Regarding McCain’s focus on the “real threat” of “isolationists,” I wanted to add a few more observations.  First, as many loyal Paul supporters will tell you, Rep. Paul eschews the label “isolationist” and has made reasonably persuasivearguments that defenders of militarism and economic sanctions policies represent real isolationism in practice.  Second, John McCain has no idea what he’s talking about when he speaks about “isolationism.”  In this he bears a strong resemblance to Michael Gerson.  Personally, I find the label “isolationist” annoying, because of its origins as an internationalist slur.  I prefer non-interventionist if we have to give it a technical label.  According to the foreign policy paradigms that split U.S. foreign policy thought into four traditions, we are the Jeffersonians, and that seems to me to be a much more agreeable label.

From that same Ryan Lizza article:

Factor has reason to be concerned. In a recent Foreign Affairs article, McCain called for the kind of costly nation-building capacity that makes libertarians shudder, arguing that the United States should “energize and expand our postconflict reconstruction capabilities” and create a “deployable police force” that would prop up collapsing states. Echoing Norquist’s book, Factor insisted that the war in Iraq is not a unifying issue for the right. He told me, “The bottom line is that to the base of the Party the war isn’t Communism—to the Republican Party under Ronald Reagan, Communism was a rallying point. This is not like that.”

This is true.  There was almost unanimous consensus about the Soviet threat and about the appropriate response to it, and there simply isn’t the same degree of agreement on Iraq.  The glue of anticommunism was far stronger and more powerful, for both good and ill, than support for the Iraq war taken in isolation.  The GOP has become by and large a party defined by the war, and McCain’s nomination will confirm that, but it has also been the last five years that have seen the GOP go from an ascendant, would-be majority party to its current miserable state.  That is one reason why, of course, supporters of the Iraq war have made tremendous, completely unpersuasive efforts to link Iraq to a broader anti-jihadist effort, because I think that even they know that an open-ended nation-building project in the Near East will lose the support of many of the American nationalists who make up the ranks of the party.  Even general anti-jihadism doesn’t seem to succeed in unifying Republicans in quite the same way that the Cold War did, probably because enough Republicans and conservatives understand that the threat from jihadis, while real and grave, will never be on the same scale as the Soviet threat and that attempts to claim that they are comparable strain credulity.  The GOP’s problem is that no other single issue unites as many factions around McCain as the war, but even the war is insufficient as a rallying cry to unite the entire party, since at least one third of the party openly opposes the war.

Instead of battling the corporate wing of his party, McCain has decided that it’s the isolationists—a group that he defines broadly, and which includes the left and the right—who are the real threat. ~Ryan Lizza 

One of the more remarkable things about this is that McCain seems to have no intention of governing as Eisenhower did.  Unlike Eisenhower, he is decidedly not going to settle for an end to the war in Iraq.  He wants to play Eisenhower since that would mean that he wins the election, but politically he is in the unhappy position of Stevenson, saddled with the legacy of a corrupt administration and an unpopular war.  If this is the equivalent of 1952, McCain is on the wrong side of the major foreign policy issue of the day and in the wrong party.  Regardless, can you see McCain acting to stop an allied war effort as Eisenhower did in the Suez crisis?  Of course you can’t, because McCain is certainly no Eisenhower.   

Ross discusses McCain’s apparent fixation with Republican “isolationists” and notes that this is a rather, shall we say, eccentric assessment of the state of the GOP.  This is right–speaking as an “isolationist,” if we must use that word, I’m afraid I don’t see the great political power we are supposed to wield.  In the young cohorts of Ron Paul supporters, I see some potential for the future, but in the here and now it’s just silly.  This reminds me of the buzz from a couple of years ago about a so-called “paleo moment,” which was correct in the sense that public opinion was swinging in a paleo direction on trade and immigration and completely ridiculous as a description of the actual state of play in Washington. 

Swatting at “isolationists” and “protectionists” is what proponents of unpopular and/or discredited foreign and trade policies are often reduced to doing, since their arguments are usually otherwise pretty shaky and because it offers the public the choice of either enduring the status quo or adopting the most radical critiques of the establishment.  Confronted with this choice, the public will tend to stick with the horrible policies they know than take a chance on what is supposed to be the only alternative, which represents too much of a sudden change for most people to want to support.  (People who prattle about how they want “change” don’t really want that much change–they want modest tweaking of the system that exists, and style themselves visionary because of this.)  But, in fact, the actual, electorally viable alternatives on offer are anything but “isolationist” and “protectionist,” much to the dismay of those of us sympathetic to one or both of these views.  

I have a couple of ideas about what McCain is doing here: he could be, like Bush, recklessly tarring his opposition, any opposition, as “isolationist” as a way of undermining them, or possibly conjuring up a mythical political foe that he can then easily overcome (since it barely exists) and claim credit for “saving” the party from what he is portraying as a dangerous resurgence of Taftism.  But this is where I am at a loss–what prominent figures in the GOP or in the Democratic Party actually represent anything that could reasonably be defined as “isolationism”?  I understand that the key to McCain’s position here is to define “isolationism” unreasonably, but even so the entire thing seems untenable, and more to the point unnecessary.  It’s as if the Tories ran an election campaign declaring their firm opposition to nationalising industry, when no one who is likely to be elected is going to do any such thing.  For his next trick, McCain can take a bold stand against the powerful forces that are trying to abolish the Federal Reserve.

P.S. This makes clear that Ron Paul’s decision not to run on a third party ticket is a wise one, since McCain and his supporters would be able to explain away any loss in November as the product of Paul’s presence in the race and would not have to be held to account for the role their own disastrous foreign policy has played in wrecking the GOP.  Perversely, a Paul third party run at this point would feed into McCain’s delusions about the “isolationist threat” and ensure that the GOP binds itself ever more closely to reckless interventionism in the future.  The GOP may remain hitched to these terrible ideas for many years to come, but it is unfortunately more likely to remain so if it can scapegoat its electoral defeat in November on the “isolationists” who regrettably do not pose much of a political threat.

What is so hard to understand is why this Russian leader has chosen the route of autocracy over the peaceful democracy so available to him as an outgrowth of his popularity. Why return to the totalitarian fabric of the Soviet Union? The answer is in the Russian predilection for strong leadership as a counter to a national paranoia. ~George Wittman

What else could we expect from an old member of the Committee on the Present Danger?  Reviving Cold War era fears is the stock in trade of such people.  These questions are absurd, and the national psychoanalysis isn’t much better.  Every modern nation is susceptible to the appeal of a strong leader as a counter to national paranoia about foreign threats–that’s why those who want greater power in the executive are always exaggerating threats and stirring up the public against various official enemies.  There is nothing particularly Russian about this.  This is how people everywhere respond to state propaganda, and it is also how they respond to genuine insecurity.  The Wittmans of the world would like us to ignore our part in contributing to Russian fears and anxieties and presumably do even more to cause them more worry, which will in turn guarantee increasingly authoritarian presidents in Russia.  The Kremlin’s best friends are not those who argue for a sober and rational approach to Russia policy (i.e., the “apologists”), but those who provide the Kremlin numerous pretexts to consolidate more power in fewer hands at home and adopt confrontational positions abroad.  If there are elements in the Russian government that thrive on building up the West as the enemy, the Westerners who are only too eager to oblige in that role are their enablers.  Naturally, leave it to hysterics talking about “the new god-king of Russia” to lecture other people about being irresponsible on national security!

Putin hasn’t chosen the route of autocracy, and people who keep using this word to describe the Russian government show that they haven’t a clue what autocracy is.  Autocrats don’t hand over power to successors, even hand-picked ones, and then settle for being prime minister.  Autocrats stay in power until they die or can hand over the reins to their offspring.  Autocrats also rule on their own, and not as part of an extensive bureaucratic and formally constitutional apparatus.  Yes, Putin is an authoritarian populist, not a liberal democrat, but we already knew that.  Talk of “the totalitarian fabric of the Soviet Union” is the sort of ludicrous American national paranoia that seems to be only too muchin voguethese days.  It is an insult to the people who suffered under the actual totalitarianism of the USSR to compare what is happening today to that.

Politicians who offer hope win elections. Despite his age, John McCain offers an alternative Republican programme. He is not a neo-Conservative and would be very unlike George Bush. ~William Rees-Mogg

If McCain is not a “neo-Conservative,” he is certainly the favourite of neoconservatives and has been for at least ten years.  As we all know, The Weekly Standard endorsed him over Bush in 2000 and their editors and contributors have not exactly made a secret of their interest in his candidacy.  In his hostility to Russia and his reflexive support for military campaigns, McCain is arguably more on board with neoconservative foreign policy ideas than Bush has been.  The idea that he represents some break with the current administration is odd, and I don’t understand how anyone can keep saying it with a straight face.  People keep repeating this claim, as if saying it were enough to make it true, but if there is one thing McCain represents it is continuity with the worst of the Bush administration.

James says:

The secession of Kosovo is really the forcible removal from Serbia of Russia, and even more importantly Russianness, the ill for which Europe has never found the proper cure, and against which even all attempted counterpoisons have sickeningly failed.

I am writing my next column on Kosovo, so I will hold off on commenting on the separation at too much length, but I would submit to my learned colleague that this makes absolutely no sense, even when taken metaphorically.  Serbia does not suffer from a surfeit of “Russianness,” and even if it did the attempted hiving off of medieval Serbian identity would have nothing to do with it.  As I’m sure James also appreciates, the Serbo-Russian diplomatic and political link is a very modern one and a product of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.  The dissolution of Yugoslavia (and now the attempted partition of Serbia) has reinvigorated and reinforced that link.  It may, but shouldn’t, surprise us to find that Kosovo’s separation will push Serbia even more into Russia’s orbit.  If the “Europeanisation” of Serbia were the goal of supporting Kosovo’s independence, it would not work.  But then I don’t really agree that the Russians aren’t European, so make of that what you will. 

A related point to ponder: the Latin occupation of Constantinople did not make the Byzantines more pro-Latin.

If there is one word that has lost most of its meaning over the last couple of decades, it is the word “responsibility.”  Bill Kristol digs deep into his bad of tricks and comes up with a boilerplate lecture about Republicans as the party of responsible government and Democrats as the feckless opposition.  There was a time when this not only seemed true, but was an accurate assessment of the two parties.  There is something very odd about this, since it was the Democrats, except for their drought of presidential wins, that were the natural party of government for almost six unbroken decades.  This generally allowed the GOP the luxury of channeling most of its energies into electing executives and focusing on foreign policy for much of the Cold War.  It is this area of governing that concerns Kristol, since the fiscal recklessness and domestic policy failures of the current administration would tend to undermine claims of responsibility, and then you realise that it is in foreign policy, the area where the GOP had cultivated a deserved reputation for being responsible and sober-minded, that Republicans have proven themselves to be the most undeserving of wielding power.

After the last seven years, if I were a Democrat I would be amazed at the gall of the first part of Kristol’s claim.  Recklessly irresponsible would be a good way to describe the current administration’s style of governing, and when it was in the majority the Congressional GOP hardly distinguished itself for making hard choices and setting priorities.  The second part–the part about the feckless opposition–is more defensible, but just as misleading for all that.  It is counted as a failure of Democratic leadership that it cannot override presidential vetoes with their slim House majority and basically non-existent Senate majority, but on the Republican side the leadership, both in the White House and the Congress, has been marked by the complete refusal to make choices and the persistent unwillingness to take responsibility for the choices they have made.  None of this is to defend the Democrats, but to drive home the point that rehashed lines about responsible Republican government no longer persuade, because the people advancing them have no credibility as judges of what constitutes responsible or good government and because the party no longer deserves a reputation for probity and weighing the consequences of hard decisions.  

Of course, in the world of Kristol, “responsibility” is defined by the policy goals you pursue and not whether you pursue them prudently, carefully or, well, responsibly.  For example, viewed rationally, invading Iraq without good cause or proper planning for the aftermath is the height of irresponsibility.  Viewed from Kristol’s perspective, invading Iraq is the epitome of responsibility and decisive leadership, while leaving Iraq is inherently irresponsible regardless of whether remaining there makes any sense.  In this view, misrule is responsible government, which is the only thing that explains how someone could have the temerity to suggest that the Republicans were still the party of responsible government.

The Albanians in Kosovo have declared independence, and it seems likely that various Western powers will make a hash of things yet again and recognise Kosovo as a sovereign state.  I will have something to say about this in the future (actually, I expect that I will have a great deal to say about this one way or another), but fornowherearemypreviousposts on Kosovo.

Speculation about Tim Pawlenty as McCain’s running mate continues, and while he brings many of the things that a VP choice ought to bring (political talent, readiness to govern, influence in a potential swing state, Midwestern Catholic reform governor–think Tommy Thompson, but charismatic) he suffers from some of the same problems with the right that McCain does.  This isn’t entirely surprising (any Republican governing in Minnesota is going to fail some litmus tests), and helps explain why Pawlenty and McCain have become allies, but I’m not sure that Pawlenty would help McCain with the conservatives already put off by McCain.  Some of them are unreachable by McCain, and some of them are hung up on the oddest things (if drug reimportation appears to you to be an evil liberal plot, you are part of a very small minority), but those who can be won over will not necessarily be entirely reassured by Pawlenty.  Someone described as a “little too green” (something that undoubtedly makes him even more of a political asset in the general election) does not help a presidential nominee whose environmental policy views distress many in his party.  It would be an intriguing pick, mainly because he is seen as such a McCain loyalist that he would seem to be the last person McCain would pick, since selecting him doesn’t gain McCain any boost within the party.  Then again, given some of the horrifying or laughable alternatives that have been mentioned, the Republicans could do a lot worse than McCain-Pawlenty.