Christopher Preble adds to the discussion about U.S. allies and clients:

We can see, then, that for all the talk of free riding, for all those instances when some U.S. government official expresses concern or frustration that allies don’t do more to defend themselves and their interests, it’s just that: talk. For the dominant foreign-policy community, allies are the equivalent of Facebook friends. U.S. officials count them, rank them, and occasionally thank them. But we don’t ever expect these “allies” to actually do anything for us in return.

We can also see that many of our officials and analysts don’t want greater allied self-sufficiency because that undermines the story they have been telling about the “indispensability” of the U.S. in maintaining international order. The reality is that the U.S. doesn’t have to fill this role, but our policymakers want the U.S. to do it and swat down any possible alternatives before they can get off the ground. Wealthy allies could assume a much larger share of the responsibilities for regional security, but they know they won’t have to because Washington can always be guilted into doing it. American policymakers don’t want to give up the prestige and the illusion of control that come with those responsibilities, and they probably like the sense of importance that this role gives policymakers in Washington.

Our officials are flattered by the idea that Americans “stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future” (as then-Secretary Albright put it), and after they endorse the “indispensability” lie they give license to our allies and clients to quote it back to them whenever one of these governments wants the U.S. to do something for them. Our officials have talked themselves into helping allied and client governments extort ours for assistance and support in pursuing their regional goals largely at our expense and under the shadow of our protection, and our government continues to indulge these dependents because we have foolishly convinced ourselves that it is necessary for keeping the world from descending into chaos.

Our leaders insist that the U.S. is indispensable because no other states can do what they think “needs” to be done, and then do everything they can to make sure that it stays that way. Given the choice between discouraging allied and client dependence or enabling the same, leaders from both parties consistently choose the latter. If allied military spending is too low, they demand that the U.S. increases its military spending, and any attempt to pare back the amount that goes to the Pentagon is cited as proof of disastrous “retrenchment” that alarms the allies and clients that would rather have us pay for their defense. Further, our officials lump together allies and clients in such a way that the U.S. creates the impressions that it has obligations to clients that it doesn’t while allowing genuine allies to skimp on their contributions to the security of their own regions. The important and necessary distinctions between clients and allies get thoroughly blurred so that the U.S. bears greater costs while receiving almost no benefits.