The most troubling aspect of Obama’s performance has been his frigidness, exacerbated by indecision, when it comes to human freedom – the major issue of the day, and of the post-Cold War world. For a man supposed to embody the triumph of an African-American community long denied its freedom at home, Obama has been unusually reluctant to employ American power – military, ideological, and diplomatic – to assist those abroad denied their freedom. Whether it was his response to the demonstrations in Iran against the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, or the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen Syria, or even Libya, where the U.S. is involved in the NATO campaign, the president has been evasive and hypocritical, incapable of transcending his innate analytical detachment to seize the high emotions of the moment and shape them to his benefit. ~Michael Young

There are good reasons to find Obama’s responses to the various uprisings to be lacking, but his supposed reluctance “to assist those abroad denied their freedom” is not one of them. What could Obama have done that would have assisted the Green movement? Never mind that the Green movement did not want outside help. What could Obama have done that he failed to do in 2009? I suppose he could have given another one of his pointless speeches to declare the importance of “universal rights,” which simply would have underscored how little Washington could do to help. It’s true that the administration did not hasten to align itself with Tunisian protesters, but incredibly the administration’s position was that it was “not taking sides,” which was almost as good as writing off Ben Ali. If the administration wasn’t going to cheer on the protesters, it wasn’t going to give Ben Ali any political cover.

Egypt was a bit more complicated, and the administration was a bit more confused in its response, but by any measure the speed with which the administration decided to drop an ally of thirty years in response to protester demands was remarkable. By comparison, it took Reagan years to give up on Marcos when he was confronted by his opposition, and Bush stuck by Musharraf for years when he didn’t need to do so. The reality that the Egyptian military was willing to sacrifice Mubarak to preserve their regime suggests that Mubarak might have been removed with or without U.S. support. As far as Egyptian freedom is concerned, removing Mubarak and replacing him with a military government has probably been a change for the worse, but this was the inevitable result of siding with the demands of the protesters, which is finally what the administration did.

If removing Mubarak has not ushered in the political order that the protesters desire, that has more to do with the inherent weakness of Egyptian liberalism than it does with the administration’s reluctance to help. Indeed, direct support is not always all that helpful. Contrary to the pious wishes of democratists in the West, foreign support really can hurt local democrats. When some Egyptian protest groups have been linked to foreign funding and training in news reports, this has served to discredit them in the eyes of their countrymen, and they have had to deny having any such links.

Compared to previous administrations, these moves marked Obama as unusually reluctant to back up allied authoritarian governments confronted by popular protests. One can agree or disagree with those decisions, but it is important to describe correctly what happened. Certainly, the response to protests and crackdowns in Bahrain and Yemen was muted or non-existent, but it would be unreasonable to expect much more than that. At this point, the administration has gone so far as to tell Saleh he should resign, which Saleh has dutifully ignored. The Syrian case is supposedly the “easiest” for deciding how to respond, but once again the question of what the administration can actually do arises. Besides using the presidential magic wand, there is not all that much constructive that the administration can do. As for a reluctance to use military power, Young conveniently ignores that the U.S. was already engaged in two wars at the start of this year. In spite of that, and in spite of the fact that the U.S. had nothing at stake in Libya, the U.S. facilitated and participated in yet another military intervention. If U.S. participation has been limited and half-hearted, this is an indirect acknowledgment that new adventures in militarized democracy promotion have virtually no support at home.

Comparisons with Carter are usually more misleading than they are instructive, but if there is one thing Obama and Carter have in common it is that most of their ideological critics have deliberately ignored their relatively greater willingness to put support for “universal rights” in other countries ahead of national interests* and bizarrely treat their administrations as more favorably inclined toward dictatorships than others.

* If it isn’t obvious, I consider this to be one of the main flaws of the Carter administration.