Conor Friedersdorf ends his Ames debate summary with this remark:

Given the fact that lots of rank and file conservatives are tired of foreign wars and the money they cost, it is bizarre that there aren’t more candidates taking a position that is more moderate on foreign policy than Ron Paul, but quite a bit less hawkish than the bulk of the Republican field.

I suppose it is bizarre, but there are a few reasons why this has happened. The most important factor is that the rank and file conservatives tired of foreign wars and their costs still not do make up a majority of Republican primary voters. On specific interventions, a plurality or majority of Republicans may be opposed, but on the whole self-identifying conservatives still tend to resist a foreign policy of prudence and restraint. There are more skeptical conservatives than there used to be, and there is generally greater Republican skepticism of entering foreign wars than there has been in well over a decade, but they are still a minority. One related factor is that ending these wars is not a high priority even for many Republican voters opposed to specific interventions, and another is that voters may be backing a candidate in the primaries for entirely different reasons and do so despite not sharing his foreign policy views. That infamous exit poll result showing McCain winning the antiwar and anti-Bush vote in New Hampshire was confirmation of the latter. Many Republican voters horrified by the Bush administration’s destructive foreign policy decisions may end up supporting candidates who agree with those decisions for a variety of reasons. It doesn’t mean that these voters aren’t war-weary and sick of meddling in other nations’ affairs, but that other factors prove to be more important in determining how they will vote.

For example, Rick Perry’s foreign policy promises to be a brasher, more obnoxious version of the Bush administration’s, but what Republicans who like him seem to find interesting about him is not the substance of his views on Iran or the “reset,” but rather the combativeness that he projects. A large bloc of Republican voters looks at the Obama administration and inexplicably does not see one of the most interventionist, militarized foreign policies of the last forty years. Because of partisan biases, and because they are in the party out of power, many Republicans are inclined to see Obama instead as accommodating and appeasing hostile states. If Obama “leads from behind,” as the tiresome attack goes, Perry would charge in with guns blazing, and for a large percentage of the GOP the latter is somehow more desirable. Since WWII it has been unusual for the minority party to rail against the incumbent for being too aggressive and too hawkish overseas, and it is even rarer when that attack yields electoral success. This has less to do with the merits of respective policy positions and more to do with the prevalence of American nationalism in shaping the politics of foreign policy, which encourages and rewards confrontational policies (at least until they backfire). As the more nationalist of the two major parties, the GOP is even less likely to attack an incumbent President for excessive hawkishness even when he richly deserves it.

One more factor that is frequently mentioned but not given enough attention is the perceived political “moderation” of foreign policy realists. While Conor was using the word moderate to refer to a position between the poles of Ron Paul’s non-interventionism and Tim Pawlenty’s neoconservatism, the bigger political problem for Republican realists is that many of them are or are perceived to be political moderates on domestic policy questions, and they tend to be weaker in their partisan attachments. Both of these contribute to the movement conservative view that they are “unreliable.” Huntsman occupies a sort of middle ground between Paul and Pawlenty on foreign policy, but he has also very deliberately positioned himself as the relative moderate in the race. In fact, Huntsman is not nearly so moderate as his admirers in the press or his campaign strategist claim, but he is perceived to be running away from the base of the party. Because of that, and because hawks have a vested interest in associating his foreign policy views with those instances when he has broken with movement conservatism, Huntsman’s sensible views on Libya and Afghanistan are treated as more proof that he is a “moderate.”

While realists recognize the enduring importance of nationalism in the world, and they are usually most interested in policies that serve American interests before anything else, they are also less likely to indulge in nationalist self-congratulation, triumphalism, and jingoism. They are unlikely to sympathize with popular anti-jihadism, and generally regard the hyping of foreign threats as demagoguery rather than a rational assessment of real dangers to national security. Because of this, many realists have a more difficult time making their foreign policy vision seem relevant to voters than alarmists. It is easier and more emotionally satisfying to exaggerate a threat, denounce an administration for “failing” to address it, and urge dangerous or counterproductive actions, and the alarmist hawks’ audience has come to expect this sort of thing.

A group of Iran experts and former diplomats and national security officials have sent a letter urging the State Department that the Mujahidin-e Khalq remain on the list of foreign terrorist organizations:

The experts contend that delisting the MEK would be a huge blow to the pro-democracy “green movement” that formed in Iran during the 2009 presidential election, which Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad is widely viewed as having stolen. Months of protests followed but the movement has since lost its momentum.

“Removing the MEK from the foreign terrorist organisation list and misconstruing its lack of democratic bona fides and support inside Iran will have harmful consequences on the legitimate, indigenous Iranian opposition,” the 37 experts say in the letter.

The letter goes on to say that de-listing the MEK will help consolidate the government’s position:

“By attempting to claim credit for Iran’s democracy movement, the MEK has aided the Iranian government’s attempts to discredit the green movement and justify its crackdown on peaceful protesters by associating them with this widely detested group.”

Among the letter’s signatories are Reza Aslan, Stephen Kinzer, Trita Parsi of the National Iranian-American Council (NIAC), Juan Cole, Ambassador John Limbert, and Paul Pillar. The full text of the letter is available here at NIAC’s website, and The Financial Times has published a copy of the letter here.

Dov Zakheim calls for greater U.S. isolation of Syria:

Washington should step out smartly and call for his exit, withdraw its ambassador, choke off all remaining direct, indirect and, to the extent possible, third-party financial and commercial dealings with the Syrian regime and push to have Assad declared a criminal. If it’s good enough policy toward the Libyan dictator, it’s certainly good enough for his Syrian counterpart.

In retrospect, several of these were mistakes when applied to the Libyan crisis, and some are coming back to haunt the Western governments that pressed for them. Having Gaddafi declared a criminal by the ICC may be the biggest mistake of them all, as it has made it that much harder to reach a negotiated settlement now that armed intervention is underway. Indicting Assad will have the same effect. No one, least of all Zakheim, proposes that the U.S. and its allies repeat the error of intervening militarily. If Assad and his closest allies “have to go,” as Zakheim says, declaring him a criminal makes it that much less likely that he will voluntarily go under any circumstances. Choking off third-party financial and commercial dealings with the regime will harm the regime, but they will also have an adverse effect on the entire Syrian economy. The regime may be reduced to a pariah on par with North Korea or Burma, but the regime may remain in place and the people aren’t going to be better off as a result. If the Burmese experience is any indication of what will happen, the results will be quite the opposite of what is intended. As Nader Mousavizadeh observedlast year:

The two-decade-old policy of isolating Burma now looks like a carefully constructed attempt to weaken Western influence and open the door to China, while devastating Burma’s legitimate economy and doing nothing to improve its people’s human rights.

Mousavizadeh went on:

This is not to say that the sanctions haven’t had an impact—only that they have been entirely counterproductive. In a series of recent conversations with civil-society leaders, businessmen, and foreign diplomats in Rangoon, a grim picture emerged: a middle class decimated and forced into exile; an educational system entirely unable to develop the country’s human capital; a private sector hollowed out, with only the junta’s cronies able to profit from trade in the country’s natural resources.

It is undoubtedly very satisfying to say that Assad “has to go,” but unless we have some realistic expectation that any of the measures being proposed here will hasten that outcome it is idle to make recommendations that might do nothing more than entrench the existing regime and immiserate the population.

Josh Rogin reports that Rick Perry’s foreign policy views will be just as bad as Tim Pawlenty’s:

“He will distinguish himself from other Republicans as a hawk internationalist, embracing American exceptionalism and the unique role we must play in confronting the many threats we face,” one foreign policy advisor with knowledge of Perry’s thinking told The Cable. “He has no sympathy for the neo-isolationist impulses emanating from some quarters of the Republican Party.”

If that sounds like the foreign policy stance of Tim Pawlenty, that’s because it is. Pawlenty also supports an unapologetic and assertive foreign policy that rejects calls for retrenchment. But Perry is also planning to add his record on international trade to that set of ideas.

The addition of Perry’s “record on international trade” isn’t that much of an addition to Pawlenty’s foreign policy, since Pawlenty has made a point of treating his trade missions as governor as part of his foreign policy “experience.” Perry’s record should create some interesting controversies among hawks. A booster of Venezuela’s Citgo, Perry seems to want to combine confrontational hawkishness with cozy relationships with companies based in the countries he would like to confront. He effectively promises to scrap good relations with Russia, reflexively support Israel, and escalate tensions with Iran and North Korea. In short, Perry can present himself as a Texas governor willing to be even more aggressive and damaging to U.S. interests than George W. Bush. Pawlenty could not sell this toxic foreign policy to anyone except for true believers, but perhaps Perry can. The question is whether Republican primary voters recognize Perry as the disastrous third term of George Bush that he would be.

Another pro-MEK legislator has written something on The Hill‘s Congress blog. Republican Rep. Ted Poe of Texas rehearses the usual song and dance about why we should sympathize with the Mujahidin-e Khalq, and he relies heavily on Iraq’s treatment of the people at Camp Ashraf. One point that Poe makes that very much needs to be corrected is this:

On April 8, 36 unarmed residents were murdered by Iraqi soldiers who invaded the Camp out of acquiescence to Iranian pressure.

The Iraqi government did kill these people, and that was atrocious, but it is important to understand that the Iraqi government was only too happy to attack the camp because the current Iraqi government loathes the MEK almost as much as the vast majority of Iranians do, and they loathe them for much the same reason. Just as Iranians regard the MEK as traitors for siding with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi government despises them for having worked for Hussein as brutal enforcers against Iraqis. Ray Takeyh explained this in his Congressional testimony on Camp Ashraf and the MEK earlier this summer:

The MEK would go on to behave as Saddam’s Praetorian Guard, as they were employed by him to repress the Iraqi Shia uprising of 1991. Given the fact that the Shia community is having a leading role in the future of Iraq, such miscalculation has alienated the MEK from the rulers of Iraq. The Baghdad regime’s hostility to the MEK cannot be seen as a function of its ties with Tehran, but as a legacy of MEK’s alliance with Saddam.

This is the group that American and European advocates are trying to rehabilitate and remove from the FTO list. It is a group that has earned the hatred of the governments of both Iraq and Iran, and the vast majority of Iraqis and Iranians. If one wanted to invent a worse ally for opposing the Iranian government, it would be virtually impossible to come up with one worse than the MEK. It is appropriate to get as many people out of Camp Ashraf, not least since as many as 70% of the inhabitants are reportedly held there against their will, but as long as their cultish leaders bar them from accepting refugee status it is extremely difficult to get these people out of Iraq without sending them back to Iran.

Column Lynch describes the cautious diplomatic response of India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) to the Syrian crackdown:

But in New York, IBSA’s diplomatic strategy has been marked by efforts to shield Syria and restrain the United States and its European partners. They argue that the council’s Western powers have been too ready to impose sanctions or use force to resolve crises, and have devoted too little to diplomacy. One frustrated Western diplomat quipped that the group’s acronym, scrambled, spells BIAS, a reflection of the group’s pro-Syrian slant during talks.

This letter scramble is supposed to be funny, but it reflects the degree to which Western governments really can be oblivious to how their policies are perceived and resented by developing countries and rising powers alike. If there was not as much international consensus on Libya as advertised, there were not many major governments willing to delay U.N. responses to Gaddafi’s crackdown. That cooperation was abused by the most aggressive members of the Council, and a limited mandate was turned into a justification for toppling the government.

As the Libyan war drags on into day 146, it is hard to take seriously that there is something particularly biased about the reluctance of India, Brazil, and South Africa to push through new Security Council resolutions aimed at isolating and penalizing yet another state. It is a reasonable response that any government would have after permitting an intervention that has become synonymous with open-ended mission creep. In fact, the Council’s Western powers are always too ready to impose sanctions or use force to resolve crises when the state in question is one they dislike. Western powers have devoted too little to diplomacy. If the IBSA governments are unduly averse to interfering in other states’ internal affairs, Western governments are usually all too eager to do so. Ambassador Rice can dismiss the argument that Libya has poisoned the Council against acting on Syria, but this is what has happened, or at the very least it is the pretext other governments will use to explain their reluctance to support Security Council measures against Assad.

P.S. I should add that the fundamental disagreements between the West and rising democratic powers in Latin America, Asia, and Africa on how to respond in these situations are the central reason why any “league of democracies” or “global NATO” intended as a vehicle for future interventionism will never get off the ground. The more democratic the rest of the world becomes, the less interested it is in permitting Western governments to determine the political future of other states.

As the military regime in Egypt tries to consolidate its hold on power, it is whipping up nationalist distrust of foreigners. The Wall Street Journalreports:

After a lull, Egypt’s new military rulers are increasingly using the same tactic: portraying pro-democracy activists as spies and saboteurs, blaming the country’s economic crisis and sectarian strife on foreign infiltrators, and blasting the U.S. for funding agents of change.

As a result, connections with the U.S. and other Western countries have turned toxic just as the largest Arab country is struggling with a rocky transition to democracy.

It’s almost as if local nationalists can use foreign support for protesters and dissidents as a bludgeon against advocates of political reform. Who would have guessed that outside meddling in other nations’ political affairs might be a cause of resentment? This lesson doesn’t just apply to Egypt. If we would like to see liberal and secular forces improve their political standing in Egypt, one of the worst things we can do is to lend them direct aid.

Not to be outdone, Egyptian liberals are eager to emphasize their own nationalist credibility by distancing themselves from the U.S.:

Even the more liberal parties vying for power are joining the anti-Western chorus. “America does not want for Egypt to become the largest democratic country in the region,” says Al-Sayed al-Badawy, chairman of the secular and liberal Wafd party. “The aim of American funding for Egyptian NGOs is to create chaos and to overthrow Egyptian values and traditions.”

Americans will find this annoying, but this is actually a good sign for the future of Egyptian liberalism. If Egyptian liberals do not identify themselves with foreign sponsors, and if they make their arguments in ways that respect the “values and traditions” of the majority, they will at least have a chance of becoming a competitive political force. It is no guarantee of success, but the alternative is to be perceived as discredited lackeys of foreign governments.

After spurning them on Libya for the last five months, the U.S. has concluded that African Union countries may not be so irrelevant after all:

The US has launched a diplomatic push to win over African leaders who have criticised Nato’s bombing campaign in Libya, in the latest political effort to break Colonel Muammer Gaddafi’s still-resilient regime.

Having dismissed AU opposition to the intervention and its attempts to mediate the conflict because of their ties to Gaddafi, Washington now seems to put too much stock in the influence of other African governments. It would be a welcome development if leading AU governments could persuade Gaddafi to give in, but he has no reason to do so. Essentially, the U.S. and its allies are asking the governments that strongly oppose a policy of regime change in Libya to help facilitate regime change, which is an admission that the U.S. and NATO are making little or no progress in achieving that goal on their own. One gets the impression that the intervening governments are out of ideas. As the FT article notes:

Analysts said that the US was grasping at straws as the campaign against the regime dragged on far longer than expected. “One gets a sense of flailing,” said Mike Singh, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “The intervention was poorly conceived and has been haphazard in execution.”

The Financial Timesreports on the financial woes of the leadership we are now pretending is the Libyan government:

But the cash-strapped de-facto government is struggling to balance the provision of domestic services with the war effort. Amid rising discontent over its performance, the delivery of everything from electricity to banking is vital to underpin the rebels’ legitimacy, which has wobbled since the mysterious assassination of their military commander last month. Late on Monday, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, the NTC leader, ordered a cabinet reshuffle, in an effort to damp tensions over the killing of General Abdel Fattah Younes.

Almost a month since the U.S. recognized the Transitional National Council as the “legitimate governing authority” in Libya, the expected unfreezing of Libyan state assets has still not happened, and it will not be happening for some time. Josh Rogin gives us the latest update from the State Department:

“We had difficult internal U.S. procedures with regard to the banking situation, et cetera,” State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said at Tuesday’s briefing. “And we’re also in an environment where U.N. Security Council Resolution 1970 put some restrictions on what we can do. So we’re continuing to work internally on various routes to get some of this money to the TNC.”

There is probably only about $150 to $200 million of frozen Qaddafi money in U.S. banks, but even that money is affected by the U.N. sanctions. The rest of the $30 billion is held outside the U.S. banking system. What’s more, Nuland said that the United States wants to make sure that the money “if given, is used properly and for humanitarian purposes.”

The Libyan rebel leadership is in an unusually difficult position. It doesn’t really have any legitimacy, so it needs funds to shore up its control and provide some basic services, and the funds it could use to that end are unavailable because of the sanctions that were imposed originally to penalize Gaddafi for cracking down on the uprising. Some of the foreign governments that recognize it as the Libyan government have provided some funds, but none of the TNC’s sponsors is interested in fully subsidizing the rebel leadership between now and whenever it finally gains access to Libyan state assets.