be interested in renouncing violence.

Prof. Mearsheimer already identified as the larger goal of the operation in his article:

But these are not the real goals of Operation Cast Lead. The actual purpose is connected to Israel’s long-term vision of how it intends to live with millions of Palestinians in its midst. It is part of a broader strategic goal: the creation of a “Greater Israel.” Specifically, Israel’s leaders remain determined to control all of what used to be known as Mandate Palestine, which includes Gaza and the West Bank. The Palestinians would have limited autonomy in a handful of disconnected and economically crippled enclaves, one of which is Gaza. Israel would control the borders around them, movement between them, the air above and the water below them.

The key to achieving this is to inflict massive pain on the Palestinians so that they come to accept the fact that they are a defeated people and that Israel will be largely responsible for controlling their future.

To force another people to accept that it is defeated once and for all requires so much brutality that I doubt the Israeli government is really willing to inflict it, which means that the strategy will fail and will strengthen the Palestinians’ culture of defeat (to use Schivelbusch’s phrase). That is, the Israeli government may be willing to inflict massive pain on Palestinians, but it is never going to be willing to inflict enough to make them accept total defeat (this is a good thing). However, the attempt will reinforce the culture of defeat that Palestinians have cultivated and will continue to cultivate, and if other cultures of defeat are any guide Palestinians will tend to become more, not less, revanchist.

Indeed, insofar as Palestinians come to see Israeli actions as part of an effort to compel them to accept this their resistance will intensify until and unless they are utterly defeated, and it may be that the latter is not even possible. The goal is one consistent with the methods of total war, but the use of such methods, in addition to the profound injustice involved, would be an act of geopolitical madness on the part of a state that already suffers from intense international scrutiny and criticism. It is therefore always strange to me to think that the people imploring Israel not to do what it is doing are considered “hostile” to the state and its people, while those encouraging it on a path to ruin are friends and well-wishers.

When our government was intent on invading Iraq, many European governments opposed it for various reasons. Some were warning the administration against the folly of an invasion because they were our friends. Whether they genuinely desired what was best for us or were trying to keep us from blundering out of their own self-interest, their cautionary counsel was correct. Our government should have heeded friendly criticism and opposition and avoided making a terrible, criminal blunder, and we would have been spared a great many costs and troubles, but instead the allies who opposed our government were treated as if they were hostile and interested in doing America harm. The opinion of generally friendly governments provides some necessary perspective for a state that sees itself as besieged and under attack. What appears to be an appropriate and necessary action to the latter is sometimes seen more accurately–because it is seen more dispassionately–as an overreaction by the state’s allies. This is why the predictable, near-universal support for any Israeli military action in our political class is so harmful to Israel: those who are in a position to dissuade an ally from making a terrible mistake play the part of enablers of its worst habits. As much as we might understand why the Israeli government is acting as it is, just as a European might understand why our government acted as it did in 2002-03, that is not excuse for letting an ally charge ahead on the wrong path. Looking at it as pragmatically as we can, it is clear that the current course will be bad for the U.S. and Israel, and will ultimately be the cause of rejoicing for those groups and states that it is supposed to be chastising. How then can support for this course of action be considered a friendly or supportive act?