Fyodor Lukyanov’s view of Putin and the “reset” is right:

Since there has been no progress on the issue of missile defence, the tone of Mr Putin’s potential statements had he attended the G8 summit, is predictable enough. It is in no one’s interest for this to happen, either from a security standpoint or on a political level. The lack of progress was due to the complexity of the issue itself and the election campaigns in Russia and the US. As US President Barack Obama told Mr Medvedev in a candid moment in Seoul, unaware that his words were being picked up by microphone, he would have “more flexibility” to deal with contentious issues like missile defence after the US presidential election if he is re-elected, of course. Washington, DC’s flexibility is vital for breaking the deadlock because Mr Putin usually reciprocates to manifestations of goodwill, or more precisely, he does so when he feels that he is dealing with someone who is ready to negotiate and compromise, rather than talking to a brick wall [bold mine-DL].

This links the two different summit-related episodes in a very useful way. The “flexibility” comment at Seoul, which Romney cited as proof of abject American surrender to the Kremlin, now appears to have been an attempt to alert the Russians that they should expect no progress on contentious issues at forthcoming meetings before November. Given Putin’s other concerns, it made sense to skip a summit where nothing was going to be resolved on outstanding issues between the U.S. and Russia.

Lukyanov also suggests that the role of Medvedev as a sort of go-between between Putin and Obama might be the way that both sides can manage the U.S.-Russian relationship in the future:

That is why, although he has changed places with Mr Medvedev, Mr Putin may try to preserve the previous tandem formula, which has proved quite effective in foreign policy. Prime Minister Medvedev could take on a broader foreign policy brief, becoming President Putin’s personal special envoy, especially since it is easier for him to find common ground with most foreign leaders.

That would render void the negative judgments about Obama’s “mistake” in cultivating Medvedev during his presidency, and it would also undermine the overly-personalized interpretations of what Putin’s return to the presidency must mean for U.S.-Russian relations.