Paradoxically, standing up to Moscow is not only the right thing to do in this crisis, but the best way to improve relations with Russia in the long term. For only a Russia that abandons its imperial agenda and respects its neighbors, irrespective of size, can be a true partner for the west. ~Svante Cornell

This is the sort of bizarre argument that interventionists are reduced to making, since the observations that the West has no vital interests in the north Caucasus and that the West doesn’t want to damage relations with Russia by backing Saakashvili’s reckless blunder are, to my surprise, quickly becoming the common ones that people across the spectrum are making.  With the exception of a few pundits and bloggers, there have been no calls for confrontation, and even the WSJ, your normally reliable guide to American Russophobic opinion, adopted a fairly mild tone in its editorial.  So we are treated to the claim that we must confront and deeply damage relations with Russia so that we can have good long-term relations with some future Russia that does not do any of the things that Moscow believes to be in its interests and within its rights in its near-abroad.  In other words, until Russia concedes to every Western demand and ceases pursuing what it considers its own interests, it will not be a suitable “partner” for the West, so we will have to confront them at every turn until relations have become so terrible that Moscow will conclude that it should yield in all things.  This is not exactly a winning grand strategy, since Russia will not respond in the way that Cornell wants. 

This argument assumes that Moscow craves Western approval above all else and will sacrifice what it considers its legitimate influence on its periphery (particularly in territories that it controlled for more than a century up until 1991) to acquire that approval.  This also assumes that America and Europe actually have an interest in damaging relations with Russia in the short term, when many governments in Europe, particularly Germany’s government, are quite interested to cultivate good relations right now.  None of these assumptions is correct.  There is not going to be a revolution in the internal politics of Russia such that Moscow will cease pursuing its ambitions in the Caucasus or elsewhere in former Soviet space, because these are the places where Moscow will always try to expand its influence.    

Imagine that the Southwestern United States, including all of California, separated from the rest of the country and became a number of independent states after having been part of the U.S. for the last 160 years.  These were lands that had not always belonged to the U.S. and had been acquired through a war of conquest, but over those 160 years Americans came to think of these territories as integral parts of the country.  Would it be wrong for Washington to try to have great influence over these states?  Would it be surprising if Washington viewed those states’ development of close relations with a foreign power on another continent as a potential threat, and wouldn’t it make a certain amount of sense if Washington saw their application to make a military alliance with this foreign power as dangerous and provocative?

It didn’t take long for the defenders of Saakashvili to swing into action.  Edward Lucas in the Times offers the “at least he’s not absolutely horrible” defense:

A crackdown on the Opposition in November, bullying of the media and instances of abuse of power among senior officials have allowed detractors to draw uncomfortable parallels between Georgia and Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

These are misplaced: Georgia is not perfect, but it is not a dictatorship. Its leadership does not peddle a phoney ideology, such as the Kremlin’s mishmash of Soviet nostalgia and tsarist-era chauvinism. It has a thriving civil society, vocal opposition and ardently wants to be in the EU and Nato. Moral grounds alone would be enough reason for supporting it against Russian aggression.

That’s true–Saakashvili has only been elected with 90+% of the vote and runs an effectively one-party state, but this is just democratic despotism.  Calling it a dictatorship might be pushing things a bit.  As for ideology, Saakashvili offers a much more pleasing mishmash of Georgian nationalism and nostalgia for Stalin.  If Russia were engaged in aggression, Lucas might have a point.  But at least Lucas skips the usual song and dance about defending “our values” and gets down to the real reason why most people west of the Black Sea thinks the West care about what happens in Georgia:

The biggest threat Russia poses to Europe is the Kremlin’s monopoly on energy export routes to the West from the former Soviet Union. The one breach in that is the oil and gas pipeline that leads from energy-rich Azerbaijan to Turkey, across Georgia. If Georgia falls, Europe’s hopes of energy independence from Russia fall too.

But Europe’s hopes of energy independence from Russia are chimerical.  Even if the Georgian pipeline stayed out of Russian hands, Europe’s dependence on Russian and Central Asian energy would still remain great (which is one of the reasons why the Europeans are not inclined to make the Russians angry).  European energy independence from their main energy supplier in the region is a fantasy.

Where do most of the supplies from the east come from?  In addition to coming from Russia itself, they come from Central Asian states that are increasingly under Russia’s thumb.  Turkmenistan and Russia cut a deal not long ago, which M.K. Bhadrakumar, writingfor Asia Times, described this way:

From the details coming out of Ashgabat in Turkmenistan and Moscow over the weekend, it is apparent that the great game over Caspian energy has taken a dramatic turn. In the geopolitics of energy security, nothing like this has happened before. The United States has suffered a huge defeat in the race for Caspian gas.

That was a little over a week ago.  In the wake of this deal, which effectively secured Russian control over Turkmen gas exports, having one pipeline not under Russian control, whether direct or indirect, is not going to make that much difference.     

The New York Post has the subtle headline, “Raping Georgia,” for Ralph Peters’ latest column.  Peters refers to Russia’s “elaborate act of aggression,” which must be very elaborate indeed, since the Russians were not responsible for escalating the conflict.  The Ossetians did goad the Georgians into escalation, and the Russians were prepared for the escalation, but this pins the responsibility on Saakashvili even more since he could have refused to be drawn in to the trap. 

Peters offers this typically overwrought line:

Russia, you see, still believes it’s entitled to all of its former empire.

This is a lie.  All of its former empire would include states, such as Poland, that it has shown no designs on whatever in the post-Cold War world.  To the extent that Russia does believe it is entitled to significant influence in its near-abroad, this belief is actually no more pretentious than the Roosevelt Corollary concerning U.S. policy in Latin America.  Peters concludes:

The only thing that’s 100 percent clear is which side we should be on.

That’s also right.  It’s perfectly clear that we shouldn’t take sides in a shooting war in the Caucasus.  Oh, that’s not what Peters meant?  How strange.

According to this, based on a RIA Novosti report, Abkhazia has entered the fray in the Kodori Gorge area, which is at the old cease-fire line and was the site of the last flare-up of Georgian-Abkhaz tensions two years ago.  The AP confirms Abkhaz involvement.  Foreign Policy‘s blog reports the comments that the Abkhaz foreign minister made to Der Spiegel.  Abkhazia’s entry into the war may have been unavoidable, but I think that may mean paradoxically that the conflict will take longer to resolve now that a fourth party has joined.  It should hasten the end of hostilities by dividing Georgian resources, but it could complicate arranging a cease-fire.

The prime minister needs to hear that using Ossetia as a pretext for imperialism [bold mine-DL] will have consequences for Russia’s relationship with the West. ~The Wall Street Journal

Goodness knows the WSJ is against pretexts for imperialism.  Ahem.  I find this use of “imperialism” quite annoying, even if it is typical for their editors.  When Russia supports separatist movements that weaken a bordering state that has strong historical and cultural ties to their country and whose government Moscow wants to keep out of the West’s orbit, that is imperialism, but when the U.S. launches wars on the other side of the world, backs separatists in countries thousands of miles away and arms small nations on the doorstep of other major powers that is supposed to be something else.  I suppose they call it global leadership.  Global leadership is all right, you see, but imperialism–which is what other people do–certainly isn’t.  Arguably, Russia is and always has been pursuing regional hegemony in the Caucasus, and since the distinction between hegemony and imperialism is wafer-thin I suppose it is not entirely inappropriate to describe Russian policy in the north Caucasus as somewhat imperialistic.  However, if we are going to lower the bar on what constitutes imperialism so far down to accuse the Russians of engaging in it, we would need to have an entirely new word to describe what it is our government does on a regular basis.  Maybe hyper-imperialism?

Setting aside this issue of double standards, so long as Russia does not threaten to end Georgian independence I see no good reason why this should have to damage U.S.-Russian relations.  That doesn’t mean it won’t damage them, since this administration has been expert in wrecking the relationship with Moscow, but there is no good reason why it should.  Taking the long view, the Russians have done us a favor by reminding us how crazy it was to contemplate including Georgia in NATO, and this conflict is a reminder of the limits of U.S. influence and the dangers of tying the U.S. to reckless proxies.  We cannot and should not be everywhere at equal strength at all times, and we are not and will not be prepared to back up many of the implicit guarantees our government has made to various states around the world.  The influence of other major powers over their immediate neighbors is unavoidable, and if our government insists on treating every instance of an exercise of this influence as proof of imperialism that must be stopped or reversed we will begin to see the costs of overstretch.

No international crisis would be complete without a hectoring Post editorial calling on Washington to meddle, including this priceless line:

The principles at stake, including sovereignty and territorial integrity, apply well beyond the Caucasus.

Ah, yes, now the Post is deeply concerned about high principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.  They didn’t apply to Iraq in the ’90s, they didn’t apply in 1999 when NATO attacked Yugoslavia over an internal matter, they didn’t apply earlier this year when Kosovo declared independence, they certainly didn’t apply when we invaded Iraq, and presumably they won’t apply in the event that the U.S. or Israel launches air strikes against Iran.  Nonetheless, the Post is suddenly very worried about the broader implications of undermining state sovereignty now that the interventionism they have promoted for decades is leading to actions by other major powers that it does not like.  The Post editorial page’s perspective is so warped that I sometimes wonder what else needs to be said. 

Unfortunately, it was always just a matter of time before other powers began to undermine the sovereignty of smaller nations in imitation of U.S. policies.  Besides leaving the U.S. with no real moral authority to condemn such moves, interventionism has provided a string of precedents and justifications for other powers to act in like manner.  Perhaps the Russians will dust off a humanitarian interventionist argument and say that they are doing this to prevent a genocide of the Ossetians, or perhaps they could say that they are interested in “liberating” Georgia from its repressive President.  As they were in past interventions for us, these will merely be pretexts and probably baseless ones at that, and these will not be the “real” reasons behind the action, but as propaganda they will be every bit as credible as what Washington has used to cover up for its interference. 

Once the sovereignty of smaller nations has been as deeply compromised as it has been in Serbia and Iraq, why exactly are other powers going to respect the sovereignty of states in our orbit?  As I have said before, U.S. foreign policy has contributed to a situation in which Russia and China, for self-interested reasons, have become by default the most prominent champions of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.  Obviously, neither feels bound to respect other states’ sovereignty in all cases, but Washington has so little credibility on this score that its protestations on behalf of satellites and allies will fall on deaf ears.  When the world’s leading power and its allies repeatedly demonstrate contempt for this principle, Russia and China are unlikely to respect it consistently when compromising the principle might bring them some advantage.  Having systematically undermined the basis of the international state system for years, it is in some ways too late for the U.S. to expect the old rules to apply to other powers.  

Mr Saakashvili, who took office in 2004 promising to restore Georgian rule over South Ossetia, appeared to have misjudged Moscow’s resolve, perhaps calculating that Vladimir Putin would not dare to respond militarily while he was in Beijing for the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. ~The Times

The situation in Georgia is tragic and terrible, and I hope that hostilities will cease as quickly as they began.  Even so, there is some small satisfaction in seeing this lackey Saakashvili have his comeuppance.  To have demonstrated so clearly and unequivocally that democratization is not a substitute for good government, the “color” revolutions are a sham and NATO expansion is dangerous and foolish in one day is something good that has come out of this.  It is something that may help Westerners to avoid making the same enthusiastic mistakes of the past.  If this conflict helps to drive home that recognizing Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence was a major blunder with grave consequences for other parts of the world, it may not have been entirely destructive.

So much for light blogging.  The conflict between Russia and Georgia is a very important topic, and I want to say a few more things about it.  I have some thoughts on what Orthodox Christians here, in Europe and around the world ought to try to do to alleviate the suffering of our brethren in Ossetia, Georgia and Russia, as all of them have lost people in this conflict so far and will continue to suffer the costs of war even after an end to hostilities.  For the moment, I will say now what I should have said initially: we should pray especially for the Georgian and Ossetian peoples, who are suffering the brunt of this conflict, and ask that God spare their suffering lands from war and the invasion of enemies, and also for the God-preserved Russian land and her people.  It is tragic and deeply troubling that these three historically Orthodox peoples are shedding each other’s blood, and it is even more unfortunate that over the course of the last several centuries they have come to regard one another as enemies.  The reports of ethnic cleansing of Ossetians are disturbing, and I would like to think that they are exaggerated or false, but given the animus between Ossetians and Georgians they may prove to be true and a cause of perpetuating the conflict.  I hope that the hierarchs of all local Orthodox Churches will make unanimous appeals for peace and offer themselves as mediators as needed to aid in bringing these hostilities to a close.  Besides being dangerous for the entire region, this war is unnecessary and to the extent that it was never likely that Tbilisi could attain its objectives it is also unjust.

Concerning more immediate, practical assistance, International Orthodox Christian Charities has already posted their emergency appeal for aid regarding the conflict.  If you would like to help the relief efforts in the Caucasus, IOCC is a reliable and effective organization that will make good use of anything you are able to give.  As I find other alerts from charitable organizations and Church jurisdictions, I will include them in the updates. 

Update: Thanks to commenter ezekiel comes this item that includes Patriarch Alexy’s call for a cease-fire:

“I learned about armed clashes in Tskhinvali and its localities and I urge the opposing parties to cease fire and renew the dialogue,” Alexy II’s statement is quoted by the Moscow Patriarchate’s official website.

“Today blood is shed and people are killed in South Ossetia and my heart deeply laments over it. Orthodox Christians are among those who have raised their hands against each other. Orthodox peoples called by the Lord to live in fraternity and love confront each other,” the Church primate stresses.

Referring to the appeal of Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II of Georgia who urged to peace, Patriarch Alexy also turned his “ardent call” to those “who are blind with enmity”: “Stop! Don’t let more blood shed! Don’t let today’s conflict boil over! Show wisdom and courage: come to negotiating table to respect traditions, outlook and hopes of Georgian and Ossetian people.”

The Patriarch has stated the Russian Orthodox Church is ready to unite its efforts with the Georgian Church to help peace come. “May Our God, Who is “not a God of disorder but of peace,” be our Assistant in it,” Alexy II statement says.

I am very grateful for His Holiness’ appeal, and I hope that charity and Christian fraternity may prevail and bring a speedy end to this conflict.

Second Update: In Russian, here are reports on the Patriarchate’s website concerning the situation in Georgia. 

Third Update: The ICRC has made an appeal to the belligerents to facilitate humanitarian relief.

Fourth Update: I neglected to include this yesterday, but here is the statement from Catholicos Ilia II of Georgia:

Georgian authorities stand for peaceful settlement of the conflict and are ready to carry out the policy of peace. I hope the Ossetian party will not exacerbate the situation. Centuries-old friendship and family relations bond Georgian and Ossetian people and what is most important we are united with Christian faith and must live peacefully without blood.

It is particularly annoying when someone who is as knowledgeable about Russia as Anne Applebaum undoubtedly is resorts to the crudest, most inaccurate generalizations:

Russia, by contrast, is an unpredictable power, which makes a response more difficult. In fact, Russian politics have now become so utterly opaque that it is not easy to say why this particular “frozen” conflict has escalated right now.

Ah, yes, the wildly unpredictable Russians, who have so “unpredictably” responded negatively to NATO establishing missile defense sites in central Europe, NATO expansion up to their borders, open Western interference in the internal politics of their neighbors and the partition of Serbia.  Who can possibly know why they act as they do?  It can’t be as simple as looking at Russia’s interests as defined by the Russian government and recognizing that our policies conflict with those interests–Russian politics is so opaque!  When in doubt, I suppose one can always fall back on the patronizing riddle-wrapped-in-an-enigma stereotype.   

Russia has scarcely done anything in the last decade that could not have been predicted, and most of what Russia has done in response to U.S. policies in recent years was predicted by some of us in the form of warnings not to do the things Washington was doing.  For her part, Secretary Rice has often expressed puzzlement about the public statements by Putin and others critical of U.S. policy, which suggests that she knows the real reasons for the worsening relations with Moscow but prefers not to admit that Washington has contributed significantly to the decline in relations or she is genuinely clueless about the government of the one country in the world about which she is supposedly a top expert.  

The conflict escalated right now because Saakashvili followed through on his promises to establish Tbilisi’s control over South Ossetia and found that (surprise!) a contingent of armed Russians was still there, just as they have been for over a decade.  He had made feints towards South Ossetia in the past, but always drew back from the brink of sustained conflict, and believed that he had his chance while the world was preoccupied with the Beijing Games.  This is not a mystery.  The situation was made demonstrably worse earlier in the year with the recognition of independent Kosovo, which all but guaranteed that Russia would make a play to shore up the Ossetian and Abkhaz statelets.  I wish my column and posts on Kosovo recognition had been entirely wrong, but at least concerning the Georgian situation I am sorry to say that they were not.  The situation was further exacerbated by the promise of future NATO membership to Georgia, which probably encouraged Saakashvili to think that he had the West’s implicit backing for his agenda to assert control over the breakaway regions. 

Applebaum’s column is unfortunately another example in a long line of Western commentators who support all of the things that anger and provoke the Russians and then express shock and bewilderment that the Russians have become angry and lashed out in some way.  More worryingly, I fear that, in the minds of these observers, there is a complete disconnect of what is now happening in South Ossetia from NATO expansion, Kosovo independence or any of the other points of contention with Russia.  In many cases, though perhaps not in Applebaum’s, Western observers confess to not understanding why these things are happening because they are studying it as a purely isolated phenomenon in which U.S. and Western actions seem to have no part and for which none of us has any responsibility.  Unfortunately, just like Russian reactions to perceived international challenges, Western commentary on Russia is so very predictable. 

Also, it is not reassuring when Applebaum keeps referring to it as “the Caucuses.”  The people in the Caucasus aren’t in Iowa, and they’re definitely not voting. 

Update: Via James, I see that Saakashvili continues to be predictably ridiculous by issuing this declaration:

If the whole world does not stop Russia today, then Russian tanks will be able to reach any other European capital.

It would be easy to laugh this off as mere absurd posturing, except that the one who is saying it is the Georgian President and responsible for the start of a war.  The most frustrating thing about all of this is that his apologists in the West are going to ignore his role in precipitating this conflict, or absolve him of all responsibility if they do acknowledge his role, and will blame the conflict on a “lack of Western resolve” rather than the irredentist fantasies of Saakashvili.  On the radio this afternoon Medved was going on about the “threat” of Russian nationalism, which seems to be less of a threat to the people in South Ossetia than Georgian nationalism and no threat to the rest of us. 

Second Update: My Takimag colleagues Richard Spencer and Chris Roach have good posts on the conflict.

Third Update: They’re getting into the predictable warmongering spirit over at Commentary, complete with warnings of Russian expansionism that might have come from Saakashvili’s press office.

Posting will be light today, but James has updates on the very important story coming out of the Caucasus.  For as long as I can remember, I have warned that Saakashvili was reckless and dangerous, and with his bid to force re-integration of South Ossetia he provoked the inevitable Russian backlash.  You would think that someone who has been complaining for years that Russia is using the separatist states as nothing more than proxies would not then go ahead and launch an attack on one of the proxies!  But that is exactly what he did, and everyone should remember that it was Saakashvili who created the current crisis.   

To understand the Russian response, imagine how Americans would respond if Serbia launched an attack into Kosovo while our KFOR troops were still there, and then imagine how much stronger the U.S. response would be if, in the course of the attack to retake the province, our troops took casualties because of that attack.  These are the unfortunate, ruinous things that happen when state sovereignty is reduced to a meaningless phrase by past interventions and partitions, and the governments that attacked Yugoslavia over its internal affairs and partitioned Kosovo have no authority to find fault with what Russia is doing now.  McCain’s complaints about violations of Georgian sovereignty are especially rich coming from the likes of him.  Of course, these regions are part of Georgia, and ideally Georgian sovereignty should be respected, but the folly of Saakashvili has probably ensured that he will lose both South Ossetia and Abkhazia and maybe more than that before it is all over.     

P.S.  Remember, both Obama and McCain wanted Georgia to join NATO, and the Bush administration tried to have them admitted at the last meeting in Bucharest.  Had it not been for the resistance of several European governments, this small, ugly crisis could have potentially been the trigger for an international disaster that might have dragged in all of Europe and the U.S.  I assume that this does not just mean that Georgia won’t be allowed into NATO, but that it also means that eastward NATO expansion in its entirety will halt.  Of course, that would make sense.  If I know McCain and his obsessive Russophobia, he will take this episode as proof that we must make Georgia a member of NATO and must do it right now.

Update: James Joyner writes:

If the U.S. and Western Europe aren’t prepared to use force upon the invasion of Georgia by Russia, then we’ve got no business even considering inviting them to join the Alliance.

Of course, since Georgia is not in NATO, the U.S. and our European allies have no reason to be prepared to use force in this case.  We already had no business in considering inviting Georgia into NATO, and this new conflict drives home why it was always a terrible idea.  We should all be grateful that Western governments are not prepared to use force to respond to this.  The dangers from the general war that could possibly follow are almost too grave to contemplate.  If other powers work to bring the parties to the conflict to the negotiating table, rather than backing the incomparably weaker state and prolonging the conflict, we can avoid the sort of blunders that made the July crisis such a disaster in 1914.  Small regional wars become global crises only when all of the major powers feel compelled to “do something” about them.  Had proponents of expansion had their way last year or earlier, we would be on the cusp of such a crisis right now.

I should add that there might have been a different, but also very undesirable outcome if Georgia had been welcomed into NATO and Saakashvili decided recklessly, just as he has now done, to test how far the Alliance would go only to be told that he was on his own.  It would avoid a broader war, but that would have made NATO security guarantees to all recent member states worthless and confirm that NATO is truly not a defensive alliance at all.  No matter which scenario had played out following Georgian entry into NATO, this outbreak of conflict would either have led to disaster or would have revealed NATO’s promises to be empty.  As I see it, the most worrisome thing is that we have already made security guarantees to other states that border Russia, some of which have significant Russian minorities that might become the focus of irredentism or separatism in the future, and it is not clear to me that we are really any more willing to go to war to defend those states than we would have been to defend Georgia.

Second Update: Robert Farley has a good, balanced post about the conflict.

I know David Brooks can’t really be serious when he says things like this, but this is at least the second grand pronouncement this week* and it’s getting out of hand:

But on or about June 29, 2007, human character changed [bold mine-DL]. That, of course, was the release date of the first iPhone.

No, human character did not change.  One thing that has been consistent and recognizable throughout every stage of competing for status and gadget-collecting is the enduring human temptation to fall prey to the latest fad.  I will agree that MySpace is rather like a leisure suit and will be regarded in a very short time to be as tacky and embarrassing as the latter has since come to be, and not just because more interesting social network tools are created, but because it will lose its allure once the novelty wears off.  At the most it will simply become a commonplace thing, no more remarkable in ten or twenty years than CD players were in the late ’90s or DVRs are today. 

The beauty of these silly fads today is that they pass so much more quickly than they once did, if only to be replaced by yet another fad.  It’s like when I was growing up and my friends and I were so enamored of Linux partly because it was experimental, open-source and new, and within a decade it had become a standard for use in major corporate operations.  One day, and it is not very far away, the iPhone will seem to us and our children to be as clunky as a rotary telephone seems now, and we will wonder what the fuss was about.  The most reassuring thing about all of this is that none of this status competition of obtaining and using gadgets really matters, and by its very transitory nature it confirms for us that it doesn’t matter.    

*The first pronouncement was “globosclerosis” (a.k.a., normality).