Michael Cecire’s case for Georgian membership in NATO goes off the rails here:

Georgia’s NATO membership also became a U.S. national interest the day that NATO members promised Georgia eventual membership in the April 2008 Bucharest summit. To abandon this strong and multilateral promise to Tbilisi would not only jeopardize the standing of pro-West forces worldwide, but would legitimately call into question the seriousness of NATO and the United States’ international commitments [bold mine-DL].

It is always a mistake for a government to defend ill-advised commitments. The pledge of future membership to Georgia and Ukraine at Bucharest was one of the biggest mistakes that NATO made in the last decade. It directly contributed to rising tensions with Russia, and encouraged Saakashvili in his disastrously mistaken expectation that the U.S. would back Georgia in a conflict with its separatist republics and Russia. U.S. encouragement of Georgian NATO aspirations and Georgian pursuit of alliance membership have already done great damage to Georgia, and it would be inexcusable for the U.S. and the alliance to keep stringing Georgia along. If NATO withdrew its pledge to Georgia or simply failed to follow through on it, would it be jeopardizing “the standing of pro-West forces worldwide”? It seems very unlikely. Why should a decision to reverse a foolish move have any effect on “pro-West forces worldwide”? More to the point, would the U.S. or NATO be less secure if Georgia never joins? The answer to that is clearly no.

Fortunately, NATO didn’t go as far as the Bush administration wished at Bucharest. The promise of “eventual” membership is one that is most likely never going to be realized so long as major European governments remain opposed to it and Georgia’s disputes with its separatist republics are unresolved. In that sense, it is almost a moot point whether the U.S. wants Georgia in, since Georgia isn’t likely to meet the requirements for membership in the foreseeable future. That’s all the more reason to stop giving Georgia the wrong idea that it will eventually be able to join.

Obviously, Michael and I aren’t going to agree on NATO membership for Georgia. I regard continued eastward expansion of NATO as unnecessary and potentially dangerous. On that, I agree with Bandow that it would create a new security commitment for the U.S. and NATO that they shouldn’t take on. It is also a commitment that the allies probably wouldn’t honor in the event of another conflict involving Russia. The protection that membership should provide Georgia would most likely prove illusory when it would be needed most. Making a commitment that the alliance isn’t likely to honor in a crisis is a much better way to “call into question the seriousness” of U.S. and NATO commitments.