David Steinberg criticizes the futility and harmful effects of a new round of Burma sanctions:

If US sanctions against the military government in Burma, the goal of which were regime change, haven’t worked for a decade and a half, by what logic would one suppose that additional sanctions would have a more positive effect? Yet well-meaning human rights and other organizations have recently proposed that further sanctions be instituted, and that a UN Commission of Inquiry into human rights violations be convened.

This proposal is especially quixotic as the EU has just modestly modified its less stringent sanctions policy in light of potential progress in that country, and none of the Asian states adheres to any sanctions regimen. Rather than being a step forward, then, this proposal undercuts both US policy and the potential for positive change in Burma.

Imposing sanctions on pariah states is the one policy response that seems to garner the broadest support across both parties, and it is a fairly easy thing to support. It makes little difference whether the sanctions have their desired effect. Since most sanctions are aimed at trying to change regime behavior or even topple the regime, they rarely have the desired effect. Instead of showing the bankruptcy of the sanctions option, this just invites a new round of sanctions. It doesn’t matter if sanctions actually discourage positive developments inside the targeted country, because the more entrenched a regime becomes the easier it becomes to justify the continuation of the sanctions. The harm sanctions do to the civilian population and the domestic political opposition is likewise irrelevant, and this can be blamed on the recalcitrance of the regime rather than the clumsy, short-sighted policy of outside governments. As the domestic opposition withers under the pressure of the sanctions, their impotence becomes an excuse for greater external pressure on the grounds that there is insufficient internal resistance. Sanctions are a favorite for using against pariah regimes with which the U.S. has no strong business connections, and this ensures easy passage and guarantees that there will be minimal political risk for those supporting the sanctions.

Steinberg concludes:

It’s simply self-defeating to advocate policies that effectively undercut the possibility of these reforms continuing, something which would be in the interests of both the United States and the people of that sorry land.

That’s true, but the habit of linking sanctions with disapproval is still far too ingrained to be resisted in this case. If sanctions are supposed to express disapproval, lifting some or refusing to impose new sanctions seems to imply approval and an endorsement of the current government. No politician wants to be accused of endorsing Burma’s junta, and there are more than enough politicians eager to posture and show off their concern for human rights by backing sanctions policies that are not going to do a thing to change regime behavior and very likely will make the plight of the population worse.