There is still a great deal of clamoring for selling F-16s to Taiwan. Sen. Cornyn of Texas continues to put a hold on confirming the nominee for deputy secretary of state until the administration issues a report on Taiwan’s air capabilities and acknowledges Taiwan’s request for the fighters. As Robert Haddick explained, F-16s are not going to do Taiwan much good in the event of a conflict with China. This post at DefenseTech confirms Haddick’s view:

Actually, RAND did the math on this one in a report last year, in typical RAND style, using sophisticated modeling to simulate a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the 2010–2015 timeframe. RAND’s conclusion was that the addition of a few dozen upgraded F-16s would have little to no impact on the cross-strait balance. In fact, RAND found that in the event of a Chinese attack, “the air war for Taiwan could essentially be over before much of the Blue air force has even fired a shot.”

It’s not the Chinese air fleet that would deliver the knock out blow to Taiwanese air power. Rather, its China’s massive arsenal of ballistic missiles that in an opening salvo would destroy most Taiwanese aircraft, even those in hardened shelters, and wreck its runways before Taiwan was able to launch its fighters.

Adding new F-16s to China’s inventory does little to change the ultimate outcome. Well, more Taiwanese aircraft would make a small contribution RAND found: “Taiwan’s air power can at least contribute to the anti-invasion defense by absorbing as much of China’s air effort as possible in the process of being put out of action.” In other words, parking more fighters on Taiwan’s ramps would make the Chinese deplete more of its missile magazines.

The answer to the cross-strait military balance will not come in the form of more short range tactical fighters sat on ramps within range of China’s massive missile force. As the RAND study conclusively shows, selling Taiwan more capable F-16s does nothing to change the military balance.

If these analyses are correct, there would seem to be no real gain in terms of Taiwanese security. That leaves the even more dubious argument that selling the F-16s now will be politically useful. Matt Anderson made the political argument in a recent article calling for the sale to go ahead:

There’s also a political impetus to get this arms sale done now. In Taiwan, the sale would bolster Ma in the next election. As alluded to before, the arms sale could preclude Ma from taking provocative actions by providing cover from accusations that he’s selling out Taiwan’s security with his pro-mainland policies. In regard to the other two relevant actors, an arms sale now could possibly take the issue off the table before the political transition takes place in Beijing and the US political climate becomes combustible with a presidential election.

If the fighters wouldn’t actually enhance Taiwanese security, selling them to Taiwan would be a waste of Taiwan’s money and a useless provocation. It is one thing to argue over whether the U.S. should be willing to rile Beijing for the sake of providing for Taiwan’s defense, but to do so when the sale doesn’t make Taiwan any more secure makes no sense at all. The sale might very well boost Ma in the next election, but U.S. policy should not be dictated by trying to keep the current Taiwanese president in office. Some Taiwan-related issue is always going to be on the table. If political transition in China initially leads to a more assertive Chinese military during the early days of Xi Jinping‘s tenure, as Anderson supposes might happen, that is all the more reason not to have created a breach in the previous year.