Because it has banked on this approach, the administration has consistently played down U.S. support for the opposition Green movement, which has been dormant in recent months. Yet Mr. Jalili’s behavior in Istanbul suggests that the regime remains more concerned about appearing weak to its domestic opposition than about the consequences of defying the Security Council.

By doing more to support the Iranian opposition, the United States could press the regime where it actually feels threatened. It could also send an important message to Iranians: that the international coalition seeks not to punish them but to weaken the government they despise. ~The Washington Post

In the world of the Post’s editors and columnists (and foreign policy hawks generally), it is always necessary to support foreign governments’ opposition movements and it is always imperative to avoid negotiations with them. It doesn’t seem to matter whether supporting the opposition aids U.S. goals or not, and it doesn’t even matter if the opposition is capable of bringing significant pressure to bear on the government in a way that is useful to U.S. policy. “Support the opposition!” is the reliable cry. It is the same advice, and it makes no difference if it is an allied government, a rival, or another major power. This recommendation is a substitute for a policy recommendation rather than a serious alternative. It is the foreign policy equivalent of calling for re-training and education as the answer to any and all economic problems.

This proposal might make sense if anyone advocating it could explain how it aids U.S. policy goals or U.S. interests. It would be helpful if the Post’s editors could offer a plausible account of how lending direct support to the failed Green movement would translate into more concessions from Iran on its nuclear program. There is no plausible account available, because there seems to be no meaningful connection between the two, and there is little reason to believe that a stronger Green movement would make Iran more cooperative. It wouldn’t hurt if Diehl or Kagan could point to something that the Egyptian government can’t do for the U.S. now that a politically reformed Egyptian government would be able to do. Of course, neither one tries to do this. Diehl dubs the administration’s “silence” on reform “dangerous,” and Kagan complains that Obama has “said nothing about the dangers of a similar eruption in Egypt,” but Diehl always thinks silence on political reform is a bad idea, and Mubarak is probably more aware of the dangers of a popular uprising than anyone in the U.S. is. Harping on the administration’s lack of support for political reform in Egypt is simply what an administration critic has to do when the administration isn’t mishandling relations with Egypt.

For his part, Kagan asserts, “After the “Jasmine Revolution” in nearby Tunisia, the Egyptian pot is about to boil over.” Anything’s possible, but despite the impressive protests taking place in Cairo this week, Kagan is simply guessing. He insists that the administration needs “to press Mubarak and his government to open the political system and avert impending disaster,” which takes for granted that there is an impending disaster (i.e., an Egyptian revolution).

It is quite possible that trying to compel political reform in Egypt now will weaken Mubarak’s government just enough to de-stabilize it without making sufficient changes to satisfy opponents of the regime. Instead of averting a disaster, Kagan’s recommendations might hasten its arrival. Opening up an authoritarian political system in such a way that it does not completely collapse is extremely difficult, the U.S. has little experience in how to facilitate this (acquiescing in the transition of a handful of allied dictatorships in the 1980s in countries with quite different political cultures doesn’t offer much guidance), and usually the result is the complete collapse of the system. Why are Mubarak and his allies going to set in motion the dissolution of their regime? Unless an advocate of reform can answer that question, calls for pushing political reform in Egypt or elsewhere shouldn’t be taken seriously.