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Reasons Not to Attack Iran

Greg Scoblete offers some possible reasons why the U.S. will not attack Iran, but I think he overestimates the importance of fiscal constraints, multilateralism, the need to “lead from behind,” and the desire to support the Iranian opposition. The final reason, the danger an Iranian war would pose to the U.S. and global economies, is […]

Greg Scoblete offers some possible reasons why the U.S. will not attack Iran, but I think he overestimates the importance of fiscal constraints, multilateralism, the need to “lead from behind,” and the desire to support the Iranian opposition. The final reason, the danger an Iranian war would pose to the U.S. and global economies, is so compelling that it would probably be enough by itself to stop any attack, but let’s consider the other four.

While an Iranian war would be fairly expensive, and could become even more so if it escalated, there are far fewer fiscal hawks than there are foreign policy hawks. The latter would point to the war with Iran and say, “We can’t possibly reduce military spending in the middle of a major war,” and they would probably insist that the military spending needed to be increased instead. The administration has hardly been eager to make real cuts in military spending as it is, and they will be even less interested in that if they started a new war. Fiscal constraints are not as binding on U.S. action as opponents of an attack would like to think.

It’s true that the Obama administration seems to care more about working through multilateral institutions than its predecessor did, and members of the administration were very interested to make sure that they had U.N. authorization for the war against Libya, but when it comes to countering perceived national security threats they have been perfectly happy to bypass the U.N. and even allied governments to do what was deemed necessary. Supporters of an attack on Iran incredibly believe that it would be an act of anticipatory self-defense, so they would assume that the U.S. needs no one else’s approval to act.

On a related point, “leading from behind” was an unfortunate quote given by an anonymous official that the administration has been trying to bury for months. Putting European governments at the forefront of the Libyan war was practical because the U.S. had nothing at stake there, but according to the administration the U.S. supposedly has a great deal at stake where Iran’s nuclear program is concerned. Opponents of an attack don’t really accept that the U.S. has a vital interest in delaying or disabling Iran’s nuclear program, so it’s easy to forget that the administration and Iran hawks consider it to be a problem that requires U.S. “leadership.” Unlike in Libya, there is no capable military alliance for the U.S. to use as political cover, and America’s local allies are neither willing nor capable to carry out a sustained military campaign against their larger neighbor. In any case, “leading from behind” was a rationalization after the fact for a war that the U.S. facilitated and helped to start. Future wars that are not primarily “humanitarian” in their justification will probably not be fought this way.

Greg is absolutely right that an attack on Iran would make it impossible for the U.S. to lend support to the Iranian opposition, and it would stoke anti-American feelings among even the most sympathetic dissidents. It would be politically devastating for the Iranian opposition. Political dissent would be even more difficult when the country is under attack, the vast majority of the Green movement would naturally resent a foreign attack on their country. There would be intense pressure to support the government for as long the war went on, and it would unite the opposition in support of Iran’s nuclear program as a matter of national pride and defiance of the attackers. A war with Iran would give the Iranian regime a new lease on life, and it would allow the regime to exploit patriotic and nationalist sentiments to consolidate its position at home. No credible Iranian dissident would dare associate with a foreign government engaged in military action against his country, and any dissident foolish enough to do so would help to discredit opposition forces. All of this is true, but I doubt that it would discourage the administration from attacking if it deemed it necessary.

Remember that some of the most vocal proponents of a war with Iran here in the U.S., including many prominent Democrats, have been happy to flack for the MEK, which they pretend is the most important Iranian opposition group despite its complete lack of support inside Iran. The Green movement abhors the MEK, and they see American support for the MEK as a disaster for their movement, but this doesn’t matter to MEK advocates, because helping a legitimate Iranian opposition isn’t what interests them. There was a time when the fortunes of the Green movement seemed to matter to Iran hawks here in the U.S., but that was when American hawks thought that the Green movement might be a useful mechanism for subverting the Iranian regime. Once it became clear that this wasn’t going to happen and wasn’t even their goal, interest in the Green movement fizzled and disappeared.

I should make clear that I believe that three of these four are perfectly good reasons why the U.S. should not attack Iran, but I doubt they will have much impact on the final decision. We can hope that the administration will opt for containment rather than war. Greg is probably right that this is what Obama will decide, but if so it will be because Iran can be contained and deterred, and because it does not pose the threat that Iran hawks claim that it does.

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