For the last few days, the various reactions to the flotilla attack have reminded me of reactions to the short war escalated by Georgia in August 2008. Then as now, there is a U.S. ally that embarks on a military action that is certainly stupid and most likely illegal in pursuit of an unwise and unsustainable policy, the initial assumption that the ally bears the bulk of the blame for the disaster that follows is later proven to be mostly correct, and Washington predictably and reliably takes the side of the attacker. We then hear endlessly about Russian/Turkish perfidy when their citizens are the ones who were attacked first. Not only do many Americans automatically sympathize with the wrong side in these situations, but many of them cannot seem to fathom that there can be any good reason to take a different view.

“Pro-Israel” hawks often complain that others are in the habit of blaming the victim. As they see it, this is what most of the world always does to Israel, whose vulnerability and weakness they exaggerate on a regular basis to make their arguments seem more credible. Most of the people excusing or justifying the flotilla raid and the blockade have been doing nothing but blaming victims since the attack occurred.

In that op-ed I discussed earlier, Robert Pollock mocks the Turkish foreign minister for saying, “It should not seem like a choice between Turkey and Israel. It should be a choice between right and wrong.” Pollock dismisses this statement as demagoguery. What this misunderstands is the unanimity and the depth of Turkish anger over this attack. Suat Kiniklioglu was the only Turkish politician to have visited Israel since Operation Cast Lead, and as such he was probably the most sympathetic to Israel of anyone in the current Turkish government. That changed on Monday, as he explained in this column for The Christian Science Monitor:

As of Monday, Turks regard the current Israeli government as unfriendly. There is no doubt that the rift has the potential to escalate if Israel will not respond quickly and responsibly.

Turkey’s government in this case is not so much trying to whip up the crowd as it is trying to stay ahead of the public’s anger. Erdogan has engaged in some real demagoguery in his time, but at the present time what ought to stand out for Western observers is how restrained the Turkish response has been given the intense public pressure at home to take an even harder line.

Were the positions somehow reversed, we would likely be hearing something very different from Pollock. Had these been ships filled mostly with Americans en route to provide aid to members the Green movement as part of a Free Iran Flotilla and the attackers were from the Iranian navy, Americans would expect and demand the support of our allies against the state that attacked our citizens. If most Americans cannot understand why Turks expect the same, we really are more clueless as a nation than I had thought possible.

Mr. Erodogan’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, is a proponent of a philosophy which calls on Turkey to loosen Western ties to the U.S., NATO and the European Union and seek its own sphere of influence to the east. ~Robert Pollock

If we actually take seriously what Davutoglu has said, this is a gross distortion at best and dishonest at worst. Just last month, Davutoglu said this:

Turkey’s relations with other global actors aim to be complementary, not in competition. Such a policy views Turkey’s strategic relationship with the United States through the two countries’ bilateral strategic ties and through NATO. It considers its EU membership process, its good neighborhood policy with Russia, and its synchronization policy in Eurasia as integral parts of a consistent policy that serves to complement each other. This means that good relations with Russia are not an alternative to relations with the EU. Nor is the model partnership with the United States a rival partnership against Russia.

What he calls a “multi-dimensional foreign policy” here combines with the so-called “zero problems” approach to Turkey’s eastern neighbors. Pollock could argue that what Davutoglu proposes is not realistic, not least because some of Turkey’s Western allies are refusing to be part of a “multi-dimensional” Turkish foreign policy. He could also say that there are people in the AKP who want to do these things, but Davutoglu apparently isn’t one of them. Pollock might also point out that the “model partnership” description of the U.S.-Turkish relationship is diplomatic boilerplate invented to paper over the deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations. So it simply isn’t true that Davutoglu proposes loosening ties to Western institutions and allies. If that is Davutoglu’s “real” intention, as opposed to the one he has stated publicly, Pollock provides no evidence that this is so.

Pollock writes later:

What’s more, Turks remain blind to their manifest hypocrisies. Ask how they would feel if other countries arranged an “aid” convoy (akin to the Gaza flotilla) for their own Kurdish minority and you’ll be met with dumb stares.

Over the last few days I have seen a few people trying to equate the current status of Palestinians in Gaza with that of the Kurds in Turkey. Apparently Pollock expects us not to know that the status of Kurds has improved significantly under the AKP government. Kurds have representation in the Turkish parliament. Kurds have been granted some language and other rights that they did not have in the “good old days” before the AKP took power, and last year’s “Kurdish initiative” was an attempt to expand on this. This AKP initiative encountered significant political resistance from the Republicans and the National Movement, which means that the one party attempting to address some Kurdish grievances is the one Pollock is attacking. Hurriyet was reporting as recently as Monday that the failure of the initiative was the reason for stepped-up PKK violence, including the attack in Iskenderun on Monday. Diyarbakir and Erzerum are not blockaded enclaves, and there are not over a million Kurds living in government-enforced poverty in the name of anti-terrorism. Can anyone seriously claim that Palestinians in Gaza are currently being treated the same as Kurds in Turkey?

It hasn’t taken long for the usual tactics of vilification normally reserved for authoritarian states to be applied in full force to Turkey. Pollock’s op-ed is the most extensive effort I’ve seen so far, but we can expect much more of the same for the rest of the summer and perhaps for the next decade.

It may be redundant to write this, but Philip Klein’s recentposts on the flotilla attack are very poor. It is jarringly illogical to claim that Hamas’ refusal to allow flotilla aid into Gaza proves that “the flotilla was not a humanitarian mission to deliver aid to suffering Palestinians.” How Hamas responds to the aid provided by the flotilla after Israel seized the flotilla has nothing to do with the purpose or intent of the people participating in the flotilla. Were Klein not looking for some way to shift attention or deflect blame from the government that just killed nine civilians in international waters, he would probably see that.

The other post is worse in a way because it is more misleading. Klein sets out to debunk the “myth of a strong Israeli-Turkey friendship” by rehearsing the usual litany of complaints, as if Israel had no part in the deterioration of relations. He seems to think that Turkey is to blame when it objects to Israel engaging in excessive military action against Gaza. Being the great fan of context and accuracy that he is, it’s strange that Klein didn’t mention one of the main reasons why Erdogan was particularly offended by the Gaza operation. Just before Operation Cast Lead began, Erdogan had been using his improved relations with Syria to mediate an Israeli-Syrian peace in which the Olmert government was supposedly interested. Olmert turned around almost immediately after meeting with Erdogan and launched the operation against Gaza. Erdogan understandably felt that he had been left in the dark about Israel’s intentions and saw Olmert’s decision as sabotage of his mediation effort. In other words, the Turkish government was attempting to help Israel with a long-standing diplomatic problem, and Israel rewarded them by making Erdogan look like a fool. Add to that the damage and the deaths caused by the operation and the genuine outrage the Turkish public felt about these things, and one can understand how Erdogan has become so combative.

Since the Netanyahu government came into office, it has been actively contributing to the downward spiral of Israeli-Turkish relations. In response to an offensive Turkish television show, Israel’s Foreign Ministry deliberately and publicly insulted the Turkish ambassador, which led to the last major diplomatic row before now. To protest objectionable content produced by Turkish citizens, Israel drastically overreacted by further wrecking relations with the Turkish government. Erdogan does demagogue the Palestinian issue, but everything the Olmert and Netanyahu governments have been doing for the last year and a half have provided him with more than enough ammunition.

Four years ago, the AKP government had reasonably good relations with Israel. The “myth” of friendship Klein dismisses was quite real. Things began going wrong when Israel responded to Hizbullah’s capture of three of its soldiers by launching a full-scale war against all of Lebanon. Like most other nations, Turks were appalled by what Israel had done, and relations began souring from then on. Even if one wants to blame Erdogan for being irresponsible in demagoguing and whipping up Turkish anger, there would have been no occasions for his demagoguery if Israel had not engaged in its excessive and destructive military actions in Lebanon and Gaza.

Speaking of Lebanon, just consider what Israel did in response to the capture of three of its soldiers and then look at how mildly Turkey has responded to the deaths of several Turkish civilian citizens at the hands of Israeli armed forces. If there had not been a strong relationship between Turkey and Israel prior to the last four years, such a provocation would have led to a much more confrontational response than the one we have seen. For that matter, Erdogan has made clear that his quarrel is principally with Netanyahu’s coalition government. As Hurriyet reported yesterday:

Erdogan made it clear that Turkey has no problem with either the Israeli people or the Israeli state, calling on the country’s citizens to stand up against the Netanyahu-Lieberman government, which he said hurts the interests of the Israeli people.

That leaves open the very small possibility that Israeli-Turkish relations might be repaired at some point in the future if Netanyahu’s government falls in the near future. At the very least, it suggests that even now Erdogan does not want to rule out rebuilding the relationship. Turkey and Israel did have a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship. Thanks largely to disastrously bad leadership in Israel that has provided Erdogan with a perfect foil for demagoguery, it is now in ruins. It is ridiculous that American hawks who cheered Israel on all along cannot admit to Israel’s part in the wreckage of a valuable alliance, but it is simply false to claim that the alliance was never strong.

I’ve long had a soft spot for Turkey. I once even argued that if the European Union wouldn’t admit Turkey, we should invite Turkey to join Nafta. Why? Because I think it really matters whether Turkey is a bridge or ditch between the Judeo-Christian West and the Arab and Muslim East. Turkey’s role in balancing and interpreting East and West is one of the critical pivot points that helps keep the world stable. ~Thomas Friedman

Yes, that’s what he thinks, right up until Turkey attempts to mediate the Iranian nuclear issue and reaches an agreement on nuclear fuel with Iran. At that point, it is suddenly “as ugly as it gets” and Erdogan has somehow sold out his democratic principles and betrayed Iran’s opposition. But, hey, that was last week. This week, Friedman wants Turkey to be a bridge again.

One of the things that often escapes notice about the AKP government here in the U.S. is that it is actually very popular among Turkish business interests on account of its economic reforms and reasonably capable management over the last eight years. When one considers the political alternative, it’s not surprising that the AKP has their support. The CHP recently elected its new party leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, whose bold new leadership involves repeating a lot of socialist bromides, so right now there is not much of a serious political challenge to Erdogan coming from the Turkish left. The economic relationships Turkey has been cultivating with Syria, Iran, and Russia, among others, are a natural result of Turkish prosperity and ultimately come from the same “pro-market” impulses that made the AKP a strong proponent of EU membership for Turkey. Friedman seems confused about how bridges work. A bridge must connect both sides of a divide, which means that Turkey will have to remain as connected to the Near East and its Muslim neighbors as it is to Europe. Last week, Friedman was horrified that Turkey was actually having dealings with people on the “other side” of the bridge he thinks is so important.

The trouble that a lot of Americans seem to have with all this is that whenever Turkey deviates from Washington’s script they view Turkey’s relations with its eastern and northern neighbors as evidence of a “drift” out of the orbit of the West. Of course, we are the ones drawing the lines and defining Turkish behavior such that they cannot pursue their interests without being perceived as a competitor or worse. In many parts of the world the U.S. encourages and welcomes economic cooperation and improved relations between neighbors, but in other regions the very same behaviors that we laud in Europe are viewed with suspicion and alarm. After a while, any nation, even one with a long-standing good relationship with the U.S., would grow weary of this treatment.

Turkey sacrificed its economic interests for the sake of maintaining Iraq sanctions in the ’90s and early 2000s, and then on the heels of that the U.S. proposed turning one of the neighboring countries into a war zone with obvious security implications for Turkey. On Iran, we expect them to put their interests second to supporting our irrational obsession with Iran’s nuclear program. We insist that Turkey take positions that don’t benefit it in the least, and then find fault with them when they refuse. Instead of accepting their assistance as a credible mediator in Near Eastern affairs, we tend to treat their efforts at mediation as unwanted interference or as something actually harmful to the U.S. Steven Cook is right that it’s time to “recognize reality” about U.S.-Turkish relations, but part of that involves recognizing how unnecessary many of our disagreements are and how many are products of our own flawed policies in the region.

When the DPJ won their landslide victory last year, I was quite sure that Hatoyama’s government would make alliance-related issues a priority. At the time, there was a lot of skepticism that Hatoyama would make much of an effort to follow through on his campaign rhetoic and try to change some aspects of Japan’s relationship with the U.S. The assumption was that a new, untested government staffed by a permanent opposition party confronting broad public discontent with domestic problems would not waste its time quarreling with the U.S. over bases on Okinawa. American observers seemed to assume that the most significant transition of power from one party to another in postwar Japanese history would have little or no effect on Japanese foreign policy. Perhaps they were too accustomed to our unfortunate bipartisan consensus on foreign policy, according to which virtually nothing ever changes despite changes in party control.

As it turned out, Hatoyama not only made it a priority, but he focused on the Futenma dispute so much and he made enough outlandish promises of what he would be able to accomplish in a very short time that he accelerated the disintegration of his ministry. Hatoyama and his cabinet were already laboring under the heavy burden of absurdly high expectations and unsustainably high approval ratings early on. The public was always going to sour on the DPJ once it had to start governing and making trade-offs. Even so, Hatoyama wasn’t necessarily doomed until his handling of the basing dispute blew up in his face.

If anything, I underestimated how important the basing issue was to a significant bloc of DPJ voters and also underestimated how responsive Hatoyama would be to their concerns. Having vowed to resign if he could not deliver a new basing deal by the end of May, he now faces a total loss of confidence. The DPJ government will continue on, but Hatoyama is now out of office. That’s unfortunate for Japan to the extent that it discourages political challenges to the status quo in government there, but it is also a missed opportunity for the U.S. As I wrote last August:

For Washington, change in Tokyo provides an opportunity to reevaluate the need for a large U.S. military presence in Japan. The U.S. presence has been a persistent source of tension and public anger in Japan. But it has also siphoned U.S. forces from areas of the world where they are needed far more. Sunday’s election may be the first step in redeploying those troops or bringing some of them home.

Clearly, I was far too hopeful that anyone in Washington would have the imagination or political courage to seize this opportunity. All that Hatoyama’s failure over Futenma means is that the tensions over basing and discontent with the alliance that helped fuel the DPJ’s rise to power will go unaddressed for many more years. The U.S. will have more difficulty in the future with Japan on account of our unwillingness to accommodate Japanese complaints this time.

I guess we should all be thankful that President Bush’s “freedom agenda” failed, right? This is Turkey – a NATO ally and prospective (although increasingly less likely) candidate for EU membership. Now imagine democracy taking root in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Iran and elsewhere – would it surprise anyone if the regional atmosphere got a lot less friendly toward the U.S. and Israel?

As I said earlier, it’s very difficult to be an honest proponent of Middle East democracy and an advocate for perpetual American hegemony in the region. The emergence of true democracies is likely to reorient the geopolitics of the region in a manner that the staunchest hegemonists would sharply disapprove of. I wonder which aspiration they’ll jettison first. ~Greg Scoblete

Greg was responding to the same Continetti post I discussed yesterday. He is certainly right that hegemonists are inconsistent in their enthusiasm for democracy promotion, as I’ve mentioned many times before. In this view, Venezuelan and Bolivian democracies are blights on the earth, but Georgian democracy is wonderful and vitally important. They used to like Ukrainian democracy until the Ukrainians elected the wrong candidate, and now they’re not so sure it’s a good idea. It’s not hard to see that these reactions match up closely with the attitudes of the respective governments to U.S. influence in their parts of the world. Many democratists also work under the very misleading assumption that democratization necessarily fosters greater international stability. Many of them also believe democracies will not clash with one another because they have shared “values” and the democratic nature of their governments will reduce the chances of conflict. As far as I can tell, none of these things is true, or at least none of them can be taken for granted.

What gets lost in a lot of commentary on Turkey and the AKP is how illiberal and undemocratic the Kemalists in the army had to be for decades to keep Islamist governments from enduring for any length of time until the AKP’s “soft” or “reformed” Islamism made it difficult for the military to intervene against them. Washington’s ability to rely on Turkish support was artificially enhanced for a long time through the end of the Cold War by the unrepresentative nature of the Turkish government and the relatively limited U.S. presence in the region. All of this began changing in the ’90s as the U.S. became much more involved in Near Eastern affairs, and then in the last decade Islamists in Turkey have adapted to avoid provoking the military into defending Turkish secularism.

Let’s remember that less than ten years ago Erdogan was convicted of a crime for publicly reciting a somewhat militant poem by the CUP ideologue Ziya Gokalp, and a short time after that he had reinvented himself as a pro-European, pro-market reformer, and Erdogan then took the old Welfare coalition that had been forced out in the late ’90s on account of its Islamism and made it into the dominant ruling AKP. During the same time, the U.S. has become even more involved in the region in ways that almost all Turks find alarming and dangerous. There might have been a time in the past when a popular backlash in Turkey against U.S. policies wouldn’t have influenced whether its government cooperated with America, but it just so happened that Turkey experienced its first full taste of representative democracy at the moment when most of its people were strongly opposed to U.S. actions in the region. This popular backlash extended to Israeli policies, too, especially after 2006.

What bothers some hegemonists about Turkey is that they tend to assume that American interests, American power and American “values” as they define them all advance and retreat together, and if you define American interests as they do an independent-minded Turkey pursuing “zero problems” with Iran and Syria is a huge setback. Hegemonists seem to think that if other countries are becoming more democratic they ought to become more “like us” in their “values,” and therefore their governments should be more willing to align themselves with the U.S. As we are seeing all over the world, the more democratic other nations become the more their governments begin to pursue interests that diverge from American interests, especially as these are defined by hegemonists. A more modest, limited, rational definition of American interests would considerably reduce the number of clashes with other governments, and an administration following such a definition would actually welcome the regional leadership and gestures towards burden-sharing that some of our allies have started to offer.

It is not a question of whether we in the U.S. find this process desirable or not. It is not something that we would be able to reverse even if we thought it necessary (and I hope we don’t). Despite the failures of Hatoyama’s government, the DPJ in Japan is not going to recede back into permanent minority status, and it represents a shift in Japanese politics towards a competitive party system that will make it increasingly difficult to dictate the terms of the alliance to Tokyo in the future. Our bases in Japan are going to have to go sooner or later, so it should probably be sooner on amicable terms rather than later. Brazilian assertiveness on the world stage may wane once Lula leaves office, but the ambition to represent non-aligned and developing nations will remain, and that is inevitably going to put Brazil at odds with the U.S. from time to time, but there would likely be fewer clashes if Washington did not presume to make everything its business. Turkey may be the most dramatic case of an increasingly assertive allied democratic government challenging the American line on certain regional issues, and up to a point Turkey has been succeeding in its challenges.

All of this has happened because the governments of these countries have become significantly more democratic and representative than they had been previously. What many hegemonists find frustrating about these developments is that they have all happened without direct U.S. efforts. Hegemonists have supported democratization in the past when promoting democracy was a U.S.-led or U.S.-backed project, but when democratic politics flourishes on its own in other countries there is not much interest in it. This happens because democratic governance is itself just a frame that is filled by the political, cultural and religious values of the people who are enfranchised. Modernization and globalization result in a considerable amount of homogenization across nations, but they also facilitate the rise of new powers that have modernized and integrated themselves into the global economy in order to empower their nations. These new powers often have very different ideas concerning a host of international issues that put them at odds with the traditional major powers. Globalization also provokes religious and nationalist reactions that can make cultural and religious differences far more relevant to international politics, and democratic governments around the world are going to reflect those differences in how they relate to the rest of the world.

One way to begin adapting to this changing landscape is to acknowledge that our democratic allies and other rising powers have legitimate interests in shaping the response to a number of international issues, and then to react rationally when their governments and ours take different positions. Instead of complaining that the U.S. is “losing” this or that country, stop making our allies choose between their own national interests and support for unwise U.S. initiatives. Instead of berating independent-minded allies and democracies as traitors or sell-outs when they do things our political class doesn’t like, look on their newfound credibility with other nations as something that could be used to benefit the U.S. as well. Their interests will not always coincide with ours, but we will be pleasantly surprised how few conflicts of interest we will have with them when we understand that our national interests do not encompass the entire globe.

The trend that few have noticed is that these elements are pulling Turkey out of the Western alliance structure and toward the Middle East. The break began in 2003 when the Turks denied the U.S. Fourth Infantry the ability to invade Iraq from the north. ~Matt Continetti

This is a typically misleading way to understand what has been happening in U.S.-Turkish relations over the last seven years. The break began when Washington told Turkey to allow U.S. forces to invade Iraq from their territory, presumed that the approval would be automatically forthcoming, and then reacted with shock and anger when the Turkish government actually pursued its own security interests and reflected the views of its people. Invading Iraq had nothing to do with being part of the “Western alliance structure,” and opposing the invasion and refusing to let the U.S. use Turkish territory to launch the invasion did not represent Turkey’s move away from that structure. Pressuring Turkey to participate in the war it opposed was part of our abuse of that structure to pursue goals unrelated to the alliance with Turkey.

The Turkish alliance has suffered for the same reason that many of our alliances suffered during the Bush years: allied security interests were ignored or dismissed, obedient support of U.S. policies was expected no matter what, and any ally that resisted or preferred to pursue its national interest instead was to be regarded as treacherous. It had never occurred to the Bush administration that the Turks might say no, because it never occurred to them that some of our allies would not act like lackeys.

The larger problem is that Washington sees the alliance with Turkey very differently than Erdogan’s government sees it. If we believe FM Davutoglu, Ankara believes that it can pursue good relations with its regional neighbors without sacrificing good relations with the U.S. and EU. Turkey is pursuing a “zero problems” approach to its neighbors, including Iran and Syria, and the U.S. very much wants there to be a problem that keeps Turkey and Iran apart, namely the nuclear issue. Washington wants Turkey as a front-line state in its confrontation with Iran, and Turkey doesn’t want a confrontation. Of course, the Erdogan government is responsible for what it does, including its demagoguery and provocations, but the U.S. and Israel are making it exceedingly easy for Erdogan to play to the crowd at home and to position himself as the reasonable opponent of our unreasonable policies.

The Tehran nuclear deal was one sign that Washington’s view of the alliance has no connection with reality. Unfortunately, as Turkey has been discovering lately, it is not possible for it to have a “zero problems” policy in the Near East without antagonizing the U.S. and Israel. This is partly because the latter insist on treaing Turkey’s “zero problems” approach as unacceptable. Turkey’s major Western allies effectively insist that Turkey choose them at the expense of their own interests in cultivating good relations with their neighbors. As a result, Turkey continues to develop better relations with Iran and other states in the region and has less and less use for Western allies that mostly ignore its legitimate interests and expect it to follow their lead or remain silent when they embark on controversial policies.

This is not Israel “shooting itself in the foot.” This is Israel winning. Be for that or against it, but at least recognize it.
~Jim Henley

This reminds me of Cato’s line from the series Rome, “So, this is not a humiliating defeat at all, but rather a rare species of victory!” Count me as part of the “counterproductivity corps” if you like, but if this is what Israeli victory looks like they will not be able politically to endure many more such victories. Up to a point, Israel can keep acting with impunity regardless of what the rest of the world says as long as the U.S. continues to back it. However, at some point Israel will alienate enough other U.S. allies in sufficiently provocative ways that the U.S. will have to start choosing between keeping on good terms with those other allies or continuing to back Israel uncritically and automatically.

The forged passports connected to the Dubai assassination badly damaged Israel’s relations with a number of European and other Western governments, and this has wrecked relations with Turkey. Israel is fast running out of friends to betray. Turkish FM Davutoglu has said that his government expects America to show solidarity with Turkey. He is going to be disappointed, and Turkey’s alliance with the U.S. is going to become so unpopular that we have to start wondering how long it will last. In case anyone has missed it, U.S.-Turkish relations were already fairly poor before this, and the administration’s sorry response to this attack has only worsened matters after it had earlier slapped down the Tehran nuclear deal. The chasm widening between Washington and Ankara is temporarily useful to Israel, but ultimately it is going to start showing people in Washington that the price for automatically backing Israel is not worth it.

I appreciate Jim’s point that there are not many specific measures that Turkey or any other state can take that will directly harm Israel, but how has it reached a point that Turkish unwillingness to go to war with Israel has become proof of Israeli success? Four years ago, the Turkish public was angry with Israel over Lebanon and Erdogan’s government expressed some displeasure. A year and a half ago, the Turkish public was furious with Israel over Gaza, and the Turkish government was angry, which later prompted Erdogan’s Davos tirade. Various diplomatic slights and pointed insults have been exchanged since then. Now the Turkish public is incandescently outraged, and the Turkish government is furious. Self-defeating hyperbole aside, when the foreign minister of one of Israel’s better allies likens one of its actions to 9/11 and the Turkish PM threatens serious consequences in retaliation, this is not evidence that Israel has won anything. It is proof that in four short years Turkey and Israel have gone from being on reasonably good terms to being practically at daggers drawn. That is the result of repeated Israeli strategic failures that have had a cumulative effect over the last several years.

Oddly, it is continued uncritical, automatic U.S. backing that enables the worst instincts in Israel’s government, and it is this that allows it to persist in its self-destructive course long after it should have stopped and corrected its course. It is that very backing that will let Israel continue down this path until it will become impossible for the U.S. to balance its relationships with its other allies and its one-sided relationship with Israel.

Update: Jim Henley clarifies what he meant in a follow-up post, and I appreciate the explanation. As far as control of the West Bank is concerned, he is correct. Clearly, I took his original post to mean something very different.

The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations greeted news of the flotilla disaster by repeating a common “pro-Israel” talking point: that Israel only blockades Gaza to prevent Hamas from building rockets that might kill Israeli citizens. If only that were true. In reality, the embargo has a broader and more sinister purpose: to impoverish the people of Gaza, and thus turn them against Hamas. As the Israeli newspaper Haaretz has reported, the Israeli officials in charge of the embargo adhere to what they call a policy of “no prosperity, no development, no humanitarian crisis.” In other words, the embargo must be tight enough to keep the people of Gaza miserable, but not so tight that they starve. ~Peter Beinart

Beinart’s emphasis on the blockade as the main issue is correct and something I did not discuss enough in my earlier post. This economic and political purpose of the blockade has never been a secret. During Operation Cast Lead, we heard all about how inflicting deprivation and misery on the Gazan population with the siege was intended to turn the population against Hamas. As Inoted at the time, sanctions and embargoes do not cause people to rise up against their rulers, but they do make them resent the people imposing the sanctions and embargoes. Now that the blockade has produced an enormous political disaster, we are supposed to forget about that and focus on arms smuggling that has nothing to do with what the flotilla was attempting to bring to Gaza.

The blockade is a policy aimed at the steady immiseration and deeper impoverishment of Gazans. This not only deflects attention from Hamas’ abuses and misrule, but it also ensures that there will not be enough prosperity in the future to foster any sort of viable political opposition against Hamas. That tells me that Israel is actually quite willing to tolerate a Hamas-run enclave on its doorstep so long as it can keep the people living there poor and dependent.