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JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2013

The American Conservative

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

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Vol. 12, No. 1, January/February 2013



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Reactions

TRUE CONSERVATISM

10 years! Wow! I can hardly believe the passage of time. I cannot tell you how much this magazine means to me, a true conservative—and as Taki put it so well—NOT a neocon.

Pat Buchanan leads the fight. What a pleasure it was to be his colleague in the Reagan White House. His column every month is must reading for all of us. Additionally for me, what a nice surprise to be told [in Michael Brendan Dougherty's November 2012 profile] that his favorite Buchanan book *Churchill, Hitler, and "The Unnecessary War"* is mine also. I often dip into it to find so many lessons for today.

There may come a day when what we know to be true will be recognized and accepted. I surely hope it won't take another 10 years.

ALFRED H. KINGON
Former U.S. Ambassador to the European Union 1987-1989, Assistant to the President and Secretary of the Cabinet 1985-1987
via email

IN DEFENSE OF ROBERT MORRIS

As a descendant of the Morris family, I must object that your book reviewer, Mr. Michael Lind, ought not to attempt the reading of history (more likely in the case of *The Founders of Finance* propaganda from the liberal nabobs of Harvard) without knowing the history of the subject matter to begin with, the historical error in his [November 2012] review of the aforementioned book with regard to Robert Morris being his assertion that Mr. Morris died in debtors' prison; he did not. To correct the record for your readers in this regard, I quote the following from the "Descendants of the Signers of the Declaration of Independence" website:

> With Morris in debtor's prison, and the Federalists weakened, Jefferson won the presidency. Morris's friend and ally, Senator John Marshall, helped pass a bankruptcy law in 1801 and Morris was released. He attempted to restart his career, but the world had changed and he was discredited. Gouverneur Morris invited him to spend some time with him and provided Robert with an annuity for the rest of his life. Robert Morris lived quietly with his wife for another five years. Robert died of asthma on May 8, 1806 and was buried in the family vault of William White and Robert Morris behind Christ Church in Philadelphia.

Mr. Lind's inaccurate portrayal of Mr. Morris provoked my wife to ask the poignant question: "Why do 'they' [the liberal elite] always have to change history?" My response to her was as follows: "They" have to change history because it is not their intention to write history in the first place but to express a version of what they think ought to have occurred, which we know is not the conservative view of history!

JOHN BRAUND
via email

BRUCE BARTLETT, APOSTATE

Former Reagan economic adviser Bruce Bartlett's December article, "Revenge of the Reality-Based Community," quickly became The American Conservative*'s most popular article ever, garnering more than 200,000 page views and 18,000 Facebook "likes."*

All hail Bruce Bartlett, who writes movingly about how he came to realize that movement conservatism and its economic doctrine weren't what he imagined them to be, and in particular how he came to realize that Keynesian analysis had a point.

Bartlett's essay only drives home, of course, how very few economists—whether in the policy/think tank world or in academia—have been willing to do the same.

PAUL KRUGMAN
Excerpt from a New York Times *blog post*

What Bruce and I shared was a belief that the conservatism of the 1980s, while defensible in its time with a few obvious exceptions, was irrelevant for the world that Reaganism had created. … Taxes were way lower than they had historically been, and conservatives should be glad about this but vigilant about debt and spending—not eager to cut taxes even more, especially in wartime. America was more multicultural, and one minority, gay citizens, was actively seeking greater responsibility and inclusion. But by the new millennium, low taxes were unbreakable theological truths on the right and gays were Biblically repellent and had to be re-ostracized—by amending the federal constitution no less. Then came the crash of 2008 and a whole set of ideas about self-regulating markets and risk had to be re-thought (as intellectually honest libertarians like Alan Greenspan and Richard Posner conceded). Facing this reality, Bartlett rediscovered Keynes as he actually was and recognized the salience of Keynesianism for a new crisis that was an almost textbook case for government intervention...

We can easily become cynical about Washington. It contains a hundred times more schmoozers and social climbers and lobbyists and parasites than it does individuals genuinely committed to the common good in different ways. And of those earnest individuals, only a few are ballsy enough to follow their own reason doggedly enough to suffer social ostracism, removal from all conservative media outlets, and loss of a job—because their mind is not for sale or rent.

Bruce Bartlett is that kind of guy. We need so many more.

ANDREW SULLIVAN
Excerpt from a blog post at The Daily Beast

THE MERITOCRACY DELUSION

Ron Unz's massive examination of elite college admissions policies in the December issue prompted a "Room for Debate" feature on the New York Times *website and won one of David Brooks's annual Sidney Awards for the best magazine essays of the year. "You're going to want to argue with Unz's article all the way along, especially for its narrow, math-test-driven view of merit," Brooks wrote. "But it's potentially ground-shifting."*

The narrowness of Unz's definition of academic achievement is connected to a broader defect of the piece. In addition to neglecting students' ability in the liberal arts, Unz does not consider the liberal arts' contribution to the university as whole. Unz's model of meritocracy is Caltech. Not coincidentally, Caltech is an engineering school, which has only a vestigial presence in the humanities and liberal arts. Caltech is a wonderful institution. But would Harvard be more "meritocratic" if its student body and course offerings were more like Caltech's? Would it be a better university? I doubt it, and not only for reasons of self-esteem.

The differing missions of tech schools and the Ivy League universities could also help clarify one of the underlying uncertainties in Unz's analysis. Since he doesn't have access to data about who applies to various universities, he assumes that their numbers are roughly proportionate to the national cohort of high-achievers. This leads to the conclusion that Jews are overrepresented.

But what if Jews are disproportionately likely to apply to Ivy League universities? In other words, what if their representation on those campuses is reflective of their representation in the application pool? On the other hand, qualified Asian students may be more likely to apply to technical schools than to Yale. That could explain their relative underrepresentation at the latter.

Unz dismisses this possibility, asking: "Why would high-ability non-Jews be 600 percent or 800 percent more likely to apply to Caltech and MIT than to those other elite schools, which tend to have a far higher national profile?" The answer may be precisely that Caltech and MIT focus on math and science, in which Asian students achieve the very success that Unz documents. …

I don't know if any of the possibilities I've mentioned are true. In combination with the narrowness of Unz's definition of academic achievement, however, they suggest that there's a lot more evidence to be sifted and thinking to be done before we can hope to understand why some students rather than others are invited through the gates of Harvard Yard.

SAMUEL GOLDMAN
Excerpt from a blog post at
The American Conservative

I propose this challenge to any Ivy League school that denies it has a de facto quota for Asian admissions. Let a third party—any number of highly respected research organizations could handle this task—randomly select a large sample of applications from which the 2012 entering class was selected. Delete all material identifying race or ethnicity. Then, *applying the criteria and the weighting system that the university claims to be using*, have expert judges make simulated admissions decisions. Let's see what percentage of Asians get in under race-blind conditions. I'm betting 25 percent at least, with 30–40 percent as more probable.

None of the Ivies will take me up on it, of course. The people in their admissions offices know that their incoming classes are not supposed to have "too many" Asian faces, and part of their job is to make sure that they don't. I just want them to admit publicly what they're doing, and state their rationale, which presumably goes something like this: The Ivies are not supposed to be strict academic meritocracies. They need students with a variety of strengths and personality types. And even 16 percent Asian students is more than three times the Asian proportion of the American population.

I don't have a problem with the need for a student body with diverse strengths and personality types. Harvard is a better place because it does not select a class consisting exclusively of applicants with perfect SAT scores. But a candid statement of the rationale that has led to the 16±2 percent solution can't stop there. … Because there's no getting past the naked fact that students from an ethnic minority are now being turned down because they have the wrong ethnicity. It is exactly the same thing that Ivy League admissions officers did to Jewish applicants in the 1920s, when it was decided that too many Jews were getting into their schools. They too had a rationale for putting a quota on Jews that they too believed was justified. What I don't understand is this: Why do we all accept that what the Ivies did to limit Jewish enrollment was racist and un-American, while what they're doing to limit Asian enrollment is not even considered newsworthy?

CHARLES MURRAY
Excerpt from an American Enterprise Institute blog post

To imagine that today's college-admissions officers can step outside the failings of humanity, making subjective judgment calls *in secret* with racial enlightenment that is unprecedented in human history, is folly. It may have seemed possible and even done more good than harm when America was mostly grappling with black and white. Now that we're asking people to calibrate the "diversity value" of American blacks, Africans, Hispanics, Thais, Jews, Chinese, Japanese, Native Americans, and many more besides? The prudent course is acknowledging the limits of our wisdom. Alas, intellectual humility and restraint are not among the Ivy League's virtues.

CONOR FRIEDERSDORF
Excerpt from a blog post at The Atlantic

The American Conservative

{ Vol. 12, No. 1, January/February 2013 }

Four Conservatisms

Conservatives are at a crossroads, and four factions seek to point the way forward. The Republican Party itself, Fox News, talk radio, and the old think tanks and magazines are nowadays inert: their fundraising may be prodigious, but their ideas have calcified into mere mantras—or as Lionel Trilling once said, "irritable mental gestures which seek to resemble ideas."

But of the four factions that still possess some sense of direction, not all have deep intellectual resources. The neoconservatives, in particular, have undergone a reverse evolution, from the highbrow days of *Commentary* to the partisan polemics of the *Weekly Standard* to, at last, the sound and fury of the Washington Free Beacon and other websites peddling accusations of anti-Semitism—and homophobia—against Chuck Hagel, the Republican realist Obama tapped to become secretary of defense.

Hagel is exactly the kind of traditional conservative the neocons would like to drive out of the Republican Party, and they've largely succeeded. But that success has come at the cost of neoconservatism's own patrimony—the worldly and cosmopolitan outlook of the New York Intellectuals—as the Kristol gang affect an apocalyptic pitch to get Fox watchers riled up to invade Iran (or Syria, or Alpha Centauri).

The second faction is the Tea Party, marked by populism and a hatred of heavy-handed Big Government. It has no clear foreign policy—its activists have embraced both Rand Paul and Marco Rubio—and its insistence on downsizing Washington is more passionate than articulate. But it provides an electoral base for more policy-minded cliques: On the one side, appealing to the Tea Party's nationalism—or "American exceptionalism"—are the neocons. On the other side, offering the Tea Party a more developed anti-statist philosophy, is the third faction: the "liberty movement" inspired by Ron Paul.

The liberty movement has a burgeoning caucus in Congress, consisting of such legislators as Rep. Justin Amash, Rep. Thomas Massie, and Sen. Rand Paul. Like the Tea Party, the liberty movement is intent on slashing the welfare state. But it's also intent on slashing the warfare state and defending civil liberties, a program that ranges from de-escalating the Drug War to standing athwart attempts to deny due process to Americans accused of involvement in terrorism.

The liberty movement draws upon a libertarian literature going back 70 years, and a classical-liberal tradition older still. There is, too, something of Frank Meyer's "fusionism"—of liberty, tradition, and practical politics—in it. And its antiwar and civil-libertarian emphasis provide common ground with the fourth faction: countercultural Burkean conservatives.

They're "countercultural" in that don't embrace the consumerism that looks so lovely in libertarian eyes. Unlike the Tea Party, they are disinclined toward partisanship. The nexus of Ayn Rand and William Kristol is their—and our—antithesis, and they heed historian John Lukacs's warnings about populism and nationalism. They have the best claim to being the authentic conservatives, but they also place the least stock in such claims and are the least inclined to salvage a political movement or party that has degenerated into a scam. ■

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Front Lines

Power Without Politics

Reshaping America isn't all about elections.

by ROD DREHER

ST. FRANCISVILLE, LA.—Living in a small Southern town, it's easy to forget that politics exists.

When I was working in Washington, D.C., as a journalist in the 1990s I would return here from time to time to visit my folks. It never failed to irritate me how disconnected everyone here was. Didn't they know there had been a Republican Revolution and Speaker Gingrich was going to set everything aright? I was on Capitol Hill watching it all go down—and nobody cared to ask me what it was like. What was wrong with them?

Now that I live in my hometown, I see this disconnect not as a vice but as a virtue. A limited virtue, and a risky one: living here, it's easy to believe politics doesn't matter much and to give oneself permission to disengage. When the only political talk you hear is the Hannity-Limbaugh line, it's tempting to turn away and focus on private life.

This suits my temperament. I tend to be a decline-and-fall pessimist. Perversely enough, little makes me happier than devouring a freshly baked Spenglerian meditation on how our civilization is staggering towards decrepitude. But then I think about a dinner I had a decade or so ago in my Brooklyn apartment. As usual, my guests and I were decrying the decline of Christianity. One of us, a Catholic priest, agreed that our gloom and doom was justified but accused us of lacking perspective.

"You only see the rot, and it is very real," he said. "But you don't see the possibilities. When I was a teenager in the '70s, the only option you had for catechism was the liberal priests and nuns in the parish. Nowadays, you can go online, tonight, and have Amazon.com send you in less than a week a theological library that Aquinas could only have dreamed of. Do you realize how fantastic that is?"

Miguel Davilla

He went on, talking about how our contemporary age, for all its chaos and breakdown, also contained the seeds of renewal—if only we had the wit to see what was in front of us.

People who think small towns are a refuge from the crises of our civilization are deluded. You're probably better off here than living in a city, but you see the same patterns of social change, including the same dysfunction and pathologies. When I was a kid, out-of-wedlock childbirth, unemployability, and intergenerational poverty were almost wholly black problems. Not anymore. The barrier between healthy and diseased doesn't follow the color line.

To whom can we look for relief? The government? Please. Politics? The Republicans and the Democrats are, to paraphrase the poet, ignorant armies clashing by night.

Besides, the rot is not primarily a political problem. You can't pass laws to change the character of individuals or communities. Given the realities of our postmodern, post-Christian culture, the best we can hope is to create a legal and political framework in which people are free to make good choices.

But how to choose? This is the heart of our collective dilemma: we have come to value choice over what is chosen.

It's wrong to yield to fear and paralysis. As Gandalf counseled Frodo, we are not responsible for saving the world, but we are respon-

sible for doing what we can in the time in which we are given. That's moral realism. And as the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre counseled the readers of *After Virtue*, the time may come when people of good will lose faith in a debased system and look elsewhere to construct "new forms of community within which the moral life could be sustained so that both morality and civility might survive the coming ages of barbarism and darkness."

This is what St. Benedict and his followers achieved in the ruins of the Roman Empire, even though—as MacIntyre concedes—they didn't realize what they were doing. All they wanted to do was pray together and live in peace.

That's not a political program, or if it is, it's what Czech dissident Vaclav Havel called "anti-political politics"—the success of which, Havel wrote, cannot be predicted in advance:

> That effect, to be sure, is of a wholly different nature from what the West considers political success. It is hidden, indirect, long term and hard to measure; often it exists only in the invisible realm of social consciousness, conscience and subconsciousness ... It is, however, becoming evident—and I think that is an experience of an essential and universal importance—that a single, seemingly powerless person who dares to cry out the word of truth and to stand behind it with all his person and all his life, ready to pay a high price, has, surprisingly, greater power, though formally disfranchised, than do thousands of anonymous voters.

Havel wrote that in 1984, as an outcast in communist Czechoslovakia. Five years later, he was president of the liberated country. What might his words mean for us today?

Over the past few months, some friends and I in our small town have been doing something that would have been unthinkable a generation ago. We have been planting an Orthodox Christian mission church in our little Southern town. Our congregation is tiny, and all of us are converts, like the priest who moved here from Washington state to serve us.

At 45, I am the oldest person in the mission. Somehow, each of us—all born and brought up Protestant—found our way to Orthodoxy, the ancient faith of the Christian East. One of us is a sheriff's deputy who works courthouse security. During slow times, he reads the Early Church Fathers on his Kindle. All of us have stories like that. We are an improbable bunch.

If we had not been raised in a time of turmoil, in which it was possible to conceive of changing churches so radically, and in which, thanks to the Internet, information about Orthodoxy was so easily obtained, there wouldn't be a mission church on a hill south of town, a congregation in a cypress-wood house under the Louisiana live oaks, chanting the fourth-century liturgy developed under John Chrysostom, patriarch of Constantinople.

And though few people in this conservative churchgoing community know what Orthodox Christianity is, our bearded, ponytailed, black-cassocked priest is not the standout he once would have been in this community, in part because the hippies—yes, the hippies—got here first in the '70s.

"Hey Father," an old farmer here good-naturedly asked our priest, "what you wearing under that black robe?"

"My Hank Williams Jr. Live in '95 concert shirt," he answered.

That priest is so in. This might work, our little hobbits-at-prayer venture. We don't want to change the world. We just want to pray together. Yet who knows what may come of it? ■

Rod Dreher blogs for TAC *at www.theamericanconservative.com/Dreher.*

Rank Incompetence

Turf wars are the one kind our generals know how to win.

by WILLIAM S. LIND

It was tragic that the career of General David Petraeus was brought down by a mere affair. It should have ended several years earlier as a consequence of his failure as our commander in Afghanistan. Petraeus, like every other theater commander in that war except Stanley McChrystal, could have been replaced by a concrete block and nothing would have changed. They all kept doing the same things while expecting a different result.

Thomas Ricks's recent book *The Generals* has reintroduced into the defense debate a vital factor the press and politicians collude in ignoring: military incompetence. It was a major theme of the Military Reform Movement of the 1970s and '80s. During those years, a friend of mine who was an aide to a Marine Corps commandant asked his boss how many Marine generals, of whom there were then 60-some, could competently fight a battle. The commandant came up with six. And the Marine Corps is the best of our services.

Military incompetence does not begin at the rank of brigadier general. An old French proverb says that the problem with the generals is that we select them from among the colonels. Nonetheless, military competence—the ability to see quickly what to do in a military situation and make it happen—is more rare at the general officer level. A curious aspect of our promotion system is that the higher the rank, the

smaller the percentage of our competent officers.

Why is military incompetence so widespread at the higher levels of America's armed forces? Speaking from my own observations over almost 40 years, I can identify two factors. First, nowhere does our vast, multibillion dollar military-education system teach military judgment. Second, above the rank of Army, Marine Corps, or Air Force captain, military ability plays essentially no role in determining who gets promoted. (It has been so long since our Navy fought another navy that, apart from the aviators, military competence does not seem to be a consideration at any level.)

Almost never do our military schools, academies, and colleges put students in situations where they have to think through how to fight a battle or a campaign, then get critiqued not on their answer but the way they think. Nor does American military training offer much free play, where the enemy can do whatever he wants and critique draws out why one side won and the other lost. Instead, training exercises are scripted as if we are training an opera company. The schools teach a combination of staff process and sophomore-level college courses in government and international relations. No one is taught how to be a commander in combat. One Army lieutenant colonel recently wrote me that he got angry when he figured out that nothing he needs to know to command would be taught to him in any Army school.

The promotion system reinforces professional ignorance. Above the company grades, military ability does not count in determining who gets promoted. At the rank of major, officers are supposed to accept that the "real world" is the internal world of budget and promotion politics, not war. Those who "don't get it" have ever smaller chances of making general. This represents corruption of the worst kind, corruption of institutional purpose. Its result is generals and admirals who are in effect Soviet industrial managers in ever worse-looking suits. They know little and care less about their intended product, military victory. Their expertise is in acquiring resources and playing the military courtier.

When one of these milicrats gets a wartime command of a division, a corps, or a theater, he does not suddenly confront the fact that he does not know his business. He lives in a bubble, a veritable Persian court of staff officers who make sure bad news is minimized and military decisions are reduced to three "staff options," two of which are insane while the third represents doing more of the same. The "commander," or more accurately chairman, blesses the option the staff wants and retires to his harem (sorry, Dave). If the result is another lost war, the general's career suffers not at all. He may go on to become the chief of staff of his service or, in Petraeus's case, director of the CIA. As Army lieutenant colonel Paul Yingling wrote at the height of the Iraq debacle, a private who loses his rifle suffers more than does a general who loses a war.

America's military did not fail in Somalia, Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan because its budget was too small, nor because it lacked sufficient high-tech gizmos, nor because the privates and sergeants screwed up. Part of the blame belongs to civilians who set unrealistic military objectives. But a good part should go to America's generals, far too many of whom have proven militarily incompetent. A serious country should do something about that. ■

William S. Lind is director of the American Conservative Center for Public Transportation and the author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook.

Retaking the Faith-Based Initiative

Compassionate conservatism didn't fail—it was never tried.

by GEORGE SEAY

The chattering class is already arguing over how the Republican Party should appeal to the demographics that it lost in 2012—working older men, younger women, and Hispanics, to name a few. But what's getting lost in this scramble is a reflection on how the Republican Party can appeal to all of the electorate, and how social conservatism is critical to that message. The GOP must become more socially conservative, with an accent on "social."

Republican defeat last year was largely due to the party's disproportionate focus on fiscal policy while ignoring the concerns that absorb the day-to-day lives of women, minorities, and other sectors of the electorate with little affinity for the GOP. The right long ago abandoned "compassionate conservative" issues out of disgust with the overall concept and contempt for the White House Office of Faith Based Initiatives that arose from it. But this has proven to be a huge political error—and more importantly, a policy error.

"Compassionate conservatism" was a term adapted by George W. Bush's communications director, Karen Hughes, from the work of University of Texas professor Marvin Olasky (particularly his book *The Tragedy of American Compassion*). The idea paved the way for the White House Office of Faith-Based Initiatives, an effort to make the federal bureaucracy "agnostic" as to the character of organizations that received government grants for social services—in particular, whether they were faith-based or secular. Much

of the finest social welfare work is performed by faith-based groups such as the Salvation Army, but co-operation between government and religious organizations had long been hampered by federal red tape.

When the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives was formed in January 2001, President Bush appointed as its first director a Catholic Democrat, University of Pennsylvania professor John DiIulio. This was a catastrophic mistake for a startup bureaucratic entity that numerous interests were already keen on minimizing or eliminating. Under a loyal Republican passionate about the office, it might have had a fighting chance. With DiIulio it did not. He lasted barely more than six months. On his exit, he took the unusual step of publicly blasting President Bush and his staff, further undermining the authority of the office he so rapidly abandoned.

Compassion for the "poor in spirit" resonates greatly with many constituencies that view the Republican Party with suspicion.

DiIulio's successor was Jim Towey, also a Democrat and a Catholic, a former representative of both Mother Theresa and Florida Governor Lawton Chiles. While a decent, talented man, Towey was consigned to the policy wastelands during his tenure, for many reasons that had nothing to do with him personally.

First, the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 irreversibly shifted the Bush administration's focus from domestic policy to geopolitics and security. Understandably so, but to the unavoidable detriment of compassionate conservatism and the Faith-Based Office.

Second, Karen Hughes left the White House soon thereafter, in April 2002, barely a year after President Bush took office. Without Hughes, there were few remaining high-level White House advocates for compassionate-conservative policies.

Third, Towey was a Democrat and not in the Bush inner circle. His competence and decency could not overcome a lack of access to or attention from the West Wing, and the Faith-Based Office slowly lost whatever priority and power it once held. After the experience with DiIulio, no Democrat or outsider could receive the full faith and support of the Bush administration.

Lastly, President Bush did not issue a veto until 2006. Spending bills sailed through Congress without opposition, and grumbling among grassroots conservatives grew. Compassionate conservatism came to be seen as a code word for unencumbered federal spending and lost much of its support on the right. Without that support, secular left-wing opposition to the Faith-Based Office became a significant roadblock. Opposed by left and right alike, the initiative was caught in a vise.

As the right abandoned compassionate conservatism, social and religious conservatives, who had played a key role in Bush's reelection, grew dismayed at the subordination of their issues to fiscal and national-security policy. In the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, they did not vote in as large numbers as in 2004, resulting in decisive Republican losses.

Today compassionate conservatism and a revitalized Faith-Based Office in a future Republican administration deserve (perhaps demand) renewed conservative attention. Compassion for the "poor in spirit" resonates greatly with many constituencies that view the Republican Party with suspicion or have outright abandoned it. A singular focus on fiscal issues does not inspire or motivate these constituencies: "checkbook policies" in isolation give the impression that Republicans are simply the party of the rich and privileged, indifferent to the plight of the less fortunate.

The best policies make for good politics too. Compassionate conservatism is a potentially great policy that remains inchoate—it cries out for reconsideration, the sooner the better. ■

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South Korea's Secret Weakness

Our military aid to Seoul gives Pyongyang its only edge.

by DOUG BANDOW

Call it the Korean conundrum, a question to baffle students of international relations. Why is the Republic of Korea—the ROK, or South Korea—so militarily weak?

Ever since the ROK was established in 1948, the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea has posed a threat. DPRK dictator Kim Il-sung launched an invasion in 1950, which was rebuffed only after much bloodshed and with the aid of U.S. troops who remained in the South after an armistice was signed in 1953. They are still there.

In the early years the South was vulnerable. But the balance of power gradually shifted. During the 1960s the South liberalized its economy, triggering sustained growth and propelling it to become the world's 13th or 14th largest.

As South Korea was taking off, the North was stagnating. By the late 1990s the DPRK was devastated by famine. A regime that celebrated *Juche*, or self-reliance, ended up dependent on handouts from Beijing.

Today there is no comparison between the two Koreas. The South is an important international player; the DPRK is a national wreck. South Korea has upwards of 40 times the North's GDP. The ROK also has a vast technological lead, full access to global credit markets, and the political clout that comes from extensive trade and investment. The South's population is twice as great as that of North Korea.

In short, the conditions that left the South open to North Korean aggression no longer exist. Yet South Korea remains dependent on America. And U.S. policymakers assume that Washington must defend the ROK, apparently forever.

Only in military affairs is the South's superiority in doubt—and the DPRK's advantage lies in the quantity, not quality, of its arms. "Military clashes between South and North Korea over the past years in West Sea have proven that the conventional weapons equipment performance of NK is inferior to that of ROK," Dr. Sungpyo Hong of Ajou University reports. "Altogether, the ROK is superior to the North in conventional weapons and equipment in general."

The DPRK has roughly twice the number of men under arms, nearly 50 percent more main battle tanks, and twice as many artillery pieces. Rolling that mass southward would do damage but would not conquer the South. Pyongyang's greatest advantage is defensive. In any war the DPRK could wreck Seoul—which lies some 25 miles from the border—with artillery and SCUD missiles, a very high price for the ROK to pay even for victory.

But here is where the conundrum comes in: why does the ROK continue to lag behind the North in any measure of military power? The disparity in numbers is not due to circumstances beyond Seoul's control. There is no special geographical feature that ensures, say, that there will always be fewer men under arms in the southern half of the peninsula. Rather, the South Korean government doesn't want to spend more money to defend itself.

Over the last decade, according to Dr. Ho, the "ROK military has decreased its troops from 690,000 to 650,000" even though the North had more than a million men in uniform. Seoul cannot complain about the resulting numerical disparity.

America's foreign-policy community seems oblivious to the perverse incentives of military welfare.

Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation points to Seoul's Defense Reform Plan 2020, adopted in 2005, which planned to cut total military manpower from 681,000 to 500,000. Nothing has changed in the years since, even after repeated North Korean provocations, including the sinking of an ROK warship and bombardment of an ROK island in 2010.

Apparently South Koreans aren't worried about their defense. Or they assume they can rely on Americans to protect them with whatever force is necessary.

Yet America's foreign-policy community seems oblivious to the perverse incentives of military welfare. It is widely accepted that generous social welfare in the U.S. long discouraged work, marriage, and education: this realization drove the 1996 federal welfare reform legislation.

Washington's military welfare for foreign nations has a similarly debilitating impact. Even while relying on America for defense from North Korea, the ROK began fashioning a blue-water navy capable of conducting more distant missions. And Seoul spent a decade actually subsidizing the DPRK, as part of the so-called "Sunshine Policy."

Colonial Americans secured their homeland before embarking on foreign adventures. They certainly didn't expect Great Britain, France, Germany, or some other nation to protect them for decades so they could, in the words of Klingner, "assume a greater role on the world stage that is commensurate with" their growing capabilities. Washington should welcome South Korea's emergence as a genuine global power. But that should not mean subsidizing South Koreans' pursuit of foreign aggrandizement.

The emergence of a prosperous and democratic South Korea has benefited the U.S. and the rest of the world—it's one of the great post-World War II success stories. Americans have special reason to be satisfied, since Washington's defense shield enabled the ROK to develop despite North Korea's threats.

But the South no longer needs U.S. support, which by now is only a source of military unpreparedness, the root of the Korean conundrum. Peoples of the two nations should remain friends—cultural, family, and economic ties do not depend on military deployments. And the two governments should cooperate in areas of shared political and military interest. But it is high time for Seoul to shift from security dependent to security adult and solve its strategic conundrum once and for all. ■

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Counterculture Conservatism

The right needs less Ayn Rand, more Flannery O'Connor

By ANDREW J. BACEVICH

How to revive the flagging fortunes of the Republican Party might matter to some people, but it's not a question that should concern principled conservatives. Crypto-conservatives aplenty stand ready to shoulder that demeaning task. Tune in Fox News or pick up the latest issue of *National Review* or the *Weekly Standard* and you'll find them, yelping, whining, and fingering our recently reelected president as the Antichrist.

Conservatives who prefer thinking to venting—those confident that a republic able to survive eight years of George W. Bush can probably survive eight years of Barack Obama—confront a question of a different order. To wit: does authentic American conservatism retain any political viability in this country in the present age? That is, does homegrown conservatism have any lingering potential for gaining and exercising power at the local, state, or national levels? Or has history consigned the conservative tradition—as it has Marxism—to a status where even if holding some residual utility as an analytical tool, it no longer possesses value as a basis for practical action?

To which a properly skeptical reader may respond, perhaps reaching for a sidearm: exactly whose conservative tradition are you referring to, bucko?

Well, I'll admit to prejudices, so let me lay them out. (Fans of Ayn Rand or Milton Friedman will want to stop reading here and flip to the next article. If Ronald Reagan's your hero, sorry—you won't like what's coming. Ditto regarding Ron Paul. And if in search of wisdom you rely on anyone whose byline appears regularly in any publication owned by Rupert Murdoch, well, you've picked up the wrong magazine.)

The conservative tradition I have in mind may not satisfy purists. It doesn't rise to the level of qualifying as anything so grandiose as a coherent philosophy. It's more of a stew produced by combining sundry ingredients. The result, to use a word that ought warm the cockles of any conservative's heart, is a sort of an intellectual slumgullion.

Here's the basic recipe. As that stew's principal ingredients, start with generous portions of John Quincy Adams and his grandson Henry. Fold in ample amounts of Randolph Bourne, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Christopher Lasch. For seasoning, throw in some Flannery O'Connor and Wendell Berry—don't skimp. If you're in a daring mood, add a dash of William Appleman Williams. To finish, sprinkle with Frank Capra—use a light hand: too sweet and the concoction's ruined. Cook slowly. (Microwave not allowed.) What you get is a dish that is as nutritious as it is tasty.

This updated conservative tradition consists of several complementary propositions:

As human beings, our first responsibility lies in stewardship, preserving our common inheritance and protecting that which possesses lasting value. This implies an ability to discriminate between what is permanent

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and what is transient, between what ought to endure and what is rightly destined for the trash heap. Please note this does not signify opposition to all change—no standing athwart history, yelling Stop—but fostering change that enhances rather than undermines that which qualifies as true.

Conservatives, therefore, are skeptical of anything that smacks of utopianism. They resist seduction by charlatans peddling the latest Big Idea That Explains Everything. This is particularly the case when that Big Idea entails launching some armed crusade abroad. Conservatives respect received wisdom. The passage of time does not automatically render irrelevant the dogmas to which our forebears paid heed. George Washington was no dope.


Michael Hogue

In private life and public policy alike, there exists a particular category of truths that grown-ups and grown-up governments will respectfully acknowledge. For conservatives this amounts to mere common sense. Actions have consequences. Privileges entail responsibility. There is no free lunch. At day's end, accounts must balance. Sooner or later, the piper will be paid. Only the foolhardy or the willfully reckless will attempt to evade these fundamental axioms.

Conservatives take human relationships seriously and know that they require nurturing. In community lies our best hope of enjoying a meaningful earthly existence. But community does not emerge spontaneously. Conservatives understand that the most basic community, the little platoon of family, is under unrelenting assault, from both left and right. Emphasizing autonomy, the forces of modernity are intent on supplanting the family with the hyper-empowered—if also alienated—individual, who exists to gratify appetite and ambition. With its insatiable hunger for profit, the market is intent on transforming the family into a cluster of consumers who just happen to live under the same roof. One more thing: conservatives don't confuse intimacy with sex.

All of that said, conservatives also believe in Original Sin, by whatever name. They know, therefore, that the human species is inherently ornery and perverse. Hence, the imperative to train and educate young people in the norms governing civilized behavior. Hence, too, the need to maintain appropriate mechanisms to restrain and correct the wayward who resist that training or who through their own misconduct prove themselves uneducable.

Conversely, conservatives are wary of concentrated power in whatever form. The evil effects of Original Sin are nowhere more evident than in Washington, on Wall Street, or in the executive suites of major institutions, sadly including churches and universities. So conservatives reject the argument that correlates centralization with efficiency and effectiveness. In whatever realm, they favor the local over the distant. Furthermore, although conservatives are not levelers, they believe that a reasonably equitable distribution of wealth—property held in private hands—offers the surest safeguard against Leviathan. A conservative's America is a nation consisting of freeholders, not of plutocrats and proletarians.

Finally, conservatives love and cherish their country. But they do not confuse country with state. They know that America is not its military, nor any of the innumerable three-lettered agencies comprising the bloated national-security apparatus. America is amber waves of grain, not SEAL Team Six.

Given such a perspective, American conservatives cannot view the current condition of their country and their culture with anything but dismay. Yet apart from mourning, what can they do about it?

My vote is for taking a page from the playbook of our brethren on the radical left. Remember the "long

march through the institutions"? It's time to mobilize a countercultural march in an entirely different direction.

Conservatism—the genuine article, not the phony brand represented by the likes of Mitt Romney, Karl Rove, or Grover Norquist—has now *become* the counterculture. This is a mantle that committed conservatives should happily claim. That mantle confers opportunity. It positions conservatives to formulate a compelling critique of a status quo that few responsible Americans view as satisfactory or sustainable.

Put simply, the task facing conservatives is to engineer a change in the zeitgeist through patient, incremental, and thoughtful action. Effecting such a change presents a formidable challenge, one likely to entail decades of effort. Yet the task is not an impossible one. Consider the astonishing successes achieved just since the 1960s by left-leaning proponents of women's rights and gay rights. There's the model.

The key to success will be to pick the right fights against the right enemies, while forging smart tactical alliances. (By tactical, I do not mean cynical.) Conservatives need to discriminate between the issues that matter and those that don't, the contests that can be won and those that can't. And they need to recognize that the political left includes people of goodwill whose views on some (by no means all) matters coincide with our own.

So forget about dismantling the welfare state. Social security, Medicare, Medicaid, and, yes, Obamacare are here to stay. Forget about outlawing abortion or prohibiting gay marriage. Conservatives may judge the fruits produced by the sexual revolution poisonous, but the revolution itself is irreversible.

Instead, the new conservative agenda should emphasize the following:

- Protecting the environment from the ravages of human excess. Here most emphatically, the central theme of conservatism should be to *conserve*. If that implies subordinating economic growth and material consumption in order to preserve the well-being of planet Earth, so be it. In advancing this position, conservatives should make common cause with tree-hugging, granola-crunching liberals. Yet in the cultural realm, such a change in American priorities will induce a tilt likely to find particular favor in conservative circles.

- Exposing the excesses of American militarism and the futility of the neo-imperialist impulses to which Washington has succumbed since the end of the Cold War. When it comes to foreign policy, the conservative position should promote modesty, realism, and self-sufficiency. To the maximum extent possible, Americans should "live within," abandoning the conceit that the United States is called upon to exercise "global leadership," which has become a euphemism for making mischief and for demanding prerogatives allowed to no other nation. Here the potential exists for conservatives to make common cause with members of the impassioned antiwar left.

- Insisting upon the imperative of putting America's fiscal house in order. For starters, this means requiring government to live within its means. Doing so will entail collective belt-tightening, just the thing to curb the nation's lazily profligate tendencies. Conservatives should never cease proclaiming that trillion-dollar federal deficits are an abomination and a crime committed at the expense of future generations.

- Laying claim to the flagging cause of raising children to become responsible and morally centered adults. Apart from the pervasive deficiencies of the nation's school system, the big problem here is not gay marriage but the collapse of heterosexual marriage as an enduring partnership sustained for the well-being of offspring. We know the result: an epidemic of children raised without fathers. Turning this around promises to be daunting, but promoting economic policies that make it possible to support a family on a single income offers at least the beginnings of a solution. Yes, just like in the 1950s.

- Preserving the independence of institutions that can check the untoward and ill-advised impulses of the state. Among other things, this requires that conservatives mount an adamant and unyielding defense of religious freedom. Churches—my own very much included—may be flawed. But conservatives should view their health as essential.

Who knows, perhaps in 2016 or 2020 the existing Republican Party's formula of protecting the well-to-do and promoting endless war while paying lip-service to traditional values and pandering to the Israel lobby will produce electoral success. But I doubt it. And even if the party does make a comeback on that basis, the conservative cause itself won't prosper. Reviving that cause will require a different formula altogether.

Now you've got my ideas. Perhaps you have better ones. If so, I'd be interested to hear them. ■

Free Kentucky Project

Is the Bluegrass State going libertarian?

by W. JAMES ANTLE III

The libertarian Free State Project bills itself as "an effort to recruit 20,000 liberty-loving people to move to New Hampshire." A state representative there recently declared they're not welcome. So a plan B might be in order: Kentucky, perhaps.

Objections immediately spring to mind. How can a state known for its love of tobacco-price supports, with half a million more registered Democrats than Republicans, possibly fit the bill? Then again, what state boasts a more impressive small-government tag team than Republican lawmakers Sen. Rand Paul and Rep. Thomas Massie?

Paul, elected to the U.S. Senate in 2010, has already garnered his share of national headlines. But Massie, who last year won the remainder of retired GOP Rep. Geoff Davis' unexpired House term and a full two years in his own right, has flown under the radar.

Massie uses just two words to sum up his mission: "cut spending." Taking office as the fiscal cliff loomed, he like most Republicans wanted to preserve as many of the expiring tax cuts as possible. But unlike the majority of his party, he wants to change the GOP's focus.

"Spending is a tax," Massie says, arguing that reducing federal expenditures is the real necessity. Taxing, borrowing, and inflating follow on the heels of high spending. Yet despite Republican campaign promises, the 2011 debt-ceiling deal, and the super committee, Massie hasn't seen much trimming going on.

Cutting government is what got Massie into politics in the first place. When his home county proposed a tax to fund a building that was in turn supposed to reel in federal money—perhaps in accordance with the maxim, "If you build it, they will come"—Massie was steamed.

First he wrote a letter to the editor of a local newspaper. Dissatisfied with how the county was being run, he decided to make a bid for office himself. This was the first time he found himself in partnership with Rand Paul, who at the time was trying to beat the Republican establishment for a senatorial nomination; Massie wanted to become judge-executive of Lewis County, a post comparable to mayor.

It was the first match the Tea Party tag team won. In office, Massie dedicated himself to finding waste in public spending. He famously stopped paying a railroad company rent for a drainage ditch on property the railroad hadn't actually owned for 20 years. Lewis County had been sending them checks the entire time.

Massie checked all the electric meters on the county dime. When the hot water heater broke at the county jail, he ordered a replacement on eBay—complete with free shipping and a warranty—and installed it himself. "Gimme three inmates, I'll put it in," he told *Roll Call* he recalled saying.

The federal budget, bleeding trillions in red ink, can't be cut meaningfully with an exclusive focus on the old chestnuts of waste, fraud, and abuse. But Massie is willing to take on tougher targets—and even Republican-friendly constituencies. He signed a bipartisan letter asking congressional leaders of both parties to consider Pentagon budget cuts.

"We know the United States can maintain the best fighting force in the world while also pursuing sensible defense savings," the letter read. "How we spend our resources is just as important as how much we spend." The signatories dismissed the idea of measuring military power based on past spending or the Pentagon's slice of GDP.

"Ten other Republicans signed it," Massie notes, "so we know at least that many are serious." Some of them—Michigan Rep. Justin Amash, California Rep. Tom McClintock, and Idaho Rep. Raul Labrador—

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have already emerged as frequent allies.

He'll need them. Massie was already on the losing end of some lopsided bipartisan votes before the 113th Congress commenced. The first was the National Defense Authorization Act, which passed the House of Representatives with no specific language protecting American citizens from indefinite detention. (Amendments along these lines did pass the Senate, but were omitted from the conference report.)

The NDAA sailed through the House on a final vote of 315 to 107, attracting majority support from Republicans and Democrats alike. Yet 30 Republicans voted no. Massie was one of them. "I couldn't in good conscience vote for the NDAA while simultaneously upholding my oath to defend the Constitution," he said in a statement.

"The NDAA violates fundamental rights recognized since the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 AD," Massie argued. "This bill ignores principles central to American liberty." A pro-lifer, he noted that the version for the 2013 fiscal year also loosened restrictions on federal funding of abortions for military personnel.

Interestingly, all four Republicans who were denied their preferred committee assignments by the House GOP leadership for being too fiscally conservative—Amash, Kansas Rep. Tim Huelskamp, North Carolina Rep. Walter Jones, and Arizona Rep. David Schweikert—also voted against the NDAA. "The purges totally backfired," says Massie.

At the time, Massie fired back on Twitter, asking why these conservatives were removed from committees: "This isn't the time for conservatives to be ditching their principles." He signed off politely asking his constituents, "What do you think?"

Massie also joined Amash, Jones, Ron Paul, and Tennessee Rep. John Duncan—who with Paul's retirement is now the last of the six original House Republicans who voted against the Iraq War left in Congress—in voting against a resolution that purported to be about deterring unspecified Iranian actions in the Western hemisphere. The saber-rattling for the next Iraq War starts small.

And when more than two dozen Republicans, with varying degrees of seriousness, plotted a coup against House Speaker John Boehner in January, Massie was one of only eight to follow through and cast a vote for a different candidate. Massie voted for Amash for speaker.

It is appropriate then that Massie is aligning himself with a congressional "liberty caucus," even if he doesn't officially join the group by that name under Amash's chairmanship.

So is the Bluegrass State perhaps a more hospitable environment for libertarian-leaning conservatism than one might initially suppose? After all, Massie's main GOP primary opponent, Alecia Webb-Edgington, tried and failed to use libertarian-baiting to her advantage in 2012. She told a local Lincoln Day dinner, "We don't need any more socialists, communists, or libertarians in the Republican Party." As they say on a popular government-funded children's television program, one of those things is not like the others. Webb-Edgington lost to Massie by 15 percentage points, taking just 30 percent of the overall vote.

"Northern Kentucky, especially in the Republican primary, is a pretty good place for liberty issues," local Tea Party activist David Adams told me this summer. Adams managed Rand Paul's 2010 Senate campaign during the primary, before it was taken over by Jesse Benton, a veteran of Ron Paul's 2008 presidential bid who went on to become campaign manager of Ron Paul's 2012 effort.

In 2014, Benton will manage the reelection campaign of Kentucky's senior senator, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell. His hiring suggests that even McConnell—who has forged closer ties to the younger Paul since opposing him in the Senate primary two years ago—appreciates the significance of the Tea Party's libertarian wing.

As Massie's approach illustrates, libertarians are just one part of the big tent for smaller government. He told a local Kentucky television station that "fiscal responsibility and constitutionally limited government" are both "libertarian principles" and "Republican principles." He has also said of his base, "Good campaigns and good government are about building coalitions. This is a coalition of the Tea Party, the liberty movement, and grassroots Ronald Reagan Republicans."

Illustrating that point, *The American Spectator*'s Jeffrey Lord—no fan of Ron Paul Republicans—praised Massie for being one the Republicans who helped defeat the GOP leadership on a key vote that would have conceded higher tax rates. Lord called Massie and a group of congressmen including Paul "Reagan's House heroes."

The vote in question was Boehner's Plan B compromise to avert the fiscal cliff. Massie also voted against the successful deal that followed, which was substantially negotiated between McConnell and Vice President Joe Biden. "This plan is Washington kicking the can down the road," Massie said in a statement. "Democrats and Republicans in Congress are once again committing doublespeak by labeling tax increases as tax cuts, and spending increases as spend-

ing cuts. I am confident that the American people will see through this."

While Massie didn't pan his state's senior senator by name—referring politely to "Senate leadership"—he nevertheless excoriated the McConnell-Biden deal for perpetuating "Obama's failed stimulus" and a "bloated tax code," as well as failing to reform entitlements while postponing "the modest spending cuts agreed to in the 2011 debt ceiling deal."

Unlike many past conservative heroes in the House, Massie could wind up as more than a backbencher. A banjo-playing Kentuckian, the 41-year-old is also an MIT-trained engineer, a successful entrepreneur, and a Tea Party insurgent with actual governing experience. *Roll Call* delicately says, "his biography doesn't fit into any neat boxes."

Massie seems aware that the GOP doesn't have much to show for its past two years in the majority, mainly because Barack Obama is in the White House and the Democrats still control the Senate. Neither Obama nor Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid has much interest in cutting government spending—but that doesn't mean Republicans shouldn't continue to make the argument that cuts are necessary. The alternative, as Massie sees it, is a fate akin to Greece's.

Kentucky won't soon replace New Hampshire as the destination of the Free State Project. But judging from recent evidence, Kentuckians are doing the better job electing liberty-loving lawmakers. And they now have one in each house. ■

Michael Hogue

Oliver Stone vs. the Empire

Why he's as tough on Truman and Obama as Nixon and Bush

by JOHN BUFFALO MAILER

Oliver Stone has the same gripe with Barack Obama as he did with George W. Bush—namely, they both stand for American Empire, and he does not.

Stone is a three-time Oscar winner, has made over 60 films, including "Platoon," "Wall Street," "JFK," "Nixon," and "W.", and is generally regarded as one of the legends of his trade.

In his new book and Showtime series, *The Untold History Of The United States* (co-authored with Professor Peter Kuznick of American University), Stone highlights what he feels are neglected figures and choices in the American journey. In conversation, Oliver Stone is amiable, keeping an open mind to views that differ from his own, but never willing to back down when he thinks you are wrong.

I recently had the opportunity to sit down with him at the Soho Grand hotel in New York, where we discussed his new book and series, the difference between Pro-Empire Liberals and Anti-Empire Liberals, uniting the Tea Party and the Occupy movement, which direction our nation will go over the next four years, sex scenes in "Nixon," and whether Harry Truman was more like George W. Bush or Sarah Palin.

John Buffalo Mailer: When I read *Untold History*, I get the sense that you are suggesting it was not all that long ago that the country went off track. You start off the Showtime series with the testing of the A-bomb, then go straight through to today. Henry Wallace is one of the standout figures in this book. Had he won the nomination for vice president instead of Truman in '44, the world would be a very different place. Is it still possible to conceive of America if Wallace had won?

Oliver Stone: I think that's the whole point of undertaking something like this, which is to show repeated occurrences in which there are pivot points where history could have been different, where the United States could have acted differently. It's like a baseball player at the plate, bases loaded, and he whiffs it. Strikes out. But as a good pro athlete, you know you can get to the plate again and have another opportunity. That's the way you have to look at it.

So there is not only the Wallace moment, but there is a wonderful moment with Kennedy in '62 after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Definite moves towards ending the Cold War with Khrushchev. It ends with Kennedy's assassination. There's a great moment with Gorbachev in January '89 with Bush I. He's being offered the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War. All that fear all those years of Communism, and where was the peace we fought for? Out the window. Who's our new enemy? Bush said it was the Drug War. The first target is Manuel Noriega in Panama. So Noriega becomes the enemy of the week. We need a better enemy than him, don't we? So eventually it shifts over to Hussein in Iraq because he invades Kuwait. Which is a great story, we go into it in detail in the book. It's again, false information that leads to a war, the first Iraq War.

Then you have the 2001 moment, 9/11. A band of terrorists does what it does. The band is not that big, but it's treated by George Bush 43 as if it's Hitler all over again coming to start World War III. It's overhyped. Another huge dose of false intelligence which leads to invading a country, Iraq again. And it's supported by liberals.

And then of course the Obama moment, whether or not to increase the troop levels in Afghanistan. There was great hope that Obama would move off

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that agenda. Those moments of hope do exist, and they will come back again, I hope, and you'll live to see them in your lifetime.

JBM: I hope so. But I can't think of a mainstream political figure like Henry Wallace. The closest I can think of is Ralph Nader.

OS: There seems to be a divide between pro-empire liberals and anti-empire liberals. Think back to the Anti-Imperialist League in Chicago at the turn of the century, the great American liberals, including Mark Twain, turning against the annexation of Cuba and the Philippines, and think of liberals today who really say, "Enough! We need to contract these 800 plus bases we have around the World." These liberals have to stay committed, but it's so much harder when they're attacked by the pro-empire types. Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton are apparently comfortable with empire, so it's truly become a bipartisan foreign policy—most Americans now support the concept of being an empire, global policemen with a given right to intervene.

JBM: I would say your book makes a pretty clear argument that Obama is a pro-empire liberal.

OS: Obama has clearly stated we are the indispensable nation. Why? I don't agree with that. That's campaign rhetoric saying we are appointed by somebody as indispensable. You're talking Obama-God. There's a god that apparently has disposed himself to make us indispensable.

I don't think that Obama is a confrontationalist by nature. I mean, there's a man who seems to get along and go along, and went far. I do like his strength, but he doesn't have the character, it seems, to challenge received opinion.

JBM: I'm hard pressed to find another Democratic president who in four years has accomplished more than Obama has.

OS: You can say that. But at the same time, he's gone along with the national-security state that was established by Bush, and in some ways enhanced it. Which was against all the things he stood for. He was a constitutional lawyer! He didn't at all enforce what I would consider to be the law. He's put the president above the law. He continues eavesdropping on a massive level. He continues the concept of illegal detention. Unfortunately, Guantanamo and the various prisons have continued. It's not a pretty picture of law. By being a Democrat and black, he's done the worst thing possible: he's taken what was an exceptional mistake by Bush and turned it into a continual text. It's going to be harder and harder to turn back. The foundation had been laid; he's tightening the screws.

JBM: The book reads like a narrative. You've succeeded in making it exciting. I could see kids getting turned on to American history through this.

Obama has taken what was an exceptional mistake by Bush and turned it into a continual text.

OS: I love history. Today our kids have lower scores in history than they do in math and science, as bad as their math and science scores are! And I think part of the reason is, history to them is boring. And the reason it's boring is because they already know the story, because it always ends up a Disney movie with the U.S. coming out okay and being good. This is no juicy horror show. Darkness is sanitized out by the country's education boards scared of political controversy. They cut out daring, challenging history. The Texas school board has a lot of power in this country. So does California, apparently, because they both buy the most textbooks.

JBM: When "Platoon" came out, the effect it had on my generation was that everyone grew up thinking Vietnam was a bad war, that we had no business being there. But the script got flipped when we were attacked by terrorists on Sept. 11, 2001. Suddenly the Afghans and Iraqis are the new Vietcong and it's okay to go invade sovereign countries again, in fact it's necessary. We've now lived through a decade of war, had a generation come up on it, and they don't seem to see anything wrong with us now moving our troops into the South Pacific and promoting the American Empire there.

OS: We're basically deploying ships and troops, in Japan and Australia, too, controlling the sea lanes. It's not about bayonets and guns. What it is, is a commitment to military treaties and alliances, with NATO, with the South Asian nations that may feel threatened by China. It's easy to feel threatened. Although China is an interesting story, because you can never tell what would happen. China has one base abroad, and yet they're one of our biggest creditors.



Oliver Stone

JBM: After reading *Untold History*, I don't know if I want to liken Truman to W. or to Sarah Palin.

OS: More to W. because I think he's the wrong man at the wrong time, with a limited imagination. Very little empathy. I can't take Palin seriously.

JBM: But no one took Truman seriously until he was suddenly the president of the United States.

OS: That's true, Truman did get in by appointment. America has gotten Truman all wrong. They have glorified a guy who shouldn't be glorified. David McCullough has a lot to do with that. He won a Pulitzer Prize for it. It was made into a hit HBO film. As we show in chapter 3, there's nothing accurate about it and there's a lot of history left out.

JBM: Can you envision a third party that would be able to unite the Tea Party and Occupy?

OS: And Labor.

JBM: If you could find the party that represents both the Tea Party and the Occupy movement, I think labor would be included, along with well over half the country.

OS: Well, wisdom says you would have to form a third party, and third parties have historic difficulties. Although, Ross Perot came very close, with 17 percent of the vote.

JBM: Michael Bloomberg is an independent. If he ran on his independent party, I imagine he'd make a little more noise than say Ralph Nader, or any of the candidates who ran on the third-party tickets this past election, who I can't name.

OS: Jill Stein.

JBM: The one. The one who got a little bit of press. Perhaps the Republican Party is ready to restructure on a populist platform.

OS: It's also possible that the real liberals, the liberals who are anti-empire, will start to come out of the shadows. We have to encourage this. I think a compassionate leader can emerge. Maybe it's someone who reads the book, sees these movies, believes in them. Believes that there's another direction for America.

JBM: I could see so many movies out of the stories in here. Are you more inspired to make those movies now, or less? Sean Penn as Henry Wallace?

OS: It was so difficult after "Nixon" to do another

movie of that nature because it failed at the box office. I love that movie, "Nixon," though.

JBM: Commercially "Nixon" failed? How about in DVDs?

OS: Over time, yeah, it's been appreciated. It's hard to take three hours and 11 minutes of politicking in dark rooms with white people in horrible suits and bad haircuts, and actually make a good movie!

(Laughter)

JBM: And make it sexy.

OS: It's not sexy.

JBM: There's one sexy moment.

OS: There is?

JBM: When she hikes up her skirt a little bit...

OS: Ahhh!

JBM: And we wonder, "Is he going to go for it? Is Oliver going to show us Richard Nixon getting down?"

(Laughter)

OS: I did what I wanted to do with my life. But I think *Untold History* is the best I can do as a dramatist. The Greeks used to consider historians and dramatists as not that far apart. I mean, hi*story*—it's a story. Homer heard about the Trojan War and concocted this history called *The Iliad.* He was a dramatist. Memory is civilization. It's the thread of that memory that keeps us together as societies. History *is* drama. As I said earlier, the history that is taught in school is boring, 'cause they take the juicy parts out.

JBM: Have you ever considered the possibility of running for office?

OS: It'd be interesting to see all the bile and slander pour out. Don't know if I'd survive it, such things often bring out the worst in human nature. It even to some degree corroded Henry Wallace's spirit after the 1948 smear campaign, in fact, it can destroy a soul. How did your father react to his Don Quixote quest?

JBM: After my father [Norman Mailer] ran for Mayor of New York, his respect for the stamina of politicians went up significantly. But he was serious about his run. This was no joke to him. He actually thought they were going to win. So he was crushed a little by that defeat. But as he always did, after a day or two, he went back to work and moved on to the next adventure.

OS: Well, your dad was a very strong individual, that I know, no one quite like Norman on those metal legs, yelling at me for rushing him to finish the sequel to "*The Castle in the Forest*..."

JBM: He was yelling at you because he knew you were right, and he knew he didn't have time to finish the sequel. Although he did bring research into the hospital with him before he died. But to go back to his campaign, one of the tactics he implemented was to embrace all the controversial things he had done in his life and position them as lessons that had made him a better man. He promoted the notion that his foibles and follies and downright gaffes had imbued him with a profound empathy for just about every kind of person and that his checkered past therefore made him more qualified to hold office, not less. I imagine, were you to run for high office, you would have to embrace a similar set of operating guidelines for the campaign.

It's the thread of that memory that keeps us together as societies.

OS: Well, certainly there'd be a lot to "get out of the way," having not or ever having been a puritan. (Laughs) This aspect of marketing yourself is exhausting. But challenges provoke me. A quest like that could consume an entire third act—and only having one left, it'd come at a huge price. This *Untold History* has already taken a toll. I'd be giving up the chance of writing that one more movie, book, play that we always believe will make the difference. That's what the third act is always about, isn't it? Making it all come together in the end. But, thumbs up or down, it'd still be unfinished business. ■

Nixon at 100

He shaped a generation, a party, and the world.

by PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

The following is from a speech given by Patrick J. Buchanan during the Richard M. Nixon Centennial celebration in Washington, D.C., on January 9, 2013.

We are here tonight to celebrate the centennial of a statesman, a profile in courage and an extraordinary man we are all proud to have served: the 37th president of the United States, Richard Milhous Nixon.

Years ago, Meg Greenfield of the *Washington Post* wrote that she belonged to what she called "the Nixon generation."

"What distinguishes us as a group," she said, is that "we are too young to remember a time when Richard Nixon was not on the political scene, and too old reasonably to expect that we shall see one." Greenfield was distressed about this.

Yet her thesis rings true. We are the Nixon Generation. We were born into and lived through what Bole Dole called "the Age of Nixon." And what a time it was—and what a man he was.

Home from the war in 1946, Richard Nixon was elected to the 80th Congress and swiftly became its most famous member. For he would exhibit early on an attribute that would mark his whole life: perseverance.

Because he believed a disheveled ex-communist named Whittaker Chambers, and because he distrusted an establishment icon, Alger Hiss, Congressman Nixon persevered to expose the wartime treason of Hiss.

By 1948, he was an American hero, so popular the Democratic Party did not field a candidate against him. In 1950, he captured a Senate seat with the largest majority in the history of California.

Yet the same people who just loved Harry Truman's "Give 'Em Hell" campaign of 1948 whined that Nixon played too rough.

In the Taft-Eisenhower battle of 1952, an internationalist, the Boss stood with Ike and, at 39, was the vice presidential nominee—and a man of destiny.

Then it was that the establishment first moved to bring him down. They hyped a phony story about a political fund, alleged it was for Senator Nixon's personal benefit, and instigated a hue and cry for General Eisenhower to drop him from the ticket. Nixon's decision to defend his record and integrity in the "Checkers" speech, though mocked by his enemies, remains the most brilliant use of television by a political figure in the 20th century.

In the 1950s, he redefined the vice presidency as a force in foreign policy, braved a lynch mob in Caracas, became the first vice president to travel behind the Iron Curtain, and confronted Nikita Khrushchev's bluster in the "Kitchen Debate."

By 1960, he had no serious challenger for the nomination.

After the closest election in a century, about which there hung the aroma of vote fraud in Texas and Illinois, he went home to California to run for governor. After a brutal primary, he was gaining on Governor Brown when the Cuban missile crisis broke his momentum, and the Boss went down to his second defeat—and looked to be out for the count.

Believing he had nothing to lose, he came down from his suite the morning after that defeat to deliver to the press words that will live in infamy. As Cactus Jack Garner said, "He gave it to 'em with the bark on."

He was now thought to be finished. ABC put together an instant documentary titled, "The Political Obituary of Richard M. Nixon." The featured interview in the obituary was political analyst Alger Hiss.

But, as Mark Twain said, reports of his death were premature. Moving his family to New York to prac-

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Patrick J. Buchanan is a founding editor of The American Conservative.

tice law, Richard Nixon entered what he would call his wilderness years. But after the Goldwater-Rockefeller bloodbath in 1964, with the party bitterly divided, the Boss volunteered to introduce the nominee at the Cow Palace and did so in one of the finest addresses he ever delivered.

But after he brought that contentious convention together with his introduction, Senator Goldwater proceeded to tear it apart again, declaring, "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice." Dwight Chapin was in the limo that carried the Boss away from the Cow Palace. He has told me what the Boss said about Senator Goldwater's speech. But there is no need to repeat those discouraging words here.

Almost all the other name Republicans abandoned Goldwater. The Old Man stood by him. He traveled the nation, working longer and harder for Goldwater and the party than the senator himself.

After the crushing defeat that fall, the Republican Party was reduced to one-half of the Democratic Party's strength: 140 House seats, 32 senate seats, 17 governors. The Republican Party was a house divided and a house in ruins. It was an open question whether it would survive.

And now began the greatest comeback in American political history.

When I arrived in New York to join the Boss in January 1966, his staff consisted of three people: I occupied one desk in the office outside his own. A second occupant was Rose Woods, and the third, a "Miss Ryan"—more exactly Patricia Ryan Nixon, the future first lady of the United States, from whom I used to bum cigarettes.

The altarpiece of that year was Richard Nixon's six-weeks war against what LBJ called "My Congress." Alone of the national Republicans, the Boss campaigned across the country—in 35 states and 80 congressional districts. In November, his bold prediction of a 40-seat Republican gain in the House proved conservative. We won 47.

After a year off, traveling the world, came the campaign of 1968, the most divisive year in American history since the Civil War.

Consider all that happened that year.

As we flew to New Hampshire the last day of January, the siege of Khe Sanh was at its height, and the Tet Offensive had just begun. Four weeks later, Governor Romney quit the race. Sen. Eugene McCarthy then stunned the nation by capturing 42 percent of the vote against Lyndon Johnson. And Robert Kennedy declared for president.

On March 31, the Boss asked me to monitor the president's speech on Vietnam on a car radio at LaGuardia—to brief him when he arrived back from visiting Julie at Smith. At the end of the speech, President Johnson announced he would not run again.

Four days after this political earthquake, Dr. Martin Luther King was assassinated in Memphis. Washington and 100 other cities exploded in riots that lasted days and required tens of thousands of troops.

In early June, a week after our Oregon primary victory, I got a 3 a.m. call from our Bible Building headquarters. Robert Kennedy had been shot in a Los Angeles hotel kitchen. I called the Boss. Julie and David had been watching TV and already awakened him.

That August, the Democratic Party came apart in a bloody brawl between police and protesters in the streets of Chicago. And so it went in that dramatic and divisive year. But at its end, Richard Nixon was president of the United States.

Now consider the city he came to, and the hostility he found.

The nation had been torn apart by a half decade of assassinations and riots, crime, and campus anarchy. Thirty thousand Americans were dead in Vietnam, and half a million U.S. soldiers were tied down in an endless war. America was coming apart.

Richard Nixon was the first president since Zachary Taylor to take the oath with both houses of Congress against him. The bureaucracy was deep-dyed Democratic. The press corps was 90 percent hostile. The Warren Court was at the peak of its power. And the Best and Brightest who had led us into Vietnam were deserting to join their children in protests against what they suddenly discovered was "Nixon's War."

As the presidential limousine came up Pennsylvania Avenue after the inaugural, it was showered with debris. As Shelley and I were entering the White House reviewing stand for the inaugural parade, the Secret Service asked us to step off the planks onto the muddy lawn, as the president was right behind us. As he passed by me, he looked over, and in the first words I ever heard from Richard Nixon as president of the United States, words I shall always remember, the president said, "Buchanan, was that you throwing the eggs?"

Yet consider what he accomplished.

By the end of his first term, all U.S. troops were out of Vietnam, our POWs were on the way home, every provincial capital was in Saigon's hands. He had ended the war with honor, as he promised.

He had negotiated and signed the greatest arms limitation treaty since the Washington Naval Agreement of 1922: SALT I and the ABM Treaty.

He had ended the implacable hostility between the United States and People's Republic of China that had endured since Mao's Revolution and the Korean War.

In his second term, he would order the strategic airlift that saved Israel in the Yom Kippur War. Israel never had a better friend, said Golda Meir.

In November 1972, Richard Nixon was rewarded with the most sweeping landslide in history—49 states and 60 percent of the vote.

Because of the campaigns he had conducted in '66, '68, '70 and '72, a party on its deathbed in 1964 was on its way to becoming The New Majority Party, America's Party, which would capture the presidency and carry 40 or more states in four of the next five presidential elections.

The president's memoirs begin, "I was born in a house my father built." Well, the Republican Party in the last third of the 20th century was the house that Nixon built.

In domestic policy, he was the first environmental president, creating the Council on Environmental Quality and EPA.

To battle the scourge of cancer, the created the National Cancer Institute.

The Republican Party in the last third of the 20th century was the house that Nixon built.

To close the widening chasm between the generations and professionalize our military, he ended the draft.

He made six nominations to the Supreme Court. Four made it. Not a bad average, when you consider the Senate he had to deal with.

As for our "Southern strategy," when Richard Nixon first took the oath of office, 10 percent of Southern schools were desegregated. When he left, it was 70 percent.

As Bob Dole said in his eulogy at Yorba Linda, it was the Age of Nixon. While Nixon was a dominant figure on the national stage in the '40s, '50s, '60s, and '70s, his influence lived on through the 20th century and into the 21st.

Would there be a Gerald R. Ford presidential library, had it not been for Richard Nixon selecting this honorable and good man as vice president?

Would there be a George H.W. Bush presidential library, if Richard Nixon had not recognized the talent of this man who had just lost his second statewide race in Texas in 1970 and made him chairman of the Republican National Committee, then ambassador to the United Nations?

When Ronald Reagan came out of the West to launch his revolution, his first national security adviser and first domestic policy chief, Dick Allen and Marty Anderson, both came out of our '68 campaign and White House staff. Both of Reagan's secretaries of state and his secretary of defense—Al Haig, George Shultz, and Cap Weinberger—came out of the Nixon National Security Council or Nixon Cabinet.

The man Reagan chose as chief justice, William Rehnquist, had been put on the court by Richard Nixon. Reagan's choice as chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, was the domestic policy research coordinator in Nixon's '68 campaign.

In 1996, when Bob Dole was the leading candidate for the Republican nomination, he was being most closely pursued by two former members of Richard Nixon's White House staff. Lamar Alexander was one. And I forget the other guy.

That brings back a memory of the 1992 election, after I had lost 10 straight primaries to President Bush. I called the Old Man in Saddle River. When he came on the line, I said: "Ten for ten. Not bad, eh, sir?" President Nixon paused and said: "Buchanan, you're the only extremist I know with a sense of humor. Come on up, and bring Shelley with you."

In 2001, George W. Bush chose as secretary of defense the man that Richard Nixon had picked to head up LBJ's poverty agency, OEO, and to monitor wage and price controls, two plum assignments for a rising young Republican star, Donald Rumsfeld, before President Nixon named him the ambassador to NATO.

Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed that "it is required of a man that he share the action and passion of his time at peril of being judged not to have lived."

Richard Nixon shared the action and passion of his time. Again and again, he came back from woundings, he came back from defeats. After he left the White House, he would write nine books on foreign policy and the great men he had known. There were many. For only Franklin Roosevelt equaled Richard Nixon in having been on five presidential tickets.

As this centennial approached, the phone calls started coming in from the offspring of the old jackal pack, asking my thoughts on Watergate. My great regret is the Old Man is not here tonight so I can tell him my thoughts on his old tormenters. In the words of Nick Carraway to Gatsby: "They were a rotten crowd," sir. "You're worth the whole damn bunch put together." ■

Crony Copyright

Will Republicans embrace intellectual property reform?

by JORDAN BLOOM

On Nov. 16, the Republican Study Committee sent out an internal brief to its more than 170 members and their staff. The memo was a blistering indictment of copyright law.

"Copyright violates nearly every tenet of laissez-faire capitalism," the paper declared, and its irresponsible expansion "destroys entire markets." Polemical arguments, to be sure, but not altogether new ones: a substantial body of literature, mostly from academics on the left—but increasingly on the right as well—argues that the lengthening terms and harsher enforcement of copyright over the last 30 years has taken us from a system that incentivizes innovation to one that stifles it. What was unprecedented here was less what the memo said than where it came from: the conservative caucus of the House of Representatives.

Though taking up copyright reform could be a savvy move for the GOP—it's popular with young people and the issue divides Democratic money in Silicon Valley and Hollywood—the memo ultimately didn't portend any such thing. Indeed, within 24 hours of being released, the document had been retracted, and less than a month later its author, 24-year-old RSC staffer Derek Khanna, had been fired.

Yet the paper was praised by *National Review's* Reihan Salam and influential Republican strategist and tech guru Patrick Ruffini, among many others. Khanna earned himself a *New York Times* mention by David Brooks as a "rising star" who bucked his party's typical "lobbyist-driven position" on copyright.

So the memo's public reception wasn't what caused the RSC to balk. Rather individual members of the RSC took the unusual step of putting pressure on the organization to get rid of Khanna. In particular, Rep. Marsha Blackburn of Tennessee, a Republican representing the outskirts of Nashville, home of the country-music industry, was said to be upset by Khanna's continued employment. Blackburn's chief of staff is a former RIAA lobbyist.

The behind-the-curtain machinations aimed at stifling conservative debate over copyright mimic copyright policymaking more generally. Major intellectual property legislation over the past 30 years has aimed to shore up industries challenged by new digital modes of distribution—and piracy—rather than trying to balance consumers' interests with the needs of innovators.

Khanna sat down with *TAC* for his first on-the-record interview since being fired to give his take on the situation and discuss where conservative IP-reform efforts might be headed. Though he's out of a job, Khanna has given reformers on the right a martyr and has rallied support from legal scholars, journalists, and blogs on the tech left as well. And now that he can speak freely, he doesn't intend to back down: about a week after our meeting he was headed to the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas to proclaim the gospel of IP reform.

Like other pro-reform conservatives, Khanna sees the surprise mutiny against the Stop Online Privacy Act (SOPA) in early 2012 as a pivotal moment when elements in the GOP turned against copyright regulation. But killing bills is a far cry from advancing a step-by-step legislative agenda to roll back decades of copyright inflation.

"Opposition is relatively easy. Obviously it's difficult to take on the interests that were taken on during SOPA, but it's *relatively* easy," says Khanna. "The big question is whether that movement can be rejiggered to push something positive forward. That's a much more complicated lift, but I think the answer is yes, because there's a lot of consensus—on the left and on the right—for what positive reforms could look like, and even on some specifics."

On the circumstances of his firing, Khanna has been careful not to alienate his former employers and declined to comment on the RSC's claim that his memo was published "without adequate review." He

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did say, however, that "it was vetted and approved. It was actually approved by additional channels. It was edited, revised, all of that. The RSC's characterization does not dispute that."

Khanna says he was "astounded" by the level of support he received for the paper, "particularly on the right. From conservative and libertarian think tanks, organizations, fellows, across the board, really, the support was well beyond what I was expecting."

Several congressmen also expressed sympathy for the ideas articulated in the paper. One RSC member is even interested in introducing some of the proposals into legislation, though Khanna declined to name whom.

The paper certainly has its critics, however. Sandra Astairs, executive director of the Copyright Alliance, a trade group, is concerned that it advocates "reform for reform's sake" and "just doing away with aspects of copyright protection for the sake of reducing copyright protection."

On the other side are legal minds including Randy Barnett, the libertarian lawyer who constructed the case against Obamacare, and Stewart Baker, assistant secretary for policy in the first Bush-era incarnation of the Department of Homeland Security. Baker called Khanna's memo "the most head-turning change of direction in decades for either party on intellectual property issues," and Baker has been one of the stronger voices calling for the Republican Party to embrace the issue.

"I do think we're going to see opportunities for the GOP to take up IP reform," says Baker. "I think that fight is unavoidable for conservatives," though the timeframe and shape of future controversies is hard to predict. He admits that copyright is a subject that brings some conservative values into conflict with one another, which could be an obstacle to building effective coalitions.

"Conservatives are skeptical of anything that smacks of 'He's got property that belongs to all of us, so the state should take it away,'" says Baker. To many on the right, intellectual property is a subset of property in general and is therefore worthy of protection by even the most draconian laws. "The problem with doing that is the social and economic losses that come from stifling creativity and economic and technological changes, plus the transactional costs of using litigation as part of a business model," says Baker.

"To my mind, the reason for conservatives to be skeptical of the remarkable rise of copyright enforcement in the last 40 years has to do with the risk of what could be called regulatory capture or crony capitalism."

Today's copyright law exhibits a pattern typical of crony capitalism—regulations restrict new entrants and creators (DJs and other remix artists in the music field, for instance) to shore up the market position of current players (record labels). But there are now powerful business interests in favor of weakening copyright as well. In opposition to the Chamber of Commerce's traditional support for strong IP protection was one reason that companies such as Amazon, eBay, Facebook, and Google broke away to start the Internet Association, a trade group for online companies.

"The real lesson of SOPA is that the tech industry is a well-funded and active special interest just like any other," cautions Todd Dupler, director of government relations for the Recording Academy, the organization that awards the Grammys. "Critics of copyright love to vilify the RIAA, MPAA, and related media companies, but they conveniently ignore the fact that tech giants like Google are spreading money around to trade associations, think tanks, public interest groups, and academic institutions to help advance their policy goals (such as undermining property rights, reducing individual privacy online, and protecting their own anti-competitive practices)," he said in an email.

"One could take the cynical view that many of these 'reform proposals' are just disguised attempts to weaken the rights of individual copyright owners or creative upstarts and to make it more likely that their works will fall into the public domain so that their interests do not have to be dealt with as frequently," warns Astairs.

IP-reformers on the left, such as Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig, claim that the new realities of digital content portend an era of "free culture" unfettered by the demands of commerce. Whether or not that's true, it's clear that propping up the market position of the content industry through regulation isn't going to work. Thus the Democratic Party is split between a techie left that's opposed to the institution of copyright and the massive institutional interests of Hollywood, rife with campaign contributors.

Though copyright has remained mostly off the radar of Tea Party groups and right-wing think tanks—the opposition to SOPA excepted—that could be changing. The Heritage Foundation's political advocacy spin-off, Heritage Action, has already made two IP votes part of its legislative scorecard, and James Gattuso, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, says he would be "surprised if there are not more this year. Since IP is an increasingly important segment of our economy, and looms larger in policy debates, it's only natural for these issues to receive more attention." Heritage appears to be interested in making IP

battles a conservative priority.

"These are issues in which there is a conflict between two fundamental principles—protection of property rights and minimal regulation of the marketplace," says Gattuso, indicating the philosophical disagreements on the right over intellectual property. "Sometimes the rights holders are correct, sometimes the users are, and we try to articulate principles that will help distinguish which is which. I'm also not surprised that conservatives are split. The Left is too. This simply does not break down along clean lines."

The fact that the copyright debate has taken root within two of the conservative movement's bastions, Heritage and the RSC—both founded in the 1970s by Paul Weyrich—is evidence of a fundamental shift in the IP conversation. But where the next copyright fight will take place is an open question. Perhaps the IP provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free-trade agreement, will ignite controversy—though that seems unlikely because it doesn't extend copyright in this country beyond its current scope. Perhaps the occasion for the next showdown will be a relatively uncontroversial effort to deal with orphan works—works whose authors have died or otherwise cannot be found—or a bill to require the registration of copyrights, a move the content industry dislikes because of the administrative burden it would impose.

Whatever the next battleground may be, conservatives have an opportunity to put the GOP on the side of positive copyright reform. The Democratic Party certainly won't take it up, no matter how popular reform may be. And the Burkean principle of adaptation for the sake of preservation is what's needed in this case. Between the radicalism of free-culture advocates and the authoritarians behind SOPA there is a middle path to be found that would preserve copyright as an institution conducive to innovation while also recognizing that the Internet has fundamentally changed the ways copyright can be administered, and in some respects has limited its effectiveness. If IP proponents continue to push counterproductive legislation like SOPA, the public will become increasingly hostile to copyright. To do nothing is to accept the continued decline of our copyright system and its eventual irrelevance. The only prudent course is some positive program for reform. ■

DEEP BACKGROUND

by PHILIP GIRALDI

There was considerable pushback at the Central Intelligence Agency following the resignation of David Petraeus. Former military officers are generally disliked at CIA, but Petraeus made all the right moves by arriving at Langley without a staff and with a professed willingness to learn. Then he went ahead and pulled together a team that favored military-style responses to international terrorism. Petraeus's proposal to obtain new drones to expand CIA's reach in Africa and elsewhere meant sharp cuts to the clandestine service and analysts: drones are cheap to buy but expensive to operate. CIA case officers argue that the Agency should revert to traditional spying, and that the unmanned-vehicle response to terrorist groups has run its course owing to difficulties in collecting actionable intelligence and a paucity of identifiable targets. Some blamed poor intelligence in Benghazi on the lack of case officers on the ground, most having been replaced by paramilitary contractors. The Agency's temporary director, Michael Morell, a former analyst, is reported to be supportive of a gradual shift away from drones, and John Brennan, Obama's nominee to be the next director, is also disinclined to expand the program. Brennan has privately criticized drone operations, stating that they do more harm than good given Pakistan's instability and the much-reduced condition of al-Qaeda.

Western intelligence agencies operating in Turkey and Jordan are alarmed at the massive security problem presented by the flood of refugees from Syria. Nearly 400,000 refugees are in camps in Turkey and Jordan. The camps are ideal launching pads for terrorist groups: the Turkish intelligence service MIT has already identified instances in which members of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) have used refugee camps as bases to stage lethal attacks on Turkish soldiers and policemen. The CIA has intelligence suggesting that a number of Jihadis who entered Syria to fight Bashar al-Assad have since assumed the identities of dead Syrians to enter Jordan and Turkey, where they have established cadres. The U.S. is supplying the Turks and Jordanians with advanced biometric registration equipment to enable the camps to issue tamper-proof identification. But biometric identifiers have been of limited effectiveness in tracking alleged militants in Afghanistan, where nearly every adult male in areas controlled by the government has been photographed and registered. ■

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest.

From War to Welfare

How taxes and entitlements begin with militarism

by IVAN ELAND

Conservatives should be leery of jumping into wars not only because American power may become overextended—especially in a time of fiscal crisis—but because war makes government expand rapidly at home, even in areas outside of national security. Although conservatives routinely criticize Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal for ushering in the era of big government, the deeper origins of the American welfare state lie in the warfare state.

During wars—especially big conflicts that require mobilization of the entire society to fight them—interest groups see the government doing things it didn't do, or wasn't allowed to do, previously. After the conflict, newly empowered bureaucrats and constituency groups benefiting from wartime expansion lobby to keep at least some of the new measures in place. The creation of the Food Administration during World War I, for example, ultimately led to the expectation in the farm sector that government regulation could prop up farmers' incomes.

Even more fundamental, however, is the impact that war has on a government's ability to finance its expansion at home. The potential for tax revenues determines how big government can grow and the number and size of programs that can be supported. (Even deficit financing is based on confidence in the government's ability to raise funds through taxes.) And war is the force that has most often led to new and greater sources of nourishment for Leviathan. According W. Elliot Brownlee, author of *Federal Taxation in America: A Short History*, "moments of sweeping change in tax regimes have come invariably during the nation's great emergencies—the constitutional crisis of the 1780s, the three major wars [the Civil War, World War I, and World War II], and the Great Depression."

A case in point is the income tax, one of the most intrusive and economically irrational taxes a government can impose. One commissioner of Internal Revenue went so far as to say in 1871 that the income tax was "the one of all others most obnoxious to the genius of our people, being inquisitorial in its nature, and dragging into public view an exposition of the most private pecuniary affairs of the citizen." Unlike sales or excise taxes, which inhibit consumption, the income tax penalizes economically productive work and the just rewards for it—thereby dragging down prosperity.

The federal income tax originated during the emergency of the Civil War, the nation's first modern conflict. During that episode, spending by the federal government increased from less than 2 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) to an average 15 percent of GNP. The Republican leadership admired how the British Liberals had used income taxes to finance the Crimean War instead of imposing higher taxes on property, and so the U.S. adopted the same device. By end of the Civil War, the wealthiest 10 percent of all Union households were paying income tax, which accounted for about 21 percent of federal tax revenues—with excise taxes comprising 50 percent and tariffs accounting for 29 percent.

The Civil War-era income tax was abolished in 1872, and the federal government returned to financing itself through its traditional antebellum means: excise taxes on particular goods and tariffs on imports (that is, two consumption taxes) and sales of public land. Yet the wartime policy had set a precedent, and after foreign trade (and thus tariff revenues) fell

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Michael Hogue

during the depression of the 1890s, the income tax was resurrected. Grover Cleveland, an otherwise very conservative president, accepted the income tax in exchange for lower tariff rates.

In 1895 the Supreme Court ruled that the new tax was unconstitutional because the U.S. Constitution required any direct tax to be assessed among the states according to population; taxing individuals according to their incomes did not meet that requirement. But in 1913 the constitutional problem was surmounted by the ratification of the 16th Amendment, which specifically allowed the imposition of an income tax. This time the tax had roots in the populist and progressive movements: the broad public perception was that the burden of tariffs and excise taxes, which accounted for most federal revenue, fell disproportionately on the non-wealthy.

Domestic movements may have reintroduced the income tax, but it was World War I that led to the income tax replacing tariffs and excise taxes as the federal government's primary form of taxation. According to Brownlee: "The income tax was a highly tentative experiment until 1916, when America prepared to enter World War I and settled on it as the primary means of raising taxes for the war." The Great War was transformational in bringing permanent "big government" to the United States, a change made possible by the war's enhancement of the income tax's role in taxation.

During wars, trade—and thus tariff revenue—gets disrupted, requiring governments to levy greater internal taxes to fund conflicts. The income tax showed once again during the world war that it had a great capacity for generating revenue. After the war, the ballooning of tax receipts underwrote the vast expansion of federal domestic programs during the Hoover

administration, FDR's New Deal, and beyond.

But it took another war, World War II, to turn the income tax from a burden on only the well-to-do into a tax on *most* earners. From 1939 to 1945, the number of people paying income tax rose from 3.9 million to 42.6 million—roughly 60 percent of the labor force—and income tax revenues soared from $2.2 billion to $35.1 billion. The federal government could now take in massive revenues from taxing middle class salaries and wages.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Dealers had believed that a mass-based income tax was the best way to guarantee a permanent stream of funds to support federal programs. They were right. In 1940, before America's entry into World War II, the federal income tax accounted for only 16 percent of all government tax revenues. By 1950, the federal income tax had grown to 51 percent of all government tax revenues. The World War II tax regime was supposed to be temporary, but it became permanent.

Both taxes and spending as we know them today—Leviathan's head and tail—spring from the warfare state.

From the postwar period until the late 1970s, the broad base of the mass income tax, combined with economic growth and inflation that pushed people into ever higher tax brackets, allowed the federal government to swim in swollen revenues, which were used to expand domestic and overseas programs while cutting excise and corporate levies. The augmented domestic programs made possible by the income tax included healthcare (for example, Medicare), education, welfare, urban development, and federal aid to state and local governments—most of the welfare state, except for Social Security. But that too has its origins in wartime measures.

To encourage male breadwinners to enlist in the military, ever since colonial times all levels of government, including the federal government, had paid pensions to widows and orphans who lost a provider in war. But in 1862, as early Union defeats tempered patriotic enlistment in the North, the federal government increased the level of compensation for such dependents and widened the range of family members covered by the payments to include not only widows and orphans but elderly parents and siblings of those killed in battle. After the war, this social program came to serve a significant fraction of the population.

From the American Revolution to 1861, the federal government had paid 143,644 pension claims. From 1861 to 1890, Civil War pensions amounted to more than five times that number. By 1889, U.S. pension spending alone was greater than the entire federal budget before the Civil War. By 1893, a whopping 40 percent of the federal budget was allocated for disabled troops, widows, orphans, and the elderly. The patronage-oriented politics of the Republican Party—which dominated American politics in the latter half of the 1800s and early 20th century—led to huge expansions of pension benefits to win votes.

In 1879, the Arrears Act caused many veterans, who hadn't realized they were disabled until the government offered $1,000 or more for finding aches and injuries, to flood the Bureau of Pensions with claims. Although, according to its commissioner, the bureau was the largest executive bureau in the world, it had few means to detect fraudulent claims, which were rampant. During election years between 1878 and 1899, Republicans used the bureau to dole out pensions rapidly and heavily in key electoral states.

In 1890, a quarter century after the Civil War ended, pension eligibility expanded to include any soldier who had served 90 days or more during the war and was unable to do manual labor—whether or not he was injured during the conflict, or even whether he had seen combat. Similarly, widows of soldiers who had served in the war for 90 days or more got pensions, regardless of whether their husbands had died in the conflict.

As historian Megan J. McClintock concludes:

> Civil War pensions were not simply a military benefits program … but also a social welfare system that contained assumptions about familial relationships. Only those pension claimants whose domestic arrangements met with approval received federal moneys. In the case of mothers and fathers, the ideal of filial devotion encouraged the federal government to become a provider of poor relief for the elderly in the late nineteenth century. Ideals of familial relations shaped policy directed at Civil War widows as well, but with very different results. Rather than simply benefiting from the expansion of federal assistance, widows were subjected to increasing government supervision of their private lives.

If a widow remarried, she was no longer eligible for the pension. This created a perverse incentive for women not to remarry but instead to cohabitate or become prostitutes. Having fostered this development, the government then had to investigate whether either of these forbidden alternatives was happening.

McClintock provides a summary of the Civil War mobilization's dramatic effect on widening the federal government's social welfare role:

> Forced by large-scale warfare to broaden its social welfare role, the federal government developed a family policy. In the postbellum years, that family policy reconstructed households shattered by the Civil War.
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> The extensive involvement of the federal government in Union households demonstrates that the links between military recruitment and family needs have shaped the evolution of social welfare policy in the United States. Before the Civil War, the federal government had assumed only limited responsibility for military dependents and virtually none for the civilian poor and disabled. Pre-Civil War military benefits were piecemeal and limited to veterans, widows, and orphans; moreover, the federal government abstained from social welfare spending for the civilian poor, and local charity was stigmatized and parsimonious. The nation's first "modern" war transformed the landscape of relief, forging new ties between the federal government and families, and between public and private economies, as the government sought to increase the number of men willing to leave their families in the 1860s and to prepare future citizen soldiers for patriotic sacrifice.

According to Theda Skocpol, the Civil War pension system degraded into what became America's first massive, federally funded old-age and disability welfare system:

> By the time the elected politicians—especially Republicans—had finished liberalizing eligibility for Civil War pensions, over a third of all the elderly men living in the North, along with quite a few elderly men in other parts of the country and many widows and dependents across the nation, were receiving quarterly payments from the United States Pension Bureau. In terms of the large share of the federal budget spent, the hefty proportion of citizens covered, and the relative generosity of the disability and old-age benefits offered, the United States had become a precocious social spending state. Its post-Civil War system of social provision in many respects exceeded what early programs of 'workman's insurance' were giving old people or superannuated industrial wage earners in fledgling Western welfare states around the world.

Skocpol adds, however, that public revulsion against the expansion, excesses, and corruption of the Civil War pension system from the 1870s to 1910 stalled the onset of the welfare state proper—then taking hold in other Western countries—until the New Deal in the 1930s. Americans may have been repelled by Civil War pensions because—in a classic case of high taxes leading to surplus government revenues leading to excess spending—Republicans supported lavish pensions to groups in their political constituency (Union veterans) to justify continued high tariff walls to protect Northern industries, which were among the most influential supporters in their political coalition. The interests of such industrialists coincided with those of pensioner lobbies and the bureaucratic empire of the Bureau of Pensions to widen the program over time.

By 1910, 45 years after the war, about 28 percent of American men aged 65 or older were receiving federal benefits. This led to the erosion of public confidence in a system then as generous as that of nascent welfare states around the world. Nevertheless, in a pattern that has been seen before, a precedent had been set and would be available at the next crisis—in this case, the precedent that the federal government could administer what amounted to a nationwide retirement program. The groundwork for Social Security had been laid. As Skocpol summarizes, "Civil War pensions at their height were America's first system of federal social security for the disabled and elderly"—and the embryo of other, even broader and more expensive federal programs to come.

Conservatives should not fail to recognize that war is the most prominent cause of the massive welfare state that has been erected in the United States. Both taxes and spending as we know them today—Leviathan's head and tail—spring from the warfare state. Traditional conservatives recognized that war is the primary cause of overweening government in human history; thus, they promoted peace. Since the rise of the neoconservatives, however, the right has forgotten this important lesson, which has to be relearned. ■

Philosopher of Love

David Schindler has a remedy for the religious right

by JEREMY BEER

For the orthodox Christian, is doing one's public duty more or less reducible to voting for the most socially conservative Republican on the ballot—and then shutting up about whatever misgivings one might have? Surely not. Yet for many election cycles, this has been often implied by the self-appointed guardians of practicality and political realism. It is even increasingly heard from the pulpit.

The assumptions that lurk behind this idea are that when it comes to ordering public life, modern liberal democracy in its best sense has things basically right. America rightly understood is the highest exemplar of this kind of liberalism. And the Republican Party is our best reasonable hope for defending this liberalism's political, economic, and cultural accomplishments from its enemies. To question these assumptions is to be naïve or—a favorite epithet—*utopian*.

This view essentially obliterates the need for prudential judgment, not to mention critical thinking. Thus, a number of Catholic moralists have identified three (the list sometimes expands to four or five) "intrinsic evils"—abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage—against which one has a moral responsibility to vote, and to which responsibility all else must be subordinated. The idea is that if only the right people were in office legislating against such evils, everything would be pretty much fine in the land of the free and the brave.

Well… if this story strikes you as just a little too pat, may I introduce you to David L. Schindler and the *Communio* school of theology he represents. Two recent books by and about Schindler—*Being Holy in the World* and *Ordering Love*, respectively—show how Christians ought to feel liberated to engage the culture in a deeper and ultimately more faithful way.

Schindler certainly agrees that abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, and the like are evils. However, unlike our partisan "realists" he does not regard these as corruptions of a liberal worldview otherwise rightly ordered but as the ironic fruit of liberalism's unwitting metaphysics. By showing how the achievements of America and liberalism in general are grounded in the same intellectual foundations as their failings, and by showing how virtually all parties in the public square embrace the same metaphysical misconceptions, he turns down the apocalyptic culture-wars heat while putting the ephemera of electoral politics in their proper context.

David L. Schindler has taught at the John Paul II Institute in Washington, D.C., since 1992, following appointments at Mount St. Mary's University in Emmitsburg, Maryland, and the University of Notre Dame. Barrel-chested and bearded, he was raised in the Seattle area by a family that owned and operated a major sporting-goods company. After receiving bachelor's and master's degrees from Gonzaga University, he enrolled in the Claremont Graduate School. In 1972, he finished a dissertation that brought the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead into conversation with the Thomist tradition. For a while, like novelist Walker Percy, he might even have been thought of as an existential Thomist. In these early years, Schindler was influenced by, among others, Frederick Wilhelmsen, Michael Polanyi, and Eric Voegelin—all important figures in the development of the postwar conservative intellectual tradition. Schindler thus represents a slender strand of that tradition, one unassociated with the conservative political movement or right-wing political theory. Instead, his thinking moved in a theological direction.

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In 1974, two years after completing his dissertation, Schindler became assistant editor of the new American edition of *Communio*, an international theological journal. *Communio* was founded by, among others, the Catholic theologians Hans Urs von Balthasar, Henri de Lubac, Louis Bouyer, and Joseph Ratzinger. The Second Vatican Council had concluded in 1965, and in various ways many of *Communio*'s founders had played a significant role in the Council. By the early '70s, they believed that its work was being misinterpreted and misappropriated, especially by the progressive thinkers grouped around another journal called *Concilium*, whose leading figures included Karl Rahner, Yves Congar, and Hans Küng. Unlike the *Communio* circle, the *Concilium* crowd counseled not just greater engagement with, but also accommodation to, modern culture.

As Tracey Rowland makes clear in her book *Ratzinger's Faith*, the *Communio* writers were certainly not reactionaries. In fact, in the decades prior to the Council, they and their intellectual predecessors had been regarded as dangerous innovators by philosophers and theologians of the establishment neo-Thomist school. De Lubac, Ratzinger, and their allies argued that the neo-Thomists misunderstood St. Thomas Aquinas's teaching regarding the relationship between nature and grace—in a way that led directly to secularism. They thought the neo-Thomist account of reason owed more to the Enlightenment than to Aquinas. And they recoiled from the bone-dry, lifeless character of the neo-Thomist "manualist" tradition, which they thought reduced the great drama of salvation to textbook propositions and made Christianity seem unappealing and irrelevant.

The neo-Thomists, not amused by these challenges, fought back in academic journals and through the official machinery of the Catholic Church. After the publication of Pius XII's encyclical *Humani Generis* in 1950, which implicitly sided with the neo-Thomists, many observers expected de Lubac's work to be suppressed. But Vatican II proved to be a turning point. De Lubac and a relatively young Ratzinger—who had been profoundly influenced by both Balthasar and de Lubac and was regarded by many old-school professors with suspicion—served as influential theological consultants to the Council.

In the ensuing years, the *Communio* school would rise to preeminence within the Catholic Church, while accommodationism would find it increasingly difficult to influence the Church's institutional life and official teachings. (It has been a different story within academia, of course.) Joseph Ratzinger would become Pope Benedict XVI in 2005. His predecessor, John Paul II, became increasingly close to the *Communio* school over time, helping to start the Polish edition of the journal and and elevating numerous *Communio*-aligned figures to the episcopate.

After he assumed editorship of *Communio* in 1992, David Schindler became the most important voice for the movement's perspective in America. He is the most notable American Catholic thinker of the last—well, one could arguably just put a period after "thinker." Among philosophers and theologians he is widely respected, yet he is mostly unknown even among relatively sophisticated American Christian conservatives. What gives?

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Beyond academic circles, Schindler's influence has been limited by at least four factors. First, as we shall see, there is the sheer immensity of his task—rethinking the nature of reality, of *being* itself, in light of Christian revelation. Second, there is the philosophical sophistication of his writing—he is not an easy read. Third, the intellectual traditions from which he draws are not characteristically Anglo-American, but Continental. And fourth, he comes to conclusions that are uncomfortable and, from a practical political point of view, seemingly useless. No easy fixes, no programs, emerge from Schindler's work—or, indeed, the *Communio* perspective as a whole. In fact, the way in which superficial fixes and programs often conceal and even deepen our predicament is in part what Schindler means to reveal.

Schindler is a relentlessly metaphysical philosopher. Over the last four decades he has developed a distinctive view of being, and it is in these metaphysical reflections that his theology of culture is based.

To live well, Schindler argues, is to live in a way that is proper to our being. Conversely, when a misapprehension of being structures our thinking and actions, we experience unhappiness, brokenness, and

poverty in its deepest sense—the absence of meaning. He believes that the modern liberal project from Descartes to Rawls is based on a radical misunderstanding of the nature of reality.

Specifically, liberalism fails to apprehend that "love is the basic act and order of things." Love brings all there is into existence, it is through love that all there is continues in existence, and it is for love that all things exist. Reality is in this sense triadic: all things are *in*, *through*, and *for* love. Being might therefore be said to be an order or "logic" of love.

The Christian story itself implies this metaphysics, but Schindler emphasizes that once disclosed by the events central to Christianity, the nature of being is in principle accessible to reason. There is no fideism at work here, but there is a different understanding of reason than the one that informs modern "rationality," including the neo-Thomist version. In Schindler's account of reason—one shared by Popes Benedict and John Paul II—faith does not narrow reason, nor does faith exist alongside reason as something "added" to it from without. Rather, faith enlarges reason from within, helping it to function better precisely *as* reason.

Love brings all there is into existence, it is through love that all there is continues in existence, and it is for love that all things exist.

As you might imagine, understanding reality as an order of love has profound implications. Among these are that being is a gift, and our proper response to being is in the first place one of receptivity and gratitude. If we do not respond to the cosmos in this way, it is because in some sense we have been "coached out of it"—by our culture, perhaps, or by our own choices and habits. Another implication of the idea of being-as-love is that being is intrinsically relational, not individualistic. The individual is real, to be sure, but included within individuality, and lying at its core, is relationality—to God, to whom the individual is constitutively related as a created thing is to its creator, and to others, to whom the individual is related through a common relationship to God.

In short, neither receptivity nor relationality are concepts that we can "add on," even in abstraction, to a self-subsisting, non-related individual of the sort imagined by liberal thinkers. Ontologically speaking, before he is anything else the person is a gift and exists in relation. Receptivity, rooted in giftedness, and relationality are constitutive of the human being, and indeed of all being.

Perhaps no theme emerges more consistently in Schindler's metaphysical reflections as a target of criticism than that of "extrinsicism." The neo-Thomists, in the *Communio* view, held to an "extrinsic" model of the nature-grace relationship. In such a model, nature is self-subsistent and in principle knowable in its totality without the aid of the supernatural—without, that is, grace. Grace adds to nature but is fundamentally "outside" of it; Christian revelation therefore adds nothing to our knowledge of nature as nature. To *Communio* thinkers like Schindler, this model is an unnecessary and indeed catastrophic capitulation to Enlightenment ideas about nature that are not just secular, but secularist. Furthermore, they argue, such a view of the nature-grace relationship is neither biblical nor truly Thomist.

As a metaphysical alternative to extrinsicism, Schindler argues analogically from the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Here the idea of "distinction-in-unity" becomes a key concept. The secular and the sacred, faith and reason, nature and grace, are indeed distinguishable, but they simultaneously and at their core relate to one another in the terms of an inseparable unity—"circumincession" is Schindler's term for this relationship. We see such a relationship, again analogically, in the bond between husband and wife, who are distinct persons yet "one flesh," or in the relationship between the Father and the Son, distinct persons yet one God. Distinction-in-unity is enabled by and is the form of love—not coincidentally, the traditional descriptor of the third person of the Christian Trinity, the Holy Spirit.

Depending on one's cast of mind, all of this may be interesting or it may be bewildering. But what has it got to do with culture, and especially with the political and economic dimensions of public life? After all, liberals claim to prescind from metaphysical and theological discussions. Argue about these things as you please, says the liberal, and come to what conclusions you may. You are free to believe as you wish—that is precisely the beauty of liberalism! But for purposes of public order, the state must remain neutral on these questions. Thus, when you enter the public square, you must make publicly reasonable rather than sectarian arguments. That is how we secure peace. The only alternative is theocratic tyranny.

The American Jesuit John Courtney Murray famously argued that this arrangement constitutes America's signal contribution to the world. The First Amendment of the Constitution, in offering not "articles of faith" but rather "articles of peace," secured religious freedom for Christians (and for others) while also respecting the rightful integrity of the secular. The American liberal order of limited government and the separation of church and state provides neutral public space while also providing freedom in the form of basic rights that provide "immunity from coercion." Christianity and liberalism, in this narrative, are not only compatible but utterly harmonious.

Now, the first thing to note is that Schindler believes that limited government, the separation of church and state, human rights, and religious freedom are legitimate achievements that ought to be preserved. But he simply does not believe (1) that liberalism, or any other conception of order, can successfully prescind from metaphysics (he quotes philosopher Etienne Gilson: "metaphysics always buries its undertakers"), or (2) that these achievements can be preserved if they are grounded in the unwitting metaphysics of liberalism rather than in the metaphysics of love.

Schindler's argument is multifaceted, but as his son David C. Schindler draws it out in *Being Holy in the World*, on one level it goes like this: by asking Christians to "bracket" their metaphysical commitments for purposes of public order, liberalism essentially asks them to accept a different metaphysics—indeed, a different theology. Christianity does not present itself as just one pre-critical commitment among others, but as the matrix or "paradigm" of rationality itself. One either rejects that claim, and is therefore not a Christian, or one accepts it as a Christian as the basis for reflection and understanding. There can be no middle, "bracketing" way.

For the Christian, the only adequate notion of reality is one that grows out of a Trinitarian understanding of the *logos*. The Trinitarian life of God means that love, as we have seen, is at the heart of the structure and meaning of being. But we do not really receive that *logos* as a *logos* unless we see that it grounds and transforms our understanding of everything. It is the furthest thing possible from a truth claim that might safely be bracketed from public discussion. Thus, "bracketing" one's Christian commitments from one's thinking at any time, as liberalism demands, is to be not only false to Christianity, but to be false to reality.

In this way, all of our political, economic, legal, and religious institutions are necessarily grounded in some conception of order—in a metaphysics—even if they reject or ignore the Christian claim. From the Christian view, liberal institutions foster a problematic "mode of being"—a distorting matrix for the formation of our intentions, attitudes, and ideas. Thus, the idea that just putting "good people," or at least those with the "right ideas," into political office will make a decisive cultural difference is insufficiently attentive to the shaping power of this matrix in a liberal regime.

According to the Schindler, "the failure to take seriously the implications of Christianity as a logos" is the supreme characteristic of liberal modernity, even for Christians, and leads to a practical atheism. Perhaps the very reason, he speculates, that church attendance remains so high in the United States is that one can claim a Christian commitment without letting it interfere with the real business of life. Because American Christianity has been privatized, it is also highly secularized.

As the younger Schindler puts it: "A man may tell his wife often that he loves her, may believe what he says, and may in fact bring her flowers without fail once a week—and yet at the same time he may exhibit a pattern of choices with regard to his career, for example, that trivialize his wife's significance in his life." Or a man may call himself a Christian but enjoy wearing Club Gitmo T-shirts and take great pleasure in hearing about the victims of his nation's bombing campaigns. Especially when those campaigns are supported by the socially conservative Republican for whom he cast a ballot as his Christian duty.

Because American Christianity has been privatized, it is also highly secularized.

Schindler argues that the hidden metaphysics of liberalism is instrumentalism. Put another way, its ontology is technology, the necessary result of bracketing the "logic of love proper to created being." Despite its overt intentions, liberalism therefore fosters relations of power rather than love: mutual manipulation rather than human dignity and freedom. It marginalizes the weak and the vulnerable, as is

obvious precisely in the "intrinsic evils" that understandably preoccupy today's Catholic bishops. Such marginalization is central to its logic.

By this logic, the problem with overemphasizing electoral politics as a response to cultural evils is that we risk tacitly accepting the idea that such evils have technological solutions—we risk accepting, that is, the false picture of reality assumed by liberalism. As one of his former students has pointed out to me, in a recent article Schindler has made just this suggestion with respect to the bishops' response to the HHS contraception mandate. He points out that with respect to the mandate:

> the dominant liberal culture … is acting consistently with the formal-juridical view of rights that is framed by liberalism's hidden metaphysics … . If this is not understood, efforts to resist policies such as that now imposed by the Obama administration in the matter of 'reproductive rights' will, however successful in immediate strategic terms, continue otherwise to aid and abet the dominant liberalism's hidden logic of repression.

In short, the liberal conception of reality undermines liberalism's own ability to secure the ends it seeks. If the legitimate achievements—such as religious freedom—of purportedly liberal regimes such as America's are to be preserved, they must be regrounded not in liberalism's strategy of agnosticism but in truth itself. There cannot be a purely juridical or procedural state precisely because to bracket the metaphysical, or to prioritize the political over the metaphysical, is to make a crucially important metaphysical claim. No state, insists Schindler, "in its legal-constitutional order can successfully avoid the question of truth."

The question therefore becomes which truth best secures the ends of civil society, including the noble achievements that have been realized (at least in certain senses) in liberal modernity—religious freedom, human rights, separation of church and state, and so on. Based on his metaphysics of love, Schindler suggests that the first truth that government ought to appropriate is "the truth of freedom as an essential inner feature of love."

Properly understood, freedom is rooted in an understanding of reality as love and a concomitant commitment to this truth. Love grounds freedom because it is in its nature to *let the other be*, not out of indifference but out of respect for his or her integrity and dignity, even as it seeks to turn the other toward truth through patient dialogue and witness, including the witness of sacrifice and suffering. Note the truly conservative implications of this conception of freedom, in that the "other" includes not just persons but institutions, communities, and social systems. The patient witness of love stands in contrast to the impatient "technological" orientation of ideology.

A second truth that the state ought to enshrine, in Schindler's view, is that it itself is not the source of truth but is rather subject to it. The limited state is, contrary to liberal doctrine, implied by the truth itself, not by official agnosticism. Thus, far from a responsibility to fragment their modes of being into distinct public and private compartments, as suggested by liberalism, Christians "have a responsibility to work at all times and places, private and public, for the true end for which man was created." Following the Cross, they must work toward such an end through non-coercive means. Schindler points to Dorothy Day, Peter Maurin, Madeleine Delbrêl, and Mother Teresa as shining examples of people who embodied the unity of truth and love in their social practice.

By now it should be clear that we cannot deduce from the metaphysics of love an alternative socio-economic system to be juxtaposed to capitalism, socialism, or some other system. The Christian task is not primarily an electoral or technological one, but rather to insert within all institutions and systems a "dynamic for transformation."

What would such a dynamic look like? That is a large question, but in a particularly arresting chapter of *Ordering Love*, Schindler suggests that one way in which Christians might take up this task is by rooting their thoughts and actions more deeply in "originary" experience via a "grateful and wonder-filled letting be." Christians ought to attune themselves to the "whole of Being" by cultivating receptivity, silence, and stillness. Schindler then draws out some implications for our patterns of consumption, use of technology, and relationship to place. For instance, he concludes, we find God "only by truly *being* in a place, through the interior stillness that alone permits depth of presence."

In ways such as this, Christianity "proposes principles that affect all human activities from within, including activities in politics and the public realm, and in economics." Christianity doesn't just "extrinsically" add substance, direction, or tweaks from the outside of social life. It puts forth a "vision of reality—an understanding of being, man, and God—that unfolds an entire way of life."

In *Ordering Love*, Schindler jokes that "there seems to be a widespread assumption today, often unspoken, that if Jesus had only had the benefit of liberal institutions and access to the Internet, he could have secured the power and influence necessary to avoid an ignominious death on the Cross." Something like this assumption seems to lie at the core of what many Christians in the United States mean by American exceptionalism—and at the core of what Pope Leo XIII condemned in 1899 as the Americanist heresy. A temptation toward such heresy seems to have always kept, and still keeps, most Americans from fully *receiving* Christian teaching. And it is largely responsible for the superficiality of how American Christians construct their role in public life.

Many commentators were baffled by Pope Benedict XVI's call, in *Caritas in Veritate*, for "new lifestyles centered around the quest for truth, beauty, goodness, and communion with others." Schindler's *Communio* theology of public life shows how this call is fully understandable in light of the metaphysics of love. The view that man is made for communion redirects our gaze away from the false promises of electoral politics toward the most realistic thing of all: love. ■

OLD *and* RIGHT

As soon as men and women learn the utilitarian lesson and refuse to take for granted the traditional arrangements that their social environment makes for them, as soon as they acquire the habit of weighing the individual advantages and disadvantages of any prospective course of action—or, as we might also put it, as soon as they introduce into their private life a sort of inarticulate system of cost accounting—they cannot fail to become aware of the heavy personal sacrifices that family ties and especially parenthood entail under modern conditions and of the fact that at the same time, excepting the cases of farmers and peasants, children cease to be economic assets.

These sacrifices do not consist only of the items that come within the reach of the measuring rod of money but comprise in addition an indefinite amount of loss of comfort, of freedom from care, and opportunity to enjoy alternatives of increasing attractiveness and variety—alternatives to be compared with joys of parenthood that are being subjected to a crucial analysis of increasing severity. The implication of this is not weakened but strengthened by the fact that the balance sheet is likely to be incomplete, perhaps even fundamentally wrong. For the greatest of the assets, the contribution made by parenthood to physical and moral health—to "normality" as we might express it—particularly in the case of women, almost invariably escapes the rational searchlight of modern individuals who, in private as in public life, tend to focus attention on ascertainable details of immediate utilitarian relevance and to sneer at the idea of hidden necessities of human nature or of the social organism. The point I wish to convey is, I think, clear without further elaboration. It may be summed up in the question that is so clearly in many potential parents' minds: "Why should we stunt our ambitions and impoverish our lives in order to be insulted and looked down upon in our old age?"

In order to realize what all this means for the efficiency of the capitalist engine of production we need only recall that the family and the family home used to be the mainspring of the typically bourgeois kind of profit motive. Economists have not always given due weight to this fact. When we look more closely at their idea of the self-interest of entrepreneurs and capitalists we cannot fail to discover that the results it was supposed to produce are really not at all what one would expect from the rational self-interest of the detached individual or the childless couple who no longer look at that world through the windows of a family home. Consciously or unconsciously they analyzed the behavior of the man whose views and motives are shaped by such a home and who means to work and to save primarily for wife *and children*. As soon as these fade out from the moral vision of the businessman, we have a different kind of *homo economicus* before us who cares for different things and acts in different ways. For him and from the standpoint of his individualistic utilitarianism, the behavior of that old type would in fact be completely irrational.

—Joseph A. Schumpeter,
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 1942

Friendship's Garland

For Buckley and Kirk, conservatism was a way of life.

by TIMOTHY S. GOEGLEIN

I met Russell Kirk, one of the founding fathers of the conservative movement and the author of the magisterial *The Conservative Mind*, when I was a junior in high school in 1981. We exchanged letters on and off through the rest of his life, and we saw each other whenever he came to Washington, which was at least two times a year on average for lectures and speeches.

Russell changed my life by seeding my intellectual curiosity. His external life was much smaller than his internal world, which was large, deep, and wide. He taught me to be wary of ideologues because they got in the way of a good life. Conservatism, I came to see because of the influence of Russell, was not an ideology but a way of life. There is no official or unofficial handbook for what constitutes conservatism, and in fact the conservative life is various.

When William F. Buckley Jr. once visited Russell in Kirk's small ancestral Michigan village of Mecosta—Russell liked to refer to that part of Michigan as "the stump country"—and asked him what he did for intellectual companionship there, Russell pointed at the wall of books comprising his library. Russell showed me it was important to live your ideas, that faith and action go together.

He was a commanding public intellectual. I remember having lunch with the librarian of Congress, Daniel Boorstin, in the Senate dining room and asking him who had not only most profoundly shaped his intellectual life but effectively challenged it. He told me it was Russell Kirk: he said Russell was one of the most astute thinkers he had ever known.

I remember spending a winter weekend with the Kirks in Mecosta. I drove to their home, which was about five hours from Fort Wayne. I thought it was one of the bleakest days of the year: the skies were grey; the fields and forests were cropless and leafless; and the bitter wind seemed endless. When I came into their village, I did not know precisely where their home was. Annette had said, "Just ask anyone when you arrive." So I stopped at the first place I found, a kind of combination gas station and gift shop. "Oh, the Kirks. Yes, they live in that haunted house down there," pointing just down the street. The Gothic house was indeed a landmark in Mecosta. The original Kirk homestead burned to the ground many years before on Good Friday, but Russell and Annette built a beautiful Italianate home in its place.

Russell and I took a short walk down a snowy old lane to the former cigar factory that became his library. Thousands of volumes animated the place, but there were two focal points in the room: the desk where Russell did his writing, usually in the dead of night while his family slept, and a roaring fire in the fireplace that in those winter months was rarely extinguished. When we walked in, I felt a sense of peace. So many of the books special in my life were written in that library.

Russell taught me to embrace justice, mystery, and an orderly and stable universe, God-ordained and true. He showed that literature and civilization matter to the man or woman who chooses public life and that being guided by those central, exciting ideas—truth, beauty, justice, goodness—was a wonderful way to navigate a meaningful life. In all of my letters and time with him, he never once raised a political idea or discussion. With Russell there was never a time of punditry or current events. If I made

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This excerpt is taken from The Man in the Middle: An Inside Account of Faith and Politics in the George W. Bush Era, *published by B&H Publishers, a division of LifeWay Books, © 2011.*

a comment about something in the news, he might express an opinion, but by and large we discussed history, biography, poetry, philosophy, theology, or shared a bit of humor.

Russell Kirk's impact on me was indelible. So was Bill Buckley's. In the 1990s I attended a noontime lecture at the Heritage Foundation, which was just three blocks from the Russell Senate Office Building, my office for nearly a decade. (I began going to the Heritage Foundation in the summer of 1985 when I was an intern for Dan Quayle in the Senate.) After the lecture I was particularly intrigued by an idea raised there. I wrote a letter about it to my friend, the Dartmouth professor and senior editor of *National Review* Jeffrey Hart, to get his perspective. Jeff shared my letter with Bill.

Shortly thereafter, in my postbox in the Senate, I found a letter from Buckley. He told me Jeff shared my letter with him, that he agreed with me on that particular point and would like to discuss it further. He invited me to have dinner with him and members of the *National Review* editorial board at Buckley's pied-à-terre in New York City. As a young Senate deputy press secretary, who read virtually everything Bill wrote, watched innumerable "Firing Line" episodes from a young age, and enjoyed his Blackford Oakes fiction series, I was astounded that he was inviting me to dinner at his home based on a letter I sent not to him but to a colleague of his.

I accepted the invitation, took the train to New York City two weeks later, and spent one of the most enjoyable evenings of my life with Bill, his wife Pat, and a small coterie of *NR* editors and other guests at their home at 73rd Street and Park Avenue. I remember walking into their apartment: King Charles Cavalier dogs barking and nipping at my feet; a tuxedoed young butler offering me a drink from a silver tray; Pat Buckley in a flowing white dress, perfumed aplenty; a harpsichord in the entry hall Bill was plucking; brightly colored paintings on every wall, many of them abstracts; and thence into a reddish-orange library for drinks and conversation before dinner.

This was the first real salon I ever joined, and the conversation ranged from that day's *New York Times* editorials to topics far beyond. Bill had just returned from a sailing trip and was discussing the beauty of Newfoundland with his friend Van Galbraith, who would later become a friend of mine through Bill's introduction. Dinner followed, eight of us at a large round table in a small, mirror-filled drawing or ballroom, the dogs omnipresent.

During dinner Bill went around the table, raised a point or two, and then asked the guests what they thought, encouraging and prompting excellent conversation and humor. I soon realized he was being fairly systematic and eventually would come to me. I rarely feel intimidated, but I was surrounded by people whose work I read for years, and wasn't quite sure I was actually supposed to be there. When Bill got to me, he put me completely at ease. He shared with the group the narrative of my letter that seeded our friendship, and he made me feel welcome in such a way that I intuited, for the first time, his legendary warmth and grace.

Russell Kirk taught me to embrace justice, mystery, and an orderly and stable universe, God-ordained and true.

After dinner and now in another beautiful room, we had coffee and aperitifs. (Bill and two others had a cigar.) The longtime publisher of *NR*, Bill Rusher, was there, and at one point cited from memory a gorgeous poem by A.E. Housman. Near 10:00 p.m. we all said our good-byes.

Two weeks later I found another letter in my Senate postbox, again from Bill. When I was in New York for dinner, he asked me in passing if I had ever been on a sailboat. I told him I was born and raised in Northeastern Indiana; that while we had lots of lakes, mostly people had speed boats, fishing boats, pontoons, or small sailboats; and that I had never stepped foot on a sailboat. I knew, of course, of his fame as a sailor but did not think again of our conversation.

Bill asked if I would like to rectify never having been on a sailboat and come to his home in Stamford, Connecticut, for an overnight sail across the Long Island Sound. Again I was surprised by the invitation and the generosity of it but felt sheepish: I envisioned it would be a party of ten or so people who all sailed, and then there would be me, the landlubber. I steeled myself for awkwardness and set a date with Bill's indefatigable

secretary, Frances Bronson.

I boarded the Amtrak on an early Friday afternoon at Washington's Union Station. Frances told me Bill would likely collect me from the Stamford station, and indeed, when I arrived in a light drizzle, Bill was there to meet me in the smallest Ford station wagon I have ever seen. I noticed a Catholic Missal was between the gear shaft and the passenger seat, along with plenty of other reading material: a copy of *National Review* that was about ten years old, a dog-eared copy of the *Human Life Review,* a copy of *Commentary*, and a Patrick O'Brien novel. Bill was wearing khaki pants, a cashmere sweater with the words *National Review* stitched into the upper left side, Sperry topsiders, and an old Greek-style light-blue sailing cap. His casual informality made him seem like a prep-school senior and not a man in his seventies. He extended his hands in a friendship clasp, and we then sped toward Bill and Pat's home on Wallack's Point.

Buckley asked if I would like to rectify never having been on a sailboat and come to his home in Stamford for an overnight sail across the Long Island Sound.

When we arrived, despite the rain, many of the home's windows were open, as was the front door, allowing the sea breezes to pour into the house. The view of Long Island Sound fronting the manse, just down the vast front lawn, was beautiful, as was a pool with statuary and bushes and willow trees. The rain slowed, the clouds were dissipating, and the late afternoon sun was slowly emerging. A beautiful evening was breaking forth, a great night for a sail. I kept waiting for the other sailing guests to arrive.

Danny Merritt, who sailed with Bill for many years, would sail with us that evening, as would Danny's 12-year-old son. I asked Bill if it was just the four of us. Yes, just four; it was a hard and fast rule with Bill. Four was the perfect number for his 28-foot sailboat called *Patito*, he said, and five would be a crowd. The car was quickly loaded with all kinds of gear and provisions—I kept thinking: all this for an overnight sail?—and we then went to the Stamford docks, loaded the boat, and proceeded to have one of the most autumnal glorious sails.

We sailed across into Oyster Bay—"Fitzgerald and Roosevelt territory," I remember Bill saying—with Bach's music playing during most of our trip across the Sound. A sumptuous dinner followed, prepared earlier by Bill's chef Julian and reheated by Danny. As dinner commenced, Bach slowly gave way to jazz by the pianist Dick Wellstood, one of Bill's favorite musicians. The evening was now getting chilly, and fresh air was pouring into the boat as we slept that night, with only the sound of waves lapping against the boat during the night.

We returned to Stamford by mid-morning, lunched with the Buckleys and other weekend houseguests, among them a bridge-playing friend of Pat's who grew up in pre-World War II Washington when it was still a sleepy southern city and Bill's priest, Father Kevin. I spent the rest of the day reading and relaxing. We watched a movie that evening in a leopard-rugged music room that doubled as a small theater, and I departed Sunday morning.

As I settled into my Amtrak seat, I realized that over the previous 24 hours I had entered a world unto itself, a world I had not been part of two days before. It was a unique entrée, animated by books, music, ideas, humor, good food, and *joie de vivre*, undergirded by Bill's unfailing generosity. It dawned on me that during my entire time with Bill he never once raised a political issue.

Like my time with Russell, unless I referred to some current public-policy issue, the political scene never arose. We shared love for music (classical, jazz, the American songbook), ideas in literature, classic and contemporary movies (Bill referred to them as "flicks"), new and old novels, and the big and various personalities he had known in a remarkable lifetime, including movie stars, politicians, writers, and journalists. These were the people and ideas stimulating our friendship, and it had the effect of widening my world far beyond the Beltway and the life of pure politics.

We would see each other twice a year or so in the course of the next 12 years, sailing together at least once a summer and often on a long sailing cruise as far north as the Bay of Fundy in Canada, the Saint John River, much of Nova Scotia, and most of the East Coast, from Blue Hill, Maine, into Penobscot Bay, to visits on Nantucket, Block Island, Martha's Vineyard, and Newport. During those summer sails, I felt a sense of relaxation and insouciance that I have rarely enjoyed since since then, or ever. ■

BILL KAUFFMAN

The Utica Club

Shortly after entering wedded bliss a quarter-century ago, my wife, a Los Angelena, told me that she wanted to see two cities: Utica and Cleveland.

I, as is my wont, made her dreams come true.

This fall I had the good luck to revisit the literary capital of the Mohawk Valley twice in a matter of weeks. First I spoke at Utica College, under the aegis of the school's Ethnic Heritage Studies Center and the Alexander Hamilton Institute, in a celebration of Utica and her faithful literary son, Eugene Paul Nassar. Upstate New York literature maven Frank Bergmann and Hamilton College history professor Bob Paquette arranged the event, which afforded me the great pleasure of meeting Gene Nassar. (As a biographer of the Anti-Federalist Luther Martin, who despised the nationalist Hamilton and defended his murderer Aaron Burr, I got a real kick out of the Alexander Hamilton imprimatur.)

My other Utica venture was to pay homage at the Forest Hill Cemetery to Harold Frederic, novelist and bigamist, whose story "The Copperhead" I adapted for a film to be released this spring. Details—and Oscars, surely--to follow.

Every small American city deserves a Gene Nassar. Mr. Nassar grew up among the Lebanese Christians of East Utica. As an adult, he established himself as a noted scholar of such poets as Wallace Stevens and Ezra Pound while remaining rooted in the old neighborhood as a professor at Utica College and historian of his city, which he loves, sins and blemishes too, with the ardor of a native son.

Utica was once a baseball rival of Batavia's in the New York-Penn League, and I like to think that the minor-league qualities of such cities—their intimate scale, the blending of the homely and the idiosyncratic, their unexpected tolerance of eccentricity—are the true soul of America. And of baseball. The majors are built on home runs and TV timeouts and $20 parking fees. To hell with 'em. To hell with the empire, too.

The glory and richness of America come not from its weaponry or wars, which debase us as much if not more than the relentlessly vulgar and witless products rolling off the entertainment industry's assembly line. Rather, our numen is found in our regions, our little places, the unseen America beyond the ken of our placeless rulers.

A national culture exists only if fed by a thousand and one local, particularistic streams. American culture without Utica and her sister cities is … what? Ke$ha? Katie Couric? *Entertainment Tonight*?

William T. Coggeshall, state librarian of Ohio (and later a Lincoln bodyguard), explained three years before the War came that "It is not enough… that a national literature exists. It is required of a nation, which combines wide differences of characteristics, that each shall have its own representation. A Republic of letters may be a confederacy of individualities, [just as] a Republic in politics may be a confederacy of States."

Before any potent or meaningful decentralist political movement develops in this country, we're going to have to rediscover the places in which we live. We have to remember *why* we love our country—and the reason isn't that "We're Number One!" or that we can sprawl out on the couch chanting "USA! USA!" as the bombs drop and the televised chickenhawks cackle.

That isn't patriotism. It isn't even a parody of patriotism. It's an allegiance to … nothing.

America, the myth goes, is a land of perpetual motion, of restless pioneers striking out for the West, or in our time, of restive television addicts lighting out for Las Vegas, with the mini-set in the SUV playing "Two and a Half Men" DVDs so that unlike the Joads, members of this family don't have to talk to one another. We are, supposedly, always moving, never stopping, consumed by what William Cullen Bryant called "the vain low strife that makes men mad."

And yet the best American writers—even those who follow their characters on rafts down the Mississippi, even those who write books titled *On the Road* or *You Can't Go Home Again*—are almost always attached to a *place*. Not a home page, but a real, individuated place that is different from any other place on earth: Sarah Orne Jewett in South Berwick, Maine. Sinclair Lewis in Minnesota. Wendell Berry in Henry County, Kentucky. Thoreau in Concord.

The regionalist impulse in American letters is greater now than at any time since the mid-1930s. Backwoods New England. Romantic North Dakota. East Utica. Writers are looking homeward. Standing on what they stand for, as Edward Abbey used to say. Only good can come of this. The Little America ain't dead yet. ■

Arts&Letters

The Well-Tempered Anarchist

by GENE CALLAHAN

Two Cheers for Anarchism: Six Easy Pieces on Autonomy, Dignity, and Meaningful Work and Play, James C. Scott, Princeton University Press, 169 pages

James C. Scott is a political scientist, anthropologist, and co-director of the agrarian studies program at Yale University. His most notable previous work was *Seeing Like a State*, which deftly described the consequences of the drive towards standardization, homogeneity, and quantifiable (and thus measurable) standards of efficiency produced by the rise of the bureaucratic nation-state from the 1500s onward.

This volume is distilled from a course on anarchism that Scott taught 20 years ago and comprises six essays centered around a theme, rather than a single, sustained argument. An idealist who believed in revolutionary change in the 1960s, Scott became disillusioned when he realized that "virtually every major successful revolution ended by creating a state more powerful than the one it overthrew… able to extract more resources from and exercise more control over the very population it was designed to serve." He came to appreciate the anarchist critique of these revolutions, and many other anarchist "squints" on things as well, but could not buy the total program: "I believe that both theoretically and practically, the abolition of the state is not an option. We are stuck, alas, with Leviathan… and the challenge is to tame it."

Even here Scott is no starry-eyed optimist, as he adds: "That challenge may well be beyond our reach." And so we see a former radical and current appreciator of anarchism reaching the essential conservative insight that reality may severely constrain our ability to realize our imaginings.

In the first chapter, "The Uses of Disorder and 'Charisma,'" Scott presents one of his more problematic ideas. It is introduced by the story of his seeing German pedestrians habitually failing to cross an intersection against the light, despite the road being empty of traffic. He argues that the Germans could stand some practice at law-breaking, which would help avoid any possible repeat of the 1930s and '40s. Well, certainly it is good to have the spine to break manifestly unjust laws. But Scott goes much further than that, suggesting that "every day or so" we should "break some law that makes no sense, even if it's only jay-walking," in what Scott calls "anarchist calisthenics."

This attitude could, I think, easily lead to contempt for the law, and needs to be balanced by a healthy, Socratic respect for the value of the rule of law for social life. (To Scott's credit, he does admit that deciding when to engage in such calisthenics requires "careful thought.")

While giving two cheers for anarchism, Scott is not particularly well disposed towards right-wing libertarianism or anarcho-capitalism. He pointedly notes: "The last strand of anarchist thought I definitely wish to distance myself from is the sort of libertarianism that tolerates (or even encourages) great differences in wealth, property, and status." Contrary to the atomic individualism that underlies much contemporary "free market" political economy, Scott insists that individuals are significantly shaped by the framework of social institutions in which they conduct their lives. Human beings were never the atomic individuals of neoclassical economics, but its hegemony is making them more and more resemble its assumptions about them:

> Further, the neoliberal celebration of the individual maximizer over society, of individual freehold property over common property, of the treatment of land (nature) and labor (human work life) as market commodities, and… cost-benefit analysis (e.g. shadow pricing for the value of a sunset or an endangered view) all encourage habits of social calculation that smack of social Darwinism.



In the next chapter, "Vernacular Order, Official Order," Scott revisits a theme he explored to great effect in *Seeing Like a State*: "The people" are attuned to a local, "vernacular" context and vocabulary that require intimate knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. For instance, the people of Durham, Connecticut call a certain road "Guilford Road" because that is where it takes them. But the residents of Guilford call the same highway "Durham Road." The state, on the other hand, operating as it were from on high, has a difficult time with such subtleties and so slaps on a label that fits the street into a larger, abstract scheme covering all of Connecticut, and so it becomes "Route 77."

Taking such an aerial view can make sense at times, but it can also be destructive, as in the case of modernist urban planning, where Scott evokes the great urbanist Jane Jacobs:

> One sees in the newspapers photographs from beaming city officials and architects looking down on the successful model as if they were in helicopters, or gods. What is astounding, from a vernacular perspective, is that no one ever experiences the city from that height or angle. The presumptive ground-level experience of real pedestrians—window-shoppers, errand-runners, aimlessly strolling lovers—is left entirely out of the urban-planning equation.

Scott is suspicious of impersonal, rationalist plans and institutions in general, not just those forwarded by the state. For instance, "scientific" forestry—the practice of planting "forests" in large monocrops of a single age—is another of his targets. Now, certainly states have been involved in that practice but so have large private firms. At first the practice seemed beneficial: the result was large tracts of trees that could be easily managed and harvested efficiently with predictable yields. But after a century, extremely low biodiversity and very high susceptibility to pests and diseases made these places famous not for their efficiency but for "forest death."

In another, frightening tale of private but impersonal institutions, he describes searching for a nice convalescent home for his two aunts. He hears good things from all of the residents of each home he visits, until he happens to be left alone with one for a moment. Then she hurriedly tells Scott that her home is horrible but she was afraid to say so in the presence of the staff because they punished residents for any complaining—by, for instance, neglecting to bathe them. Scott realized he was witnessing a "regime of low-level terror." From that point on, he tried to see residents at other homes with no staff present, but three out of the four institutions he

visited refused his request.

Continuing the same theme, Scott's case for local shops is such a good enumeration of the many ways in which they are superior to the giant chain stores that it is worth quoting at length:

> It is surely the case that 'big box' stores can, owing again to their clout as buyers, deliver a host of manufactured goods at a cheaper price than the petty bourgeoisie. What is not so clear, however, is whether, once one has factored in all the public goods... the petty bourgeoisie provides—informal social work, public safety, the aesthetic pleasures of an animated and interesting streetscape, a large variety of social experiences and personalized services, acquaintance networks, informal neighborhood news and gossip, a building block of social solidarity and public action, and (in the case of the smallholding peasantry) good stewardship of the land—the petty bourgeoisie might not be in a full accounting, a far better bargain, in the long run, than the large, impersonal capitalist firm.

It turns out that removing traffic lights can make driving, biking, and walking in dense conditions safer.

In another paean to spontaneous ordering, Scott describes the "shared space" concept of improving traffic flow that has been gaining ground of late, especially in Europe. It turns out that removing traffic lights can make driving, biking, and walking in dense conditions safer, when done properly. Hans Monderman, the pioneer of this concept, did not simply yank the light from the busiest intersection in Drachten, the Netherlands: he replaced it with a traffic circle, a bike path, and a separate pedestrian area. Furthermore, as Scott notes, drivers' increased alertness in these new situations is "abetted by the law," which penalizes those it holds responsible for accidents.

Here we glimpse part of the reason for Scott's two rather than three cheers for anarchism: spontaneous ordering can take care of many things we typically believe require central direction, but the successful examples we see around us tend to rely upon an underlying, state-supplied order.

Scott also takes on the Bush administration's "No Child Left Behind" legislation, which predictably resulted in teachers "teaching to the test" and in fact often falsifying results to meet standards imposed from the top downward. Scott explains the perverse results by invoking "Goodheart's law [which] holds that 'when a measure becomes a target it ceases to be a good measure.' And Matthew Light clarifies: 'An authority sets some quantitative standard to measure a particular achievement; those responsible for meeting that standard do so, but not in the way which was intended.'"

At the same time the United States was dumbing down its educational system in this fashion, Scott notes that, ironically, many other nations were doing away with such standardization, with good results, while thinking they were following the American model. He adds another example of the problematic nature of such "one-size-fits-all" measures, that of French kings, who, wishing to tax (presumably wealthier) subjects with larger houses more than those with smaller ones, instituted a tax based on the number of windows and doors a subject's house had. The result? Houses in France had fewer and fewer windows and doors as time went on, whatever their size.

These cases segue into one of the most interesting claims of this book: the fixation on what is measurable in political decision-making is a way of pretending to be apolitical while actually favoring a certain style of politics—technocratic, elitist, analytical, managerial. For instance, Scott argues, cost-benefit analysis is not a politically neutral way to make decisions, it is a way to make a political decision by deciding what costs count for what and what benefits count for what, while pretending that one is not doing so and attention is being paid to "Just the facts, ma'am." Often such a fixation has been established with the laudable goal of eliminating discrimination, but the result is perverse: "While fending off charges of bias or favoritism, such techniques… succeeded brilliantly in entrenching a political agenda at the level of procedures and conventions of calculation that is doubly opaque and inaccessible."

The aspects of Scott's work that I have been able to examine above, although they don't do justice to the entire book, demonstrate that the typical left-right axis by which political positions are classified is seriously inadequate to the task of handling a thinker like Scott. His case against big government is going to appeal to libertarians. His demonstrations of the wisdom often contained in traditions and customs will be attractive to conservatives. And his concerns with lessening inequalities of wealth and power will be congenial to progressives. So where does he fit on the left-right axis? Nowhere, I'd say: he is his own man. And, setting aside its many other virtues, that alone makes this a book worth reading. ■

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What Same-Sex Marriage Means

by ANDRE ARCHIE

Debating Same-Sex Marriage*, *John Corvino and Maggie Gallagher, Oxford University Press, 296 pages

We opponents of same-sex marriage are fighting a rear-guard battle. Recently Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, and Washington passed referendums in support of legal unions for gay couples. If the latest polls are to be believed, a substantial majority of Americans in the not too distant future will judge same-sex marriage to be morally equivalent to heterosexual marriage. What accounts for the radical shift in public opinion from a traditionalist understanding of marriage to a progressive one?

In *Debating Same-Sex Marriage*, authors Maggie Gallagher (co-founder of the National Organization for Marriage) and John Corvino (associate professor of philosophy at Wayne State University) debate the philosophical arguments for their respective positions. As they explain in the introduction, their purpose is to "achieve disagreement" in order to uncover "where they differ and why."

Gallagher's argument against same-sex marriage is divided into two parts. The first part contends that marriage refers to a "natural kind" that law did not create. The second part claims that historic and cross-cultural understandings of marriage are grounded in its natural foundations. Gallagher begins by stating the traditionalist view of marriage, a view she says elites now find incomprehensible: "Marriage is intrinsically a sexual union of husband and wife, because these are the only unions that can make new life and connect those children in love to their co-creators, their mother and their father."

According to Gallagher, marital unions are unique insofar as they consolidate basic goods like sex, love, babies, rearing children, and mother and fathers. These basic goods tend to fragment outside the marital union. Since marriage is the institution that best functions to tie together the basic goods, it is intrinsically moral.

Gallagher argues that the word marriage refers to a natural kind. Believers in natural kinds hold that words, taxonomies, and classifications track the divisions within nature. Unlike a corporation, which is an institution that comes into being and is regulated through legal decrees and definitions, marriage "has meaning prior to and outside a current legal definition." Likewise, the component parts of marriage, the basic goods, are prior to and outside legal definition. For example, one way of talking about sexual relations when construing marriage as referring to a natural kind is to argue that sexual relations require a male and female body for the purpose of reproduction. Law may regulate sexual relations, but law cannot decree that male bodies unite for the sake of reproduction. In this view, marriage can be affirmed, denied or regulated by the law, "but law alone cannot create marriage in a socially meaningful way."

Although Gallagher acknowledges in a footnote that her view of marriage is only partially indebted to theorists such as Robert P. George and John Finnis, it is clear that her conception of marriage is deeply grounded in the natural-law tradition.

In the second part of her argument—"What is Marriage: The Case for Our Historic, Cross-Cultural Understanding"—Gallagher states that "marriage is a virtually universal human social institution. It exists in virtually every known human society." She briefly mentions various forms that marriage has taken across history and cultures from the jungle of the Amazon, the steppes of Asia, the deserts of Africa to the forests of America and Europe. The recurrence of the marriage idea in diverse human societies, she says, confirms that the institution is grounded in nature and that it "addresses three persistent truths about human beings everywhere."

The first truth is that marriage provides a context in which men and women both satisfy and tame their sexual desires. The second truth is that marriage provides the context in which society replenishes itself through reproduction. The third truth regarding marriage is that a child ought to have a mother as well as a father. Gallagher supplies historical context to emphasize the importance of this third truth by explaining that in the 1970s many educated elites argued that nontraditional family structures were good. Single mothers and unmarried women with children were all considered liberated from "archaic moral norms."

Social-science studies have shown that children tend to do better emotionally and intellectually when they are brought up by married mothers and fathers.

Gallagher rightly points out that the elites were wrong. Subsequent social-science studies have shown that children tend to do better emotionally and intellectually when they are brought up by married mothers and fathers. Gallagher's arguments are bolstered by the recent social-science research done by Mark Regnerus on adult children of parents who have same-sex re-

lationships. His major finding is that these children of parents have some of the same social problems as the children of co-habiting parents or single parents.

If marriage refers to a natural kind that consists of a mother and a father, and it is not created by law because it is prior to law, why does the law regulate marriage? Because civic order, according to Gallagher, has a stake in regulating the sexual behavior of men and women for the purpose of ensuring that children are raised by married mothers and fathers in a context that provides a sense of familial permanence, monogamy, and fidelity.

From Gallagher's perspective, Corvino's definition of marriage is radical because it is genderless and purposeless.

Corvino offers a radically different conception of marriage. He defines marriage as involving a "couple's commitment to each other and to society that they are each other's main line of defense in the world, for life. It [marriage] is an exclusive commitment, not in the sense a spouse doesn't care for other people (children, friends, parents), but in the sense that only one person can be your Number One Person."

From Gallagher's perspective, Corvino's definition of marriage is radical because it is genderless and purposeless. It strips marriage of its role in regulating sexual contact for the purpose of reproduction. Even if one were to argue that sexual contact within marriage is not always for the sake of reproduction, it is still the case that sexual contact between a husband and wife may potentially result in reproduction. Even when conception cannot take place in a heterosexual marriage due to infertility, purpose resides in the couple's organic bodily union. Corvino's definition of marriage merely describes an emotional relationship.

Corvino argues that the word marriage does not refer to a natural kind. Like most words that are governed by convention, marriage acquires its meaning through a "shared understanding across a community." According to Corvino, Gallagher has fallen into the error of thinking that marriage has a static referent that is independent of law and social custom. To illustrate her confusion he cites two examples. The first concedes Gallagher's point that some words, like the word mother, refer to a biological reality: "the mother is the person who bears the child with her body." But Gallagher also states that through law and custom a mother who "cannot or will not perform her maternal function for the child" can be replaced by another mother who can perform her maternal function. Similarly, Corvino argues, the traditional definition of marriage can be replaced by one that includes same-sex couples. Same-sex couples, according to Corvino, can perform social roles that are associated with married couples like romantic partnering and exclusive commitment.

His second example highlights the elasticity of conventional institutions such as marriage by analogizing it to the introduction of the designated hitter rule in baseball. The rule allowed someone else to hit for the pitcher. Purists objected to the rule, but it became an accepted feature of the game. Today the word baseball includes the designated hitter rule. Corvino's point is that social practices like baseball and marriage, contra Gallagher, are not prior to custom and outside current legal definition. These social practices are the product of custom and law.

Gallagher's argument against same-sex marriage is motivated by the natural-law tradition, which states that marriage requires procreative–type acts. Corvino takes issue with natural-law theorists who argue that homosexual conduct is wrong because "it violates the sexual organs' 'natural purpose' of procreation." One of the questions he raises is whether a sterile heterosexual couple violates the natural purpose of procreation. If the answer is no, Corvino responds, would not the same hold for a same-sex couple? Another question is whether the natural-law tradition would allow paraplegics to marry legally. The inability of the sterile heterosexual couple or the paraplegic to realize the natural purpose of their sexual organs leads Corvino to conclude that the natural-law theorists' arguments in opposition to same-sex marriage are incoherent.

Debating Same-Sex Marriage is an important book that lays bare the philosophical arguments for and against the legalization of same-sex marriage. Although I am partial to Gallagher's arguments, Corvino's position is well argued and more in tune with the times. Perhaps the traditionalist's view of marriage as a heterosexual institution should consider the position recently advocated by David Blankenhorn, a former opponent of same-sex marriage who has come to believe that marriage as a social practice will be strengthened by including homosexual couples in such a conservative institution. Whether or not Blankenhorn is correct, whichever side wins the debate over same-sex marriage, the losing side will be permanently marginalized. ■

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The Spy Who Bored Me

by JORDAN MICHAEL SMITH

Ian McEwan, Sweet Tooth: A Novel, Doubleday, 304 pages

Ian McEwen was hailed as brilliant from his first book. A collection of short stories, *First Love, Last Rites* won the 1975 M. Somerset Maugham award. His reputation only grew in the ensuing years, as he went on to claim the Booker Prize and the National Book Critics Circle Award, among other accolades. His 2001 novel *Atonement* sold in massive quantities and was made into a fine film. What makes McEwan's acclaim unusual is that he is not a formal innovator. It cannot be said that he—like, say, David Foster Wallace or Salman Rushdie—bumps forward fiction's possibilities.

Sweet Tooth, like *Atonement*, his best book, does have something of a postmodern curvature; the novel incorporates short stories written by characters and a letter at the end that upends some of the previous happenings. But those experiments exist in no sizable quantity, let alone in an especially innovative fashion. Rather, McEwan is highly regarded for the beauty and precision of his prose, and for the depths of his characters.

Passages of some of his books are worthy of the masters. I instance *Saturday*'s pages-long relation of a squash game. As a player of the game myself, I could imagine few things less engaging than writing about a sport played by two sweaty men inside a small, bland room where conversation is slight and exhilaration slighter. At least David Foster Wallace had tennis played in the spacious outdoors. Yet *Saturday*'s squash match is told with as much as splendor, observational power, and excitement as any bullfighting recollection to be found in Hemingway or the baseball game opening Philip Roth's *American Pastoral*. It is as if the players in *Saturday* are holding guns, not small racquets.

Unlike Saturday, which focused on a day in the life of a venerable English surgeon, *Sweet Tooth* is a story with inherent tension. Young, beautiful Englishwoman Serena Frome joins her country's intelligence service. She is tasked with assisting the war of ideas, as it was called in the Cold War and continues to be in whatever wars we are currently fighting. She works for a shell foundation supporting European anticommunist writers.

Through an unfortunate combination of naiveté and arrogance, she beds the unknowing writer she has been charged with recruiting to Freedom International and, quite predictably, it all ends in disaster. No spoiler is being announced here: the first paragraph in the book says, "Within eighteen months of joining I was sacked, having disgraced myself and ruined my lover, though he certainly had a hand in his own undoing."

Frome's unpleasantness is foreshadowed in that last clause. She is critical of herself but not about important matters. She is calculating, capable of deceiving both herself and others. She is intelligent but not as intelligent as she believes. She lies persistently and, most of all, is cold and unprincipled. Speaking about nuclear weapons to a prospective lover she desires to impress, "I repeated a phrase I'd read somewhere—a cliché, I realized later. It would be impossible 'to put the genie back in the bottle.' Nuclear weapons would have to be managed, not banned," she recalls. Tellingly, the sin for which she is censuring herself is one of unoriginality, not dishonesty. She continues: "Actually, I had no particular views on the subject. In another context, I could have spoken up for nuclear disarmament… . I'd announced myself as a trainee Cold Warrior."

A remarkable admission coming from a future infiltrator. If she was thrillingly amoral, something out of a typical spy novel, the disclosure would be appealing. But in fact Frome courts no adventure; she simply joins the service because the job interview was arranged on her behalf. And then she displays indifference and unprofessionalism in her work.

McEwan has succeeded before in making odious characters likeable. Frome is not one of those characters. We sympathize with anyone but the worst of creatures who tells a story in which he or she suffers. But Frome is not funny enough to be guiltily enjoyed, nor intriguing enough to be appealing.

Sweet Tooth is disappointing because it is so promising. The book's epigraph alone—"If only I had met, on this search, a single clearly evil person," a line from Timothy Garton Ash's book about exploring the files that East German intelligence kept on him—is electrifying. Excepting the final chapter though, that tension is not sustained. For a book about a beautiful, unethical spy, it is decidedly boring.

That is not to say that the novel is entirely devoid of McEwan's strengths. The prose is, as always, wonderful. We have "post-coital clarity," a "pearly pink painted nail," and, appropriate for the 1970s, handkerchiefs supplanted by paper tissues that were "becoming ubiquitous, like supermarket trolleys. The world was starting to become seriously disposable."

McEwan retains his capacity for repeating an era. Any reader familiar with the CIA's funding of various cultural projects during the Cold War will find Freedom International's fronts and trickery familiar, right down to the organization's name. The employees of the group are bitingly portrayed, condescending and fraudulent. *Sweet Tooth* is a reminder that most intelligence agents in the Cold War were not out of James Bond movies. It's a fine recollection, but it does not nearly approach the best work of one of the world's premier writers of fiction. ■

Jordan Michael Smith, a contributing writer at Salon *and the* Christian Science Monitor, *is a contributing editor at* TAC.

Red Europe

by LEE CONGDON

Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944–1956, Anne Applebaum, Doubleday, 566 pages

In a widely circulated essay of 1984, Milan Kundera lamented the fact that Europeans—and, one might add, Americans—saw "in Central Europe only Eastern Europe." For the Czech writer, *Mitteleuropa* referred primarily to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, though because he thought in cultural rather than political terms, he did not exclude any of the lands between Germany and Russia. "Eastern Europe," he insisted, properly meant Russia.

Anne Applebaum adopts a similar view. In the introduction to her new book, she tells us that she fixed her attention on three countries of "Central Europe"—Poland, Hungary, and Eastern Germany—because they illustrated an important point: though "very different," they came, for a time, to exhibit grim similarities. Against their will, they were forced to downplay their national identities and merge into an undifferentiated "Eastern Europe." There are additional reasons, however, for Applebaum's focus. She is married to Radek Sikorski, the foreign minister of Poland, and speaks Polish. Because the Poles and Hungarians are the only peoples of the region to enjoy a historic friendship, Hungary was a logical second subject. And Berlin being the flashpoint of the Cold War, Eastern Germany could not easily be ignored.

As the author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning *Gulag: A History*, Applebaum, who contributes to the left-wing *New York Review of Books*, harbors no illusions concerning communist ideology or Soviet rule. She knows how Stalin tyrannized Soviet citizens and as a consequence of World War II established a brutal hegemony over millions of subjects farther West. She does not shrink from characterizing the so-called satellite nations as "totalitarian," long a taboo designation because it is said to be a product of the Cold War and to place Stalinism and Nazism on an equal plane. The term, she writes, "is long overdue for a revival" because the Eastern European regimes did attempt, with some success, to establish total control over those under their authority.

On the long and bloody march to Berlin, the Red Army missed few opportunities to rape and pillage, thus habituating its victims to violence.

The communist takeover, she points out, began long before 1948, the year that marked its completion. On the long and bloody march to Berlin, the Red Army missed few opportunities to rape and pillage, thus habituating its victims to violence, an ineradicable feature of Stalinist regimes. At war's end, the Soviets could have assumed power immediately, and in some places—Poland, Yugoslavia, and Albania for example—they did. But in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Stalin decided to proceed more slowly, in part, as Applebaum suggests, because local Stalinists believed they could win power through the ballot box. That optimism was shattered by the Hungarian elections of November 1945, in which the communists gained no more than 17 percent of the vote.

Clearly the time had come for more direct measures. Although pretending to share power with non-communist parties, the communists, firmly in control of the security organs, began to drive all remaining political opposition underground or into exile. Suspicious of civil society, they co-opted or suppressed those intermediate institutions that might shield individual citizens from an all-powerful state: churches, radio and newspapers, universities, youth groups, private businesses. To that end, the Hungarian communist leader, Mátyás Rákosi, employed "salami tactics"—one slice at a time.

1948 marked the beginning of the era of "High Stalinism." Even though Stalin's Eastern European satraps—Rákosi in Hungary, in December 1948, police arrested József Cardinal Mindszenty, the Roman Catholic Primate of Hungary and an uncompromising opponent of communism (as he had been of Nazism). After being tortured, humiliated, and drugged by the ÁVO (State Security Department), the cardinal confessed in court to anti-state activities and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, Primate of Poland, chose not to confront communist power directly. In private he registered protests, but in public he sought compromise in an effort to salvage what he could. In 1950 he signed a controversial "agreement of mutual understanding" with the regime, which, however, never regarded him as anything other than an enemy. The police arrived at his door in 1953.

Cardinal Wyszynski was never put before one, but several Eastern European regimes did conduct show trials that mirrored the Moscow Trials of the 1930s. In part, these were the result of the 1948 Soviet excommunication of Yugoslavia, whose communist dictator, Josip Broz (called Tito), had displayed an unwelcome streak of independence. Outraged by this breach of comradely etiquette, Stalin cast the wartime partisan leader as the Prince

of Darkness, a role originally played by Leon Trotsky. Any sign of "Titoism" was to be dealt with in the manner prescribed for any deviation from the Stalinist line.

And so it was in Hungary, where the regime orchestrated László Rajk's "Conceptual" (that is, show) Trial. Rajk, a lifelong communist, fought against General Franco's Nationalist forces in the Spanish Civil War, after which he was briefly interned at Le Vernet in the foothills of the Pyrenees. After the communists seized power in Hungary, he served initially as minister of interior and later as minister of foreign affairs. But because—unlike Rákosi and other top party leaders—he had spent much of the war in Hungary, rather than the USSR, and was not of Jewish origin, he enjoyed a modicum of popularity and could have emerged as a political rival. By the time the police arrested him in May 1949, they had concocted what they believed to be a convincing "plot," one that revolved around a foreigner.

When he defected to Prague in 1949, it had not occurred to Noel Field—American communist and Soviet agent—that Czechoslovak authorities would hand him over to the Hungarians, who, knowing of his service in the U.S. State Department, could claim they had "unmasked" him as an intelligence agent and recruiter of Hungarian traitors. Under torture, Rajk "confessed" that he, Field, and Tito had conspired against the Hungarian leadership. He was tried in September 1949 and executed in October. (It is worth noting that during his rehabilitation interview before his release in 1954, Field identified Alger Hiss—by name—as a Soviet agent.)

On a smaller scale than in the Soviet Union, Eastern European regimes created their own gulags. A student of the Soviet Gulag, Applebaum provides an informed account of the Hungarian forced-labor camp at Recsk, 50 miles northeast of Budapest. Recsk could accommodate (if that is the word) about 1,300 prisoners, all of whom quarried stone when they were not constructing roads. They labored ten to 12 hours each day, seven days a week. The poet György Faludy was among them, and Applebaum draws extensively upon his memoirs, *My Happy Days in Hell*. She does not mention Imre Lakatos, an even more famous internee. At the time, Lakatos was a fanatical communist, but after escaping abroad in 1956, he fashioned a distinguished career as a philosopher of mathematics and science.

In addition to show trials, forced-labor camps, and futile attempts to plan the economy, the communist regimes in Eastern Europe aspired, by means of propaganda and the silencing of dissent, to create a "new man," a *Homo sovieticus*. In some of the finest chapters in this book, Applebaum reflects on their successes and failures. She points out that most people did collaborate, if only by showing up for work. Many accepted aspects of the party's program—land reform and affirmative action for members of the working class, for example. In addition, a fear of being suspected of ideological incorrectness made conformity seem the only prudent course. But Applebaum concludes that most went along primarily because the price of resistance was too high; theirs was a reluctant collaboration.

What opposition there was was passive. Jokes, for example, were, and remained to the end of the communist period, a favorite form of resistance. One of Kundera's most famous novels, written before he emigrated to France in 1975, was entitled *The Joke*. Later, sporting unconventional clothes or evincing an interest in jazz became

Joe Sobran

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

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—Patrick J. Buchanan (from the Foreword)

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ways of annoying the ruling class. In both those regards, Applebaum mentions the late Leopold Tyrmand, who eventually landed in the United States and launched *Chronicles of Culture*, a conservative magazine that, under his editorship, raised irreverent political humor to a form of art.

Open opposition in Eastern Europe awaited Stalin's death, which came on March 5, 1953. In a matter of weeks, East Berliners took to the streets, only to be met by Soviet tanks. In Hungary, Imre Nagy, who would play a tragic role in 1956, replaced Rákosi, closed Recsk, freed political prisoners, and set the country on a "new course." Elsewhere in the bloc, however, not much changed until February 1956, when Khrushchev delivered his de-Stalinization speech to the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Before the year was out, the Polish party had elevated Wladyslaw Gomulka, a "national communist," to the position of party first secretary; by affirming loyalty to the Soviet Union, he managed to forestall a Red Army intervention. In Hungary, however, growing opposition among intellectuals (many of them communists), young people, and workers led to the Hungarian Revolution. And even after Soviet tanks crushed the uprising, George Kennan prophesied correctly that "the Soviet Union will never recover." Neither, as it turned out, would "Eastern Europe." ■

Outraged by this breach of comradely etiquette, Stalin cast Tito as the Prince of Darkness, a role originally played by Leon Trotsky.

Lee Congdon lived in communist Hungary for two years in the 1970s. He is the author of a trilogy on Hungarian intellectuals.

Conservatism's Mozart

by R.J. STOVE

Joseph Sobran: The National Review Years, Articles From 1974 to 1991, edited by Fran Griffin, FGF Books, 191 pages

These are the times that try men's scruples, especially the scruples of reviewers. Fact A: I knew Joe Sobran, from 2003 to 2008, well enough to sabotage such hopes of critical detachment as I might otherwise have retained concerning his oeuvre. Fact B: any non-American will be handicapped when discussing the authentic literary heir of Mencken and Ambrose Bierce. Fact C: I made a small donation toward the cost of producing this compendium, a donation recorded with disconcerting solicitude on its 167th page.

Here, then, we go. Nuts to critical detachment.

Joe Sobran's talents included a rare—indeed a unique—mixture of buttonholing informality with austere erudition. Merely to glance at the index here is to appreciate something of his versatility: under G we find "gay rights," "genocide," "German/Germany," "ghetto," "Gielgud, John," "Glazer, Nathan," and "Gnosticism." Examining any other letter would produce a similar outcome.

The National Review Years serves to remind audiences of how formidable an authorial presence Joe had become before he turned 30. "What is extraordinary about this book of essays," Patrick Buchanan's foreword explains, "is the range of Joe's interests and the quality of his insights." Tom Bethell's preface says it best:

> He was the intellectual equivalent of a natural athlete who can reach Olympic standards with no training. … Often, Joe seemed to have little understanding of the quality of his own writing and he quickly forgot what he had written. It was as though he was a mere conduit through which his genius was transmitted.

From around 1988 I had encountered a few of Joe's columns through two channels. First, the U.S. Information Service in Sydney had a public-spirited librarian who made a point of letting neophyte Australian scribblers pore over as many *National Review* back issues as they wanted. Second, Joe had a long-term Melbourne admirer in the elderly Catholic activist B.A. Santamaria, who now and then would reproduce various Sobran aperçus in his magazine, *News Weekly*. (With typical foolhardiness, I never bothered to inform Joe of the Santamaria headquarters' esteem for him, and I must hope that he discovered this admiration from other sources.)

Neither from *News Weekly* nor from the USIS did I glean the protean nature of Joe's intellect. That appreciation came only when I happened on his small masterpiece of invective "Victims of Music," which appeared in the January 1998 issue of the *Sobran's* newsletter, although I first saw it on a syndicate's website. Somehow I discovered Joe's email address, wrote to him in praise of this article—and received from him, in return, the astonishing information that he only vaguely recalled writing the thing! Such blissful creative unselfconsciousness had something Mozartean about it.

When he joined *National Review* in 1974, Joe was still only 28 years old. He no more required obvious formal tuition in his art than Mozart did in his. If he ever suffered from those deleterious literary influences that napalm the average 20-something scribbler's brains, they cannot have troubled him for more than about 10 minutes. Finger would hit typewriter keyboard and suddenly Joe

would spring forth, fully armed, from—as it were—the head of Joe.

Back then, I now realize, *National Review* probably constituted Joe's perfect periodical outlet. As Joe himself commented in 1975: "Who but *NR*'s editors would begin the first issue after Kennedy's murder by announcing, regretfully, that their patience with President Lyndon Johnson was exhausted?" The sheer bookish insolence of this reproach communicated eloquently to Joe.

Max Beerbohm mused about an aspiring wit: "He must have invention keeping pace with utterance. He must be inexhaustible. Only so can he exhaust us." Those sentences eerily prefigure Joe's stylistic method. As he wrote, so he spoke. His conversation abounded in ornate aphorisms that could have come from his columns.

Another Mozartean feature of this material: its predominant cheerfulness. Many Cold Warriors discerned leftists' and cultural revolutionists' malice; Joe, almost alone, discerned their inability to master even the pretense of logic.

How long ago it all seems, and how easily, how mercifully, forgotten! Carter Agonistes in the White House as the hostage crisis concluded ("He [Carter] wanted intimacy with 226 million people at once"); the anti-Reagan peacenik protests, marked by inability to voice any but the mildest criticisms of Andropov; the early 1980s' Phil Donahue mania ("Phil's constituency is 40 million housewives plus Ashley Montagu"); the whole "Roots" televisual cult, where even suggesting—never mind affirming—Alex Haley's plagiarism remained *verboten*; such doyennes of de jure Catholic and de facto feminist theology as Mary T. Hanna pontificating in *Commonweal* (reading between the lines, Joe characteristically said of Miss Hanna's glutinous verbiage, "sure beats reading the lines")—who, in 2012, remembers any of this? *Où sont les neiges roses d'antan*?

Well, not even Joe can overcome the problems we shall experience in remembering yesteryear's snows, but his dispatches from the Cold War front infallibly make us care, afresh, about them.

On one topic, provincial distance might give an Australian reader an advantage. Not only did I have no dog in the Howard Beach fight when it occurred, to screaming national headlines, in December 1986; I managed to remain blissfully unaware that there even was a fight—though Australians could not escape noticing the subsequent Tawana Brawley brouhaha. Joe devoted to the improbable subject of Queens race-relations ten tough, implacable pages without a wasted syllable. They're all preserved here.

Joe announced to me and others via email his grand plan to exile himself by becoming the first illegal immigrant in the history of Haiti.

Mencken, when asked why he insisted on living in America while famously deriding it, retorted: "Why do men go to zoos?" Here Joe parted company with Baltimore's sage (for whom, he once surprised me by saying, he had limited patience). It is true that once, driven to convulsive fury by Dubya, Joe announced to me and others via email his grand plan to exile himself by becoming the first illegal immigrant in the history of Haiti. This scheme died aborning—the triumph of experience over hope—and doubtless we should be grateful that Haiti never got to exercise on him the devitalizing charm with which Mexico seduced Malcolm Lowry. Or should we? The collapse of Joe's career after 1991 had several causes, but aggravating the agony of them all was (I now sense, on the strength of the present anthology) his overwhelming, filial love for an America that no longer loved him back. During Clinton's climactic bimbo eruption, Joe warned his compatriots: "It's his country now. You and I are just paying the rent." He could not have written that during the Cold War.

When Joe eulogized "the Republic of Baseball," he treated the game as his secondary religion; as, one might almost say, his primary religion's Eighth Sacrament. I can apprehend—however clumsily—something of Joe's sports-related *pietas*, just as mere Australians can in part detect the magic of Norman Rockwell's parallel universe, although that universe accorded with nothing in antipodean history. On *NR*'s cover for June 11, 1990 (helpfully reproduced here), there stands Joe, attired in Yankees uniform and wearing on his face an expression of shining beatific gratitude such as he never managed, however high his spirits, after I came to know him.

Above, I reflected: "As he wrote, so he spoke." But those six words don't convey the half of it. Anyone who ever knew Joe will have, while perusing this chrestomathy, the surreal experience of hearing Joe's voice ring forth in every line, as if through a superb stereo system. Tennyson poignantly mourned "the touch of a vanished hand, and the sound of a voice that is still"; but he did nothing to prepare us for the timbre of Joe chastising, chortling, lauding, joking, and snarling, large as life and twice as natural. That timbre is the predominant tone of this book. Plenty of essays by him remain uncollected, though they must be filed away somewhere. There remains, therefore, abundant scope for a Volume Two, and a Volume Three, and… ■

R. J. Stove is the author of César Franck: His Life and Times.

Oakeshott vs. America

by KENNETH B. McINTYRE

Oakeshott on Rome and America, Gene Callahan, Imprint Academic, 250 pages

An obscure college professor once wrote that the reception of English philosopher Michael Oakeshott by American conservatives resembled the sound of one hand clapping. Although interest in Oakeshott's work among U.S. academic historians and political theorists has increased exponentially since his death in 1990, his influence on public intellectuals and policy makers here has remained negligible—with the notable exception of Andrew Sullivan, who, like Oakeshott, happens to be British.

The opposite of rationalism for Oakeshott is not irrationalism but authentic practical reasonableness.

This lack of influence among the movers and shakers of American political life should not be surprising, given Oakeshott's insistence on the irrelevance of political philosophy to practical politics. As he once wrote, "reputable political behavior is not dependent upon sound or even coherent philosophy." Such behavior is instead related to the concrete practical knowledge of an actual political tradition and what such a tradition intimates. Oakeshott was skeptical of philosophers who meddled in practical affairs, insisting that he was not concerned with establishing "a seminary for training political hedge-preachers in some dim orthodoxy."

Further, Oakeshott's critique of ideological or rationalistic politics makes him an unlikely source of inspiration to a people whose entire political tradition has been informed by that style of political discourse. The rationalistic or ideological style manifests itself in the abstract and often vacuous pronouncements about foundational principles that animate American political life. As Oakeshott observed in a review of a book by Walter Lippman:

> when Mr. Lippmann says that the founders of our free institutions were adherents of the philosophy of natural law, and that 'the free political institutions of the Western world were conceived and established' by men who held certain abstract beliefs, he speaks with the shortened perspective of an American way of thinking in which a manner of conducting affairs is inconceivable without an architect and without a premeditated 'dedication to a proposition.' But the fact is that nobody ever 'founded these institutions.' They are the product of innumerable human choices, over long stretches of time, but not of any human design.

Such a long view is not likely to be welcome in a country that has from the beginning considered itself a *novus ordo seclorum*.

With these considerations in mind, it was with a great deal of excitement that I read Gene Callahan's new book, *Oakeshott on Rome and America*, which is a well-written examination of Oakeshott's own work, but also a novel application of Oakeshott's critique of rationalist or ideological politics to American constitutional history. Callahan argues quite convincingly that Oakeshott's analysis of the errors of modern rationalism is both acute and accurate and that the American constitutional tradition has been informed by a highly rationalistic rhetorical style from the beginning.

So what is rationalism, in the Oakeshottian sense of the term? First, it involves the claim that the only adequate type of knowledge is that which can be reduced to a series of rules, principles, or methods—and thus it is also a claim that "knowing how" to do something is nothing more than "knowing that" the rules are such and such. Second, because of this denigration of practical knowledge, it is a claim that rational action can only take place following the creation of a theoretical model. As Oakeshott once observed, modern rationalism is literally "preposterous" because theoretical reflection can only occur after a practice already has made itself distinct and more or less concrete.

Finally, as Callahan points out, since rationalism is a mistaken description of human knowledge and its relation to human activity, it is also an impossible way of acting, politically or in any other sphere. Human action, including political action, is inherently an engagement of practical reason working within a particular tradition or and attempting to follow through on some of the inchoate suggestions that the vagueness of the practice offers. The opposite of rationalism for Oakeshott is not irrationalism but authentic practical reasonableness. Thus, and contrary to many of his reading-impaired critics, his critique of rationalism is not a critique of reason but a defense of it against a false modern conception of it.

To use one of Oakeshott's favorite examples, if one has no knowledge of cookery, a cookbook is useless. If, on the other hand, one is an experienced chef, a cookbook is superfluous. The cookbook is relevant only in a situation where either the great majority of cooks are relatively inexperienced and there is a dearth of connoisseurs or in a situation in which the traditions of cookery are in a state of confusion and a reminder is needed of some of the tradition's neglected resources.

Oakeshott used the term "ideology" to describe the attempted application of this rationalistic style to political activity. The rationalist's or ideologist's desire is to solve permanently the problems of political life and leave everything else to administration. Yet politics isn't concerned with the search for truth. Instead, as Oakeshott noted, "it is concerned with the cultivation of what from time to time are accepted as the peaceable decencies of conduct among men who do not suffer from the Puritan-Jacobin illusion that in practical affairs there is an attainable condition of things called 'truth' or 'perfection.'"

Thus the alternative to ideology is not nescience. As Callahan writes, it is instead a politics that

> remains grounded in the concrete circumstances and earlier experiences of the participants in a polity, and resists the temptation to reject the ambiguities and uncertainties of the practical world by embracing some theoretical abstraction of political life that boasts it can provide definitive resolutions, incontrovertibly justified through their deduction from first principles, to any and all political issues.

The relevance of ideology to political experience is the same as the relevance of the cookbook to cookery. If there is little or no experience of, for example, liberal democratic institutions in a particular political community, a written constitution supposedly instantiating such principles will be useless; while, where there is extensive experience of and commitment to liberal democracy, a written constitution will be redundant.

A written constitution might serve as a reminder of the "admitted goods" of a political community, but it won't serve as a replacement for the actual conduct of politics within that community. If, over the course of time, the admitted goods change, then the constitution in the widest sense will change as well, whether there is any amendment to a written document or not. As Callahan notes, "a written constitution can offer, at best, a subsidiary support for the maintenance of some particular, desired manner of ordering a nation's political life, the continuation of which depends primarily on the importance that citizenry assigns to preserving that form of government."

We can see in Callahan's account further reasons for the neglect of Oakeshott's work by contemporary policymongers. Obviously, if Oakeshott is wrong about rationalism, then they are sensible to ignore him. But if he is right about the deficiencies of the ideological style, then they are unlikely even to understand him. The rationalist, when he fails, is like an American trying to speak to a foreigner who knows no English; the American thus continues by merely repeating himself in a much louder voice. If the rationalist's project doesn't work at first, his answer is to repeat it in a more expensive and ex-

London School of Economics

Michael Oakeshott

pansive fashion.

Callahan offers an Oakeshottian explanation of the radical discontinuity between American constitutional fundamentalism and actual U.S. political practice. His book goes beyond an examination of Oakeshott's critique of rationalism and investigates the relevance of that critique for contemporary American politics. He asks, first, "has the American political tradition been characterized by rationalistic discourse?" and second, "has the American constitution, which is an example of the rationalist disposition at work, been especially effective at limiting government?"

The opposite of rationalism for Oakeshott is not irrationalism but authentic practical reasonableness.

In answering these questions, Callahan undermines one of the central myths of American political culture (as well as movement conservatism): that the Founders created a nearly perfect Constitution which, if followed to the letter, would provide remedies to all of our political problems. The mythical element here is of a prelapsarian purity in which a flawless document appears like Athena emerging from the forehead of Zeus. However, as the myth continues, a subsequent fall from grace and straying from the original constitution has led us into the sinful land of relativism and the "living Constitution." We can only be rescued from the slough of despond by returning to the oracular pronouncements of the original document.

The question of the ideological or rationalistic character of the Founders is rather easily answered by briefly perusing the justifications advanced by those who rebelled against British rule and by their political descendants. Here is just a brief sample. Alexander Hamilton claimed that "the sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the Hand of Divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power." (Does Hamilton believe that, in the entire history of mankind, he and his fellows are the first rational human beings?) His colleague in the ratification debates, John Jay, argued that "the Americans are the first people whom Heaven has favored with an opportunity of deliberating upon, and choosing the forms of government under which they should live. All other constitutions have derived their existence from violence or accidental circumstances." (Was Jay suggesting that the American Revolution was nonviolent?) And even that changeling John C. Calhoun pronounced that "we have a government of a new order, perfectly distinct from all which has ever preceded it. A government founded on the rights of man, resting not on authority, not on prejudice, not on superstition, but reason… . All civilized governments must in the course of time conform to its principles." (This was before he discovered his real allegiance was with South Carolina.)

Examples could fill multiple volumes, but these should suffice to suggest that, at the very least, the tradition of American political rhetoric has been rationalist or ideological in the Oakeshottian sense from the beginning of the Republic. Oakeshott himself certainly thought so, and noted, "it was in a flight of fancy that the Federalist writer urged his contemporaries to bend themselves to the completion of their political task so that succeeding generations might be undistracted in their devotion to the arts of civilized living." In other words, the Founders meant what they did, rather than merely what they said.

In suggesting that, Oakeshott neglected the exemplary rationalist of the early American Republic, but fortunately Callahan does not. Thomas Jefferson is exhibit A in Callahan's case that, despite the rhetoric, American political practice has not really been so rationalistic after all because, as previously noted, rationalist human action is an impossibility. Jefferson, who claimed that each generation should wipe the slate clean and start again, and who also claimed an absolute allegiance to the letter of the Constitution, was notable throughout most of his presidency for disregarding it. Jefferson quite obviously ignored his own strictures on constitutional literalism when making the Louisiana Purchase and when engaged in his vengeful pursuit of Aaron Burr. The former was the decision of a pragmatic and forward-looking politician, while the latter was a manifestation of Jefferson's personal vindictiveness. Further, the bombastic character of Jefferson's public pronouncements on the natural equality and freedom of men rested quite uneasily with his rather traditional treatment of those men and women whom he owned. Jefferson as practical politician and traditionalist planter trumped Jefferson the ideologist every time.

Callahan offers many more examples of the discontinuity between American ideology and American practice, but he focuses on the rationalistic character of constitutionalism in contrast to the pragmatic character of American political life. He offers a conspicuous example in the election of 1800, which he describes as "a notable instance of the inability of rationalist planners to devise a scheme that could foresee the multitudinous contingencies thrown up by actual political

practice." Despite the almost infinite wisdom of the writers of the Constitution, they somehow did not foresee the emergence of the single most important force in U.S. electoral history: political parties. In the presidential election of 1800 there were significant problems with the balloting which should have voided Georgia's ballot and thrown the election to the House of Representatives. But Jefferson (an interested party, perhaps) was the vice president and thus in charge of the decision, and predictably accepted the Georgia ballot. There was also no distinction made on the original Electoral College ballot between president and vice president, and there was no contingency described in the Constitution if the House could not come to a final decision.

Decisions were ultimately made, of course, and Jefferson took office, but none of it had anything to do with the original intent of the Founders. As Callahan soberly concludes, "the failure to follow the letter of the Constitution … is something that began almost as soon as the U.S. Constitution was adopted, and is not (primarily) a symptom of bad faith but, rather, an inevitable consequence of the fact that no such rationalist design can ever dictate subsequent practice in the way that it is meant to do."

So what are the implications of Callahan's assertions? I think there are two distinct sets of conclusions to take away from the book. First, the academic conclusion would be that a new approach to American political history and political thought is necessary. The first order of business will be to devise a more adequate periodization in which it is acknowledged that today's U.S. constitutional arrangement has about as much to do with that of either 1785 or 1805 as the contemporary British constitutional arrangement has to do with its 18th-century "mixed constitution" ancestor. There have been at least four distinctive American republics, if not more, though, unlike the French, we don't normally rip up our document and start over when we change constitutions.

Academic historians of American political thought should eschew hagiography and pay attention to what the participants actually say, why they say it, and how far what they say differs from the actual political and social reality of their time. Leave the hagiography to the journalists and focus on the historical meaning of various utterances and actions and the connection between such meanings and the self-conceptions (largely mythical) of Americans contemporary to the subjects of study.

Second, since the traditional discourse of American politics has been predominantly rationalist, there is little hope of an immediate cure. To paraphrase R.G. Collingwood, a person may think that he is a duck; that will not make him one, but it will affect his conduct, and for the worse. American politicians and those who serve them think that they're ducks, and although they aren't, they are likely to continue to quack ideologically. Thus it is doubtful that a non-ideological politics, which emphasizes both the limitations and the necessity of political activity—the need for real consensus, the need to address actual not "potential" problems, etc.—could succeed in the United States.

To look to Oakeshott's work for a practical solution, however, is a mistake since he has no doctrine to sell in the market of ideologies, given that his alternative to rationalistic politics is a traditionalist pursuit of intimations. Indeed, as Oakeshott observed, "it is always depressing for a patient to be told that his disease is almost as old as himself and that consequently there is no quick cure for it, but… this is usually the case." ■

Kenneth B. McIntyre is the author of Herbert Butterfield: History, Providence, and Skeptical Politics.

Two, Three, Many McCarthyisms

by CLARK STOOKSBURY

Manufacturing Hysteria: A History of Scapegoating, Surveillance, and Secrecy in Modern America, Jay Feldman, Anchor, 416 pages

"I dreamed I saw Joe Hill last night, alive as you and me." The oft-recorded folk standard tells of a misty encounter with the legendary labor activist and member of the Industrial Workers of the World. Hill was executed in Utah in 1915, after a dubious trial, for a double murder he most likely did not commit. In *Manufacturing Hysteria*, a wide-ranging history of sedition panics and government repression in modern America, journalist Jay Feldman uses Hill's execution as an example of fear run amok.

Feldman begins with the administration of Woodrow Wilson. The 28th president was an authoritarian who began stoking fears of "hyphenated-Americans"—whom he claimed "poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life"—before the United States went to war with Germany. After entering the Great War, the Wilson administration and a compliant Congress enacted the Espionage Act of 1917, which gave the government vast powers of repression. Senator William Borah of Idaho, one of the few legislators to vote against the act, stated that "a more autocratic, more Prussian measure could not be found in Germany." The legislation apparently wasn't Prussian enough and was soon joined by the Sedition Act, which made it a crime to "utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States."

Socialist presidential candidate Eugene Debs became the most famous free-speech prisoner during the Great War. He was indicted in 1918 for de-

claiming at a Canton, Ohio Socialist picnic that, *inter alia*, the "patriotic duty" of the ruling class "never takes them to the firing line or chucks them into the trenches." The prosecuting attorney called him "the palpitating pulse of the sedition crusade." The jury agreed, and Debs received a ten-year sentence, served until it was commuted in 1921 by President Harding.

The Sedition Act gave Postmaster General Albert Burleson power over every publication in the country. Burleson directed local postmasters to "keep a close watch on unsealed matters, newspapers, etc." The Post Office then proceeded to ban numerous, mostly Socialist publications. When an issue of *The Masses* was censored, editor Max Eastman protested to Woodrow Wilson, as did Amos Pinchot and John Reed. Their complaints went unheeded, and Burleson added insult to injury by revoking the second-class mailing permit from *The Masses* and other publications that had had an issue banned, on the grounds that they were no longer periodicals.

Manufacturing hysteria is much easier with the aid of a compliant press. Feldman documents the leading role played by the *New York Times* in stoking fear of "hyphenated-Americans" and immigrant radicals. When the anarchists Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman were deported, the *Times* practically spat nails at them. "With the general American gratification at the departure of these unclean spirits may well be mingled something of shame to remember how long they suffered to afflict us." It wasn't just the *Times*—Feldman quotes papers from the *Seattle Times* to the *Washington Post* supporting the deportation of, as the *Post* put it, "bewhiskered, ranting, howling, mentally warped, law-defying aliens."

Elite newspaper editors used words, but angry mobs often resorted to bloodshed. *Manufacturing Hysteria* begins with a prologue describing numerous examples of mob violence, including the 1918 lynching of Robert Paul Prager, who was suspected of being a spy. "On April 3, a group of miners seized Prager and, employing the ritual widely practiced on anyone suspected of disloyalty, compelled him to kiss the flag." Collinsville, Illinois officials made feeble attempts to save Prager's life, but the mob broke him out of custody and hanged him from a tree. Eleven defendants were eventually acquitted of his murder in a trial described as a "farcical patriotic orgy."

After the war widespread paranoia fostered several attempted or successful terrorist bombings, allowing the federal government to keep the heat on socialists and anarchists. A series of mail bombs caused explosions that rocked seven cities on June 2, 1919, including at the home of U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. A leaflet found near the Palmer residence spouted incendiary rhetoric: "There will have to be bloodshed; we will not dodge; there will have to be murder; we will kill, because it is necessary; there will have to be destruction..." The crimes were never solved: evidence suggested that the federal government suspected a small band of Italian-American anarchists known as the Galleanists, but it chose instead to fan fears of a national conspiracy.

The 1919 Red Scare helped advance the career of a young J. Edgar Hoover at what was then the Bureau of Investigation (BI). In 1921, he was elevated to its assistant director under President Harding. After a Justice Department house cleaning in 1924, the new attorney general, Harlan Fiske Stone, promoted Hoover again. Feldman notes Hoover's cynicism in portraying himself as a "champion of civil liberties and tolerance" to please the new regime. The cynical ploy worked so well that Hoover won the endorsement of the American Civil Liberties Union after

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he convinced ACLU founder Roger Baldwin that he had not been a supporter of the Palmer Raids and repressive tactics of the BI. Once ensconced, Hoover gripped the reins of power so tightly that they could only be pried from his cold, dead hands nearly 50 years later.

Stone instituted reforms to reel in the BI and refocus it on law enforcement instead of tracking subversives. The rise of organized crime during Prohibition helped to give the bureau new purpose for a time. President Franklin Roosevelt—whom Feldman notes possessed an "often cavalier disregard for civil liberties"—uncorked the bottle again when he met with Hoover in 1936 to discuss the subversive activities of suspected Fascists and Communists. FDR was particularly concerned with the German American Bund. The result was an FBI back in the business of domestic intelligence gathering.

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Roosevelt administration issued a proclamation restricting the activities of Japanese aliens in the U.S., and shortly thereafter he would do the same regarding German and Italian aliens. Only people of Japanese ancestry, however, were placed in internment camps on a large scale. Feldman writes that "a cloud of suspicion hung over all three communities, based in large part on the assumption and fear that aliens' loyalties were necessarily divided between the United States and their countries of origin." German and Italian aliens avoided large-scale internment because they were too great in number and were protected by the administration's fear of angering the sizable German-American and Italian-American communities. Feldman quotes two very different columnists supporting the internment of people of Japanese ancestry:

> Such disparate and influential syndicated newspaper pundits as the measured liberal Walter Lippmann and the acerbic conservative Westbrook Pegler both came out in favor of removal. In a piece called 'The Fifth Column on the Coast,' Lippmann argued for 'a policy of mass evacuation and mass internment,' and three days later Pegler fulminated, 'The Japanese in California should be under armed guard to the last man and woman right now—and to hell with habeas corpus until the danger is over.'

The aftermath of World War II saw the country embroiled in a second Red Scare. In the 1940s, former spies Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers publicly admitted to having been Soviet agents and exposed, among others, high-ranking officials like Harry Dexter White and Alger Hiss as being spies as well. White denied the charges and died of a heart attack within days of testifying before Congress. Hiss also denied the charges under oath and was later convicted of perjury. Both were implicated by the secret Venona Project, which tracked Soviet espionage in the United States. One weakness of *Manufacturing Hysteria* is that Feldman gives too little credence to these charges and neglects to mention the Venona evidence.

After Republican gains in the 1946 midterm elections, the Truman administration began a series of anticommunist loyalty investigations within the federal government, establishing the Employees Loyalty Program by executive order in 1947. The fear of communism set the stage for the rise of Joseph McCarthy, who gave his infamous Lincoln Day speech in Wheeling, West Virginia on February 9, 1950, just days after Hiss was convicted of perjury. "McCarthyism" would become a byword for second Red Scare.

With his explosive charges of Soviet spies in high places, McCarthy became a dominant force in American politics before sawing himself off of the limb he sat on. The Wisconsin senator ceased to be a significant force after he was censured by his fellow legislators in 1954, but the hunt for subversives continued. The FBI instituted a series of "Counterintelligence Programs"—COINTELPRO—during the 1950s to entrap real and imagined subversives. The most famous target of Hoover and the FBI was Martin Luther King. The investigation of King was based the assumption that some of his associates were Communists, but the FBI's level of attention suggests a more personal motivation. Hoover intervened to keep Marquette University from granting King an honorary degree and was especially agitated at King's winning a Nobel Peace Prize. The bureau's most egregious abuse of power in this case was a crude attempt to wreck King's marriage by sending him illegally recorded tapes of his marital infidelities, accompanied by a crudely forged letter encouraging him to commit suicide before his "filthy, abnormal fraudulent self is bared to the nation."

The harassment of King and other COINTELPRO abuses came to light toward the end of Hoover's career as the level of trust Americans had in their government was collapsing. COINTELPRO was exposed by a group styling themselves the Citizen's Commission to Investigate the FBI, whose members broke into a federal office in Media, Pennsylvania and began mailing pilfered documents to reporters and legislators.

Feldman calls for vigilance in the wake of continuing assaults on civil liberties, and there are plenty of areas of to be concerned about, from the national hysteria that followed the 9/11 attacks to the trend toward militarization of law enforcement. There have been notable civil-liberties successes, however, in the last century: if the Bush administration had had the same level of authority in 2002 as Woodrow Wilson did in 1917, the feds would have strangled *The American Conservative* in its crib, and the war critics who filled its pages would have gone to prison. ■

Clark Stooksbury writes from Knoxville, Tennessee.

Taki

The Thin White Lie

In the autumn of 1972 I was living in Paris, and William Buckley suggested I interview expatriate American writers like James Jones and Irwin Shaw for *National Review.* I was excited by the idea and went to work immediately. I rang James Jones from my room at the Plaza-Athenee, where I was living in great comfort after my *al fresco* stay in Hue, Vietnam the previous spring. Jones answered the telephone himself, and the conversation went something like this:

Me: Hello, Mr. Jones, my name is Taki Theodoracopulos. I write for *NR* and would very much like to interview you.

JJ: I am sorry, but I don't give interviews.

Me: This is very bad news because I'm a struggling writer who has just returned from Nam and needs to feed two children and a wife.

JJ: Well, we are all struggling writers, what can I say?

Me: Some more than others. But the kids gotta eat.

JJ: What did you say your name was and who do you write for?

Me: Taki Theodoracopulos, and it's *National Review*, the William F. Buckley Jr. conservative fortnightly.

JJ: You poor bastard. You better come around.

And around I went, to his beautiful house on the Left Bank, where he and his wife Gloria treated me with great kindness and generosity of spirit. Jones revealed to me that he'd had it with Paris. "I'm going back to my roots in the good old U.S.A. Paris is really yesterday. Like Papa said, 'Paris is for the young ….'" He pointed out that the City of Lights had been irreparably damaged by the modern architecture sprouting all over the place and that the people had lost some of their spirit for the arts and literature. "The mindset is now that of Wall Street, so why settle for second best?"

A butler served us a wonderful lunch, Jones encouraging me to have seconds and thirds, obviously hoping to fatten me up before I returned to a diet of bread and beans. We talked about writing. *Time* had just published some rubbish about how Irwin Shaw and Jones were *passé* because they were simple storytellers. "Yes," said Jones, "both Irwin and I write books that have a beginning, a middle, and an end, and we try to entertain our readers not confuse them." This was before deconstructionism and magic realism had muddled the issue of literature. Still, we found plenty of ammunition against the modernists. Having taken copious notes, I bade James and Gloria *adieu* and thanked them profusely. I had spent eight hours with them, but it felt like much less. Jones looked awfully uncomfortable as I was leaving. But Gloria whispered something to him, we shook hands, and I left. I found out later that he wanted to slip me a few francs, but his wife thought I might be insulted by it.

Now comes the good part, as told to me by Irwin Shaw years later. Two weeks after my interview with James Jones, he and Irwin and their wives were dining in a bistro when the *Time* article came up in conversation. Irwin was steamed up about it. "Who the hell are these no-talents to be passing judgment on us?" He then made a few choice remarks about critics and the press in general. James tried to calm him down. "Don't forget, we're quite fortunate. I had a kid come and see me recently, and he has a family to support on a lousy $8,000 per year that Bill Buckley pays him. He had a long, strange name, a Greek one."

"That's funny," said Shaw, "I know somebody like that. His name is Taki Theodoracopulos."

"Yeah, that's him," said Jones.

"Well," said Irwin, "Taki is a friend of mine, is not married, has no kids, writes the occasional article for *NR*, and in case you are interested, I'm going to be on his yacht in the south of France next week."

"Son of a bitch," spluttered Jones, "I've been conned by a fascist."

Years later, at a Fourth of July party in Easthampton, Irwin couldn't stop chuckling about it. James Jones had passed away by then, as Irwin would soon afterwards, but he went on and on about it, actually congratulating me for having tugged at James's heartstrings. "You must have known that James was a softie underneath, didn't you?"

Well, I didn't, but successful, tough-guy writers like Jones are more often than not eager to help those whose talents don't match their own. ■

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

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



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







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