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Ron Paul Paradox
TIMOTHY STANLEY

Revolt in the Ranks
CHRIS BRAY

Romney Capitalism
SEAN SCALLON

JUNE 2012

The American Conservative

IDEAS OVER IDEOLOGY • PRINCIPLES OVER PARTY



When News Becomes
PROPAGANDA

JORDAN BLOOM

Did you ever consider that when people keep their balance, it is not by their intent? Instead, they are acting on the intent of a natural law we call gravity.

Extend that concept to all the laws of physics and realize that to be safe, people must act on the intent of all applicable laws of physics, as each law's intent dictates what people should do.

Decades ago the late Richard W. Wetherill identified a natural law that defines its intent for the behavior of the human race, and he called it the Law of Absolute Right. Lacking knowledge of that law caused the ancients and all following generations to live by their own intent, routinely causing their extinction.

The intent of nature's behavioral Law of Absolute Right is defined as rational and honest responses to all aspects of life.

Thanks to Wetherill's insight, this generation has the opportunity to change their flawed thinking and behavior to the intent of an inviolable, self-enforcing natural law, calling for the same compliance as with the laws of physics.








Richard W. Wetherill
1906-1989

People who accept the logic of the above explanation live by the intent of the behavioral law, as best they can. They know that any problems or troublesome results indicate their deviation from the Law of Absolute Right. Eagerly they drop their intent and return to the safety of the intent of this natural law.


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This Month

VOL. 12, NO. 6, JUNE 2012



ARTICLES

- 15 **Neo-Keynesian Trap**
Easy credit stimulates bad growth
CHARLES HUGH SMITH
- 18 **As Goode as It Gets**
The right's third-party alternative
W. JAMES ANTLE III
- 21 **Romney Capitalism**
His father made cars, Mitt made money.
SEAN SCALLON
- 24 **Revolt in the Ranks**
The virtue of military disobedience
CHRIS BRAY
- 28 **Eastern Right**
Conservatives turn to Orthodox Christianity
ROD DREHER
- 31 **Hungary Reconstituted**
Budapest repeals liberalism
A.K. MOLNAR
- 34 **Kuwait's Crossroads**
Islamists win. Does America lose?
DOUG BANDOW

COVER STORY

- 12 **When News Is Propaganda**
Why cable has no place for Pat Buchanan
JORDAN BLOOM

FRONT LINES

- 6 Thomas Sowell's myopic *Visions*
JORDAN MICHAEL SMITH
- 7 Markets precede democracy
MARTIN SIEFF
- 8 The F-35 stealth turkey
WILLIAM S. LIND
- 10 Psychology of the drone
ED WARNER

COMMENTARY

- 5 *The American Conservative's* web
- 11 Where have all the workers gone?
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
- 33 War and the intellectuals
ROBERT NISBET
- 38 Surveilling Bill Clinton
PHILIP GIRALDI
- 39 Ron Paul's punk ethos
BILL KAUFFMAN
- 58 A brawl with Alec Baldwin
TAKI

ARTS & LETTERS

- 40 *Enemies: A History of the FBI*
by Tim Weiner
JAMES BOVARD
- 43 *Ron Paul's Revolution: The Man and the Movement He Inspired*
by Brian Doherty
TIMOTHY STANLEY
- 46 *Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States*
by Michael Lind
JAMES P. PINKERTON
- 48 *Uncontrolled: The Surprising Payoff of Trial-and-Error for Business, Politics, and Society*
by Jim Manzi
RONALD BAILEY
- 51 *Bad Religion: How We Became a Nation of Heretics*
by Ross Douthat
NOELLE DALY
- 54 *Cosmic Constitutional Theory: Why Americans Are Losing Their Inalienable Right to Self-Governance*
by J. Harvie Wilkinson
WILLIAM J. WATKINS JR.

COVER ILLUSTRATION: Michael Hogue

CHINA'S BABY BUST

Mr. Unz makes a few interesting points (“China’s Rise, America’s Fall,” May 2012). But China is facing a growing demographic crisis. With its one-child policy, China will have a lot more young men and not enough women to marry or have children with. This will put a crimp on the Middle Kingdom being the low-cost factory of the world.

While their overall GDP might pass that of the United States, in terms of per capita GDP China will still lag. With an aging population, a looming population decline, and a slowing economy China faces obstacles that the rich world faces but without the money.

Unlike Europe and the United States, China does not have a social safety net. There is no social security for the elderly, who are expected to go and live with their children, a further drain on the spending of Chinese workers.

KEVIN WINTER
Elk Grove, Calif.

UNEXAMINED REVIEW

I was puzzled by the review of my book, *The Unexamined Orwell*, by Chilton Williamson (“No More Orwells,” March 2012) because it is less a review than it is a litany of *ad hominem* criticisms conducted by someone whom I’ve never met. He seems to have placed me in some bogeyman categories that have triggered his ire, none of which is related to the book and several of which are completely inaccurate as to the person and writer I am. I only wish that readers of *The American Conservative* could have a chance to read a review of the book itself, not a skewed review of my presumed literary and professional identity.

Mr. Williamson repeatedly misfires. For instance, he calls me an “academician,” which reflects the very “Socialsciencespeak” and “Academ-

icspeak” of which he accuses me. Repeatedly he refers to me as “Professor Rodden” or bemoans my book as “another failed attempt by another academic at ‘creativity,’” calling the book “a pig’s breakfast” of “18 academic articles.” Mr. Williamson is obviously unaware that I am no more an academic than he is—I left academe 20 years ago. I write nonfiction and poetry for various publications, including *The American Conservative*, *Modern Age*, and the publisher from whom his forthcoming volume is appearing, ISI Books.

All this is little more than academic-baiting. Mr. Williamson says that my own prose style, unlike Orwell’s, is comparable to “a sheet of crazed glass half-obscured by cob-webs and smuts.” He offers no specific example in support of that assertion. Mr. Williamson also associates me erroneously with “the hard Left” and the “left-leaning establishment,” by whom he says Orwell has been treated as a “moral hero.” This sort of rhetorical overkill and ignorance of the views of Orwell’s conservative and moderate cultural critics are embarrassing.

If Mr. Williamson is no strong admirer of Orwell, I have no objection to that. But why dismiss so many distinguished admirers of Orwell as if their opinions count for nothing? Those admirers include cultural conservatives such as John Wain, Kingsley Amis, Robert Conquest, John Lukacs, Russell Kirk, Dwight Macdonald, Peter Viereck, and Robert Nisbet. All of them have responded to Orwell as an inspiring presence, indeed as an intellectual hero, sometimes even explicitly calling him a “moral hero.”

Several of them have also been drawn to speculate on what Orwell would have said about the events after his death, the thematic question in one of my chapters, “If Orwell Were Alive Today.”

Continued on page 57

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The American Conservative

{ VOL. 11, NO. 11, JUNE 2012 }

Turn Off, Tune Out, Drop In

The television blares: a blonde bombshell declaims the headlines or a few red-faced older men shout themselves to apoplexy. For millions of cable viewers, this is the news—or what used to be the news. Thirty years ago nonstop reporting, with some seasoned commentary interspersed, seemed to herald an information revolution long before the dot-com boom. But for years Ted Turner had the cable-news field to himself. Conservatives demanded an alternative: a co-host on “Crossfire” was no substitute for a channel of one’s own.

Trouble was, movement conservatism had already been mixed promiscuously with Republican Party loyalty, a concoction that juiced the market first for talk radio and then for Fox News. The right-wing press—once stocked with a little food for the brain—envied its younger, louder brothers and rushed to emulate them. Book publishers did likewise. And soon you could read Rush Limbaugh or Mark Levin, Sean Hannity or Bill O’Reilly, as well as watching and listening to their wit and insight.

That was too much. Republican happy-talk, neo-conservative stargazing, and the overall lowering of the right’s moral and intellectual standards had to be resisted. Turn off, tune out, and drop in—independently minded conservatives and libertarians needed a new outlet. The Internet offered many. *The American Conservative* offered another kind, the traditional (in several senses) print magazine. The thinking right is not without a presence on radio—Mike Church on Sirius XM comes immediately to mind—and, until the networks disposed of them this spring, Patrick Buchanan and Andrew Napolitano gave it voice on MSNBC and Fox Business Channel.

But most of the action for Burkean conservatives or Rothbardian libertarians has been found in small magazines and new media.

TAC is now fighting on both fronts. We have had a website since the beginning, but until now our web presence has been a platform for print content. It still is that, but it is also much more. *TheAmericanConservative.com* carries daily, indeed hourly updates and observations from such conservative minds as Daniel Larison, Rod Dreher, and the magazine’s battalion of contributing editors. Young thinkers who eschew ideology and embrace what was derided in the Bush years as “the reality-based community” are also plentiful on the *TAC* site—fresh writers familiar from these pages, such as Noah Millman, Scott Galupo, and Eve Tushnet. Though small in numbers, the philosophical right and its allies punch far above their weight class.

Our recently remodeled website also includes *The Repository*, an archive of conservative thought from the past century (and earlier), re-presenting classic texts that in some cases have not been seen for decades by any but scholars’ eyes. Albert Jay Nock, T.E. Hulme, Senator Robert A. Taft—names familiar from the magazine’s “Old and Right” department abound in *The Repository*.

Americans are awash in a sea of propaganda, bombarded by noisemakers from every side of the partisan spectrum. The written word, especially the printed word, is a haven amid this cacophony. (Mark Levin’s coloring books notwithstanding.) The Internet too is rife with distraction, but the revamped *American Conservative* website offers a fixed point among the waves, anchored to the bedrock of tradition. As the kids say, check it out. ■

Front Lines

Impaired Visions

Thomas Sowell's thinking is blinded by partisanship.

by JORDAN MICHAEL SMITH

Thomas Sowell is no ordinary right-wing pundit. For one thing, he is actually a subject expert, having a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago. For another, he has won many honors off limits to hacks. From a National Humanities Medal to positions at Cornell and UCLA, he is among the most decorated of conservative intellectuals writing today. Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker cites Sowell approvingly, and he has been praised by *The Economist*. Among conservatives, Sowell is akin to what John Kenneth Galbraith was for the left, a hallowed figure approaching the status of a deity.

Sowell's most esteemed work is *A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles*. In 2005, *National Review* cited it as one of ten books that have "advanced the cause of conservatism, and of freedom in general" in the magazine's lifetime, alongside classics by Solzhenitsyn and Milton Friedman. Scholar Charles Murray wrote that *A Conflict of Visions* "gives us an intellectual framework that must shape an attentive reader's way of looking at the political world forever after." Upon the book's initial release in 1987 (a revised edition appeared 20 years later), the *New York Times* called it "cogent" and "extraordinary."

The 25th anniversary of the book makes an apt occasion for reconsidering *A Conflict of Visions*. For while Sowell's work has the trappings of a dispassionate, fair-minded rendering of political

debates, in fact it exemplifies many of the failings common to the contemporary conservative intelligentsia. Not only does the book fail to understand the American left, it fails to describe the American right from which Sowell himself emerges. For all its erudition and accessibility, *A Conflict of Visions* betrays a profound self-delusion.

According to Sowell, American political debates follow two parallel lines tracking distinct visions of human nature. Those on the left have an unconstrained view of man, and those on the right have a constrained view. The unconstrained view holds that humans are perfectible creatures sullied only by their flawed social environments. With the proper education and social support, man can become an altruistic, even Christ-like being. Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau was the unconstrained thinker *par excellence*, holding that "men are not naturally enemies" and that the individual "is born free but everywhere is in chains." Man is inherently rational in this perspective. With proper organization and education, universal peace is attainable, as is the eradication of poverty, violence, and disunion. John Kenneth Galbraith was a recent example of a thinker with an unconstrained view of human nature, according to Sowell.

In contrast, the constrained vision sees man as a beast, held in check by customs, traditions, and coercion. Adam Smith, the *Federalist*, and, especially, Edmund Burke epitomized the

beliefs of the constrained view. Moral and intellectual limitations define the perspective of this outlook, which believes above all in the "general infirmities of human nature," as Burke put it. War is ineradicable, as are class conflicts, hatred, and evil. The ideas of Friedrich Hayek represent the humility of the constrained view, writes Sowell.

For Sowell, these taxonomies go far in explaining political debates. "Conflicts of visions affect not only such large and enduring issues as economic planning versus laissez-faire, or judicial activism versus judicial restraint, but also such new issues as the most effective modes of Third World development, 'affirmative action,' or 'comparable worth,'" he writes. "In each of these controversies, the assumptions of one vision lead logically to opposite conclusions from those of the other."

Even-handed as Sowell's arrangements appear to be, they are deeply flawed. For all his purported commitment to evidence, very little of contemporary debate is explained by Sowell's visions. Begin, for example, with foreign policy. Only those who call themselves paleoconservatives or foreign-policy realists can be honestly considered adherents to the constrained view of human nature in international affairs. In recent years both liberals and movement conservatives have shown themselves fond of nation-building and using force to change foreign societies. It would be difficult to imagine a policy matching the unconstrained vision more perfectly than the invasion and occupation of Iraq, with its intention of swiftly implanting liberal-democratic values in a region that has scarcely

known them. Given his self-conception as the prudent man facing a society of overzealous social engineers, one might be surprised that Sowell, like nearly all other Republicans, supported the war. More than that, he criticized the very idea of a constrained foreign-policy vision. In a 2002 column called “Dangerous Restraint,” he likened the “threat” from Saddam Hussein to—what else?—that of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s. “Caution is sometimes the most dangerous policy,” he wrote. “And this looks like one of those times today.”

By 2006, Sowell was suddenly re-embracing the constrained view. “Another concept whose bitter falsity has been painfully revealed in Iraq is ‘nation-building.’ People are not building blocks, however much some may flatter themselves that they can arrange their fellow human beings’ lives the way you can arrange pieces on a chess board.” Like so many other contemporary intellectuals, Sowell does not so much subscribe to a political philosophy as adopt and abandon ideas whenever convenient to do so from a partisan standpoint.

This is not just a matter of scoring cheap shots or identifying obvious examples of hypocrisy. The point is that today’s debates don’t primarily revolve around notions of human nature. Those who oppose same-sex marriage, for instance, are nearly all self-described conservatives—among them Thomas Sowell. Yet one would be hard-pressed to imagine a more radical unconstrained vision than the hope that an individual’s homosexuality can be reversed. “What the activists really want is the stamp of acceptance on homosexuality, as a means of spreading that lifestyle, which has become a death style in the era of AIDS,” Sowell wrote in 2005. The notion that homosexuality can be spread to those who don’t want it reveals a tremendously malleable view of human nature.

Similarly with healthcare. Those on the left who believe in universal health-

care have plenty of other countries to point to as examples of places where human nature is sufficiently elastic to allow for government-sponsored health services. Conservatives do not oppose government-run healthcare out of a belief that humans are incapable of it. Rather, they do so on the principle of individual responsibility and beliefs about the proper role of government. Human nature enters into it little, if at all.

On issue after issue, what Sowell sees as debates reflecting conflicting visions

of human nature revolve as much or more around concepts such as justice, freedom, and religion, to say nothing of the grubbier instincts of class, race, and tribe. To the extent that *A Conflict of Visions* has become a lodestar for the right, it suggests nothing so much as a lack of self-understanding. Sometimes even the strongest of visions are blurred. ■

Jordan Michael Smith is a contributing writer at Salon.

Markets First, Elections Later

Why democratization fails from Russia to Iraq

by MARTIN SIEFF

It was November 1989, and I was in Moscow accompanying a delegation of senior *Washington Times* editors. They were eager to gloat over the coming collapse of communism with their own eyes.

We were in the shabby, very much the worse for wear, unpretentious little office of the chief ideologist of the Institute for the Study of Systems of Socialism. His name was Andranik Migranian. Today he is a wealthy and successful man, running a think tank in New York, and has been consulted by Russian leaders for more than 20 years.

For all his stature in Russia and his practical professional success, Migranian remains almost unknown to the American media. His influence in the halls of Congress, the White House, and the State Department is zero. In those days he was an enthusiastic champion of democracy for Russia. But he believed that it would take at least 20 years, maybe more. A free market would have to be created first. Migranian argued passionately that the worst way to create democracy was to create it instantly from a standing start.

That’s the same mistake the United States has made in Iraq and Afghanistan. It’s the mistake we—following

Thomas Friedman—are making in assuming that the Arab Spring will create any stable, Western-style democracies in the Middle East. It’s the mistake Friedman and the presidents naïve enough to believe him have made in sacrificing American jobs to build the Chinese economy. They all believe in Instant Democracy. Just add hot water, like instant coffee, and it will come.

Back in 1989, Migranian already knew that idea was rubbish. He had studied world history. He knew all about the birth of successful democracies and free markets across Europe, North America, and Asia going back hundreds of years. And his conclusions were simple:

First, you cannot create a successful democracy if a successful free market and a large middle class enjoying basic property rights and the rule of law do not already exist.

Second, the system of checks and balances in any democratic society allows existing interest groups to prevent a free market from emerging. So there is no free market to generate the overall rising levels of prosperity and optimism across society that any democracy needs to survive and flourish.

Third, it takes a tough, centralized

authoritarian government or a strong, self-confident oligarchy to create the conditions for a free market to emerge. Only a strong central government can impose a free market and prevent the less efficient elements of society from blocking it.

However, once the free market is created and starts to function, a new, wider, stronger middle class will emerge. Over a period of one to three generations—from about 20 to 100 years—democracy will emerge. It won't be easy, there may be years of frustration, of struggle and learning. But when democracy does come, as it has to nations from Poland to South Korea, it's the real thing. It works.

Think about it: if Migranian is right, then Thomas Friedman, Charles Krauthammer, Peter Beinart, and the entire, endlessly chattering tribes of neo-conservatives and neoliberals are all wrong. You cannot expect democracies to emerge fully formed whenever a repressive or even mildly authoritarian but just plain corrupt government falls to revolution and popular protests.

Back in Moscow in 1989, I already recognized the original, radical nature of what Migranian was saying. I often thought of his ideas during the next 20 years when I traveled widely across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia for the *Washington Times* and United Press International. I personally witnessed where new democratic societies were emerging and where they obviously were not.

I also recognized that Migranian's model perfectly explained the conditions under which Britain emerged to global greatness as the first major industrialized nation in the 18th century. It explained the pattern of how successful democracies emerged in most other major countries as well.

Migranian's model explained why democracy collapsed in Weimar Germany in the 1930s. For 15 years after World War I, the long-suffering German people were hit by one national calamity after another. An idealistic,

weak, and ineffective democracy discredited the whole idea of democracy among the German people. Instead, the failed Weimar experiment prepared the way for them to accept the monstrous dictatorship of Adolf Hitler. Their parents would never have swallowed Hitler's evil lies in the stable, tolerant, and largely democratic imperial Germany before 1914.

In the years that followed, Migranian incurred the rage of Russian liberal democrats. They accused him of being a secret fascist. But the course of Russian history in the 1990s and early 2000s proved him to be a prophet.

Under the hapless guidance of U.S. President Bill Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, and Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers, Russia embarked on an enormous privatization program. It sounded great.

But in reality this meant that control of the vast resources of the Russian Federation—even without the other 14 former Soviet republics, still the largest country in the world—fell into the hands of enterprising buccaneers. They became known in the West as Russia's new oligarchs.

Stealth Turkey

The trillion-dollar F-35 is an easy target.

by WILLIAM S. LIND

Congressman Paul Ryan's laudable if sometimes misguided efforts to trim the federal deficit deserve support. So here's an idea for him. Want to lose a trillion dollars in ugly budget fat? Cut off the F-35 fighter/bomber.

\$1 trillion is now the estimated life-cycle cost of the F-35. Some calculations place the figure even higher, closer to \$1.5 trillion.

How could the president and Congress contemplate spending that much for an airplane? The answer goes back to the futility and vast casualty count

Over the past decade some of those oligarchs have fallen. Quite a few have fled Russia. They have been replaced by new oligarchs known as the *siloviki*. These new guys have close ties to Vladimir Putin.

But Russia never developed a truly free market. And it didn't develop a successful democracy either. Migranian expected this. Back in November 1989, he prophesied to me and to the visiting *Washington Times* editors that Russian democracy under Boris Yeltsin would fail. Yeltsin, he said, was going to create a weak liberal-democratic government. It would bungle the creation of a real free market. The new political system would be unsuccessful. It would throw Russia's 150 million people into dire poverty. Its failure would discredit true democracy. Everything worked out exactly the way he said it would. ■

Martin Sieff is a columnist at FoxNews.com and is editor at large of The Globalist.

Excerpted from That Should Still Be Us: How Thomas Friedman's Flat World Myths Are Keeping Us Flat On Our Backs by Martin Sieff. Copyright © 2012 by the author and reprinted by permission of Wiley.

of World War I on the Western Front. Even before that bloodbath ended, men were searching for a better way to make war, one that would collapse an opponent quickly with comparatively small losses. Air power seemed to offer the answer. While strategic bombing had failed in World War I, General Giulio Douhet in Italy and General Billy Mitchell in the U.S., among others, thought it was the key to rapid victory.

It wasn't, but as propagandists Douhet, Mitchell, and company were highly able. They created a myth that surrounded military aircraft of all types,

not just bombers. The associated myth of the fighter pilot as the new white knight added gloss. Today, politicians and the public overestimate what aircraft bring to war. That is why both turn out in large numbers for air shows, and it is also why the notion of spending a trillion dollars for an airplane does not get laughed to death.

If we turn from myths to facts, we quickly see that the F-35 is unnecessary. The United States already has the world's best fighter planes in the F-15 and F-16. How we got them is a story relevant to the F-35.

In the late 1960s and the 1970s, the Air Force was working to design a new fighter. As each element of the bureaucracy added its favorite bells and whistles, the plane grew in size, weight, complexity, and cost, while combat effectiveness fell—just what has happened to the F-35.

Desperate to reverse the trends, the Air Force called in an ornery, eccentric fighter pilot named John Boyd. Boyd, who developed the energy-management tactics now used by fighter pilots everywhere, converted the tactical qualities a fighter needs into a new set of maneuverability measurement equations that could be applied to fighter design. He turned the incipient turkey into the F-15, a good if overlarge fighter. (Small size is important in fighters because the bigger the plane, the easier it is for the enemy to see and thus take by surprise.)

When the Air Force bureaucracy persisted in adding weight and complexity, Boyd and his civilian associate Pierre Sprey kept working the equations. Their goal was a fighter of half the size and weight of the F-15 with higher maneuverability and a lower price. The outcome of that work was the F-16, which was both better as a fighter than the F-15 and much cheaper. Needless to say, that achievement made Boyd and Sprey the most hated men in town.

The Pentagon says the F-15 and F-16 aren't good enough now because they aren't "stealth" aircraft like the F-35.



The problem is, stealth is a fraud. Supposedly, enemy radars cannot pick up stealth planes. But they can. Early in our 1999 war with Serbia, the Serbs shot down one of the Air Force's stealth F-117 fighter/bombers. Beside the wreckage, they put a sign, in English: "Sorry, we did not know it was supposed to be invisible."

Long-wavelength search radars, like those used in the Battle of Britain and still sold around the world by the Russians, readily detect stealth aircraft, and there is nothing aeronautical engineers can do to get around that problem. They would have to put anti-radar coatings one or two meters thick on the planes' wings, turning them into unflyable blobs.

The Pentagon replies that stealth will still protect the F-35 from the short-wave radars in enemy fighters and radar-guided missiles. That claim also fails under scrutiny. First, radar-guided missiles—ground-to-air and air-to-air—have a 50-year record of dismal combat performance, with probabilities of kill (Pk) seldom attaining 0.1: one hit in ten shots. It's hard to justify a trillion dollars to defend against that.

Second, to amortize its cost, the F-35 will have to be in service for decades. How many generations of missiles can be optimized against it in that time?

Third, the short-wave radars carried by fighters can pick up stealth airplanes outside certain limited "cones" of angles. "Stealth" can defeat short-wavelength radars only if the radar is looking directly at the nose or side profile of the stealth aircraft. As soon as the stealth aircraft maneuvers and shows some of its top or bottom area,

it can be seen by any radar—and in combat, any plane that fails to maneuver dies quickly. A friend of mine who flew F-16s told me he had once acquired an F-117 on radar. He said it would come and go, but the signal was strong enough to tell him something was there to go take a look at.

If an enemy fighter does go looking for an F-35, the stealth plane will be in trouble. The design characteristics required for (non-existent) stealth make the plane a grape. It has a thrust-to-weight ratio of just .85:1, less than the F-15, F-16, and most foreign fighters, which means its acceleration is sluggish. Even worse, its wing is so small that every square foot has to support more than 108 pounds of weight. That high wing loading means the F-35 is even less maneuverable than the infamous F-105 of the Vietnam War, which was hated by pilots, who called it the "Thud" or the "Lead Sled." Its inability to maneuver made the F-105 the favorite target of Hanoi's MiG-21 pilots. What do you call a fighter that can't accelerate and can't turn? A kill.

All this for just a trillion dollars.

As it happens, no thanks to the Pentagon, we have an alternative. Not only would it cost less and perform better than the F-35—anything would—it would cost less and perform better than the F-16, a much tougher challenge.

A bunch of the guys who designed the F-16 have been working on a worthy successor. They have conceptualized a superb fighter—very small, incomparably agile and lethal—that could put America ahead of everybody else for years to come. Note to Paul

Ryan: it's so cheap we could buy it and still save around a trillion dollars.

That, of course, is why the Pentagon won't talk to the designers and Congress has never held a hearing to look at their ideas. The F-35 is good at only

one mission, but that mission is the one that counts: bringing in bucks. A trillion of them, from our pockets. ■

William S. Lind is director of the American Conservative Center for Public Transportation.

Freud and the Drone

Robot war means more killing, less guilt

by ED WARNER

Perhaps in a whimsical mood, Sigmund Freud cited some unusual evidence for the aggressive impulse he found in mankind. In his essay "Reflections on War and Death," he writes that French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau "asks the reader what he would do if without leaving Paris he could kill, with great profit to himself, an old mandarin in Peking by a mere act of his will. Rousseau implies that he would not give much for the life of the dignitary." Imagine if great numbers could so exercise their will. What violence would be unleashed, how many prostrate bodies around the globe who never knew what hit them. Ecstasy!

And so it has come to pass. With the will to do it, the United States—that is, the White House—can now eliminate undesirables anywhere in the world by means of the unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone, with over 2,300 remote executions so far. A case in point was the assassination last September of a U.S. citizen, suspected terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, as he was driving in Yemen. This was accomplished with less oversight than capture and extradition would have required—paperwork and negotiations avoided. Clean.

Attorney General Eric Holder says execution by drone is not assassination if the victim is threatening the state. It may not be due process as provided by the U.S. Constitution, but it's "judicial process" as decided by the White House. Holder offers only scant details on the targets—classified, you know—

but rest assured they have been painstakingly selected, and we are at war, though not, to be sure, in Yemen. That country, we're told, at least partially approves of these attacks.

Pakistanis have complained that too many civilians are killed in American drone strikes. At a recent meeting with President Obama, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani demanded that drone attacks stop in Pakistan. No way, responded Obama. They're needed to wipe out terror.

That's what they all say, notes Freud, a congenital skeptic. Acts of violence are usually given some justification, deserved or not, to relieve the conscience. In this regard, he quotes Shakespeare's Falstaff, who says that when excuses for any doubtful action are needed, reasons are "as plenty as blackberries." Pick away. And drones can continue to pick away without impediment.

So far the United States, Israel, and the UK are the only nations to carry out drone strikes. But what's to stop others? Drones aren't costly and are risk free, at least for their users. A top-line drone costs about \$10.5 million as compared to a fighter jet at some \$70 million. It's expected that in the coming decade, global drone sales will reach \$94 billion. "Countries have an insatiable appetite for drones," Northrup Grumman executive James Pitts told the *Financial Times*. Can we anticipate an arms race with a perpetual buzzing overhead from a swarm of drones?

That's quite possible since China is getting into the game. Every Chinese

military manufacturer is now reported to be involved in drones. Both China and the United States are developing sea-based carrier drones for any possible future confrontation between the two states. But is the drone the answer to modern warfare? All the strikes on the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan have not improved the prospects for winning that war. Anticipating U.S. withdrawal, Afghans of means are preparing to leave the country, the *New York Times* reports. Will this be the first drone defeat?

Nothing deterred, Israel is second only to the United States in production of drones and second also in their export. Attack drones provide the operational answer to any need, says Tommy Silberring, head of the drone division at Israel Aerospace Industries. "Automated systems are better than people. Computers don't get sick, and they're never in a bad mood."

They also get around. According to the *Washington Post*, the United States has protested Israeli sales of sophisticated drones to Russia. Moscow, in turn, objected when it encountered Israeli drones in its 2008 war with Georgia. In January, Turkey scrambled F-16s to intercept an Israeli drone spying over the country's southern provinces of Hatay and Adana. In 2004, the Turks themselves purchased ten Heron drones from Israel for \$183 million.

Drones make wars so easy, say critics, that we're likely to see more of them in the days ahead. Just a flick of the wrist and home for lunch. But wait—soon enough, not even the human hand will be needed. Software will deal the blow with a will of its own. All the destruction desired without having to give it a second thought, or even a first. Pity all those mandarins. Even Freud might be surprised, but war by robot proxies would hardly force him to revise his view of the aggression stubbornly lodged in mankind. ■

Ed Warner is a former editor-reporter for the Voice of America.



From Boomers to Bust

When the April figures on unemployment were released May 4, they were more than disappointing. They were deeply disturbing.

While the unemployment rate had fallen from 8.2 percent to 8.1 percent, 342,000 workers had stopped looking for work. They had just dropped out of the labor market.

Only 63.6 percent of the U.S. working age population is now in the labor force, the lowest level since December 1981.

During the Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton years, participation in the labor force rose steadily to a record 67 percent. The plunge since has been almost uninterrupted.

A shrinking share of our population is carrying an ever-expanding army of dependents.

If this were a result of American women going home to have kids, that would be, as it was after World War II, a manifestation of national vigor and health.

But that is not the case here.

The number of Americans of working age not in the labor force grew in April from 87,897,000 to 88,419,000—by an astonishing 522,000. This is an immense army for the rest of society to carry.

Why are Americans dropping out?

Some have given up looking for jobs in towns they grew up in, because the jobs are gone and not coming back, and they don't want to leave. Some are rejecting the low-wage unskilled work being offered, because the alternative—unemployment checks and federal and

state welfare—is not all that torturous.

America, it seems, is becoming less like the country we grew up in, in its attitudes about work and idleness, and more like Europe.

Whatever its causes, this social and economic torpor is a dark cloud over the hopes of Barack Obama for a second term.

And yet another ominous cloud, no longer on the far horizon, is now directly above: the impending departure from the labor force of 70 million baby boomers in the next two decades.

According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States, from Jan. 1, 1930, to Dec. 31, 1935, there were 13 million births in the U.S. From January 1940 through December 1945, there were 16 million.

This was the Silent Generation, born in Depression and war. It never produced a president, and never will. The Greatest Generation gave us six presidents, starting with JFK and ending with Bush I. Our three most recent presidents—Bill Clinton, Bush II, Barack Obama—are all baby boomers.

And here we come to the heart of our next economic crisis.

If one adds up all the children born between Jan. 1, 1946 and Jan. 1, 1965, the era of the great American baby boom, the total comes to 77 million babies born in the United States.

Why is this so significant now?

Because this year, 2012, the first wave of baby boomers, all those born in 1946, like Clinton and George W. Bush, will reach 66 and eligibility for full Social Security and Medicare benefits. The boomers, en masse, will start

moving off payrolls onto pension rolls.

Let us assume the 77 million boomers are down to 72 million. This means that over the next 20 years, boomers will be retiring and reaching eligibility for Social Security and Medicare at a rate of 3.6 million a year, or 300,000 a month, or 10,000 every day.

And as the boomers are the best-paid, best-educated generation we produced, the loss of their collective skills, abilities, and tax contributions will be as heavy a blow to the nation as the funding of their Medicare and Social Security will be a burden to the taxpayers they leave behind in the labor force.

Since *Roe v. Wade*, abortions have carried off 53 million from the generations that were to replace the boomers. While those 53 million lost have been partially replaced by 40 million immigrants, legal and illegal, our recent immigrants have not exhibited the same income- or tax-producing capacity as boomers.

In 1965, LBJ announced his plan to convert our ordinary society into a Great Society. Since then, trillions have been spent.

The fruits of that immense investment? The illegitimacy rate, dropout rate, crime rate, and incarceration rate have set new records, as the test scores of high school students have plummeted to new lows.

Our labor force is shrinking, the number of dependent U.S. adults is growing, and our best-educated and most productive generation is retiring.

To borrow from Merle Haggard, "Are the good times really over for good?" ■

When News Is Propaganda

Cable networks perfect their partisan slant—and that means war.

by JORDAN BLOOM

The video age has sped up our cognitive powers. We get to the point faster. ... People who watch the evening news see entire South American cities collapse under earthquakes in sixty seconds or less. So if you're just talking for sixty seconds, you'd better be good and interesting.

—Roger Ailes, 1989

“I hope you enjoyed that fancy burger, Mr. President.”

Less than four months after President Obama was sworn in, Sean Hannity was knocking his choice of mustard.

The story hit Fox News Channel's prime-time lineup in the spring of 2009 after ricocheting around local news blogs and MSNBC earlier that day, and it became a partisan Rorschach test: liberals saw common-man appeal in Obama's visit to the faddish environs of Ray's Hell Burger in Arlington, Virginia—where one can order a patty topped with foie gras—while conservatives thought the opposite: elitist snob!

Trying to place exactly when cable news lost its mind is futile, but this is as good a place to start as any: “Burgergate” has become typical of 21st-century cable news. The story was trivial, but it compactly illustrated how Fox and MSNBC have calibrated their partisanship over the last several years.

Since 2008, even though each major party is now represented by a cable news channel—MSNBC for Democrats, Fox News for Republicans—the range of opinion allowed on air has become narrower than Sean Hannity's taste in burger toppings.

On Fox, this has meant more hosts and contributors from the GOP establishment who can be relied on for talking points and well-spun analysis; people like Karl Rove, or former Bush press secretary Dana Perino, now a host for “The Five.” Divergent views are out: Hannity's liberal co-host Alan Colmes left their show in 2008, while the idiosyncratic Glenn

Beck was booted from the network last year.

MSNBC maintains a token conservative presence, but the network's leftward drift has made it all the more responsive to activist groups' demands for political correctness. Most recently, emboldened by their success in removing Beck from Fox—he became “a bit of a branding issue,” said Roger Ailes, which reveals less about Beck's unpopularity than the network's ideological purity—the gendarmerie of acceptable opinion, led by Media Matters and Color of Change, claimed the scalp of Pat Buchanan over alleged racism in his book *The Suicide of a Superpower*.

To many on the right, the downfall of Beck and Buchanan seems proof positive of the multicultural left's power to crush dissent. But as Ailes's remark suggests, network interests in streamlined branding played as big a role.

Buchanan was a holdover from the old days of MSNBC, before president Phil Griffin proclaimed the network, “the place to go for progressives,” and he seemed as out of place among lightweight Republican contributors like Meghan McCain and Michael Steele as he did next to liberals like Rachel Maddow.

During an interview with the Hoover Institution's Peter Robinson weeks after his break with the network, Buchanan revealed, “I knew the book would be controversial. The fact it caused my departure from MSNBC, I'll let people decide whether that says something about my book, or something about MSNBC.”

“Breaking it down into the MSNBC versus Fox thing [actually] reflects what's in that book, which is the division, polarization, divorce, and separation of Americans from Americans,” Buchanan continued. “A racist back when I was growing up was Bull Connor shooting fire hoses at folks. Now you can hear

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that comment on cable TV all the time, people just throw it out there.”

“I find many of Pat’s views to be abhorrent, but the best answer is to counter Pat and prove him wrong, not to silence him,” Buchanan’s former co-host Bill Press told *TAC*. Liberal MSNBC host Chris Matthews also spoke up for him after the incident.

But Buchanan was a poor fit for MSNBC’s progressive brand, and L. Brent Bozell III, president of the Media Research Center, wonders if his voice had been lost on the network’s left-wing viewership.


“I just don’t know what he was doing for the cause; I don’t say that as a criticism, I say that as someone who is in awe of that man’s mind, and I want to see greater exposure for him. ... I think it’s a tragedy, he didn’t deserve it, and I’m glad he’s not there.”

But should commentators only address an audience on their own side—and should they side so closely with parties and movements in the first place?

“Aside from the emergence and dominance of social media, the biggest change I’ve seen in my media career, both on television and radio, is the tribalization of political debate,” says Press, former host of MSNBC’s “Buchanan and Press” and CNN’s “Crossfire,” the first point-counterpoint cable news show. “It used to be, you seldom saw a liberal without a conservative by his side, and vice versa. But no longer. Today, it’s either all right or all left. In prime time, neither MSNBC nor Current TV makes any attempt to include a conservative point of view. And Fox, with rare exceptions, slams its doors on liberals.”

Journalists who fall outside the two-party schematic are pushed to the margins. Libertarians like John Stossel, who with 19 Emmys has won more awards than the entire Fox News network, are relegated to ratings oblivion on the Fox Business Channel. In February when FBC cancelled its entire prime-time lineup, the only other libertarian with a regular slot on cable, Judge Andrew Napolitano, was edged out and consigned to a contributor’s role.

The network cited business constraints and poor



ratings as the reasons for the shake-up, but the effect has been to silence controversial opinions on civil liberties, foreign intervention, and the drug war.

It was not always thus. Before “Crossfire,” and before cable, there was “Firing Line,” the venerable discussion program hosted by William F. Buckley Jr. The show’s extended debate format probably had a lot to do with why the show moved to public television in the early 1970s. “Firing Line” didn’t just permit guests to defend their personal views, it required them to do so. Everyone got a fair exposition and an unreserved rebuttal, and if Allen Ginsberg wanted to make his point by singing “Hare Krishna” while accompanying himself on harmonium, so be it.

Today unpredictability is out; demographic targeting is in. Competition drives this process, but to what degree are cable news companies competing—and to what degree are they cultivating new, narrower monopolies? Rupert Murdoch correctly saw that conservatives were an underserved market in the media environment of 20 years ago. MSNBC

now strives to match Fox's partisan intensity.

Cable news is more or less a lost cause, argues Clay Johnson in his book *The Information Diet*. "Instead of having to do your own research and your own homework, television does that for you, which is a huge convenience," says Johnson, an open-government activist and co-founder of the firm that managed Barack Obama's online campaign in 2008. "The grocery store does a lot of meat preparation; nobody wants to butcher their own cows. I think that's what makes television extremely convenient."

So why has the left sometimes seemed better—if not by much—at getting independent, non-establishment voices on television? How could Buchanan last as long as he did?

"Basically, I look at Fox News as a disruptive technology—that Roger Ailes invented a new manufacturing process for news. It's something that MSNBC has only recently begun to catch up on. While the left can bring in interesting people, it's really that the left is still figuring out which products sell better than others."

There's more at stake in the ideological branding of today's cable news than ratings or pundits' careers. The more complex or controversial an issue, the more it suffers from the networks' stereotyping. Nowhere is this more obvious than in international affairs.

Since CNN broadcast some of the opening volleys in the first Gulf War, the history of cable news has been inextricably tied to foreign conflict. War is a godsend for the networks. The public sits at home in rapt patriotism while the network brings on experts who speculate about minute details and strategies in language with just enough jargon to sound convincing.

The elephant in the room—the advertising and viewership benefits of war—has never been acknowledged by any of the three networks. But they regularly censor antiwar voices.

"There is little room for an antiwar point of view, either from the left or right, on television today," says Press, whose show on MSNBC was cancelled because he and co-host Buchanan were both against the Iraq War. He criticizes the media's failure to question government assertions about military operations.

"It did not do so in Vietnam, the first Gulf War, nor the war in Iraq. For the most part, reporters just recycled propaganda coming out of the White House and helped the White House sell war after war to the American people. Also networks mainly book cheerleaders for the war—because they're afraid of being dubbed 'anti-American.'"

"That was clearly a show where there was debate," says Jeff Cohen, founder of the liberal media watchdog Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting and a producer at MSNBC when "Buchanan & Press" was on the air. "It was often Buchanan and Press against two interventionists. That show didn't last. One by one the voices of reason, the ones that turned out to be right on Iraq, were silenced."

Uncritical coverage of the Iraq War was a product of either fear and cowardice or opportunism. At least in the case of MSNBC's "Donahue," where Cohen was senior producer, that's perfectly clear. An internal NBC memo warned that antiwar host Phil Donahue might be a "difficult public face for NBC in a time of war."

"We were still the top-rated show" at the time, says Cohen, and "if we could have been the one show that allowed moderate voices and noninterventionist voices, we would have been huge." But network executives "were less interested in ratings than in tamping down controversy."

"As it got closer to the invasion day, they clamped down on our program more and more with edicts that came down from management that we had to have more pro-war views than anti-invasion views. What that resulted in—and I think management was happy about this—was that the hawks seemed to shout out the voices of reason that were arguing we should wait."

Cable news today perpetuates a vicious circle: critical views of American foreign policy are unrepresented in the leadership of either party, and producers are reluctant to air opinions perceived as out of the mainstream. Nobody was eager to book Ron Paul before 2007. But as the Texas congressman showed in the GOP debates that year, once views such as his get a hearing, they can be galvanizing. Without being included in forums like the presidential debates—glorified cable news shows—antiwar and realist dissidents have little chance to influence their parties. The Internet is changing that, but not fast enough.

What's true for foreign affairs is true for other difficult subjects as well, such as the nation's economic crisis. Instead of challenging viewers, ideologically segregated networks reinforce what their audiences think they already know. Eventually consumers of the news may really believe that they're more interested in things like President Obama's choice of mustard than in the real problems that cable is so good at distracting us from. Perhaps this is the way the cable news world ends. Not with a bang, but with a burger. ■

Neo-Keynesian Trap

Cheap, abundant credit stimulates the wrong kind of growth.

by CHARLES HUGH SMITH

The grand global debate in political economy boils down to Keynesian stimulus vs. austerity. Stripped of rhetoric, the debate is much the same in nominally communist China, socialist Europe, and notionally free-market America: should the central state continue borrowing and spending enormous sums of money to maintain or restart economic growth (Keynesianism), or should it live within its means (austerity)?

Polemics have distorted the debate on several levels, starting with what “Keynesianism” and “austerity” actually mean. As many observers have pointed out, John Maynard Keynes did not, in fact, advocate permanent government deficits, but rather a commonsense policy of paying down public debt in good times and borrowing in bad times to bolster demand for goods and services.

What Paul Krugman and his allies propose today is neo-Keynesianism, and what that prescribes should be spelled out without spin: governments should borrow and spend all the time, but a lot more during recessions.

The neo-Keynesians have succeeded in painting austerity as the grim policy of wresting bread crusts away from widows and orphans, but its unspun meaning is that governments must live within their means rather than fund basic programs with borrowed money.

The neo-Keynesian left claims that fiscal stimulus is responsible for America’s recovery—in contrast to Europe’s ongoing crisis under austerity—and that all we need do to escape the darkened woods of slow growth is borrow another couple of trillion dollars a year for a few years. The Tea Party right claims that fiscal stimulus is like fusion energy—its proponents have been saying it will work next year for 20 years—and the jobless U.S. recovery, dependent on unprecedented

government borrowing, is not even real growth.

But fiscal stimulus, right or wrong, is only the surface of the problem. The core lies much deeper, in the systemic mispricing and misallocation of capital and risk.

We cannot grasp the dynamics of what both sides claim as their ultimate goal—broad-based economic growth—without first understanding the engines of growth: capitalism and credit. Capitalism has two key tenets: capital is put at risk, and the open market discovers the price of capital, labor, credit, and risk through supply and demand. Gain is not guaranteed: loss and failure provide the discipline and feedback the system needs to function. Moral hazard is the separation of risk from gain—those exposed to risk behave very differently from those not exposed to risk.

The key feature of credit is that its cost is reflected in the interest rate established by the market.

Contrast these basic tenets with central-state fiscal and monetary policy as practiced virtually everywhere, by center-right governments as well as left-wing ones. Interest rates are kept artificially low by central bank policies—for example, the Federal Reserve’s Zero Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP). As a result, borrowed money (capital) is both abundant and cheap. Supply and demand have been shown the door: regardless of the purpose for which money is borrowed, credit is plentiful and inexpensive both for governments and favored private borrowers.

This distortion of supply and demand is presented as a way to boost growth through low borrowing

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costs and easy access to credit. But since the discipline and feedback of the market have been banished, the system effectively incentivizes over-borrowing, excessive leverage, and misallocation of capital.

Cheap abundant credit is a form of moral hazard, as the risks of borrowing have been artificially reduced: if you can borrow money for near-zero, why not put that money to work in speculative “carry trades” that earn a few percentage points of profit? If credit were priced by supply and demand, the money might cost more than the gains earned in the carry trade, effectively limiting speculation. With credit at near-zero interest, there are no limits to speculative borrowing or leverage.

The assumption behind artificially extending cheap credit is that the money will be invested in the desired growth—i.e., productive enterprises. But

Risk—the foundation of capitalism—has been drowned by easy credit.

since discipline and feedback have been eliminated, what actually happens is that credit fuels the growth of financial cancers. Why bother risking capital in legitimate enterprises when there are financial carry trades that are profitable thanks to ZIRP?

When credit is priced by the market, the purpose for which loans are to be used sets the cost of that money—the interest rate. Money bound for marginal, risky enterprises costs more, and so these enterprises must attract cash capital. If the venture can't attract investors, it goes unfunded. This is how capital and credit are allocated in an open market that discovers the price of risk and credit.

Once credit is abundant and cheap, all sorts of marginal-return or high-risk ventures receive funding and the mispriced capital is misallocated.

The ultimate misallocator of capital is the centralized state: when there is little cost to borrowing, it's a painless decision to fund bridges to nowhere, \$300 million-a-piece fighter aircraft (the F-35), and other extravagances. If money were priced by the market, borrowing vast sums would require a tradeoff, as the interest paid would be recognized as being unavailable for other spending.

When governments can borrow virtually unlimited sums for near-zero interest (a 5-year Treasury bond yields .82 percent, and the 1-year yields .19 percent),

there is no brake on borrowing or spending.

Risk—the foundation of capitalism—has been drowned by easy credit: if the government squanders the money it borrows, it can simply borrow more. Easy credit eliminates the tradeoff enforced by markets discovering the price of credit and risk: there is no need to debate what is productive or unproductive, as there is plenty of money for everything.

But risk cannot be eliminated; it can only be pushed beneath the surface. Borrowed capital has an opportunity cost: money borrowed and spent on one thing is no longer available for something more productive. Interest also bears an opportunity cost: revenue spent paying interest is no longer available for more productive purposes.

The neo-Keynesians' basic premise is that cheap, abundant credit and massive government borrowing and spending generate growth by sparking “aggregate demand” for goods and services, which enterprises expand to provide. What Kurgman and company fail to consider is the systemic misallocation of scarce capital and revenue that their policies incentivize.

Having banished the discipline and pricing of the market, their policies have no mechanism to differentiate between consumption and productive investment: any and all borrowing and spending is considered good because it creates demand for something.

This intrinsic inability to distinguish between squandering borrowed money and investing it in productive enterprises is neo-Keynesianism's fatal flaw.

The neo-Keynesian faith in borrowing and spending trillions of dollars as the surefire solution to recession or slow growth is rooted in an idealized “proof of concept”: World War II.

In their mythology, the central state ended the Great Depression by borrowing trillions of dollars into existence and spending it on the hugely wasteful enterprise of global conventional war. According to this myth, it didn't matter if millions of people were paid to make things that ended up on the bottom of the sea: what mattered was that workers were getting paid and their savings and “animal spirits” were building up aggregate demand, which would be unleashed once the war ended.

While the narrative is accurate in broad-brush, it fails to note the unique conditions of America in 1941 that made the war effort and postwar expansion possible:

1. America was the Saudi Arabia of the world at the time, with seemingly endless reserves of cheap oil to burn on global war.
2. America's federal government had little debt.
3. The private sector also had little debt, as credit had contracted in the Depression.
4. The idle labor force could be employed at modest rates of pay and overhead and could generally be trained for duties in factories or the military in a matter of months.
5. Wartime restrictions on consumer goods were a form of forced savings as there weren't enough goods available for workers to buy. These forced savings formed a massive pool of capital.
6. These forced savings flowed into war bonds, so federal borrowing was largely funded by domestic capital.
7. Foreign capital and manufactured goods played insignificant roles in "Fortress America."

None of these conditions apply to 21st-century America. Instead, the public and private sectors alike are burdened with gargantuan debts, and the private sector's primary household asset, the home, has had its value gutted by the popping of the credit-fueled housing bubble. Foreign capital is required to fund government borrowing, as domestic savings remain anemic in our over-indebted, highly leveraged economy.

What's missing from the neo-Keynesian narrative is this: America in 1941 was wealthy enough in natural resources and borrowing power that it could waste enormous quantities of energy, material, and labor. The forced-savings capital accumulated in the war fueled the long postwar boom, and this precious pool of capital was by and large efficiently allocated by the market.

The situation is entirely different now, thus it is little wonder that the model of 1941 isn't working as intended. Instead, the federal government's open-throttle fiscal and monetary policies have unleashed unintended consequences such as commodities inflation: when abundant credit and scarce commodities meet, inflation results.

Since scarce commodities are priced in the global economy, the cost of these essentials responds to newly printed or borrowed-into-existence dollars by leaping higher. We received a taste of this when the flood of global stimulus unleashed in late 2011 by central banks resulted in higher gasoline and oil prices, at least for those of us holding U.S. dollars.

In a global economy competing for resources,

Keynesian stimulus triggers inflation and speculation in commodities, not growth. Once again, the suppression of market discipline and pricing leads to distortions that cannot be fixed by additional stimulus. What is stimulated is toxic to real growth: over-indebtedness, speculation, and inflation.

Cheap credit, unlimited government guarantees on loans, and debt-financed spending provide no mechanisms for distinguishing between unproductive consumption and productive investment. Thus every \$100,000 student loan is counted as an investment, even though there is a world of difference in the job market between a degree in software design and one in fashion, medieval literature, or even in business, as MBAs appear to be in massive oversupply.

When all borrowing and spending is equally "good" and market discipline and feedback have been eliminated, then unproductive spending is equated with productive investment. The consequences of this Keynesian myopia are catastrophic: students enter the job market with essentially worthless degrees and \$100,000 in debt; roughly 40 percent of all Medicare expenses are fraudulent (though nobody really knows as only a tiny proportion of expenses are actually audited); Head Start teachers

In a global economy competing for resources, Keynesian stimulus triggers inflation and speculation in commodities, not growth.

employed by government are paid roughly double what equivalent private-sector teachers earn; the new F-35 fighter aircraft costs six times more than the F-18 it replaces—the list of unproductive spending is nearly endless because there is always more free money to be borrowed and spent next year.

Though it may seem as if our ability to borrow and print dollars is unlimited, history suggests otherwise: capital and resources are scarce, and squandering them on unproductive consumption means they won't be available for productive investments that fuel real growth in productivity and output.

What we desperately need is not a misleading debate between stimulus and austerity, but a return to an economy that is allowed to transparently price credit, risk, capital, and labor, so the discipline and feedback of reality can inform our choices about investments of scarce capital and resources. ■

As Goode as It Gets

The Constitution Party has a nominee, but does it have a future?

by W. JAMES ANTLE III

During the Republican primaries, conservatives turned to one candidate after another to be the right's alternative to Mitt Romney: Michele Bachmann, Rick Perry, Herman Cain, Newt Gingrich, and finally Rick Santorum. One by one, their campaigns fizzled. Now, with the nomination in Romney's grasp, conservatives seem to have run out of choices.

Virgil Goode wants to remind them not to settle. So serious was the former congressman about expanding conservatives' options this November that he secured the presidential nomination of the Constitution Party, which has spent the last two decades trying to convince conservative Christians and constitutionalists that there is a purer, more principled alternative to the GOP. "I'm in it to win it," Goode says, fusing a slogan of Hillary Clinton's with a platform to the right of Barry Goldwater.

Goode isn't a household name, but he is the most politically experienced nominee in the Constitution Party's 20-year history. He has won more elections than Romney and President Barack Obama combined, starting with a special election to the Virginia state senate when he was just 27. Back then Goode was a Democrat, though a staunch conservative. "Conservatives used to be a majority in the [Virginia] Democratic Party," he explains. "The party has changed."

A Southern gentleman with a quiet drawl, Goode hails from what former senator and governor George Allen once described as "the real Virginia." He defended the tobacco industry and lamented the possibility that his mother might be denied the "one last pleasure" of a final cigarette on her deathbed. He railed against gambling and gun control. Goode was an early supporter of Douglas Wilder, the Democrat who became the state's first black governor.

But Goode was never a party loyalist. He ran twice for the U.S. Senate against party-approved Demo-

cratic candidates, losing the nomination both times. In 1996, Goode nearly threw control of the Virginia state Senate to the Republicans for the first time since Reconstruction. Instead he forced a power-sharing agreement between the two parties, with conservative Democrats like himself standing in the balance.

This didn't make Virginia Democrats happy, but it didn't stop him from winning his party's nomination for Congress in the Southside of the state that same year. He was elected with 61 percent of the vote. Still in his first term, Goode was one of just five Democrats to vote in favor of impeaching President Bill Clinton in 1998. He ran unopposed for reelection that November.

By this point, it wasn't clear whether Goode had had enough of the Democratic Party or the other way around. He ran for reelection as an independent in 2000 and won in a 67 percent landslide. Goode proclaimed himself as "independent as the people he represents," but he started caucusing with the Republicans for organizational purposes. He ran for reelection under the GOP banner in 2002—becoming the first Republican to represent his district since 1889—and remained the party's nominee in the next three elections.

Goode lost his House seat in 2008 by just 727 votes out of over 316,000 cast, a margin of roughly 0.24 percent. His challenger, the liberal Thomas Perriello, benefited from a Democratic tide that saw former governor Mark Warner overwhelmingly elected to the U.S. Senate. Obama even narrowly managed to win the commonwealth's electoral votes, becoming the first Democratic presidential candidate to do so since 1964. Perriello lasted only one term, losing to a Goode-endorsed Republican in 2010.

Goode may be the only politician to win election

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to Congress as a Democrat, independent, and Republican. At least one poll showed him with a chance of retaking his House seat as a Constitution Party candidate, but he declined to run.

His party changed, but Goode's basic political allegiances—pro-life, pro-gun, and supportive of his constituents' economic interests—seldom wavered. It is clear from talking to him that he considers immigration a paramount issue. "We need a moratorium on immigration," he says, going beyond the border-security platitudes preferred by most of his congressional colleagues. "We can't wait ten or even five years to do it. We need one right now."

Goode joined the Constitution Party after leaving Congress. "On some issues, I felt [the GOP] wasn't willing to do what was in the interests of the country." Certainly few Republicans came to Goode's aid when he criticized newly elected Democratic Congressman Keith Ellison, a Muslim, for swearing his oath of office on a Koran. Goode blamed mass immigration. "If American citizens don't wake up and adopt the Virgil Goode position on immigration, there will likely be many more Muslims elected to office and demanding the use of the Koran," he wrote in a December 2006 letter.

While Goode's stand was unpopular in Washington, it resonated in his district. "The people around here, they feel like immigration laws are not being enforced and the federal government has ignored the working class of Southside Virginia," R. Wayne Williams Jr., mayor of Danville, told the *Washington Post*. "Virgil is standing up for everybody here." Williams also praised Goode for his votes against free trade agreements.

The Constitution Party has been angling for a candidate of Goode's stature for over 20 years. Founded as the U.S. Taxpayers' Party in 1991 by former Nixon staffer Howard Phillips, it was intended as a vehicle for a prospective third-party presidential bid by Pat Buchanan. But Buchanan stayed in the Republican Party after his 1992 and 1996 campaigns. When he was finally ready to bolt in 1999, he decided to seek—and, at great cost, win—the Reform Party nomination instead. The Reformers were founded by Ross Perot, whose '96 showing qualified the party for better state ballot access and \$12.6 million in federal matching funds.

Howard Phillips ended up running for president himself in all three elections as the U.S. Taxpayers'/Constitution Party nominee. Phillips, a longtime veteran of the conservative movement, was an able

defender of the party's platform: strict fidelity to the Constitution, a prominent place for Christianity in the public square, adamant opposition to abortion, and a less interventionist foreign policy. But for many conservatives his disillusionment with the GOP seemed premature—he had technically left the party while Richard Nixon was still president—and serious media coverage of his campaigns was practically nonexistent.

Phillips and other Constitution Party leaders unsuccessfully wooed other, more prominent Republican defectors to be their presidential nominee: Bob Smith, a combative conservative senator from New Hampshire, "Ten Commandments Judge" Roy Moore, the author Jerome Corsi. Before Virgil Goode, Alan Keyes was the first relatively big name to bite. Keyes sought the party's nomination in 2008, but was defeated by pastor Chuck Baldwin when delegates—including Phillips—were turned off his by

The Constitution Party has been angling for a candidate of Virgil Goode's stature for over 20 years.

his conventional Republican foreign policy.

On those issues, Goode's record is also a less than perfect fit with the mostly noninterventionist third party. He voted for the Iraq War and the Patriot Act. Unlike North Carolina Republican Rep. Walter Jones, in Congress he never budged from these positions. He subsequently voted to make the Patriot Act permanent. When Goode voted against a congressional resolution opposing the surge in Iraq, he said he didn't want to "aid and assist the Islamic jihadists who want the green flag of the crescent and star to wave over the Capitol of the United States and over the White House of this country." Goode warned of "In Muhammad we trust" appearing on U.S. currency.

In our interview in March, Goode was somewhat equivocal about foreign policy. He emphasized Congress's constitutional power to declare war and opposed following the dictates of the United Nations. "We can stay in Afghanistan and the Middle East forever, and it won't make a difference," he argued. Goode said he was in favor of reducing the number of troops and bases overseas but against cutting veterans' benefits.

The former congressman was harder to pin down

Election

on his past record, however. “I still believe to some degree that Iraq had WMD,” he confessed. Goode said we should “send Iran a clear message that if we are assaulted, we will meet it and trump it.” That’s not the same as calling for war with Iran—under Goode’s scenario, Tehran would be the aggressor—but the tone is a bit off for someone who is leading a party that truly advocates a humble foreign policy.

Goode’s record clearly concerned many purists in the Constitution Party, of which there are many. He won the nomination on the first ballot, but by just one vote—the smallest winning margin for a CP nominee.

Just as the Constitution Party couldn’t land Pat Buchanan as a candidate, it also failed to win his voters.

But Goode avoided Alan Keyes’s fate for several reasons. First, Goode began working within the party in 2010. Keyes had no involvement with the Constitution Party prior to seeking its nomination.

Second, Goode tried to win over Constitution Party leaders. The famously abrasive Keyes sought to convince them that his foreign-policy views were correct. Keyes’s supporters even made an unsuccessful attempt to revise the platform to better reflect their candidate’s positions. This year Howard Phillips placed Goode’s name into nomination; he had delivered a fiery speech denouncing Keyes at the 2008 convention. The opposition to Goode was never unified and became further fragmented when bankruptcy attorney Darrell Castle, the party’s vice presidential nominee four years ago, entered the race late.

Finally, it was clear that Goode’s positions were evolving in the Constitution Party’s direction. In his acceptance speech in Nashville, he said that his membership in the party has helped him better evaluate legislation from a constitutional perspective. He conceded he was wrong to vote for the Patriot Act and called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Goode had already been a member of Ron Paul’s Liberty Caucus and he donated to Paul’s presidential campaign in 2008.

The Constitution Party itself is at a crossroads. State affiliates have been fighting the national party and each other over abortion—some state parties

have nominated candidates who are pro-life with exceptions for rape and incest, a position unacceptable to hardliners. The party’s presidential candidates have yet to break 200,000 votes nationally. Chuck Baldwin did better than any previous nominee, despite being left off the ballot in a number of populous states, but his campaign largely failed to capitalize on either the Ron Paul moment or broader conservative discontent with John McCain.

Paul’s supporters are increasingly having success within the Republican Party. The exacting constitutionalism of someone like Michigan Rep. Justin Amash may be the norm in the Constitution Party and a curiosity in the GOP. But as a Republican, Amash can get elected to Congress. The Constitution Party hasn’t been relevant to this process of remaking the mainstream right, other than by giving Ron Paul Republicans someone to cast a protest vote for in November.

Just as the Constitution Party couldn’t land Buchanan as a candidate, it also failed to win his voters. Most Buchananites were social conservatives rather than full-spectrum paleoconservatives. They could be won over by Bob Dole and George W. Bush’s pro-life appeals. To the extent that they cared about Buchanan’s stand on foreign policy, Republicans were able to placate them with opposition to nation-building before 9/11 and talk of keeping the country safe from another attack afterward.

The Constitution Party did qualify for major-party status in Colorado after nominating former congressman Tom Tancredo for governor in 2010. Tancredo is a bigger name than Goode, but they have similar records. He managed to finish second in the gubernatorial race with 36.7 percent of the vote, ahead of the Republican candidate. Constitutionalists no doubt hope that what Tancredo did in Colorado, the mild-mannered Goode can do nationally.

“The Founding Fathers had just four Cabinet departments and the postmaster general,” Goode says. If a federal government that small was good enough for them, why not us? “Goode is better!” his supporters chanted as he accepted the Constitution Party nomination. That’s the message he’ll have to send conservatives who are contemplating holding their nose for Mitt Romney in the fall—that the right can do better than that.

“If not now, when?” Ronald Reagan memorably asked. For a Constitution Party seeking an electoral breakthrough and a conservative base fed up with the GOP establishment, it’s a pertinent question. ■

Romney Capitalism

Mitt's father knew that industry, not finance, built America.

by SEAN SCALLON

*Edward Lewis: "We don't make anything, Phil."
Phil Stuckey: "We make money, Edward."*

—"Pretty Woman" (1990)

There's a subplot in the movie "Pretty Woman" that serves as an apt metaphor for the business careers of George Wilkin Romney and his son Willard Milton "Mitt" Romney. The Edward Lewis character, played by Richard Gere, is in the same line of work that was once Mitt's. His business buys the stock of ailing companies up to a majority stake, using money from investors and banks. Once these companies are under his control, they are then broken up and sold off piece by piece for a profit.

Lewis's firm is trying to do this to a Los Angeles shipbuilding company whose exec is played by the venerable actor Ralph Bellamy. At a dinner meeting—which includes the star of the film, Julia Roberts—Bellamy's character mentions once encountering Lewis's father, Carter, who turns out to have been estranged from his son before his death. The scene subtly suggests father disapproved of son for more than just being kicked out of college.

It's pure speculation what the elder Romney thought of his son's business in comparison with his own career as an auto executive. But their divergent paths illustrate how the once all-powerful manufacturing sector that produced men like George Romney for public office gave way to the all-powerful financial sector from which Mitt springs.

George Romney knew how to work with his hands, whether on his parents' potato farm in Idaho or in his father's construction business after his family sold the farm and moved to Salt Lake City. He also knew debt and deprivation in the Glasgow slums during his Mormon mission to Scotland in the late 1920s and in the hardships his family faced during the Great Depression.


He worked his way from the bottom to the top, starting as an apprentice with the Aluminum Corporation of America (Alcoa) in 1930 before rising to become a leader of the Automotive Committee for Air Defense and the Automotive Council for War Production during World War II. Thereafter he was a general manager of the Automobile Manufacturers Association in the late 1940s before finally becoming CEO of the American Motor Company (AMC) in 1954.

That's where Romney built his reputation as an innovative businessman before launching his first campaign to become governor of Michigan in 1962. He streamlined management, cut executive salaries (including his own), fended off takeover attempts, produced cars like the Rambler, cultivated good relations with United Auto Workers, and established a profit-sharing program. When Romney took over at AMC it traded at \$7 a share. When he resigned in 1962, it was trading at \$90 a share.

By contrast, Mitt Romney always knew he was well ahead by virtue of being his father's son. George Romney, like many of his generation, wanted to make sure his children didn't have it as tough as he did. So Mitt grew up in the ritzy Detroit suburb of Bloomfield Hills and attended its exclusive prep school Cranbrook with the sons of other auto executives and Detroit businessmen, then went on to Stanford and Brigham Young universities, before law school and business school at Harvard in the mid-1970s.

Top companies wanted the *cum laude* graduate Romney working for them. But the young, would-be executives like Romney being churned out by the top business schools at the time were not always eager to jump into established industries, perhaps with good reason. The industrial old guard, especially in manufacturing, had to deal with strikes, oil embargoes,

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George and Mitt Romney in May 1964

inflation, and cheap imports eating into their profit margins at a time when the country was struggling to shake off a decade-long malaise. Mitt didn't use his Harvard MBA and law degree to follow his father into the auto industry. Instead, he went into management consulting, which led to his hiring by Bain and Company in the late 1970s. Following that, in 1984 he founded Bain Capital.

The elder Romney didn't exactly earn an MBA. (He briefly attended a junior college in Idaho, as well as the University of Utah and a business college affiliated with the Latter-day Saints.) What he learned was taught to him by leaders in the cradle of American industry, the steel and automotive businesses. He no doubt learned a great deal helping to construct the "Arsenal of Democracy" in Detroit's factories during World War II. An unavoidable lesson was that industry and manufacturing are what gave the nation its power and led it to victory. What was good for industry—if not for General Motors, which George Romney wanted to see broken up along with the other Big Three automakers—was good for the country. Preserving such industry and providing for its labor force while making a profit for shareholders underpinned his business decisions at AMC.

The younger Romney, by contrast, attended Harvard at a time when the Chicago school of economics was gaining influence in business schools across the

country. The lessons being taught in that era said it didn't matter who made what and where as long as labor costs were low. The world was becoming one big interconnected market, and what mattered was the free flow of goods, services, and labor. As far as the U.S. was concerned, if the nation maintained its technological and financial edge and was able to keep markets around the world open with its military might, all would be okay. Attempts to regulate this emerging global market were to be contested, and existing regulations (like Glass-Steagall) were to be repealed.

Mitt Romney backers can point to the fact that Bain Capital under his leadership helped to create companies such as Staples, the big-box office supply store (which put out of business local supply stores that used to be a prominent part of downtowns across the country). But soon Bain moved from startups to leveraged buyouts: purchasing the stock of existing businesses with money borrowed against their assets and then either fixing the companies or selling them off to make the 113 percent average rate of return Bain delivered to its investors.

That aspect of his business has made Romney an easy target for his political opponents because it involved layoffs and bankruptcies. What may have been taught as the genius of "creative destruction" in a Harvard classroom devastated long-established companies, along with the lives of their employees. Both George and Mitt may have created, but Mitt also destroyed.

If Romney the Elder didn't have much influence on the business career of Romney the Younger, he did help bring him into the other family trade: politics. George Romney not only encouraged his formerly apolitical son to run for the U.S. Senate in 1994 but actually moved into his Boston home, went on the campaign trail for him, and served as an unofficial adviser to the campaign.

George Romney had helped to rewrite Michigan's state constitution between 1959 and '61, before running for governor in 1962 after he had made his fortune. He served two terms, the latter of which overlapped with his 1968 bid for the White House. His son has so far followed a parallel trajectory: he first

made his millions, then became governor of Massachusetts (2003-07), and since then has been running for president.

There have been many comparisons made between the two Romneys' presidential campaigns in the context of both being "moderate" candidates that had to court the party's conservative base. But a man of George Romney's background must have well understood the financial backers of the early conservative movement, the self-made industrialists who ran companies like Acme Steel of Chicago, Wood River Oil of Wichita, Rand-Ingersoll of Rockford, and the Cincinnati Milling Machine Company. His résumé would have passed muster with the movement's California business wing—such figures as Henri Salvatori, Walter Knott, Holmes Tuttle, and Patrick Frawley.

In fact, George Romney and Barry Goldwater came from similar Western backgrounds: both were self-made businessmen (Goldwater as a department store owner), both wanted to see big labor unions broken up, and as presidential candidates both made sometimes awkward moral appeals to voters (One of Romney's campaign slogans in 1968 was "The Way to Stop Crime is to Stop Moral Decay!"). They parted ways over civil rights, toward which Romney, as governor of an industrial state with a large black population, took a more activist view. (It was politically helpful as well: Romney carried 30 percent of the black vote in his 1966 re-election.) Conservatives may have felt real animosity towards a Nelson Rockefeller or a William Scranton, but one doubts they felt the same way about George Romney. His failures as a national campaigner, more than opposition within the party, doomed his presidential ambitions.

What makes Mitt Romney seem like a "moderate" today is not just his record as governor—his individual-mandate healthcare reform, his support for abortion rights before 2005, and other positions he struggles to explain away—but his managerial personality as compared to the crusading temperament of much of the Republican Party's base. The profile of his donor base reinforces Romney's image as something other than a right-wing man of the people: by the end of March, Romney's campaign had raised about \$87 million, most of it not from the small donors who support more ideological campaigns but from fellow businessmen like Lewis Eisenberg, a senior advisor to the famed Kohlberg, Kravitz, Roberts private equity fund; or Julian Rob-

erts, the head of Tiger Management; or hedge fund founders Paul Singer and John Paulson and Romney's buddy from Bain, Edward Conrad. Employees at Goldman Sachs have been very generous to Romney, giving him nearly a half-million dollars.

As AP writer Stephen Braun has noted, "New York's financial institutions are the hub of Romney's fundraising." Birds of a feather. Compare this to his father's main campaign bankrollers, Detroit businessman Max Fisher, who made his money in oil reclamation and gas stations, and Romney's fellow Mormon and Marriott Corporation founder J. Willard Marriott (after whom George Romney named his son).

Perhaps Mitt is not so much his father's son after all, when it comes to politics; a better father figure would be Nelson Rockefeller himself. "Rockefeller Republicans" were in reality political opportunists, as pointed out by author Geoffrey Kabaservice in his recent book *Rule and Ruin*. They were partisan Republicans but not ideological ones. As New York governor, Rockefeller supported some very strict drug laws and ordered the crackdown on the Attica State Prison riot—hardly liberal things to do.

The profile of his donor base reinforces Romney's image as something other than a right-wing man of the people.

Republicans of his kind have drifted with the direction of the party, which in recent years has moved to the ideological right. To survive politically, politicians like Mitt Romney have had to go with the tide. George Romney didn't do this, so his political career capsized.

At the end of "Pretty Woman," Richard Gere not only gets the girl but also saves the shipbuilding company. There is no girl for the happily married Romney to get—certainly no one speaking in his ear telling him there's a better way to do business. The ghosts of his father's past simply can't show any other kind of success: the car company no longer exists; the presidential campaign has gone down in history as a monumental failure, a punch line remembered only for George Romney attributing his support for the Vietnam War to "brainwashing" by military propaganda.

Romney the Younger has made more money and gone farther in public life than Romney the Elder ever did. Whether it ultimately earns him more respect is another matter. ■

Revolt in the Ranks

Dissent in the armed forces is a patriotic tradition

by CHRIS BRAY

On a September afternoon in the peacetime year of 1821, a regiment of Rhode Island militia completed its annual review and prepared to go home. Suddenly the regiment's parade field in Providence became the scene of a spontaneous military riot.

In a confrontation that exploded over the space of a few minutes, the regimental commander was arrested and men in the ranks shouted for fellow militiamen to "fix bayonets" and resist orders by force. Ordered to take command in place of his arrested colonel, the senior battalion commander instead marched his men off the field, breaking the regiment apart to prevent the possibility of its obedience. Finally, as men in the ranks lashed out to strike a brigadier general's horse with the butts of their weapons, a staff officer grabbed the general and dragged him away to safety.

A single disputed order had set off this conflagration: Brig. Gen. Joseph Hawes had ordered Col. Leonard Blodget to dismiss his men from their place on the field, an order that Blodget refused to pass down. Blodget and his subordinates didn't believe a brigadier had power over a regiment unless it was assembled as part of a complete brigade, a view of authority that made Hawes a usurper at a regimental function.

But there was another problem: by long-established custom, the regiment had always been dismissed from its annual review at a bridge linking the communities that formed the force. Blodget could not give an order that violated regimental custom, he told Hawes on the field, because his men would not agree to obey.

He was right. Blodget's subordinates defended the social practice they had established in the community of their regiment. Militiamen declined to subordinate their permanent identity as citizens to their momentary identity as soldiers. Joining together to defend their communities as the free citizens of a republic, they would shape the terms of their service. They would make and enforce a set of local rules that origi-

nated from their consent and their shared purpose.

The court martial that followed became a forum for competing arguments about the nature of authority in the young republic. In Blodget's view, which was shared throughout his regiment, officers were bound by their social covenant with the free men they led. Military institutions were rooted in civil society, even as they were instruments of the state.

Responding to this view, a flabbergasted Hawes pointed to the statutory language that created military ranks. Colonels, he told the court, are supposed to obey brigadier generals. Legislated structure made command, unconstrained by social agreement.

Blodget was convicted of disobedience, sentenced to the loss of his rank and command, and forgiven. The major general who commanded the state's militia reversed the sentence of Blodget's court martial, restoring the colonel to his place at the head of a regiment he intended to command by its consent.

"The Age of Treason"

In our time, expressions of military dissent and politically inspired disobedience are seen as something shocking and new. Suddenly, dangerously, military personnel have politics. They speak critically of government institutions and leaders even as they provide the armed power of the state. Perhaps most controversially, an activist organization called Oath Keepers brings together military personnel who agree to resist unlawful orders.

News media have reacted with urgent hostility. In 2010 a typical story in *Mother Jones* blasted the group under a headline about an emerging "Age of Treason," warning darkly that soldiers were openly pledging to defend the fundamental law: "At regular ceremonies

Chris Bray served as an infantryman in the peacetime Army.


in every state, members reaffirm their official oaths of service, pledging to protect the Constitution—but then they go a step further, vowing to disobey ‘unconstitutional’ orders from what they view as an increasingly tyrannical government.”

The liberal *Mother Jones* warned that the Oath Keepers were a right-wing group girding themselves to resist the authority of President Barack Obama, but similar warnings have appeared in different political contexts. In an essay published in *The Atlantic* during the late years of the Bush administration, Boston University professor and retired army officer Andrew Bacevich warned against a soldiers’ movement, the Appeal for Redress, that petitioned Congress to end the war in Iraq. The movement, Bacevich wrote, “heralds the appearance of something new to the American political landscape: a soldiers’ lobby.”

It didn’t herald anything of the sort. None of these events are unprecedented. Politically oriented military disobedience and dissent are as old as the nation—in fact, older—and an important piece of our shared effort as citizens to shape the politics of a constitutional republic. In fact, military disobedience and political dissent today is far tamer than it has been many times in the past. It represents no threat to our security or to the subordination of the military to civilian authority, particularly when it comes from small numbers of privates and sergeants.

Compare the Oath Keepers and the Appeal for Redress movement to the soldiers of the Continental Army’s Pennsylvania Line, who launched the largest of several Revolutionary War mutinies. At the beginning of 1781, the enlisted men of the Pennsylvania Line expressed their grievances over pay and their terms of enlistment by killing an officer and marching out of camp under the command of a committee of sergeants. Revolutionary officers struggled to contain mutiny from the ranks, but the officer corps itself would soon be responsible for a far more dangerous act of disloyalty.

In the Newburgh Conspiracy, officers of the Continental Army hinted at their willingness to overthrow the new government they had established if they weren’t provided with half-pay for life as a reward for



their service. The conspirators at the army’s camp in Newburgh, New York were secretly encouraged by Alexander Hamilton, who—not wanting to let a crisis go to waste—hoped to use the threat of a *coup d’état* over officer pensions as grounds for direct national taxes.

In comparison, the Oath Keepers have pledged to uphold the Constitution, and the Appeal for Redress movement formally and lawfully petitioned their representatives in Congress to end the war in Iraq. You can take your choice as to which of these events was more ominous.

Liberal Obedience

Unease over military dissent is rooted in a view of the American military that ignores the culture of armed force in a republic born from violent and principled revolution. An April 14 story in the *San Diego Union-Times* warned readers about Sgt. Gary Stein, a marine who made the apparently unforgivable mistake of talking about his political views on Facebook. Stein’s “Armed Forces Tea Party Patriot” page, the newspaper concluded, crossed an impermissible line with its criticisms of Obama:

Democratic nations rely upon their armed forces for their defense—for unhesitating obedience to lawful orders from military commanders and civilian leaders. The American model, like that of most nations, punishes direct disobedience, as well as open conflict of subordinates with their leadership, military and civilian.

Military personnel are to obey, not to think and speak about what, or who, they're obeying. Obedience makes military institutions work, and disobedience destroys the institutional premise.

But that's not true.

Elizabeth Samet teaches future military officers at the United States Military Academy and is the author of a smart and lively book, *Willing Obedience: Citizens, Soldiers, and the Progress of Consent in America*. Samet borrows a phrase from Edmund Burke to describe a cultural model she locates in the 19th century American military: liberal obedience. "Freely given and prompted by a love of country, liberal obedience cannot partake simply of restricted professional and technical, or immediate, circumstantial considerations," she writes. "It must be entirely compatible with the intellectual enlargement that distinguishes the *liber*, or free man."

The very thing that Americans most feared after their revolution was the possibility of unthinking obedience from armed men following charismatic leaders. Citizens of a republic gave their loyalty to republican principles, not to men. George Washington, a complicated figure whose personal intervention ended the Newburgh Conspiracy, repressed mutinies while tolerating the sentiments that caused them. Agreeing that soldiers at Valley Forge had complained bitterly and constantly about their poor treatment, Washington told a correspondent that their behavior had been a sign of their character as free men.

"An apparently loyal silence under extreme hardship," Samet concludes, "would have served only as proof that these soldiers had become dangerous automatons who shed their identities as democratic citizens and relinquished their consciousnesses to a tyrannical discipline."

That's the thing to watch for from the American military, the sign that we're entering an actual "Age of Treason" for *Mother Jones* to fear: an *apparently loyal silence*, a withdrawal from the public sphere into the isolation of unconsidered obedience. The republic is not threatened by a sergeant's Facebook page. It would be threatened by a desert of thought populated by two million people with powerful weapons.

No form of dissent, disobedience, or criticism from within the American military today lacks at least a somewhat comparable parallel in the past. No soldier who speaks critically about the armed forces or its wars blazes some entirely new trail. And no petty institutional snit at attacks from within is wholly surprising.

This year, Lt. Col. Daniel Davis, an armor officer in the U.S. Army, wrote a pair of reports—one for the public—accusing military leaders in Afghanistan of lying about progress in that war. After ten years of fighting, Davis wrote, victory is no closer. Much of the Afghan National Army, trained and equipped by the United States, won't fight the Taliban on its own. Asked about combat patrols, an ANA commander "laughed in my face, and said, no, we don't do that. That would be dangerous." In an interview in April, Davis told a reporter from the *Guardian* that he was "persona non grata," still in uniform but without much of a career ahead of him.

In 1903, the army whistleblower who became persona non grata for his damning report on an American war was the commanding general of the Army, Nelson Miles. Returning from an inspection tour in the Philippines, Miles wrote a long statement to Secretary of War Elihu Root concluding that American troops had tortured Filipinos and murdered prisoners of war. Some, he wrote, had been "shot or bayoneted to death, being in a kneeling position at that time." His list of charges extended to corruption, supply failures, the unlawful concentration of the population through forced relocation, and widespread demoralization of exhausted American troops.

A few months later, after a frigid silence, Root publicly announced the general's retirement date without discussing it with Miles: "The retirement from active service by the President, Aug. 8, 1903, of Lieut. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, United States Army, by operation of law, under the provision of Congress approved June 30, 1882, is announced." In his fifth decade in uniform, the commanding general of the Army got a send-off that might as well have been chiseled in ice.

Writing on the CNN website in April, former attorney Dean Obeidallah concluded that Gary Stein's anti-Obama Facebook page was such a hot topic in the news because "these are not normal times. Instead, we live in a grotesquely partisan era." Living in an unusual historical moment, he concluded, we have to get back to normal: "Inserting partisan politics into our military is dangerous."

In reality, there is no sudden stain on the virgin snow of the American military. The year before Nelson Miles destroyed his standing in the War Department with criticism of a conflict, another American general had done very nearly the opposite, waging war on critics. In a speech to a civic group in Denver, Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston had mocked American anti-imperialists in Congress as delicate men

who deserved contemptuous pity. Talking about Sen. George Frisbie Hoar without mentioning his name, Funston said, "I have only sympathy for the senior senator from Massachusetts, who is suffering from an overheated conscience." Seeing reports of the speech, President Theodore Roosevelt suggested to the War Department that Funston not make any more speeches. Mildly reprimanded, Funston went on to be promoted to major general.

Compare the Appeal for Redress, petitioning Congress to end the war in Iraq, with military opposition to the war in Vietnam. Army Lt. Henry Howe famously marched in an El Paso parade in 1965 with a sign demanding an end to "Johnson's fascist aggression," a choice that landed him in the military prison at Fort Leavenworth. The other side of his sign announced a hope that the nation would have some option other than "petty ignorant fascists" in the next presidential election.

As the war intensified, so did opposition from the ranks. At Fort Ord in 1968, two privates circulated a petition among their fellow soldiers: "We are tired of it. We are tired of all the lies about the war. We are uniting and organizing to voice our opposition to this war." This theme, criticizing the war as built on a foundation of official dishonesty, was a common one. Retiring from the Marine Corps two years earlier, Master Sgt. Donald Duncan had published a description of his experience in Vietnam under the headline, "The Whole Thing Was a Lie."

Underground newspapers sprang up on military bases. The Antiwar and Radical History Project at the University of Washington in Seattle archives and documents "GI Movement" local opposition to the Vietnam War. Some posts had several unauthorized newspapers over the course of the conflict, writes graduate student Jessie Kindig, "including *Counterpoint*, *Fed Up*, the *Lewis-McChord Free Press*, and *G.I. Voice* from Fort Lewis Army Base and McChord Air Force Base near Tacoma; the unit newsletters *B Troop News* and *First of the Worst*, from Fort Lewis; *Sacstrated* and *Co-Ambulation* from Fairchild Air Force Base, near Spokane, WA; *Puget Sound Sound Off* from Bremerton Naval Yard on the Washington peninsula; and *Yah-Hoh*, published out of Fort Lewis by a group of radical Native American servicemen."

Facing the threat of discipline, soldiers produced radical newspapers off post, gathering in GI coffeehouses to plan and write. Gary Stein's Facebook page is the mildest echo of far more radical political speech from the ranks.

Accused of leaking classified government material to WikiLeaks, Bradley Manning faces 22 criminal counts, including the devastating charge of aiding the enemy. But no evidence that has yet been made public suggests that Manning intended to help the nation's enemies; rather, the young soldier is said to have expressed his horror over the "incredible things, awful things" that he discovered about the American war in Iraq as an intelligence analyst assigned to support that war. In an online chat with an FBI informer, Manning said that he hoped a public debate over the material he is alleged to have leaked "might actually change something."

The real danger to our country lies in the official responses to military engagement in public debate, as when the Army piles on absurdly excessive charges against Manning. Dissent works. Loyal disagreement and principled disobedience can shape vital policy. Military personnel strengthen the nation they serve by forcing policymakers to explain, justify, and correct bad decisions.

If Manning is proved in court to have sent classified materials to WikiLeaks, his actions will merit some degree of discipline. But his apparent intent is as important as his poor choice of methods. A soldier asked us to think about what we are doing as a nation, to confront evidence and discuss it. We have soldiers who risk grave punishment to get us to do our duty as citizens.

In his book *Paul Revere's Ride*, historian David Hackett Fischer describes the moment when the militiamen in Lexington, Massachusetts responded to an alarm in the middle of the night in April of 1775. They gathered around Captain John Parker, their commander, who greeted them "less as their commander than as their neighbor, kinsman, and friend." In the morning, facing British troops, Parker would shout commands. But not that night.

"The men of Lexington did not assemble to receive orders from Captain Parker, much as they respected him," Fischer writes. They expected to participate in any major decisions that would be taken. They gathered around Captain Parker on the Common, and held an impromptu town meeting in the open air."

A government of limited powers, ensuring the common defense of free people with the consent of the governed, would not be threatened by a sergeant's Facebook page or a group of soldiers who entered into a covenant to uphold the framework of government. A culture that cries for silent obedience from its military, on the other hand, doesn't have much left to defend. ■

Eastern Right

Conservative minds convert to Orthodox Christianity

by ROD DREHER

Since the Second World War, Roman Catholicism has had enormous influence on American intellectual conservatism. The postwar rebirth of conservatism had two sources: libertarianism—a reassertion of classical liberalism against statism—and cultural traditionalism. For Russell Kirk and other leading traditionalists of the era, the Roman Catholic church, with its soaring intellectual edifice and unitary vision of faith and reason, matter and spirit, was the natural conservator of Western civilization and the sure source of its renewal after the catastrophes of the 20th century.

The Catholic contribution to conservative intellectual life has been hard to overstate. It is impossible not to notice the steady stream of right-of-center intellectuals into the Roman church: Kirk himself, his libertarian sparring partner Frank Meyer, early *National Review* luminaries such as L. Brent Bozell Jr. and Willmoore Kendall, and many more. One does not—or should not, at least—convert to a religion for any reason other than one thinks it is true. But there is something about the intellectual culture of Catholicism that draws thoughtful conservatives, even amid an exodus of rank-and-file American Catholics from the church.

Prominent intellectual conversions have been notable among Evangelicals, many of whom find in the Roman church a more solid theological, philosophical, and historical grounding for their faith. As the Baylor University philosopher and former Evangelical Theological Society head Francis Beckwith told *Christianity Today* after his 2007 return to the Catholicism of his youth, “We have to understand that the Reformation only makes sense against the backdrop of a tradition that was already there.”

Much less well known is the small but growing group of American conservative intellectuals who embrace Christianity, but not in its Western forms—who are neither Catholic nor Protestant. There is a distinct set of conservative converts to Eastern Or-

thodoxy, which depending on your perspective either left, or was left by, Roman Catholicism in the Great Schism of 1054.

Since then, Western and Eastern Christianity developed separately, under very different social and cultural conditions. It is often wrongly assumed that Orthodoxy is little more than Catholicism without a pope, plus an ethnic gloss—typically Greek, Slavic, or Coptic. In fact, the differences with Catholicism are substantial and to a significant degree account for why these tradition-minded conservatives have found themselves looking past Rome to the churches of the ancient East, whose theology and liturgy centers on the thought and practice of Christianity’s first 500 years.

When I left Roman Catholicism for Orthodoxy in 2006, an intellectual Catholic friend said he couldn’t understand why I was leaving a church with such a profound tradition of intellectual inquiry—Scholasticism and its descendants, he meant—for one so bound up with mysticism. The comment was unfair, in that my friend didn’t understand that the Orthodox are not Pentecostals with incense and liturgy. Orthodoxy is about far more than religious experience; its theology is extraordinarily deep.

But his remark was accurate in that Orthodoxy is deeply skeptical of rationalism in religion. Orthodoxy always keeps before it the primacy of the mystical encounter with God, both through the sacraments and through the early church’s practice of hesychasm, or inward prayer.

University of South Carolina theologian James Cutsinger says that the point of all religion is “not only to experience God, but to be transformed into His likeness”—a process called theosis. For Cutsinger, a convert from Protestantism, the mystical theology of the Orthodox Church is far more important than

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Orthodoxy's historical claims to be uniquely faithful to the apostolic tradition.

"Orthodoxy is alone among the Christian possibilities in offering its adherent the ancient treasures of a contemplative method, in the form of hesychasm," Cutsinger has written. "Not that there aren't Catholic and even Protestant mystics and sages, to say nothing of saints. That's not in question. But which of them is able to tell the rest of us how to attain to his vision, let alone transformation? Where is there a step-by-step, practical guide to theosis outside the Christian East?"

Hugh O'Beirne, a corporate attorney in Princeton, NJ, was once an enthusiastic Catholic and fellow traveler of the conservative Opus Dei movement. He came to believe, though, that Latin Christianity is too bound up in legalism and philosophical speculation—a legacy of the Middle Ages. Though he remains an admirer of Catholicism, O'Beirne converted to Orthodoxy 12 years ago.

"Catholicism's strong analytic ability overshadowed the primal religious experience," O'Beirne says. "I think that's a canard Protestants often level against Catholics, but there's something to it."

"I reject the idea that because you can talk about religious truths more exactly than you have gained any more intellectual insight into them," he continues. "Remember the mystical experience Aquinas had at the end of his life, which made him describe all that he had written as 'straw'? After that, how can Catholics complain about our hesychastic approach?"

For most converts, Orthodoxy's claim to be alone in its unbroken succession with the church of the Apostles—a claim also made by the Roman church—is a significant factor in conversion. Like Catholicism, Orthodoxy has an episcopal structure. Unlike Roman Catholicism, the Orthodox churches are not governed centrally, with power flowing downward from an ecclesial monarch (the Pope) at the center, but are run collegially, by bishops in council. The Orthodox view papal primacy as a Latin innovation driven by Frankish politics. As one Orthodox professor told me, "It's not true that Catholicism is conservative. It is, in fact, the mother of all religious innovation, and has been for more than a millennium."

Orthodoxy's deep conservatism, for better or worse, has much to do with its ecclesiology. Little can change in Orthodoxy's doctrinal teachings outside of an ecumenical council—a gathering of all the bishops of the church. Though there is some controversy among the Orthodox about when the last ecumenical council was, the last one everyone agrees on was in the year 787. Though some contemporary Orthodox theologians lament that Orthodoxy has no effective

mechanism for updating doctrine, others see what innovation has done to Western Christianity—the chaos following the Second Vatican Council, for example, and the endless multiplicity of Protestant denominations—and count this procedural stasis as a blessing.

Baltimore writer Frederica Mathewes-Green, perhaps the best-known American convert, contends that Orthodoxy's stability in this regard appeals to conservative Christians weary of doctrinal and liturgical tumult within their churches and traditions.

"The faith stays the same, generation to generation and from one continent to the next," she says. "It's kept by community memory, grassroots, rather than by a church leader or theological board. So someone who wanted to challenge it doesn't have any place to start, nobody with whom to lodge a protest. I think this is a resource within Orthodoxy, a really central and indelible one, that helps it resist the winds of change."

This is not to say that Orthodoxy exists in a bubble untouched by the cultures in which Orthodox Christians live. In fact, there is widespread agreement among believers that the worst problem Orthodoxy faces is phyletism—a heresy that makes the mission of the church perpetuating ethnic culture. This has a particularly troubling effect in the United States, blocking Orthodox unity and reducing parish life in some places to the tribe at prayer.

On a practical level, any conservative who believes he can escape the challenges of modern America by hiding in an Orthodox parish is deluded. All three major branches of Orthodoxy in America have suffered major leadership scandals in recent years. And while Orthodox theology does not face the radical revisionism that has swept over Western churches in the past decades, there are nevertheless personalities and forces within American Orthodoxy pushing for liberalization on the homosexual question. And in some parishes—including St. Nicholas OCA Cathedral in Washington, D.C.—they are winning victories.

Orthodoxy does, however, have certain advantages over both Protestantism and Catholicism. Men who convert often say that Orthodox worship and practice—especially the ascetic rigor—feels more masculine than the more emotional, consumer-driven atmosphere in the churches they left behind. "When I go to Russian churches, I see men; when I visit Protestant churches, I see a lot of men crying and holding each other," says one convert. "And we don't have Dunkin' Donuts in the narthex."

Although Orthodoxy lacks the administrative unity and strong teaching authority (Magisterium) of Catholicism, the theological and liturgical atmosphere in Orthodox parishes is usually far more traditional than



in contemporary American Catholic parishes. Converts from Catholicism fed up with post-Vatican II liberalism frequently observe that Orthodoxy is what Catholicism once was.

When Frederica Mathewes-Green and her husband, now an Orthodox priest, realized that they could no longer remain in the fast-liberalizing Episcopal Church, they assumed Rome would be their new home. They were put off by the drab modern Catholic liturgy, which struck them as too irreverent. But there was more.

“We were also concerned that so much of American Catholicism, in practice, was theologically and socially liberal,” she says. “We were told that that was not important, the important thing was that the doctrine taught by Rome was correct. But it wasn’t enough for us. We could see that things every bit as strange as current Episcopalian doctrine was being promoted and taught all over American Catholicism. It did not look like a safer place for our kids to grow up.”

Though many vote Republican, nearly all the conservative intellectuals I spoke with for this essay express gratitude that Orthodoxy avoids the “Republican Party at prayer” feeling that pervades some Evangelical churches.

“Kirkean, Burkean conservatism finds its paradise in Orthodoxy,” says a professor who teaches at a Southern college. “It is non-ideological and traditionalist to its bones. It collects and preserves and quietly presents the organically grown wisdom of the past in

a way that’s compelling and, literally, beautiful.”

Alfred Kentigern Siewers, a literature and environmental studies professor at a mid-Atlantic college, says the social teachings of the church fathers, as adapted by modern Russian Orthodox theologians, taught him to think of society “more as an extended household, and less as an impersonal economy, whether free market or socialist.”

“Orthodoxy taught me how Christian notions of human dignity are more central to being authentically human than impersonal notion of rights by themselves alone,” says Siewers. “I think Orthodoxy encourages an awareness of the importance of living tradition and community and the need for caution in embracing either free market or socialist economic models as social models.”

In part because Orthodox countries did not undergo the Enlightenment, the Orthodox way of thinking about social and political life is so far outside the Western experience that it can sometimes seem barely relevant to American challenges. On the other hand, Orthodoxy’s pre-modern traditionalism can be a rich new source of spiritual and cultural renewal.

Pope Benedict XVI, who has made generous and well-received overtures to Orthodox Church leaders, has said that the regeneration of Western civilization will depend on a “creative minority” of Catholics willing to live the Gospel in a post-Christian world. Whatever role Orthodox Christians in America have to play in this drama, it will certainly be as a minuscule minority. In worldwide Christianity, Orthodoxy is second only to Roman Catholicism in the number of adherents. But in the United States, a 2010 census conducted by U.S. Orthodox bishops found only 800,000 Orthodox believers in this country—roughly equivalent to the number of American Muslims or Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Yet converts keep coming, and they bring with them a revivifying enthusiasm for the faith of Christian antiquity. One-third of Orthodox priests in the U.S. are converts—a number that skyrockets to 70 percent in the Antiochian Orthodox Church, a magnet for Evangelicals. In the Greek Orthodox Church, around one-third of parishioners are converts, while just over half the members of the Orthodox Church in America came through conversion. For traditionalist conservatives among that number, Orthodoxy provides an experience of worship and a way of seeing the world that resonates with their deepest intuitions, in a way they cannot find elsewhere in American Christianity.

“From the outside, Orthodoxy seems exotic,” an Orthodox academic convert tells me. “From the inside, it feels like home.” ■

Hungary Reconstituted

The “Easter constitution” reasserts a national identity

by A.K. MOLNAR

In the sorry past of the country, Hungary endured without a written constitution, just like the United Kingdom. Fortunately, the “light” arrived from the East, and Hungary received its first written constitution from the Soviet Union in 1949. Under this document, Hungary would enjoy one of the harshest totalitarian regimes in the region during the first part of the 1950s.

When the Soviet experiment collapsed like a wet sock, jurists from Hungary’s opposition parties joined members of the ruling Socialist Party and re-wrote the constitution, heavily amending it. It was adopted in 1989 by the last Socialist Parliament. Sooner or later, it was thought, a new, definitive constitution would need to be created, but neither political party was yet up to the task. Hungary then had the distinction of being the sole former Eastern bloc nation that did not adopt a wholly new constitution after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The country’s 2010 elections changed things. With the victory of the center-right coalition of the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union (Hungarian: *Magyar Polgári Szövetség*) and the Christian Democrats (*Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt*), conservatives gained a huge majority in parliament. They immediately started to draft a new constitution to replace what many saw as the last remnant of the country’s socialist past.

The first step was taken on September 7, 2010, when an *ad hoc* parliamentary committee started to make preparations. After numerous debates about matters of principles, the early drafts of the new Hungarian constitution were written between January and March of 2011. It was finally adopted by the Hungarian parliament and signed into law by President Pál Schmitt on April 25, 2011.

Controversy ensued almost immediately. The storm around the “Easter constitution”—so called because it was passed on Easter Monday and because for its supporters it represents the resurrection of traditional values—followed two paths of argument. One

of them involves the legislative process. The constitution’s critics say that its drafting, preparation, and adoption didn’t involve all political parties; that there was no widespread civic debate about it; and, finally, that no public referendum was held. Of course, many of these elements were absent in the case of the country’s previous constitutions, as well as those of many other countries.

The other argument focuses on the constitution’s content. Practically speaking, the Easter constitution changed the political framework of the country only slightly. Hungary is still a republic, and the roles of the president, parliament, and the country’s other important political institutions didn’t change much. But opponents of the Easter constitution assert that it has transformed the politico-cultural context of Hungarian life in the long run. Critics focus their fire almost exclusively on the new constitution’s preamble.

The politico-cultural foundation of the constitution, as enshrined in its preamble, can be summarized by three words: God, homeland, and family.

The preamble starts with a reference to the first line of Hungary’s old national anthem, which asks God to bless the Hungarian people. Although the constitution itself clearly embodies the principle of separation of church and state, it also refers to their cooperation. And despite recognizing the country’s various religious traditions, it explicitly mentions the Christian roots of Europe, as well as the role of Christianity in the history of the Hungarian nation.

It is interesting to note that there were no serious attacks on these points from non-Christian religious groups in Hungary; it was mainly atheist intellectuals who attacked these religious elements.

Another frequent target of critics is the Easter constitution’s defense of what we may call the traditional family. The new constitution says that a marriage is

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Europe

solely a union of a man and a woman, and furthermore, that Hungary protects the family as the basis of the nation. This clause has been condemned by left-wing groups in Hungary and across Europe as being insufficiently broad for failing to include same-sex marriages.

For them, the other extremely problematic element in the new constitution has to do with the dignity of human life. By talking about the inviolability of human dignity and the protection of the fetus from the moment of conception, the Easter constitution doesn't explicitly prohibit the right to abortion, as its critics assert. But it does open the gates for anti-abortion legislation to be introduced in parliament—or at least some limitations on government-funded abortion on demand.

After 1956, under the Socialist regime headed by János Kádár until 1988, abortions were funded by the government's social-health agency. And today there is a widespread culture of abortion in Hungary. In fact, the number of abortions is close to the number of births.

In such a climate, even a modest antiabortion campaign or pro-life argument can provoke a scandal. Despite what the alarmist pro-abortion opponents of the Easter constitution say, at present there is no legislative initiative in Hungary to change or repeal the abortion laws.

Nevertheless, the Easter constitution certainly does give abortion foes a chance to change the laws—and the culture—in the future.

The last controversial element in the constitution is the issue of nationhood. A foreign observer should know that Hungarian political life is rather historically conditioned. This means that despite the prevalence of familiar pragmatic or ideological issues in the country's political debates—such as the role of the market and state, questions of human rights, and so forth—the main dividing lines are not those that are well-known in Western Europe. Rather, Hungarian political life is seen only in relation to religious tradition and in the context of an interpretation of Hungary's past—mainly that of the 20th century.

The constitution, for example, proudly mentions Saint Stephen, the founder of the Hungarian state and the first King of Hungary (1000-1038). It also makes explicit reference to other great forebears of the country, and makes note of the intellectual and spiritual unity of the nation, which is the patrimony of every Hungarian citizen, and which was torn apart by the ideological movements and international conflicts of the 20th century. This language has been interpreted by critics of the constitution as a hidden and dangerous re-evaluation of the Trianon (1920) and Paris (1947) treaties, which defined the country's borders

and subtly chipped away at Hungarian unity.

Thus, because it is rooted in the country's traditions and is critical of international treaties, the Easter constitution has been accused of being a threat to the European status quo. For critics, advancing this accusation is important so that the entire debate may be exported to international forums—and Hungary can be placed in the crosshairs of the international community.

The constitution condemns the crimes committed under both the National Socialist and Communist dictatorships, and it further specifies the date of Nazi occupation as the day on which the country lost its liberty. The first statement here makes it impossible to consider the Communist regime as any different from the Nazi one and clearly points to the interwoven political, economic, and intellectual frameworks that Hungary has been trying to shed during the post-Socialist period. Of course, linking the Socialists to the Nazis in this way is rather unpleasant for Europe's socialist family, but doing so is not unprecedented, especially in light of the scholarly work of Hannah Arendt in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.

Within the country there is a historical-political debate taking place about how to interpret the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1945. The right in Hungary calls it occupation, but the left sees it as liberation. In the eyes of the left, the period between of 1945 and 1948 was the "honeymoon of democracy" created by the Red Army.

According to the Hungarian left, there is a fine Socialist tradition in the country after 1945, while the pre-Socialist past is all rubbish. But the new constitution implicitly re-evaluates the country's Socialist era in contrast to its pre-Socialist past—and finds the former wanting.

Finally, the very end of the constitution's preamble speaks about the abiding need for spiritual and intellectual renewal in Hungary—something that members of the Vanenburg Society, an organization of traditionalist conservative intellectuals, have been discussing avidly in the context of Europe since 2006.

Hungary's Easter constitution entered into force on the first of January. It has garnered both sympathetic interest and more than a few attacks from abroad. Many Hungarian critics have notably received support from left-wing organizations in other countries.

Why do the constitution's critics need this help? In the 20th-century history of Hungary, there is a separation between political groups styled as "progressives" and "reactionaries." (Never mind that this latter set has included those who were classical liberals at the beginning of the last century.) The former group has consistently preferred to present itself as the only

agent of progress against local backwardness. This is a crude misrepresentation.

The progressives who have been attempting to re-define the political spectrum in Hungary, and who have continually attacked the Easter constitution, have historically only been able to get and maintain political control with the help of foreign powers: this is true whether we speak of 1945 or 1918. In the same way that so-called progressive forces within Hungary facilitated the Communist takeover in 1945, for example, with the complicity of international organizations and foreign powers, so today the opponents of

Hungary's attempt to rediscover and re-embody its historical traditions in the Easter constitution are joining forces with the self-proclaimed agents of progress across Europe, especially those in the administrative and bureaucratic structures of the European Union.

In their political imagination, Hungary's difficulties—political, economic, or cultural—are always the result of backwardness and the tradition-bound Hungarian who should be forced to modernize. Thus, there is no compromise with local tradition: it and its supporters need only be eliminated to make way for progress. ■

OLD and RIGHT

As one scans the works of the great political intellectuals, it is apparent that while none of them could be properly accused of war-mongering, there is an abiding fascination with the kinds of leadership, heroism, and unity we are more likely to find in war than in peace. Few prescriptions by out-and-out militarists have exceeded Plato's *Republic* in devotion to military values, though it would be unfair to say that Plato loved war as such. Few intellectuals do. It is that they hate other things more: economic phenomena like profits, competition, and all the tensions and conflicts which threaten constantly to erupt from the marketplace. Economic values, so antagonistic to heroism and great leadership, tend to be despised accordingly by writers, artists, and other intellectuals.

Most of the great military-political personages in Western history have surrounded themselves at one time or other with intellectuals, often to the considerable profit of their cultures. We may be certain that Aristotle was not the only philosopher close at one time to Alexander; earlier Plato had associated himself with Dionysius the Elder, military tyrant of Syracuse. Augustus, we learn, saw much of Rome's historians, philosophers, and rhetoricians. Charlemagne's court was resplendent with scholars, teachers, and artists. It is impossible to miss the intellectual cast of the courts of such notable military leaders as Frederick II, the divine right monarchs, or most of them, and Napoleon. In our day there is a high correlation between the appearance of war-presidents in the United States and the flocking to Washington of large numbers of intellectuals.

There is a natural crisis-mindedness, I think, among intellectuals generally; a fondness for the great changes and great decisions which the crisis of war

makes possible. It is not that writers and artists and professors love the carnage of war, or even the military as such, though they seem to prefer the military to businessmen. It is simply that when it comes to a choice between the banality and anti-heroic nature of the marketplace and the heady opportunities of crisis, especially military crisis, the decision is not hard to make. Most certainly when there is an Augustus, Cromwell, Napoleon, Churchill, or FDR to serve!

It may fairly be said, I think, that the American intellectual's romance with war and with the kinds of structures and processes which attend war began under President Wilson in World War I. Being himself an academic man, Wilson had the fealty of the intellectuals, for the most part, from the beginning of his first term in office. But it was only when he made the fateful decision to plunge the United States into the war raging in Europe that his affinity with the intellectual and academic class reached its zenith.

Wilson badly needed the assistance of the intellectuals, for opposition to American entry was formidable in almost all parts of the country. If an army was to be manufactured for export to Europe in a war that a very large number of the American people considered none of America's business, then a new nation had to be manufactured: economically, politically, culturally, and, not least, psychologically. Elementary social psychology dictated that if war enthusiasm among Americans was to be generated, then a whole new set of mind must be created on a mass level. And if popular consciousness was to be transformed, there must be superbly articulated instruments fashioned for his Herculean labor. Who but intellectuals could have fashioned, could have *become*, these instruments?

—Robert Nisbet, *Twilight of Authority*, 1975

Kuwait's Crossroads

Islamists and American power imperil the Gulf's freest state.

by DOUG BANDOW

KUWAIT CITY, KUWAIT—Voting in Kuwait is a risk factor for obesity. Outside the polling places candidates offer food and drinks to prospective voters. Unfortunately, the outcome of the most recent legislative election wasn't as sweet as the refreshments. The opposition won control of parliament with 34 of 50 seats. Islamists took an outright majority: 23 Sunni and four Shi'ite. Liberals won just nine seats.

Kuwait is one of the Gulf's most open societies—not the most competitive of categories, it must be said. Women work, drive, and dress as they wish, despite some discrimination. The media is considered the region's freest, though journalists are occasionally prosecuted, and the government has caused concern with its new plan to regulate social media.

Religious minorities face some difficulties, but three Christian churches sat within two blocks of my hotel. On an earlier trip the late Reverend Jerry Zandstra, who presided over an English-language evangelical congregation, told me: "We have never had any trouble with the government, where they've inhibited us or stopped us." (Faiths not mentioned in the Koran, such as Hinduism, enjoy less liberty.)

Elections also are free. Undersecretary of Information Salman Sabah al-Salem al-Homoud al-Sabah touts Kuwait's "long practice of democracy." The 16-member cabinet is appointed by the Emir, but the elected National Assembly can block government initiatives, question officials, investigate abuses, and hold no-confidence votes on ministers. Indeed, the previous cabinet, headed by the Emir's nephew, resigned after opposition attacks for alleged corruption.

Kuwait sits atop a pool of black gold. Oil provides roughly half of the nation's GDP—the exact share varies depending on oil prices—and as much as 95 percent of the government's revenue. According to the Kipco asset-management company, "Even in the non-oil economy ... government activity (commu-

nity, social and personal services) is a prime source of opportunities and the second largest contributor to GDP is government services." The state controls about 70 percent of GDP and provides a bountiful welfare state. In Kuwait City's better neighborhoods, beautiful homes sit with expensive cars lining the streets.

The country is filled with bright, engaging people. But there is little spirit of private enterprise, even though the economy is more open than those of its neighbors. By one estimate 90 percent of Kuwaitis work for the government. Why engage in the uncertain process of starting a business when safe employment and generous benefits are available just for living? Faisal Hamad al-Ayyar, vice chairman of Kipco, told the *Financial Times*, "The government takes care of you from birth to death; even the rubbing when you die is by the government." There is hustle and bustle, but most often it comes from expatriates—who last year made up 83 percent of the workforce.

For years Kuwaitis have talked about diversifying the economy. Kuwait received just \$800 million in foreign direct investment over the last decade, compared to \$130 billion in Saudi Arabia, \$73 billion in the United Arab Emirates, and \$10 billion in Bahrain. "There's a saying here: Kuwait is the past, Dubai the present and Qatar the future," oil analyst Kamil al-Harami told the *FT*.

Parliament has blocked government attempts to open oilfields and refineries to international investment. Two years ago the government did receive authority from parliament to privatize public firms and undertake a development program to attract private investment, expand the private sector, and diversify away from oil. Yet not much has been achieved. In October the government delayed its plan to privatize the much-derided Kuwait Airways.

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Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah al-Mubarak al-Sabah, a top official in the prime minister's office who after the election was appointed Minister of Information, told me, "There is always a contest between philosophies. Normally the free market versus state control." He said that Kuwait suffered from the influence of a strong "mercantile establishment," the majority of whose members "want to be spoon fed with a state-sponsored welfare system and economy."

Increasing dependence is the government's first defense against social unrest. When tremors from the Arab Spring hit Kuwait last year, the government responded by giving an extra \$3,600 and 18 months of free food staples to every Kuwaiti. But religious and tribal controversies still flare.

Before the election former oil minister Adel al-Sabeeh complained of an "unhealthy and highly charged" atmosphere in which "sectarian and tribal tensions are negatively impacting our country." There was unusual violence—the burning of a candidate's campaign tent and a mob attack on a television station. Prime Minister Sheikh Jaber Mubarak al-Hamad al-Sabah insisted, "We will not allow factionalism or tribalism or sectarianism to affect our national unity."

Islamists have dominated parliament before, but today's context is different. Dr. Ahmad al-Kateeb, a former MP who helped produce the constitution, expressed his apprehension to the *Kuwaiti Times*: "The regional conditions and sectarian tensions in some countries have helped Islamist movements to emerge, leaving some effect on [Kuwait's] parliamentary elections." Dr. Abdullah al-Shayji of Kuwait University similarly warned *Bloomberg*, "It's beyond all expectations. We have extremism on all fronts, and it's going to be very explosive."

Still, it is important not to overplay the Islamist victory. Dr. Naser al-Sane, a former MP whose Islamist group saw four candidates elected, noted, "corruption was the hot issue of the campaign." The Islamists took up the banner of reform.

Those elected are diverse. "Some of the Islamists are very moderate in thinking," Dr. Shafeeq Ghabra of Kuwait University told me, pointing to Dr. al-Sane as an example. Moreover, they are deeply embedded in

what remains a small society. When I met Dr. al-Sane at my hotel he was greeted warmly by people from across the political spectrum, including government ministers. He emphasized the Islamists' willingness to work with other groups, including liberals. "Reform and development represent our agenda," he said.

Yet the Islamist bloc was quick to propose amending the Kuwaiti constitution to make Sharia Law "the" rather than just "a" source of legislation. The proposal



Michael Hoque

seems unlikely to get the necessary two-thirds parliamentary vote, but Islamist MPs may push a legislative equivalent.

Some MPs have proposed banning bikinis and requiring women to wear headscarves. Such rules could require the creation of Saudi-style religious police. Rola Dashti, one of four female MPs defeated in February, was quoted in the *Financial Times* saying that the Islamists will attempt to push women out of public life and that the cabinet will "trade social liberty and women's rights for the sake of 'cooperation.'" Other observers downplay the threat.

In May the National Assembly overwhelmingly

passed legislation imposing the death penalty for blasphemy, which until now has been punished by imprisonment and a fine. The government indicated that it would not block the measure. The new punishment would only apply to Muslims, but some MPs sought to cover non-Muslims as well. This will move Kuwait uncomfortably close to Pakistan.

After taking office the newly formed al-Adala, or Justice, parliamentary bloc proposed prohibiting the construction of any new churches or other non-Muslim centers of worship. The Salafist MP who drafted the measure initially wanted to outlaw existing facilities as well. The legislation was tabled in March. The Kuwaiti Minister of Religious Endowments warned that the measure would violate “the state’s laws and regulations” which protect religious freedom.

The government has little choice but to work with the National Assembly. Within the country the biggest issue is political reform, which even the Emir’s government supports. “More freedom, more democracy is the right way,” said Undersecretary al-Homoud al-Sabah. Sheikh al-Mubarak al-Sabah similarly argued, “There need to be changes in the constitution to make it more democratic and to keep up with the pace of change.” Most fundamental are proposals to establish a constitutional monarchy and a true parliamentary system.

Calls for radical change remain muted, but there are signs of impatience. An independent MP, Salem al-Namlan, predicted, “There will be major confrontations between the government and MPs.” The National Assembly chose as speaker a long-time opposition leader who has sought to restrict royal power. Last November, opposition MPs led demonstrators in storming the parliament building to demand the prime minister’s resignation.

The Arab Spring serves as a dramatic backdrop. “History is being put in a pressure cooker,” with people expecting results much more quickly, Dr. Ghabra observed.

Yet the most serious challenges to Kuwait remain external. The 3.6 million Kuwaitis, barely a third of whom are citizens, live in a bad neighborhood. Noted Alanoud al-Sharekh of the International Institute for Strategic Studies: “We are well aware of the dangers of antagonizing our more populous and militarily powerful neighbors.”

Kuwaitis are mindful that absent American intervention their nation would be the 19th province of Iraq. The scars of that war remain. “It took a lot to overcome the shock when we lost our country,” said Sheikh al-Mubarak al-Sabah. But much of Kuwait’s young population does not remember the invasion.

Thus Undersecretary al-Homoud al-Sabah told me, “We need to make some efforts to teach our new generations about the sacrifices of the American people.”

The U.S. presence offers security but creates another kind of dependency. The Kuwaiti army numbers just 11,000; the country has 11 naval vessels and 66 combat aircraft. The U.S. does not seem likely to soon withdraw from the Persian Gulf. Sulaiman Majed al-Shaheen, who has held top foreign ministry and other government posts, told me, “Every new administration has new views, but the commitment of America in the Gulf is there.”

Yet growing financial pressures on Washington could force unexpected changes. Moreover, there are some tensions with America. Kuwaitis uniformly oppose U.S. policy towards Israel and the Palestinians. Indeed, the government has aided Hamas in Gaza. Dr. al-Sane argued that it isn’t “enough for the U.S. to be driven by a single side of the Israel-Palestinian conflict.” Kuwaitis have also demonstrated against the detention of Kuwaiti prisoners in Guantanamo Bay.

An expanding American military presence could create further problems. The relationship is governed by a renewable (and classified) security agreement. Troop numbers have come down with no more forces in Iraq to support, but apparently 15,000 personnel remain, including an army combat brigade shifted from Iraq and called a “mobile response force” by its commander. While this troop presence might help deter an attack on Kuwait, it also has an offensive purpose. Washington’s use of Kuwait to launch operations against Iran or another nation would invite retaliation against Kuwait.

Kuwait’s most immediate concern is Tehran. Undersecretary al-Homoud al-Sabah emphasized that “we intend to have peaceful relations with Iran.” Yet the relationship remains characterized by “anxiety and uncertainty,” Sheikh al-Mubarak al-Sabah admitted.

Only in January did Kuwait announce that the two countries would reinstate their ambassadors, who had been withdrawn after last year’s discovery of an Iranian spy ring in Kuwait. Sheikh al-Mubarak al-Sabah complained, “Iran plays a subversive role in Kuwaiti politics.” Indeed, Iran is sharpening the Sunni-Shia divide, which he calls a “riptide.” Kuwait’s Sunni monarchy has faced little challenge from the relatively large (40 percent) Shia minority, but Kuwaitis look nervously at Bahrain, where Sunni royalty backed by Saudi Arabia is at war with the majority Shia population. “When the sectarian trend rises, it rises here,” according to Sheikh al-Mubarak al-Sabah.

Iran’s nuclear activities—and Washington’s hawkish stance toward them—remain a grave concern.

Observed Kristian Coates Ulrichsen of the London School of Economics: "I think the Kuwait government is coming under pressure to take a much harder line than it would like."

No one believes the Iranian leadership plans a suicidal jihad, but a nuclear capability would reinforce Tehran's ability to overawe the region. "We support their use of nuclear energy," said Sheikh al-Mubarak al-Sabah, but he insisted that the program comply with international safeguards. "Even with their assurance to the international community that they are using their nuclear program for civilian use, we have doubts," admitted Undersecretary al-Homoud al-Sabah.

There appears to be little fear of direct Iranian aggression. Retired ambassador Abdullah Bishara dismissed the rhetoric emanating from Tehran. "There is a line Iran won't cross. They won't do anything to hurt themselves." Military action by Iran "would be national suicide." Iran is "surrounded by nuclear powers. None are friendly. So Iran wants nuclear weapons for protection." Similarly, Dr. Ghabra opined, "I can understand why Iran, though a major power, is insecure."

Certainly Kuwait prefers that no war be fought in its neighborhood. The government says that it will not allow military operations from its territory against Iran, which the latter warns would result in retaliation. Dr. Ghabra is concerned that "if you attack Iran, the regime will mobilize. People will not change the regime for the U.S." According to Dr. al-Sane, "Military action would be very bad for us. We would suffer a lot." Analysts disagree over Tehran's ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, but a combination of missiles, mines, and small attack vessels could inhibit oil traffic and raise insurance rates. Tehran attacked Kuwaiti oil tankers once before during the lengthy Iran-Iraq War.

Iraq also is a problem, even though Saddam Hussein is long dead. "No one trusts Iraq," admitted Sheikh al-Mubarak al-Sabah. In fact, four years ago Kuwait's defense minister indicated his concern over U.S. weapons sales to Iraq's new government: "In the short term, there is no danger for Kuwait, but in the long term, there could be some fears from these arms sales."

There are obvious reasons for caution. "The instability in Iraq, the internal politics are not very encouraging," allowed Undersecretary al-Homoud al-Sabah. Dr. Ghabra further noted that there "is a big vacuum in Iraq. Iran is trying to fill the vacuum."

But the problem is more fundamental. Iraqis appear to covet territory, Gulf access, and wealth,

which they see as denied to them by Kuwait's existence. "When there are problems there they find a way to export it to their neighbors. And their weakest neighbor is Kuwait," explained al-Shaheen.

Even democratic Iraq long refused to respect a 1993 United Nations resolution setting the boundary between the two nations. In March Iraq finally accepted the UN-designated border.

Other issues aggravate relations. Iraq was forced to pay reparations after its invasion of Kuwait and still owes \$25 billion, for which 5 percent of all oil revenues are deducted through a UN-supervised process. Iraqis are asking for relief, and some observers wonder if Kuwait risks being penny-wise but pound-foolish, recalling the reparations demands of the allies after World War I. Indeed, Kuwait's attempt to seize an Iraqi Airways airplane on its first flight to London to enforce a separate \$1.2 billion claim by Kuwait Airways had the look of comic opera. KA's case was also settled in March.

Controversy surrounds Kuwait's plan to build a new port at Mubarak al-Kabeer, a few miles from Iraq's planned Grand al-Faw port. Mubarak al-Kabeer would also compete with Iraq's established al-Basra and Umm Qasr ports. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki formed an Emergency Committee last spring to address the issue. Some Iraqis improbably charge that Kuwait intends to damage their nation, and they advocate various forms of retaliation. Last fall the Iraqi foreign minister said the dispute had been resolved, but it hasn't. In April, Iraqi parliamentarians were pressing their government to pursue the matter.

Kuwait has a legal right to proceed but has raised the possibility of third-party arbitration. "We have to maintain efforts to preserve good relations," said Undersecretary al-Homoud al-Sabah. Some adjustment might make sense for political reasons: "Kuwait is the country that will feel the heat if something happens. So it's best not to follow the Saudi line; it's better to have an open relationship with Iraq," Kuwait University's Ghanim al-Najjar observed.

Relations appear to be improving. Prime Minister Maliki visited Kuwait in March. Two weeks later Kuwait's Emir attended the Arab Summit in Baghdad, making the first visit by Kuwait's head of state since Hussein's invasion.

Kuwait is a friendly, hospitable, and relatively free society that exhibits genuine gratitude toward Americans. "Thank you very much for the American people supporting Kuwait," said Undersecretary al-Homoud al-Sabah. Sheikh al-Mubarak

al-Sabah told me, “It makes a lot of difference to us that the Americans are here.” He may be right in claiming, “there has been no truer friend to the U.S. in the last 20 years than Kuwait.”

Yet even Kuwait is not immune from larger social forces sweeping the Arab world, which demonstrates the problem of Washington picking up security dependents almost by happenstance. Before 1990, few Americans thought Kuwait was important. Some analysts argued against intervening to stop Saddam Hussein’s invasion since it didn’t matter who controlled Kuwait’s oil as long as it remained on the market.

After restoring Kuwait without defanging Iraq, the U.S. couldn’t easily return home. Temporary as-

sistance turned into a permanent guarantee. Today Washington hopes to use Kuwait as a base for watching both Iraq and Iran, and perhaps much more. This will discourage Kuwait from improving its own defense, while keeping America entangled in Gulf disputes. And if Kuwaitis’ pro-American attitudes start to recede, the relationship could crash.

That’s something Americans and Kuwaitis alike should ponder. A couple of years ago the U.S.-Egypt relationship looked solid. Then came a popular challenge during which U.S. policy veered between amateurish and disastrous; no one knows what relationship finally awaits the former allies. Kuwait is a far better friend and much freer society than Egypt. But how long will it remain that way? ■

DEEPBACKGROUND

by PHILIP GIRALDI

As governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton regularly participated in state trade missions to Europe. Clinton, who had visited the Soviet Union during his Oxford years, had earlier come to the attention of U.S. intelligence agencies because of his travels in the Eastern Bloc, and some regarded him as indiscreet based on contacts that he allegedly made on his trips. As a result, whenever Governor Clinton visited Europe, he was clandestinely shadowed by an intelligence officer, in the belief that among the progressive circles he frequented he might have connections that could be regarded as inappropriate or that could pose a security risk.

This surveillance was based on the standard of behavior that was expected of a relatively high-ranking government official. Whether the intelligence agencies were justified in monitoring a governor who had broken no law on a “just in case” basis is debatable, to say the least, but the story casts light on how the perception of appropriate behavior for government officials has changed for the worse.

As a case in point, the Obama Justice Department has decided to take no action against current elected officials, as well as former senior functionaries, who have vigorously supported lifting the terrorist designation from the Iranian Mujaheddin e-Khalq (MEK). Unlike anything Bill Clinton might have been involved in, MEK—which is a cult described as believing in a “weird combination of Marxism and Islamic fundamentalism”—actually killed six Americans in the 1970s. The group, which is believed to be funded at least in part by the Israeli Mossad, has plenty of money

to pay for full-page newspaper ads, as well as to acquire the services of politicians willing to call for its exoneration. Those have included John Bolton and ex-CIA Director James Woolsey; former head of the Democratic Party Howard Dean; former New York mayor Rudy Giuliani; ex-CIA director Michael Hayden; former generals Anthony Zinni, Peter Pace, and Hugh Shelton; former congressman Lee Hamilton; ex-attorney general Michael Mukasey; former Homeland Security director Tom Ridge; former national security adviser Jim Jones; ex-senator Robert Torricelli; former FBI director Louis Freeh; and former New Mexico governor Bill Richardson.

Last year Barbara Slavin of Inter Press Service reported that several of MEK’s friends, including Zinni and Hamilton, had been paid to give speeches on behalf of its cause. Hamilton admitted to receiving a “substantial amount,” but conceded that he had possibly been fooled about the group’s democratic credentials. “You always can be misled,” he said.

Attorney General Eric Holder is apparently willing to ignore the government’s own very clear definition of “material support” for terrorism, a crime that has sent numerous young Muslim men to prison for having done much less than MEK’s supporters. The attorney general is looking to placate the many enemies of Tehran circulating in Washington for whom MEK—sometimes described as “freedom fighters” when carrying out terrorist acts inside Iran—is a useful tool. ■

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Ballot of a Thin Man

Our daughter turned 18 this past winter, which meant, among other milestones, that in the April New York Republican primary she cast her first-ever vote. Being a girl of uncommonly good sense, she chose Ron Paul. She and my wife supplied the good doctor with 33 percent of his votes in our town. (As I remain a wholly torpid registrant of the slightly less bloodthirsty Democratic Party, and as the infinitesimal antiwar bloc of that party is harder to find than Chuck Berry at a meeting of Promise Keepers, I had no choice.)

Heretofore, all my adult life I've voted in those massive draw-the-curtain, pull-the-lever Myers Automatic Booths. (They were first used in 1892 in nearly Lockport, birthplace of Joyce Carol Oates and the supermodel-turned-hemorrhoid-cream spokeswoman Kim Alexis.) These were sturdy, solid, reliable. But the Help America Vote Act, signed into law by the wretched G.W. Bush—who with his wars and Patriot Acts and Wall Street bailouts and refusal to leave any child behind (or alone) is a contender for the most centralizing president in American history—forced New York to junk these estimable war-horses and use instead scannable sheets of the sort one associates with 1960s classroom overhead slide projectors.

We now vote in New York by filling in circles next to our choices in the manner of spiritless students answering multiple-choice questions on one of those standardized tests which Bush's No Child Left Behind inflicted on the nation's schoolchildren. Explain to me again why the Fortunate Son Romney, whose politics differ in no

important sense from Fortunate Son Bush, is preferable to Obama?

Gretel's first vote for a presidential candidate sure puts mine (for Ted Kennedy in the 1980 NY primary) to shame. It's almost enough to make me believe in the improvement of the species.

This race is has been Ron Paul's electoral valedictory. Whether he is the augury of a restored republic, as his yard signs proclaimed (he was the only candidate whose supporters declared him splendid in their grass), or a brilliant one-shot comet the fading of whose tail marks the end of liberty's last chance in the erstwhile land of the free is a good test of one's sanguinity. And as Brian Doherty emphasizes in his entertaining and incisive new book, *Ron Paul's Revolution*, the Paul folks evince a sweet, even compelling optimism in the face of Empire. They savor of the old DIY—Do It Yourself—ethos of the circa 1980 punks, and in fact the Paul campaign's grassroots call to mind the refreshingly rebellious idealism of those first punks.

Brian Doherty, not coincidentally, played bass for a 1980s Florida punk band called The Jeffersons. His 2007 book *Radicals for Capitalism* was a rollicking history of the libertarian movement full of I-Didn't-Know-That moments. My favorite was the revelation that Leonard Read, pamphleteer for liberty and a founder of the Foundation for Economic Education, whom I had always considered a somewhat dull worthy, was a precocious experimenter with LSD who dropped acid the way an eight-year-old right fielder drops fly balls. I'll never read "I, Pencil" in the same way again.

The portrait Doherty paints of Paul is of a soft-spoken man of peace patiently explaining the principles of liberty to those Americans—a minority as yet, alas—who are desperate for an alternative to those who sit atop our system: smug bullies and oleaginous operators whose only gods are war and power.

Dr. Paul understands that despair is a sin, and anger a consuming fire. So he is equable but urgent, radical but in a meek-shall-inherit-the-earth way. He, more than anyone, has dented, if not shattered, the liberal-conservative/Red-Blue prison cell in which our politics are trapped, and American voices suffocated. Doherty describes the typical Paul crowd as consisting of "concerned veterans, pierced anarchists, conservative Christian moms, real estate brokers and homeschoolers and weapons enthusiasts and peace hippies" exuding "a galloping joy and enthusiasm." And no great thing, as Emerson lectured us, is ever accomplished without enthusiasm.

My favorite Doherty snapshot is of Ron Paul sitting in an Ames, Iowa, hotel bar. He is not drinking, having declined Barry Goldwater Jr.'s sympathetic offer, "Do you need a tequila shot?"—but he *is* patiently discussing the Fourteenth Amendment with a 12-year-old fan.

This is the man who was booed by South Carolina Republicans—ostensible Christians—for advocating a foreign policy based on the Golden Rule. Sometimes, as the poet said, all you can do is sing about it. Or write about it. Maybe even read about it—and weep. ■

Arts&Letters

A Stasi for America

by JAMES BOVARD

Enemies: A History of the FBI, Tim Weiner, Random House, 560 pages

A ripple of protest swept across the Internet in late March after the disclosure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was teaching its agents that “the FBI has the ability to bend or suspend the law to impinge on the freedom of others.” This maxim was inculcated as part of FBI counterterrorism training. The exposure of the training material—sparked by a series of articles by Wired.com’s Spencer Ackerman—spurred the ritual declaration by an FBI spokesman that “mistakes were made, and we are correcting those mistakes.” No FBI officials were sanctioned or fired for teaching lawmen that they were above the law.

At least the FBI has been consistent. Since its founding in 1908, the bureau has rarely let either the statute book or the Constitution impede its public service. Tim Weiner, the author of a superb exposé of the CIA (*Legacy of Ashes*) has delivered a riveting chronology of some of the FBI’s biggest crimes with his new book, *Enemies*.

The FBI was born in deceit. Congress had prohibited Theodore Roosevelt’s administration from creating a separate agency of federal investigators for fear that the new hires would trample the Constitution. Rep.

George Waldo, a New York Republican, warned that it would be a “great blow to freedom if there should arise in this country any such great central secret service bureau as there is in Russia.” But Attorney General Charles Bonaparte—a direct descendant of the French dictator—created the bureau by his own edict, shuffling funds from the Justice Department’s expense account to bankroll the new operation.

The bureau was small potatoes until Woodrow Wilson dragged the U.S. into World War I. With one fell swoop, the number of dangerous Americans increased by perhaps twentyfold. The Espionage Act of 1917 made it easy to jail anyone who criticized the war or the government. In September 1918, the bureau, working with local police and private vigilantes, seized more than 50,000 suspected draft dodgers off the streets and out of the restaurants of New York, Newark, and Jersey City. The Justice Department was embarrassed when the vast majority of young men who had been arrested turned out to be innocent.

In January 1920, J. Edgar Hoover—the 25-year-old chief of the bureau’s Radical Division—was the point man for the “Palmer Raids.” Up to 10,000 suspected Reds and radicals were seized. (The bureau carefully avoided keeping an accurate count of detainees.) Attorney General Palmer used the massive roundups to propel his presidential candidacy. The operation took a drubbing, however, after

an insolent judge demanded that the Justice Department provide evidence as to why individuals were arrested. Federal judge George Anderson complained that the government had created a “spy system” that “destroys trust and confidence and propagates hate. A mob is a mob whether made up of government officials acting under instructions from the Department of Justice, or of criminals, loafers, and the vicious classes.”

After the debacle of the Palmer raids, the bureau devoted its attention to the nation’s real enemies: the U.S. Congress. The bureau targeted “senators whom the Attorney General saw as threats to America. The Bureau was breaking into their offices and homes, intercepting their mail, and tapping their telephones.” The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was illegally targeted because the bureau feared he might support diplomatic recognition of Soviet Russia.

After President Warren Harding died in August 1923, the bureau’s political espionage was exposed. The chief of the Justice Department’s criminal division urged Congress to “get rid of this Bureau of Investigation as organized.” The new attorney general, Harlan Fiske Stone, warned, “A secret police system may become a menace to free government and free institutions because it carries with it the possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly comprehended or understood.” Stone fired the bureau’s chief, and Hoover, who was number

two in the agency, pledged to cease the abuses. But the FBI soon resumed its machinations.

Hollywood teamed with the Roosevelt administration to whip up support for a war on crime in the 1930s, and Hoover became the face of federal law enforcement. While Hoover stood as an icon of law and order, his men became experts at installing wiretaps and conducting “black bag” burglaries, often including the planting of listening devices. By the late 1930s, Weiner notes, “At the highest levels of power in Washington, an awareness dawned that Hoover might be listening to private conversations. This sense that the FBI was omnipresent was its own kind of power.” After the FBI tapped the home telephone of a Supreme Court clerk, “Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes suspected that Hoover had wired the conference room where the justices met to decide cases.”

While FDR welcomed the dirt the FBI delivered to him, Attorney General Robert Jackson noted in a secret memo, “The FBI is the subject of frequent attack as a Gestapo.” Shortly after taking office, President Harry Truman made a similar comment in his diary: “We want no Gestapo or Secret Police. FBI is tending in that direction. They are dabbling in sex-life scandals and plain blackmail... This must stop.” But Hoover outfoxed Truman and continued building his empire. Hoover correctly perceived that the Roosevelt and Truman administrations—especially the State Department—had been heavily infiltrated by Soviet spies. The FBI nailed some of the double-agents who provided Stalin with key information to build atomic weapons.

In 1950, three months after the start of the Korean War, Congress passed the Internal Security Act, which authorized mass detentions of suspected subversives. Hoover compiled a list of more than 20,000 “potentially or



actually dangerous” Americans who could be seized and locked away at the president’s command. “Congress secretly financed the creation of six of these [detention] camps in the 1950s,” Weiner notes. Hoover specified that “the hearing procedure” for the detentions “will not be bound by the rules of evidence.”

The more power the FBI captured, the more craven Congress became. “Congress fawned over Hoover during his annual appearances before the leaders of the judiciary and appropriations committees,” Weiner notes. Hoover fed buckets of leaks to favored politicians, helping spur the rise of Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy.

From 1956 through 1971, the FBI’s COINTELPRO program conducted thousands of covert operations to

incite street warfare between violent groups, to get people fired, to smear innocent people by portraying them as government informants, to sic the IRS on people, and to cripple or destroy left-wing, black, communist, white racist, and other organizations. FBI agents also busied themselves forging “poison pen” letters to wreck activists’ marriages. FBI agents were encouraged to conduct interviews with antiwar protestors to “enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles and further serve to get the point across that there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox.” COINTELPRO was only exposed after a handful of activists burglarized an FBI office in a Philadelphia suburb, seized FBI files, and leaked the damning documents to the media.

While Weiner's history of the FBI's first half-century is masterful, he downplays or excludes some of the bureau's worst modern abuses. His less-than-a-paragraph thumbnail summary of Waco could have been written by the FBI Office of Public Affairs: "The FBI had used tear gas against the barricaded and heavily armed group, giving its leader the apocalypse he desired." Weiner notes that 80 Davidians "died in the fire that followed."

He neglects to mention that the CS gas was delivered via 54-ton tanks driven by FBI agents. The tanks

J. Edgar Hoover found one shady pretext after another to continue breaking the law.

smashed through much of the Davidians' home and intentionally collapsed 25 percent of the building on top of the huddled residents. The FBI knew the Davidians were lighting and heating their residence with candles and kerosene lamps and had bales of hay stacked around the windows. The FBI also knew that "accumulating [CS] dust may explode when exposed to spark or open flame," as a U.S. Army field manual warned. Six years after the assault, news leaked that the FBI had fired incendiary tear gas cartridges into the Davidians' home prior to a fire erupting. Attorney General Janet Reno, furious over the FBI's deceit on this key issue, sent U.S. marshals to raid FBI headquarters to search for more Waco evidence. From start to finish, the FBI brazenly lied about what it did at Waco—with one exception. On the day after the Waco fire, FBI on-scene commander Larry Potts explained the rationale for the FBI's final assault: "Those people thumbed their nose at law enforcement."

Weiner justly excoriates Louis

Freeh as one of the FBI's most inept directors. The FBI's pervasive failures prior to 9/11 "contributed to the United States becoming, in effect, a sanctuary for radical terrorists," according to a congressional investigation. Freeh had promised Congress in 1997 that he would "double the 'shoe leather'" for counterterrorism investigations. But walking was no substitute for thinking.

The FBI's ability to decipher terrorist plots was thwarted by its profound aversion toward modern technology. Though Congress had deluged the FBI with almost \$2 billion to upgrade

its computers, many FBI agents on 9/11 had eight-year-old machines that were incapable of searching the web or sending email. One FBI agent observed that the bureau ethos is

that "real men don't type. The only thing a real agent needs is a notebook, a pen and gun, and with those three things you can conquer the world... The computer revolution just passed us by" because of that mindset. (FBI computer upgrades continue to flounder, billions of dollars and a decade later.) As usual, the FBI's failures did not prevent the agency from receiving vastly more power and funding after the disastrous attacks.

At times, Weiner is like a prosecuting attorney who marshals a vast array of evidence of perfidy—and then suddenly announces that the defendant's good intentions absolve all his crimes. Weiner declares, "Over the decades, the Bureau has best served the cause of national security by bending and breaking the law."

But many of the FBI's illicit operations were complete disasters. Hoover perpetually falsely assured presidents that the Soviets or other communist regimes were bankrolling the civil rights movement. Hoover's reports also fed the fantasies and paranoia of

both LBJ and Nixon that the communists were behind the antiwar movement, thereby helping deepen and perpetuate the Vietnam quagmire.

Hoover pioneered the art of assuming that the bureau was entitled to use any powers that had been delegated to it by a president or attorney general. The Supreme Court repeatedly ruled that warrantless wiretaps were unconstitutional. Hoover found one shady pretext after another to continue breaking the law. FDR authorized Hoover to use any means necessary to go after fascists, communists, or other subversives, and Hoover ever after cited that "authority" for black-bag jobs, bugging bedrooms, and other abuses.

Former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach explained to a Senate Committee in 1975 how the FBI justified scorning the law:

As far as Mr. Hoover was concerned, it was sufficient for the Bureau if at any time any Attorney General had authorized [a particular] activity in any circumstances. In fact, it was often sufficient if any Attorney General had written something which could be construed to authorize it or had been informed in some one of hundreds of memoranda of some facts from which he could conceivably have inferred the possibility of such an activity.

Hoover conveyed this attitude to his agents, and they acted accordingly. After COINTELPRO abuses were exposed, two top FBI officials were convicted for "black bag" jobs and other abuses. (President Reagan gave them full pardons.) Weiner recounts the justification offered by the FBI's chief of intelligence, Edward Miller, who "took his argument from the common law of centuries gone by. A man's home is his castle, he conceded. But no man can maintain a castle against the King."

It was bizarre that any American

could attribute such a doctrine to the common law. The English in the 1600s fought a civil war, executed one king, and deposed another to banish that notion from their land. William Pitt, speaking in Parliament in 1763, famously declared: “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the crown. ... [T]he storm may enter—the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter.” The English common law was adapted as the foundation of American jurisprudence at the time of this nation’s founding, and Pitt’s dicta helped guide American courts.

But the FBI long operated on a presumption that the law did not apply to the king—or anyone the king designated to break the law. FBI badges were presumed to provide the same exoneration that Cardinal Richelieu reputedly gave agents sent on dastardly deeds: “The Bearer of This Letter Has Acted Under My Orders and for the Good of the State.”

The “except for the king” theory of law has mightily expanded since 9/11. Justice Department lawyer John Yoo assured the Bush White House that the president was “free from the constraints of the Fourth Amendment” and its prohibition of unreasonable, warrantless searches. The Obama administration has taken up the same tune with its contortions on the president’s prerogative to order the killing of Americans without a trial or other judicial niceties.

The biggest surprise in *Enemies* is Weiner’s lionization of current FBI director Robert Mueller, who took over in 2001. Mueller earned his halo from Weiner for his refusal in April 2004 to rubberstamp the extension of the post-9/11 wiretapping regime. Bush purportedly modified his “Terrorist Surveillance Program,” and Mueller stayed contentedly on the job. Without knowing the details of the policy change, it is unclear why Mueller is sainted. The revised system

continued vacuuming up thousands of Americans’ phone calls and emails and was widely condemned as illegal after the *New York Times* exposed it in December 2005.

Mueller is portrayed as a steadfast defender of liberty in part because of the just-released 460-page FBI guideline for running intelligence operations, which Weiner labels the “first realistic operating manual for running a secret intelligence service in an open democracy.” The new rules require “rigorous obedience to constitutional principles.” Sounds good—but at the same time, the FBI was teaching its agents behind closed doors that they have “the ability to bend or suspend the law.”

We have probably not seen the tip of the iceberg of the FBI’s post-9/11 abuses. The FBI has almost always been more abusive than it appeared. It took decades before Americans learned of Hoover’s secret list with the names of tens of thousands of people who would vanish into federal stockades at the drop of a presidential memo. Americans did not learn of the breadth of COINTELPRO’s outrages until almost 20 years after the program started. We have no idea what personal info has been vacuumed up by the 400,000-plus National Security Letters the FBI issued in the past decade. Weiner notes that the FBI has more than 700 million terrorism-related records and a suspected terrorist list with more than a million names.

For most of its history, the FBI has been one of the most venerated of federal agencies. The FBI has always used its “good guys” image to keep a lid on its crimes. There are many competent, courageous FBI agents who do fine work and make America a safer place. But the bureau’s vast power and pervasive secrecy guarantee that more FBI scandals are just around the bend. ■

James Bovard is the author of Attention Deficit Democracy.

Ron Paul’s Paradoxes

by TIMOTHY STANLEY

Ron Paul’s Revolution: The Man and the Movement He Inspired, Brian Doherty, Broadside Books, 304 pages

I was a bit nervous about reviewing Brian Doherty’s excellent new biography of Ron Paul and his movement. The Paulites are hard to please. I could type, “Ron Paul’s Great!” a thousand times, and I’d still get a slew of emails saying, “Why do you always use such a small font when you write about Ron Paul? When are you people in the mainstream media going to give him the respect he deserves?” Most political activists can’t handle light criticism. The Paulites can’t handle light praise.

A lot of journalists don’t like Paul’s people because of the way they behaved on the campaign trail. When not shouting the praises of the Texas congressman, they were often shouting down their opponents. I was present in New Hampshire this January when the news came through that their guy had placed second with 23 percent of the vote in the first-in-the-nation primary. To say that the crowd at the Ron Paul party went wild would be an understatement. They went bestial—all teeth and claw, hollering at the cameras and pawing at the stage.

The great Ron Paul paradox is that he sells himself as the most conservative Republican alive because he wants to take America back to a golden age of low taxes, no bureaucracy, and the sovereignty of the states. Yet his campaign has been anything but conservative. His supporters seem more like revolutionaries than activists, while his small-government philosophy signs him up to positions that can seem more libertine than libertarian—guns on planes, surrender in the War on Drugs, gay marriage on tap.

For this reader, the most interesting thing that a Ron Paul biography could



do is to unravel that paradox and explain how it fits into the grand history of American conservatism. Luckily, Doherty is an intelligent, informed observer who does just that. By the end of his super-smart book you have a good sense of Ron Paul the man and Ron Paul the movement and where both might go next.

The man was born in Pittsburgh in 1935. The son of a dairy owner, he earned a doctorate in medicine at Duke University's School of Medicine in 1961. Like most of his generation, he served his time in the armed forces without complaint—as a flight

surgeon in the Air Force from 1963 to 1965 and then in the National Air Guard from 1965 to 1968. He settled down in Texas with his wife and established a private practice in obstetrics and gynecology.

In terms of personality, that's all you're going to get from Ron Paul. The image Doherty draws is of a straightforward, ordinary man who loves his family and has honored his country. No George W. Bush-style drunk driving or Kennedyesque shenanigans. The only color in Paul's early life is ideological. Always opposed to government handouts, he refused Medicaid or Medicare payments and lowered fees for those patients who could not pay. To conservatives in his care, Dr. Paul was both sound and affordable.

Interestingly, it wasn't the liberal antics of presidents Johnson or Carter that encouraged him to enter politics but the flip-flopping conservatism of Richard Nixon. Paul—who “had already been reading his Hayek and his Mises”—was shocked by President Nixon's decision to go off the gold standard and fight the inflation of the early 1970s with price controls. In Paul's own words, he knew it would “usher in a new age of rampant inflation and big government and I wanted to speak out.” It was 1974 and, thanks to Watergate, no one wanted to run as a Republican for Congress. Paul did, and he lost. But the name recognition he gained set him up for a win in 1976.

He went to Congress as an issues politician, and he refused to lavish time, or the taxpayer's money, on special interests. “Dr. No,” as he became known, was a curiosity. On the one

hand he was charming, politically gifted, and enjoyed broad support across the conservative movement. On the other hand, he took a lot of awkward stands in Congress that isolated him from the Republican caucus—stands on things that weren't obvious conservative issues. “He's the cult politician par excellence, in the sense that his enthusiasms tend to be mightily, but thinly held, across the American landscape,” says Doherty. In other words, Paul's matured libertarianism was consistent but only appreciated by folks whose numbers were spread “thinly” across the country. And often its policy agenda appealed to isolated activists rather than a broad coalition. Just as it was logical for Paul to quit the Republicans in 1988 (on the not widely held premise that Ronald Reagan had been a closet liberal) and run as a Libertarian presidential candidate, so it was inevitable that his run should be beset by internal squabbles and slim national support.

It was when he was launching his comeback to Congress in 1996 that Paul demonstrated the quiet strength of his political brand. According to Doherty, “Paul's opponents... painted him as a madly radical libertarian who would be for selling heroin in public schools.” They cut ads “trying to portray him as a loon... weird noises, boooooiiing, cartoon like effects, he must be crazy.” But one meeting with the “quiet, calm, wonkish country doctor” put voters at ease. A former activist told Doherty that personal contact immediately disabused them of “the idea that he's any kind of dangerous nut. [His opponents] tried to portray him as a dangerous extremist, but meet him and he's painfully ordinary.” Paul won the election by a squeak: 51 to 48 percent. But once voters get used to Paul, his support ticks up. In his 2010 congressional race, he took 76 percent.

September 11 turned Paul from a local curiosity into a national phenomenon. Strangely, the American

left failed throughout the noughties to develop a consistent, compelling response to the Iraq War. It didn't even feature as a front and center issue for the Democrats in 2008, when instead they debated the rather more trite question of who it would be more historic/cool to see as president: a woman or an African-American. Only Ron Paul—identified erroneously as a right-wing Republican—astutely and passionately articulated the case against the military-industrial complex.

This was a case of cometh the hour cometh the man. Paul brought two things to his argument: that disarming “wonkish” quality that made him sound like less of a radical than he really was, and an intellectual depth that was lacking on the left. Perhaps one of the reasons why he ran stronger in the presidential contest of 2012 than in 2008 is that his small-government philosophy offered an integrated critique of the two biggest crises then facing America: war and the credit crunch. Paul argued—in a way that no Democrat could—that welfare and warfare were linked, that they were all part of the growth of government beyond the limits placed upon it by the Constitution. The U.S. has to finance war, so it creates new taxes. The new taxes feed the public hunger for programs, so the taxes grow. As the state enlarges domestically, so it is emboldened internationally. The twin compulsions of imperialism and social democracy birth a new movement that gives them political legitimacy: neoconservatism. And neoconservatism leads to debt, cheap money, crass speculation and... the credit crunch.

The message was powerful enough to achieve some genuine breakthroughs in 2012. Paul's ability to raise millions was remarkable, while his activist base seemed like a force of nature. His third-place showing in Iowa was incredible because it was against the odds, and in the face of a media that alternately demonized Paul and

pretended that he didn't exist. His second place in New Hampshire should have resulted in him being given top-tier status by the party and press. Instead it outraged and confused them in equal measure. He never got a fair crack at the nomination.

But Paul had flaws, too. His foreign policy could be distracting—not necessarily because he was wrong but because it underscored his quirkiness and made him unacceptable to the vast majority of hawkish Republicans. Paul's willingness to answer honestly any question put to him was a disadvantage for a politician, as when he told Bill Maher that the Civil War was unnecessary. Then there was the revelation that back in the 1990s he had put his name to a series of newsletters that were borderline racist and homophobic. For some of us, that was a step too close to the fringe. To use the parlance of Paul's liberal supporters on campus, “Not cool, dude. Not cool.”

But his biggest problem was his fans. Doherty recalls a conversation with a “tipsy young Romney supporter” during the Iowa caucuses who admitted that she liked Paul but hated his followers. “They were outside agitators, she insisted, almost scary in their intensity.” Reading between the lines, Doherty has some sympathy with that view. I do, too. After all, isn't conservatism about sustaining order, not tearing it down?

And yet, Doherty correctly concludes, it is the Ron Paul following that will be his most important legacy. His activists are already getting elected at a state level, while his son is a rising star of the Senate. Best of all, the Paulite vote is young and only likely to grow. Doherty writes, “The results in Iowa showed signs that Paulism, with its appeal to the young and to independents, might be the key to

the future of the GOP. Entrance polls for the Iowa caucus had Paul pulling 48 percent of those age 19-29, and 44 percent of independents.” In Virginia, where Paul went up against Romney alone, the libertarian won 61 percent of voters age 17-29 and 63 percent of those 30-44. He won the poor and the unmarried as well. But—and here's the problem—he also won the votes of self-described liberals, those who “oppose the Tea Party,” and supporters of legalized abortion. That's why Paul did so well among independents in 2012: they were drawn from the libertarian cult, not the mainstream Republican church.

The most intriguing part of Doherty's book is his consideration of

September 11 turned Paul from a local curiosity into a national phenomenon.

where Paul's movement fits within U.S. political history. He finds comparisons here, there, and everywhere—some of Grover Cleveland's fiscalism, a little of William Jennings Bryan's populism, a dash of Goldwater's rampant right-wingery. But with all these figures there is some disagreement (with Bryan on coinage, with Goldwater on foreign policy) that makes him impossible to place within the grand tradition of American history. It's one more reason why his presidential races have proved disappointing, even as they have revived the spirit of American politics. Ron Paul is his own man, stubbornly pushing a brand of libertarianism that almost defies electoral good sense. Paulism is a principle still in search of a party. ■

Timothy Stanley is author of The Crusader: The Life and Tumultuous Times of Pat Buchanan and a blogger for the Daily Telegraph.

Hamilton Shrugged

by JAMES P. PINKERTON

Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States, Michael Lind, Harper, 592 pages

Any good book of history tells a useful tale about the present as well as the past. And a great book of history looks into the future as well. Michael Lind has written such a book in *Land of Promise*, a volume simultaneously scholarly and entertaining—bereft, blessedly, of graphs and equations. Yet at the same time, the work poses a serious challenge to the contemporary orthodoxies of left and right, offering a manifesto for a future far different from what the policymakers in either political party might imagine.

Interestingly, the source for Lind's future vision is a notable figure from American history, a man admired today as a Founder even as his economic philosophy is mostly ignored—Alexander Hamilton. We might ask: Where would America's first Treasury secretary find space in the political spectrum of today? Which political party would welcome him? Lind's answer: there's no real home for Hamilton today, although there should be.

As a champion of energetic government, eager to pursue developmental economic goals, Hamilton might seem to be on today's left. But as an enthusiast for business and profit, he might seem to be more on the right. So he is politically adrift, we might say—neither party nowadays is interested in the sort of pro-business economic strategy that Hamilton championed.

The same situation holds true for this book's author. Lind first came to national prominence in 1995, publishing an article in the left-wing magazine *Dissent*, "Why Intellectual Conservatism Died," that scourged the conservative movement for harboring Pat Robertson and his crackpot theories. And

today he writes a column for *Salon.com*. Yet at the same time, Lind must regularly confound his lefty readership by openly disdaining environmentalism, multiculturalism, and contemporary progressivism in general, as he argues for a hard-nosed neo-Hamiltonian revival of American infrastructure and industry.

Thus we come to *Land of Promise*, which begins with a reminder that the intention of our early leaders—that is, the English government in London—was to make America a permanent agricultural satellite of the mother country. As a 1721 report from the British Board of Trade observed, "Having no manufactories or their own," the colonists will always be "dependent on Great Britain."

Perhaps not surprisingly, this vision of America—as nothing more than a land of farmers, growing crops to trade for British manufactures—was appealing to Adam Smith, the great champion of free trade who was also, of course, a loyal Briton. Lind writes crisply, "If America had paid attention to Smith, the United States would never have become the world's greatest industrial economy—because it never would have become an industrial economy at all."

To Hamilton, such a future for America was unacceptable. As an officer in George Washington's army during the Revolution, he had seen that the colonists nearly lost the war for want of adequate military equipment. That weapons deficit, Hamilton believed, should never happen again: for any future wars, the young republic needed its own military-industrial complex. And so Hamilton rejected free trade and non-industrialization in favor of a conscious policy of protectionism and industrialism, nurturing the nation's "infant industries."

President Washington, himself a plantation owner, sided with Hamilton, thus going against the regional interests of his fellow Virginians and Southerners. Agriculture-exporting Dixie, after

all, saw Hamilton's tariff as an unfair economic burden, designed to benefit Yankee manufacturers. Yet in Lind's view, the first president's largeness of spirit—siding with the Hamiltonian modernizers as opposed to his "home team," the Jeffersonian agrarians—enabled the United States grow into a world power, not only economically, but militarily.

If Hamilton is the overall guiding light of Lind's book, Henry Clay is the brightest star of the antebellum period. The author nimbly escorts the reader through the seeming arcana of such antique topics as the First and Second Banks of the United States, as well as various Nullifications and Abominations, all the while pointing toward the creation of Clay's vaunted "American System," a strategy of tariffs, "internal improvements"—that is, infrastructure—and national finance.

It was under this American System that such inventor-manufacturers as Samuel Colt, Cyrus McCormick, and Isaac Merritt Singer were able to flourish. Economic development in the U.S., in other words, occurred under a regime that was neither laissez-faire nor bureaucratically ordained; its capitalism arose within a set of business-friendly rules that Hamilton, Washington, and Clay believed to provide the best balance between personal economic liberty and the desired national results. As Lind observes, "Industrial policy is not alien to the American tradition. It is the American tradition."

And technology also mattered. In Lind's telling, the American System included a healthy appreciation of its transformational power; technology was what proved crucial to American military success in the Civil War and thereafter. As Lind makes clear, while economic growth is always a desirable goal, what is essential is national survival—and survival is only guaranteed by force of arms.

Echoing Alfred North Whitehead's observation that the greatest invention of the 19th century was the idea of in-

vention, Lind observes that the world's leading powers were those that could systematize research and development through either public or private means. So while properly describing Thomas Edison as "brilliant," Lind adds, "most of the products for which he is given credit, from the incandescent lightbulb to the phonograph and motion picture technology, were the work of engineers he organized into teams in a succession of laboratories." Edison's enduring success was the result of the system he created.

Thus once again, Lind enters territory outside of the familiar economic debate of our time. He mostly ignores Milton Friedman and Paul Krugman, for instance, focusing rather on earlier economists, such as Joseph Schumpeter, who saw technological advancement as a force larger even than the market. Indeed, from Edison's General Electric to AT&T's Bell Labs to Uncle Sam's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to Stanford University's multiple engineering spinoffs, Lind correctly notes that the greatest inventions have typically come from public or private bureaucracies—organizations mostly immune from the normal cost-cutting pressures of competition. The prime mover of innovation, Lind argues, is the innovative spirit, not the free market.

Summoning up an out-of-fashion economist, John Kenneth Galbraith, Lind emphasizes again that bigness is not necessarily badness. He supports federal regulation of business, even while criticizing anti-trust laws that seek to limit business size. Lind blames rules against horizontal integration—that is, against a company's enlarging its market share in a given sector—for the value-destroying conglomerate movement of the postwar era, in which businesses bought other businesses in unfamiliar fields, with predictable negative results. Beatrice Foods, for instance, made 290 acquisitions between 1950 and 1978. Today, the company no longer exists.

Lind hopes that large, technologically proficient corporations will lead to a revival of "Fordism"—Henry Ford's belief that high profits and high wages can coexist. Indeed, Lind argues that high profits and high wages reinforce each other because workers then have the wherewithal to buy the products they are making. Without endorsing Ford's political views, Lind sketches out a positive history of Fordist American corporatism, featuring business leaders such as Gerard Swope and Owen Young, as well as political leaders who supported such views, including Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and even Herbert Hoover. Some of these presidents were more successful than others, but all shared similar ideas about cooperation between business, labor, and the public.

Yet Lind's hero among 20th century presidents is Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom he sees as an obvious inheritor of the Hamiltonian tradition. Lind concedes that the New Deal of the '30s was a mixed success but insists that its shortcomings were mostly because it wasn't big enough. He quotes John Maynard Keynes in 1940: "It seems politically impossible for a capitalistic democracy to organize expenditures on the scale necessary to make the grand experiment which would prove my case—except in war conditions." In some situations, Keynes is saying, war is the health of the economy.

World War II came to the U.S. soon thereafter and finally, in Lind's telling, the government fully accelerated the economy. Across the nation, new infrastructure projects were built in record time: Lind recalls, for example, that the Big Inch oil pipeline, connecting Texas to New Jersey, was built in less than six months. Indeed, his enthusiasm for such projects leaves no doubt as to where he stands on the proposed Keystone pipeline of today. But of course, back then, just about everyone was in favor of heavy projects since they were seen as vital to the war effort. In 1941, Woody Guthrie composed an ode

to the Grand Coulee Dam: "Now in Washington and Oregon you can hear the factories hum/ Making chrome and making manganese and light aluminum/ And there roars the flying fortress now to fight for Uncle Sam."

Lind's point is that needed infrastructure almost always requires the push of national urgency to overcome lethargy, localism, and NIMBY-ism. As the imperatives of Depression, World War II, and Cold War faded, so did necessary Hamiltonian investment. "The Golden Age of infrastructure spending between the 1930s and the 1960s," Lind writes, "gave way to an era of crumbling bridges and barge-canal locks and traffic and freight congestion, as spending on infrastructure declined." The national motivation was gone.

Meanwhile, Lind casts an approving eye on other countries that chose a Hamiltonian strategy, notably Japan. He quotes one Japanese trade negotiator in 1955: "If the theory of international trade were pursued to its ultimate conclusions, the United States would specialize in the production of automobiles and Japan in the production of tuna." If the Japanese had adhered to the doctrines of Adam Smith, they would be a nation of fishermen, not industrialists. In recent decades the economic might of Japan has faded, but Lind makes much the same point about China's pro-industry policy today: through its currency manipulation and rampant theft of intellectual property, Beijing is confounding free traders and bulking up its economic and military power.

Back on the home front, Lind celebrates the economic regulation that survived the New Deal into the '40s and beyond, including regulation of the trucking industry, the airlines, and most of all Wall Street. These rules, he believes, boosted the middle class and kept the economy in productive balance. He laments that such regulations were repealed, starting in the late '70s during the Carter administration. He calls the next three decades "the Great

Dismantling,” blaming deregulation for the erosion of wages, the spiking of income inequality, and the reckless speculation that brought on the current Great Recession.

By now it should be evident that Lind’s vision is an assault on the most established schools of thought in America today. Not only should libertarians be horrified but also environmentalists, as well as neoliberals of the Bill Clinton-type who supported the 1999 repeal of the New Deal-era Glass-Steagall banking regulation. What Lind is advocating is a conscious effort to revive the Hamilton-Clay-FDR vision, which he believes would be pro-car, pro-highway, pro-suburbs, pro-income-redistribution, pro-business, pro-labor, pro-growth—all at once.

Looking ahead, Lind argues not only for more technology but also for more energetic government efforts to promote it and distribute its benefits widely. Acknowledging that even if factories were to come back to the U.S. they would likely be staffed by robots, Lind calls for “service sector Fordism”—that is, high wages in labor-intensive sectors such as healthcare. Thus a new middle class is created, as salaries are pushed up by government policy.

Lind argues that he is simply keeping faith with Hamilton’s original vision, which provided the dominant economic agenda for the first 180 years of U.S. history. Those who disagree are numerous, to be sure—and some of them claim, as well, that they are speaking for Hamilton. Yet those who defend the current orthodoxies of the left and right must explain what went wrong over the last few decades, and they must then show how a repeat of such policies will lead to a better result next time. So far, at least, neither side has convincingly made these arguments to the American people. Thus Lind’s book emerges as a fresh and bold challenge to the status quo. ■

James P. Pinkerton is a contributor to the Fox News Channel and a TAC contributing editor.

The Science of Policy

by RONALD BAILEY

Uncontrolled: The Surprising Payoff of Trial-and-Error for Business, Politics, and Society, Jim Manzi, Basic Books, 300 pages

Human beings crave certainty. Throughout history, assorted shamans, haruspices, auspices, astrologers, sibyls, kaballahists, pyromancers, Hegelians, Marxists, palmists, tarot-card readers, stock chartists, and computer modelers have made good livings off of the apparently limitless market demand for more certainty and reduced risk. But as Jim Manzi persuasively argues in his insightful and well-written new book, *Uncontrolled*, humanity is terrible at foresight, and trial-and-error is the chief way humans develop reliable knowledge.

Manzi begins with a telling example from the beginning of his business-consulting career. A retailer wanted to know if extensive plans to remodel its stores would result in enough profits to justify their costs. Young computer whiz Manzi crafted a complicated model taking factors like consumer research and competitive benchmarking into account and with great pride presented its output to a senior partner. The partner listened and then responded, “Okay, but why wouldn’t you just do it in a few stores and see how it works?” Manzi confesses, “This seemed so simple that I thought it couldn’t be right.” This encounter turned out to be the beginning of wisdom.


Uncontrolled presents a compact and lucid history of the development of the experimental method from its 17th-century promulgator Francis Bacon through David Hume to Karl Popper, Friedrich Hayek, and Thomas Kuhn. Experimentalists seek to identify causes by changing one possible cause while holding everything else constant and then carefully observing and mea-

suring the results. The formalization of this seemingly simple trial-and-error procedure is a huge part of what has made the difference between modern wealth and health and Medieval poverty and plagues.

Manzi highlights the importance of the deep insight of philosopher Karl Popper that it must, in principle, be possible to falsify a theory for it to be scientific. Experiments can prove a theory false but never that it is true. While all scientific theories are conditional, they become more widely accepted as replicated experiments produce the same predicted results. “Science does not tell us whether theories are true, in the classic philosophical sense of accurately corresponding to reality, only that they are true in the sense of allowing us to make reliable nonobvious predictions,” explains Manzi. “In the end, sciences produce a body of engineering knowledge that lets us make practical predictions with tolerable reliability: an airplane of this design will fly; this vaccine will prevent smallpox; and so on.”

It is a sad fact that all too many practicing scientists will find Manzi’s claim that “the parallels between markets and science are striking” surprising. Yet is it so. “Both systems abjure absolute authority,” explains Manzi. He adds, “Both systems deploy trial-and-error learning and ruthlessly eliminate failures.” As Timothy Ferris, author of the superb book *The Science of Liberty: Democracy, Reason and the Laws of Nature* has put it: “Liberalism and science are methods, not ideologies.” Both science and markets advance in better understanding their subject matters by testing and falsifying asserted claims. And both often provoke populist backlashes because their psychologically counterintuitive processes and results are rejected by romanticizing reactionaries as “soulless” and “unnatural.”

Devising falsifiable experiments, while not a trivial problem, has been easier in the physical sciences than in social sciences. Even coming up with



falsifiable experiments in biology, especially for therapeutic interventions, has proven harder to do. Why? Because of what Manzi calls “causal density,” in which the number and complexity of potential causes that give rise to a phenomenon increase dramatically, making it difficult even to identify all relevant contributing factors, much less to hold all but one constant.

Eventually researchers hit upon the technique of randomized controlled trials as a way to address the problem of increasing causal density. What Manzi more generally calls randomized field trials (RFTs) were developed as a way to evaluate and compare proposed therapeutic interventions. In RFTs researchers aim to measure an intervention’s effect by randomly assigning individuals to an intervention group or a control group. Any difference in outcomes between the two groups ideally represent the effect of the intervention.

“The RFT is a relatively new piece of technology—newer than the automobile or the airplane, and about

the same age as color television or the electronic computer,” notes Manzi. RFTs combined with growing physical knowledge of biological pathways have helped guide researchers to many effective biomedical treatments.

Can this new technique be fruitfully applied to the sciences of human behavior? Causal density is even higher in the social and economic arenas in which policy specialists wish to intervene. As Manzi points out, “The maze of causation is now far beyond anything that physicists or biologists typically have had to address.” Consequently, social scientists try to use non-experimental methods to analyze data in an effort to unravel the tangled skein of causality.

Manzi shows that such non-experimental methods often prove less than successful. As examples, he eviscerates two widely publicized studies based on regression analyses, one claiming that since 1948 Republican presidents have increased income inequality and the other asserting that

legalized abortion reduced the crime rate. Neither survived deeper scrutiny unscathed. Manzi then goes on to show that non-experimental analytical techniques also fueled various business strategy fads in the 1970s and 1980s that also did not pan out.

Then a conceptual breakthrough came two decades ago, when some entrepreneurs recognized that businesses could use experiments to test strategies in much the same way drug companies use them to evaluate therapeutics. One was the senior partner who had asked Manzi, why not experiment? In fact, that partner moved on to the credit card company Capitol One that now successfully runs thousands of experiments each year. A homely example: Would households respond at a higher rate to a solicitation in a blue envelope or a white one? Randomly mail out 50,000 of each and see what happens.

All sorts of companies now experiment in this way including Amazon, Google, and eBay. Manzi and his colleagues built their company, Applied Predictive Technologies, by providing the technology used to automate, design, and measure all sorts of business experiments. Of course, just like scientists, business experimenters need to replicate in order to validate their results.

Regarding the need for replication Manzi again gives an example how another famous one-off RFT was wildly overgeneralized, the jam experiment. One suspects that this experiment gained such wide acceptance because it flattered the confirmation biases of that class of influential intellectuals who disdain America’s consumer society. In the experiment shoppers were given a choice of tasting six jams or 24 jams and then given \$1 jam-discount coupons. Considerably more people who had six jams to taste rather than 24 later purchased a jar using the coupon.

This study was popularized in the bestseller, *The Paradox of Choice*,

which argued that consumers and citizens are overwhelmed with choices, implying that they might be better off with fewer options. Options, of course, that would no doubt be pre-selected by benevolent government officials guided by wise social scientists. But Manzi shows that subsequent randomized tests contradicted the jam experiment result and found that greater choice actually tended to increase consumption.

In reviewing the history of both physical-science and business experiments, Manzi garners two fundamental insights: innovative ideas rarely work, and when they do work they generally yield only small improvements. This holds true as well in the arena of public policy. Manzi considers three policy areas where some limited RFTs have been run: criminology, education, and social welfare. “Empirically, the vast majority of criminal justice, social welfare, and education

programs fail replicated, independent well-designed RFTs,” he concludes.

In criminology only nuisance abatement of the sort described by the broken windows theory dependably reduced crime. Replicated social-welfare studies find that programs with mandatory work requirements are the only ones that reliably get people off of welfare. And the most consistent outcome of educational experiments is that student results improve, albeit marginally, if they can choose to go to a non-unionized school. One very preliminary insight that Manzi garners from the randomized policy experiment literature is that programs that focus on changing incentives and environment appear more likely to work whereas attempts to improve human behavior directly by raising skills or consciousness do not.

So we come to the heart of the book: can experimental science help identify policies whose benefits will out-

weigh their costs? Manzi cautiously thinks so. Manzi favors decentralization as a way to maximize the number of policy experiments. Thus he champions federalism, arguing that the federal government should grant waivers to states allowing them to experiment by changing almost any federal law or mandate—welfare eligibility, educational requirements, drug laws, etc.

States may be the laboratories of democracy, but recent history shows all too often that when one state tries out a new program, policymakers in other states or, even worse, those in Washington, D.C. rush to adopt the fad before its long-term results are in, e.g., Massachusetts’s experiment with mandatory health insurance. Still, Manzi’s stronger emphasis on federalism would likely be an improvement over the sort of one-size-fits-all policies regularly being imposed from Capitol Hill.

In keeping with his advocacy of the experimental method, Manzi proposes the creation of what would amount to a Federal Social Policy Experimentation Administration to oversee social-policy randomized experiments. He ambitiously wants to run 10,000 of them each year, too. But he acknowledges, “Naturally, Congress, presidential administrations, and everyone else with power or money at stake would attempt to manipulate the findings this agency produced.” Well, yes. I think he drastically underestimates how big a problem this would be. Already, most studies contracted by federal agencies from “independent” researchers find results that favor whatever policy the agency is promoting. There are reasons to doubt that this is just a happy coincidence.

In addition, Manzi fails to grapple with the problem that public-policy experimentation run by government does not benefit from the fierce discipline of profits and losses imposed by markets on businesses. It is a very rare thing for an agency ever to go out of business. Manzi clearly appreciates the

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institution of free markets as the critical arena for trial-and-error improvement of all types of technologies, products, and services. One way to improve the results of what is called public policy would be to make more of it private policy. While not all government services may be appropriately privatized, surely many would be improved by exposing them to the bracing experimentation and competition found in free markets. In any case, let's run some RTFs and find out. Who needs a Federal Experimentation Agency if government services can be fruitfully moved to the private sector?

Manzi worries that the disruptive process of innovation fostered by free markets undermines social cohesion and produces resistance to change that can be exploited by those romanticizing populists mentioned above. Thus he favors maintaining a reformed version of the welfare state as way to buy off economic losers so that they will permit innovation to continue. "[A]s far as can be seen from history, the idea of a capitalist society without a welfare system is misplaced nostalgia—or more accurately, is an anachronism," he asserts. But history's verdict may not be in. The current economic crisis afflicting Western countries might more properly be thought of as part of a larger trial-and-error process indicating that the welfare state is not a viable long-term socio-economic model after all.

In *Uncontrolled*, Manzi provides an incisive and highly readable account of how trial-and error experimentation in science and free markets lessens human ignorance, uproots bias, and produces progress. Failure is a strict but effective instructor. Doubtless Manzi is right that deploying honest randomized trials would also improve the results of policymaking, but his sketch for how this might practically be done needs considerable fleshing out. ■

Ronald Bailey is the science correspondent for Reason.

When Religion Goes Wrong

By NOELLE DALY

Bad Religion: How We Became a Nation of Heretics, Ross Douthat, Free Press, 352 pages

Former poet laureate Robert Haass once began a poem by observing, "All the new thinking is about loss/ In this it resembles all the old thinking." Indeed, it seems as if we have been talking about American decline for many years, and perhaps nowhere is the lamentation more clamorous than in writing about religion.

"Too much" religion, say the seculars; "not enough," retort the believers, each perceiving the other to be the aggressor. The former insist that Christianity is corrosive—"anti-science", bigoted, misogynist, and just plain embarrassing. They imagine that powerful religious impulses could be expunged, and that such a purified America would thrive. Yet as Ross Douthat writes in *Bad Religion*, for all their excesses, atheists have done less damage to American culture than have the wayward faithful.

Perhaps that seems like a surprising concession for a conservative Catholic like Douthat to make, but in his view the squabbles between the godless and the god-fearing aren't so important: most Americans read neither Richard Dawkins nor the latest papal encyclical. Deploying two unpopular anachronisms, *Bad Religion* argues that the main force behind the country's cultural decline has been proliferating heresies that have displaced Christian orthodoxy.

Throughout the book, Douthat calls foul on rigid "either/or" binaries, reminding us that orthodoxy, with all its doctrinal complexity and contradictions, often says "neither" or "both" in theological disputes. Theodor Adorno wrote that modern art "wants to shake off its illusoriness like an animal try-

ing to shake off its antlers"; so too, in Douthat's telling, do various "pseudo Christianities" respond to modern challenges by shaking off mysteries and paradoxes, from the incarnation to the resurrection. He seeks to enthrall the reader to the ineffable, the sublime and numinous in Christianity—which is all too often debased by the identity politics that subsume both liberal and conservative churches today.

At the same time Douthat repudiates the pervasive belief of the "spiritual but not religious set" that brick-and-mortar institutions are an elegy to, not the embodiment of, the faith they stand for. Without those edifices, self-styled "seeking" can too easily become yet another form of egotism, leading to a therapeutic "I feel" rather than a hard-won "I believe." When those edifices crumble, the radical humility and discipline asked of the orthodox believer seem to become an untenable, esoteric pursuit. Each heresy, in Douthat's definition, is an attempt to paper over Christianity's harder truths, its emphasis on sin, sacrifice, and suffering; and each deserves the simple rebuke that "there's no Christ without a cross."

Yet Douthat's understanding of heresy is more nuanced than condemning: he gets why so many well-intentioned reformers think some more palatable version of Christianity would rescue the faith from irrelevance in the modern era. Such efforts, unfortunately, result not just in a denuded "spirituality of niceness" but in encouragement of vice, particularly greed and narcissism. The prosperity gospel hucksters promise God will reward worship with wealth. Prayer can get you what you want, rather than help you conform to His will. Such a deity is merely a genie granting wishes or a "college buddy with really good stock tips." The many gurus of what Douthat calls "God Within" theology, like Deepak Chopra and *Eat Pray Love's* Elizabeth Gilbert, attempt

to resolve God's otherness by depersonalizing him into a cosmic force. This nebulous, beatific divine power is all around us, in the natural world and in the inner reaches of the soul. But unlike earlier Christian mystics, whose incendiary experiences of God brought them to their knees in humility and devotion, the New Agers use "spirituality as a convenient gloss for [the ego's] own desires and impulses." Across the spectrum, heresies make the believer the primary actor, not God.

Douthat's taxonomy of Christian heresies can seem overbroad, from Oprah's consumerist self-actualization to Glenn Beck's brand of nationalist civic religion. Many of his heretics

Today, in the absence of a pushback from a self-confident core, heresy too easily masquerades as truth.

would reject the label because they consider themselves either authentic Christians or rebellious free spirits with no connection to Christian heritage. But schematic weaknesses aside, *Bad Religion* is a persuasive account of how these spiritual practices unleash a solipsism and impatience with hardship into the wider culture, with socially toxic effects.

Yes, Douthat acknowledges, America has always been a nation of heretics, and Christianity has been shaped by its response to innumerable heresies from its earliest centuries. When met with a robust orthodox response, heresy can provoke religious institutions toward necessary course-correction. Today, however, in the absence of a pushback from a self-confident core, heresy too easily masquerades as truth. And as more Americans shed religious affiliation to stroll through

a bazaar of spiritual practices, they can forget the contributions a strong Christian center made in the country's middle 20th-century heyday: the sprawling networks of schools, hospitals, and charities, the ecumenical cooperation behind the Civil Rights movement. Douthat weaves together biographies of figures like Fulton J. Sheen, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Billy Graham, among others, to illustrate the moment of Christian convergence.

(Douthat takes pains to reiterate that his account of the rise and subsequent disintegration of Christian orthodoxy is "an interpretation of an era, not a comprehensive history." Although many a pugilistic reviewer has skewered him for some breach of scholarly protocol, he is quite explicit about crafting a work of ideas and trends, and his journalist's knack for storytelling is a strength of the book.)

Of course, this period of towering cultural authority was brief, and the churches were toppled by a messy combination of social upheaval and internal weakness. Douthat identifies five main factors, each of which inspired the heresies that would rush into the vacuum later on. The churches' political activism, fed by hubris, became partisan and polarizing to the detriment of its spiritual witness. Today's social-justice left and social-conservative right can each focus on political gains in this world so much that they hollow out the supernatural core of the faith.

The sexual revolution dealt a knockout punch to the churches' age-old teachings of chastity and marital fidelity. Douthat likens contraception's massive impact on Christian credibility to the publication of *The Origin of Species*. Not merely because it made sexual sin much more convenient, but

because Christian ethics no longer neatly aligned with secular prudence about pregnancy and children. And like a mirror opposite of Nietzsche's revolution of morality, the Christian exhortation to modesty and restraint became not only archaic but psychologically harmful repression.

Globalization introduced Americans to a world of radically different religious practices that called into question Christianity's unique purchase on truth: exposure to foreign cultures through television and air travel ignited public appetite for the exotic. Suddenly the humdrum suburban Christianity of Sunday School, church picnics, and plodding hymns was "just one option among many—and an option tainted by its long association with white Chauvinism and Western imperialism." Here the rebellion against Christian authority gradually fed into a broader indulgence in "self-flagellation and self-doubt" about American hegemony. The result was a sort of salad bar of religious tenets, where "seekers," as they came to call themselves, could fashion spiritual hybrids that borrowed from pagan fertility cults, Buddhist meditation, Native American nature worship, karma, and reincarnation. (It's worth noting that the great enrichment that accompanied this open window to the world did not necessarily have to result in the rampant relativism that crippled the Church.)

American affluence, too, undermined Christianity's emphasis on suffering as not only inescapable but meaningful, a bridge to God—a God who doesn't eradicate pain but suffers with us. As postwar memories of deprivation and loss faded, Americans became accustomed to, and then felt entitled to, material comfort. Soon that ready ease recast Christian asceticism as perverse and masochistic. The tantalizing proximity of wealth raised the opportunity costs of religious vocations: priests and nuns who took vows of poverty a mere decade earlier

were not living such different lives then, before consumerism ran amok. But whether chosen or circumstantial, poverty in an age of abundance and a mass middle class seemed an indignity—and that sentiment, however moved by righteous indignation, is far from that of the Beatitudes. By now the consecrated life seems to entail a positively neurotic level of renunciation, rather than being a choice widely celebrated in culture.

Taken together, these challenges had the traditional churches stumbling, no longer striding confidently into the public square to adjudicate social conflicts and shape the culture, but forced into postures of accommodation or resistance. Liberal churches that attempted the former soon found that when a faith that asks too little of its adherents, even lukewarm devotions strike them as oppressive or without much purpose. Reactionaries, on the other hand, find themselves too embattled to shape the world outside their own churches.

Douthat describes a wide array of failed attempts to restore vitality to Christianity in a pluralistic age, from Unitarian Universalists to megachurch Evangelicals. He has a particular ire for the academics who swanned into the fray with newly revisionist and relativistic forms of historical Jesus scholarship. Elaine Pagels’s work is perhaps the most prominent example of their project to design modernity-friendly, non-paradoxical Jesuses that could better compete in the religious marketplace. Whether they thought they were correcting and revitalizing Christianity or merely toppling orthodoxy, they reclaimed “heretic” as a badge of honor, convinced that the religious institutions of their time had emerged from an early swamp of competitors by way of power struggle and patronage, not divine guidance. Douthat paints this “choose your own Jesus” movement as a kind of *trahison des clercs*: “The idea that a religious tradition could be saved from crisis

because a group of intellectuals radically reinterpreted its sacred texts is the kind of conceit that only, well, an intellectual could possibly believe.”

Pointing out how far the new thinkers have come from the likes of John Courtney Murray or Reinhold Niebuhr, Douthat notes that the old guard used their deep foundation in traditional theology to address the contemporary spiritual concerns of everyday people. I’d wager that Douthat aspires to emulate their example. He understands that his mid-century forebears’ greatness lies in their motivation to defend Christianity “in an often hostile world, rather than perpetually currying favor with its cultured despisers.” Perhaps Douthat’s position as the self-described “resident conservative scold” at the *New York Times* has tested his mettle, made him a more deft apologist, a stealth evangelist of sorts. Like the Christian Paul counseled to be “in

the world, but not of it,” Douthat has been shaped by academic and intellectual conventions but resists their more negative impulses toward intellectual vanity. In charting orthodoxy’s fall from cultural powerhouse to dusty museum piece, Douthat sees the abdication of the educated elites as decisive. Though the church had been no stranger to conflict, these revisionists denied the validity or continued existence of the Christian center around which controversies used to turn.

Douthat’s critics have accused him of trafficking in nostalgia for an anomalous moment of Christian ascendancy. But he makes the case for the theological truth and social goods of orthodoxy in reverse, carefully cataloguing the flaws of the many alternatives on offer in a way that can instill in believers and skeptics alike an appreciation for a tradition too often taken for granted or dismissed. As the spiritual fads are debunked left and right,

The image shows a screenshot of the website for *The American Conservative*. At the top, there is a navigation bar with links for HOME, BLOG, POLITICS, WORLD, CULTURE, ECONOMY, ENERGY, ARTS & LITERATURE, and CURRENT EVENTS. Below this, the main content area features several article teasers. On the left, under the heading "STATE OF THE UNION", there are articles by Jordan Bloom, Samuel Goldman, and Daniel McCarthy. In the center, a large article by Patrick J. Buchanan is titled "Fewer Workers, More Welfare" with a sub-headline "How has America liquidated its labor force?". To the right, there is a section for "Get our Kindle Edition" showing the magazine on a smartphone and tablet. Below that, there are more article teasers, including one by Neil McMillin titled "It's not Do In Iraq" and another by David Johnson titled "Homeschooling Aspires".

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orthodoxy's mysteries, its challenges, stand in stark relief—as in Chesterton's phrase, which could serve as the epigraph for this book, "the dull heresies sprawling and prostrate, the wild truth reeling but erect." That truth is as wild, and as countercultural, as it ever has been. Indeed, throughout this book Douhat's writing evinces more passion and pronounced wit than in his previous work; his arguments are often more bold and ambitious than his characteristically decorous writing style suggests.

Perhaps in capitulation to the publisher's demand for an upbeat ending—and the convention that an America in Decline book must end with a set of prescriptions—Douhat names possible sources for the renewal of traditional Christianity that he thinks would so benefit the country: the same postmodernism that uprooted the churches could produce enough malaise to revive interest in the Gospel; the religious landscape might shrink to encompass smaller but more devout churches; contemporary artists might tire of reigning nihilistic and subversive trends and offer film and fiction more interested in the ennobling effects of the good, the true, and the beautiful. But his "ways forward" conclusion is dark enough to liken current times to those of the early church under the Roman Empire. Having traversed Douhat's catalogue of wildly popular and spiritually shallow pseudo-Christianities, the reader can't help but share his pessimism. In some senses, Christian evangelism was easier among an earlier era's population of the unchurched than among a public today that insists its sins are virtues, its innumerable heterodoxies the truer incarnation of Christian heritage. For all its eloquence, the book's apologetics may fall on deaf ears; Douhat's heretics are wlier foes than yesterday's heathens. ■

Noelle Daly is associate editor of *The American Interest*.

Beyond Originalism

By WILLIAM J. WATKINS JR.

Cosmic Constitutional Theory: Why Americans Are Losing Their Inalienable Right to Self-Governance, J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Oxford University Press, 161 pages

"In theory there is no difference between theory and practice," said Yogi Berra, but "in practice there is." It's doubtful that Yogi had in mind theories about fundamental law, but his quip aptly sums up Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson's critique of modern theories of constitutional interpretation.

Wilkinson today serves on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. When he was chief judge of the Fourth Circuit (1996-2003), it was widely regarded as the most conservative appellate court in the country. In 2004, Wilkinson was on the short list of possible Supreme Court nominees considered by President George W. Bush. His is a name to conjure with in conservative legal circles.

In *Cosmic Constitutional Theory*, Wilkinson laments that judiciary's theorizing is subordinating the people's right of republican self-government to the personal preferences of the judges. Although various systems of constitutional interpretation profess an aim of limiting judicial power, Wilkinson argues that the opposite is the result. "The theorists have made [judicial] modesty impossible," he writes, "and it is to our country's loss."

Talk of constitutional theory might be a yawner to many Americans, but it shouldn't be. The status of marriage, the future of healthcare, and the protection of our Southern border will ultimately be decided by courts rather than the people themselves or their

representatives. In this state of affairs, citizens ignore constitutional theory at their own peril.

Wilkinson begins his book with a candid examination of the theory of "living constitutionalism" advocated by likes of Justice William Brennan. Belief in a living Constitution entails efforts to shift the meaning of the text to address current issues. Although Wilkinson advises that conservatives should make their peace with much of the modern world and accept court decisions that have promoted greater personal liberty and equality, he is far from a supporter of Brennan's jurisprudence. Indeed, the book describes living constitutionalism as "one of the most significant encouragements to freewheeling judging that has yet been devised."

Wilkinson is quick to admit that "imperfections of the human condition" often infect lawmaking and result in foolish enactments. Throughout our history legislators and the people themselves have taken sundry wrong

Wilkinson dons the mantle of a prosecutor and accuses originalists of judicial activism.

turns. While we regret the results of these democratic misadventures, *Cosmic Constitutional Theory* reminds us that judges are not immune from the same imperfections. Consequently, judges cannot be "general arbiters of majoritarian dysfunction."

Neither does Article III empower them to sit as a perpetual constitutional convention revising fundamental law to accommodate the latest fad as a constitutional right. Such activism harms principles of self-government because the people are never permitted to err and learn lessons from their

mistakes. Moreover, it never truly settles an issue inasmuch as the losers feel that they have been denied a fair hearing in the courts of public opinion. A prime example is *Roe v. Wade* and the heightened acrimony of political debate after the Supreme Court constitutionalized abortion in 1973.

Next comes originalism. In contrast to living constitutionalism, originalist theory approaches constitutional interpretation by focusing on the original intentions of the Framers or the original public meaning of the words and phrases they used. Originalism purports to limit judicial discretion by supplying a neutral framework for deriving, defining, and applying of constitutional principles. Wilkinson recognizes the potential of originalism in constraining judges, but he concludes that it has failed to deliver on its promise of restraint. He credits Robert Bork with focusing the public's attention on "the use of neutral principles" to check the judiciary and to "prevent the aggrandizement of its own power at the expense of the other branches." This Borkian theory "ultimately falls short," but "there is no denying that originalism has done much to popularize the notion that judges must indeed be constrained."

Wilkinson argues that there is too often conflicting evidence about original intent, evidence that proponents of different outcomes can mine to support various positions. He also points out that judges are not professional historians and thus should be careful when wading into the debates, speeches, and pamphlets of the early Republic.

Wilkinson dons the mantle of a prosecutor and accuses originalists of activism. His first exhibit is the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in *District of Columbia v. Heller* in which the court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to possess a firearm for traditionally lawful purposes. Wilkinson

concludes that both the majority and the decision's dissenters marshaled impressive evidence for opposite results. The court's conservatives simply outnumbered the liberals and, by a five-to-four vote, wrote their policy preferences against gun control into the Constitution. "What was transparently contestable," Wilkinson writes, "Heller portrayed as indisputable. It drank the elixir of originalism and dismissed the tired old judicial values of humility and restraint." Gun control, he argues, should have been left to the people's elected representatives.

Cosmic Constitutional Theory posits that a similar right-wing activist approach is being taken with Obamacare. Wilkinson is skeptical that original intent reveals President Obama's Affordable Care Act to be out of bounds. "The idea that Congress is constitutionally disabled under the commerce power from regulating activity affecting one-sixth of the na-

tional economy," Wilkinson offers, "strikes me as a heavy judicial lift."

The third system examined in the book is the process theory advocated by the late John Hart Ely. Under process theory, judges are supposed to ignore the substantive outcome of a legislature's work and instead focus on protecting the deliberative process by strictly scrutinizing laws limiting voices in, or access to, the political arena. Wilkinson finds fault with process theory because judges must decide what our democracy should look like, what processes are most critical and deserving of protection, and what government interests might justify limitations of process. Even with the focus off of substantive outcomes, Wilkinson is uncomfortable leaving such weighty matters to unelected officials.

The final theory discussed is legal pragmatism as championed by Judge Richard Posner. A judge of the pragmatist school is not bound by text or

The screenshot shows the homepage of 'The American Conservative' website. At the top, there are navigation tabs for HOME, BLOG, POLITICS, WORLD, CULTURE, SECURITY, OPINION, ARTS & LITERATURE, and CONTACT US. Below the navigation is a search bar. The main content area features several article teasers: 'STATE OF THE UNION: Of Manes and Moments' by Jordan Bloom, 'Can There Be a Decent Night?' by Samuel Goldman, 'EAC Secret Feature: Millman's Brainwiring' by David McCarthey, 'A Comment About Comments' by David McCarthey, 'GOP Foreign Policy is Elsewhere' by Peter Berkowitz, 'Leave Marriage to the States' by Andrew Sullivan, 'The Day's Unsettling Politics', 'Jeff Fortenberry: Crunchy Congressman' by Rod Dreher, 'The Nebraska representative defied Grover Norquist—here's why.', 'NEAR BELLEVILLE: It's not the In Iraq' by Donald Marquis, 'Home-sharing Angles: Your Family Or Your Job, Professor? Always And Forever, Amen', and 'Continued Education'. At the bottom of the screenshot, a quote from Bill Kauffman is displayed: "In a political age dominated by chicken hawks, cowards, and opportunists, *The American Conservative* is indispensable and irreplaceable." Below the quote, it identifies Bill Kauffman as the author of *Every Man a King* and provides the website URL: www.theamericanconservative.com.

precedent. He simply decides a case with an eye to the best result. Wilkinson questions Posner's contention that appellate judges are "councils of wise elders" suited to adjudicating constitutional matters with a results-oriented approach. "Pragmatism, by encouraging judges to engage in this inevitable hazy exercise of balancing," writes Wilkinson, "leads both 'activists' and more traditionally minded judges into briar patches the courts were never intended to enter."

In his conclusion, Wilkinson offers no alternative theory for his colleagues on the bench to follow. But he reminds judges that because the Constitution grants them life tenure and often the last word on constitutional

knowledges that "America places a big bet that judges will restrain themselves" and that "placing bets on self-restraint is by all objective measures foolhardy."

It is especially foolhardy when we consider that calls for modesty have gone out before and have been largely ignored. For example, in 1893, the eminent Harvard law professor James B. Thayer warned the courts about dabbling with judicial supremacy. At that juncture in American history, the Supreme Court had just begun to hint that it was open to using the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to gage the reasonableness of legislation. Recognizing the movement toward sub-

stantive due process would allow courts to second-guess legislative policymaking, Thayer addressed the Congress on Jurisprudence and Law Reform and spoke about the necessity for judicial restraint. The judicial power, according to Thayer,

does not extend to policy considerations. In the realm of competing policies, legislative choice should be "unfettered." A duly enacted law ought not be questioned by the courts unless "it is so obviously repugnant to the constitution that when pointed out by the judges, all men of sense and reflection in the community may perceive the repugnancy."

Although Thayer's writings—especially his 1893 article "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law"—have been repeatedly cited by scholars examining the role of the judiciary, we have seen nothing but an increase in judges' power and their willingness to use it from the 1890s to the present. The Supreme Court gave Thayer's generation the *Lochner* era of substantive due process. A later generation

watched the Warren Court make public policy. Now we are treated to courts constitutionalizing all sorts of aberrant behavior that, from the beginning of the Republic, had been prohibited or regulated by the states' police power.

If it is inevitable that judges are going to dabble in public policy, why not treat them like other policymakers? Governors, the President, senators, and representatives must face the people at regular intervals and account for their use of power. Judges too are agents of the people and, if wedded to policymaking, should appear on the ballot and explain themselves to the citizens at election time. Today, 33 states select all or a portion of their judicial officers at the ballot box. Such a reform for the federal system would have been an excellent topic for the concluding pages of *Cosmic Constitutional Theory*.

Wilkinson would also have done well to consider other mechanisms for ending the rule of the judges, such as augmenting the power of juries, removal of activist judges or the nullifying of their policy determinations, and use of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions already in the Constitution. Unfortunately, his book is silent on those matters.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals is fortunate to have a judge of Wilkinson's caliber and modesty. Wilkinson evinces a true respect for the elected branches of government and works hard simply to apply the law to the case in front of him. If more judges took such an approach, judicial power would be a buttress of republican government rather than a threat to its existence. ■

If wedded to policymaking, judges should appear on the ballot and explain themselves to the citizens at election time.

issues, they owe Americans a duty of self-restraint. They should abjure theories and rally to the virtue of judicial modesty. They should recognize the limits of their knowledge and permit elected officials to experiment with various measures in addressing society's ills. Otherwise, democracy atrophies and the people are denied their right to self-government.

Wilkinson's book is highly readable for both lawyers and lay people—a reflection, no doubt, of Wilkinson's years spent as an editor with the *Norfolk Virginian-Pilot*. He works hard to respect the four major theories examined and offers the pros and cons of each approach.

The one thing missing is guidance on what we shall do when the bench ignores this latest plea for restraint. *Cosmic Constitutional Theory* ac-

William J. Watkins, Jr. is author of Judicial Monarchs: Court Power and the Case for Restoring Popular Sovereignty in the United States and a former law clerk for Chief Judge William B. Traxler Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

Letters

Continued from page 4

Why not address that important historical (and sociological) fact? Instead Mr. Williamson plays lay analyst and psychologizes my own conjectures about “what Orwell would do” as purported evidence of “Rodden’s projection of his personal obsession with Orwell.”

Mr. Williamson writes: “It has never occurred to me to wonder ‘what Orwell would do’ about anything.” Again, fine. But what does that have to do with my discussion of Orwell’s unique influence on intellectuals across the ideological spectrum, including cultural conservatives?

Finally, Mr. Williamson says that none of the five men of letters whom I have discussed as the “American Orwell” resembles him at all, except in the case of John Lukacs. But it is Lukacs himself who calls Dwight Macdonald “the American Orwell.” Joseph Epstein, Richard Rorty, and several others have discussed whether Irving Howe could be “the American Orwell.” In the cases of Lionel Trilling and Christopher Hitchens, similar circumstances prevail: they have been termed “the American Orwell” by significant voices on the right or left. None of this is my invention or “speculation.”

Mr. Williamson certainly could learn an “unlesson” or two about intellectual humility from George Orwell.

JOHN RODDEN

via email

TORTURE DULY NOTED

I am grateful to *The American Conservative* and Maisie Allison for the lengthy, and largely positive, review of my book, *Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America’s Imperial Dream* (“Theodore Roosevelt Builds an Empire,” May 2012). But I would like to correct two misstatements of fact in a paragraph near the end of the review where Ms. Allison writes, “In his prologue, Jones imagines a session of water torture. ‘Oh, how it hurts! . . . I will tell the *americanos* what they wanted to hear.’”

First, this scene was a very real incident that occurred in the Panay Island town of Igaras on November 27, 1900. As I detail in my end notes, this event was witnessed by several U.S. soldiers, some of whom later testified under oath in U.S. Senate hearings and U.S. Army court-martial proceedings. I drew my account from these sources. Second, the final sentence of Ms. Allison’s passage has me quoting the water cure victim, Igaras town president Joveniano Ealdama, as saying, “I will tell the *americanos* what they wanted to hear.” In fact, I paraphrased Ealdama’s words from his testimony. What I actually wrote is: “He would tell the *americanos* what they wanted to hear.” These were his thoughts, as reflected by his testimony.

Thank you again for providing a valuable forum for books devoted to our nation’s history.

GREGG JONES

Dallas, Texas

THE PURITAN MIND

The article on the Celtic mind by Bradley J. Birzer (“The Celtic Mind,”

April 2012) makes the same error Adam Smith made about why the English colonies grew so wealthy so quickly. The Yankee rise and the so-called Scottish Enlightenment were not about philosophies or invisible hands. It was simply that the Puritan or Evangelical Protestant peoples became more intelligent and more industrious relative to the rest of British civilization.

A religious motivation and culture led to better homes and schools. In England this was less obvious, as there was more diffusion of the Puritan in society. However, lowland Scotland and New England showed the real origin of modern civilization. Capitalism is only a special case of how to make wealthy nations—through a general rise of the common intelligence of the people.

Adam Smith misunderstood this and perceived that simple noninterference would raise society. It was about identity and not common laws or abstract philosophy.

ROBERT BYERS

Toronto, Ontario



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Taki

Welcome to Takiwood

“Sorry, I’m in make up, if it’s something important, call my agent, Israel Goldfarb.” This is how I’ve been fending off the myriad of calls from eager females trying to reach me now that I’m about to become a major movie star. The story so far: Michael Mailer, son of Norman and a very close buddy, is producing a movie directed by James Toback and starring Alec Baldwin, about a movie producer trying to finance a film during the Cannes film festival. Actually it’s a great idea because that’s what movie festivals are all about. Greedy Hollywood types dicker and haggle over future films and imaginary profits against the azure background of the French Riviera. So this is a movie within a movie, I suppose, and yours truly plays an Onassis-like figure languishing on his yacht trying to fend off Hollywood sharks looking for a mark. According to the script, which I have yet to see, Alec (us Hollywood types only use first names) comes on board my yacht *Bushido*, sees my young blonde girlfriend du jour, makes a pass at her and we end up fighting. The only provision the director has made is that the fight should be for real. No faking and no taking dives, except that we both should end up in the sea fully dressed. This is the good news. The bad is that Alec Baldwin is not only a tough guy, he’s also no friend, having told Mailer that I’ve trashed him in print and that he’s looking forward to a revenge. Oh dear!

Mind you, for someone who has detested Hollywood’s philistinism for as long as I have—when was the last time a priest was not portrayed as a child molester, a cop as corrupt, and a soldier as a psychopathic murderer?—I must say I’m looking forward to my 15 seconds of fame. And rubbing shoulders with all the film people who are in Cannes as I write. I shall look at them from afar, from my boat, and keep an Onassis-like distance from them, unless they’re very young and pretty and of the opposite sex.

But as I said, I have hated Hollywood most of my adult life for the way it shows America to be. All southerners are Klansmen, all farmers dumb and backward, all drug dealers misunderstood, and all criminals victims of an unfair system. And yet in my private life I’ve only had good experiences when coming into contact with movie stars. Except for the ghastly Peter Lawford, next to whom I lived at the Sherry Netherland almost 50 years ago. He was a very bad drunk, brother in law of JFK, and a drug addict whose idea of paternal concern was to give one of his sons—according to the son’s biography—five grams of coke which father and son consumed together on Christmas Eve. I finally ended up punching Lawford after he disgracefully insulted my young wife and that was the end of a beautiful friendship.

After that it was all hunky dory. I went out with the sexiest woman of her time, Linda Christian, and with a very young Joan Collins, and the beautiful Janet Leigh, but my real friendships


were with men like Louis Jourdan, the handsomest actor of his time in films like “Gigi,” “Letter from an Unknown Woman,” and “The Swan.” Louis and his wife gave a wonderful party for me on my way back from Vietnam, and we used to spend our summers together at the Hotel du Cap in Antibes. Louis is now in his nineties and looks as good as one can at his age.

Just as charming is Frank Langella, whose book, *Dropped Names*, is beautifully written and who is a sophisticated man and one wonderful actor. But my closest buddy in the acting world is Sir Roger Moore, a man with whom I’ve spent a lot of time due to our William Buckley and Gstaad connections. As his son Jeffrey once said to me, “Roger is not a great actor, he’s a great movie star.”

As luck would have it, who but the first James Bond, Sir Sean Connery himself, moved near me in Gstaad a couple of years ago, and during a dinner party revealed to me that he’s been reading me for 30 or so years in the *Spectator*. His wife is even more of a fan because she shares my prejudices. Sean and I have shared many dirty jokes and many good bottles of wine, and there you have it. Having known the two best James Bonds, now at age 75 I am about to join the Hollywood pantheon myself by throwing Alec Baldwin off my boat like Achilles slaying Hector long ago. Look for the movie starring Taki and tell your children and your children’s children about it. Hooray for Hollywood. ■

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