John Bolton is terrified that Russia has been invited into a mediating role to try to end the Libyan war:

Inserting Russia into the middle of the Libyan war gives it an unmistakable advantage in shaping the TNC, and post-Gaddafi Libya more broadly. Moscow (along with Beijing) has a keen interest and now a real possibility to become far more involved in exploiting Libya’s oil and natural gas resources than at present. This opportunity is something Russia could never have achieved on its own. To be handed it by Obama and Clinton, utterly gratuitously, is breathtaking.

This is Bolton’s standard hysterical nonsense, but it’s certainly entertaining. Russia compromised its position as a possible mediator from the moment that Medvedev insisted on Gaddafi’s departure at the Deauville summit earlier this summer. Bolton’s entire argument is based on the illusion that Russian mediation matters.

How much does Bolton think this role matters? He tells us:

Now, as a mediator, Russia will, in effect, have the chance to rewrite the Council’s resolution according to its own lights.

This isn’t true. The resolution has already been “rewritten” in that its original limits and authorization have been cast aside for the actual goal of regime change, but despite making noises of protest early on the Russian government has endorsed the position that Gaddafi must be removed from power. Despite objections at home that he was ignoring Russian interests, Medvedev has gone out of his way not to block or interfere with U.S. and NATO policy. Unlike twelve years ago during the Kosovo war, Moscow cannot influence Gaddafi to yield, much less shape or control the future of Libya. There are many things badly wrong with the administration’s policy on Libya. Welcoming Russian efforts to try to get the U.S. and NATO out of this embarrassing blunder is not one of them.

Stanley Kurtz keeps pushing his mistaken ideological reading of administration policy:

Obama’s willingness to cede so much to the Russians reflects the fact that he is far less interested in achieving and enforcing regime change in Libya than in using this intervention to advance the utopian plans of his hyper-internationalist advisers.

Right, because the obvious ally in any effort to strengthen international norms that undermine state sovereignty is Russia. Obviously, Obama hasn’t ceded anything to the Russians. All that Obama has “given” them is the dubious honor of being a mediator with Gaddafi in order to negotiate his exit. As I said, Russian mediation will likely go nowhere, but involving the Russians is part of the effort to achieve regime change. Like the French proposal that Gaddafi might remain in Libya after leaving power, it is an acknowledgment that the Libyan war is dragging on much longer than it was supposed to, and it is an admission that the U.S. is not going to let itself get pulled in any deeper into the Libyan morass than it already is.

Kurtz also writes:

That is, Obama may be willing to cede Russia substantial de facto control over Libyan oil and gas resources as the price for Russian cooperation in authorizing and organizing a post-war U.N. peacekeeping force.

This is verging on conspiracy-theory territory. Russia would vote for a U.N. peacekeeping force anyway, and it is not going to be involved in organizing it. Kurtz is claiming that the administration is trying to buy something with resources it doesn’t control to get something it will already receive.

Kurtz continues:

That would simultaneously bolster the development of a post-American world order — with an R2P-enforcing U.N. exercising a larger military role — and exempt Obama from having to send in U.S. troops. The only drawback would be the substantial enhancement of Russia’s strategic position, i.e. the heightening of its ability to use its control of oil and gas resources to bully the Europeans. But again, Obama is less concerned about those sorts of strategic considerations than about advancing the vision of a world policed by a U.N. freed of U.S. domination.

The only part of this that is true is the part about the U.S. not having to send troops to Libya, which is the sole redeeming quality of Obama’s policy. Russia’s ability to use its energy resources to wield influence in Europe won’t be significantly enhanced by anything in Libya once the fighting is over. In fact, once Libyan oil production resumes Russia’s leverage in Europe will decrease. Russia often provokes unreasonable reactions from American hawks, but this panic about a non-existent Russian menace in North Africa sets a new standard.

Update: The Russian and Libyan foreign ministers recently met, and here was the result:

Muammar Gaddafi will not step down from the helm of affairs in Libya under any deal with the opposition, country’s foreign minister said on Wednesday in Russia, describing the proposal as unacceptable.

After his talks here with his Russian counterpart, Libyan Foreign Minister Abdul Ati al-Obeidi said: “The proposal for stepping down of the Libyan leader Gaddafi was unacceptable to Tripoli, it is out of question.”

How will the U.S. survive this dramatic expansion of Russian power?