Kanwal Sibal, Indian Foreign Secretary under the previous government, is the voice of reason for all of us:

Because of its “soft power”, the US presidential election gets such extensive coverage internationally that its import gets exaggerated. This election decides the fate of two competing candidates, not that of the world. As in elections elsewhere, the central issues are domestic ones, not those of foreign policy. In the American case, the contest is not between two radically different visions of US foreign policy; it is about advancing US interests best. The difference is in tactics, not strategy. On basic assumptions, such as US global pre-eminence, preventing the emergence of any other power that can challenge Washington’s dominance, the goodness of US intentions and actions, superiority of American values, the responsibility to maintain international peace and stability, its exceptionalism providing the right to act unfettered by multilateral constraints if required and keeping America safe against non-proliferation, there is internal consensus in the US.

Certainly, there are many Indians who don’t mind the status quo that much, other observers from India who would like to see many changes to the U.S.-India relationship, but even here Mira Kamdar acknowledged that “87 percent of Indians polled said that they did not think the [U.S.] election mattered to them.” Their indifference is refreshing. Perhaps the only thing more strange than the jubilation among Americans I have seen is the enthusiasm of some foreign nations after the election. There aren’t going to be that many significant changes domestically, so how much less are things going to change in our relations abroad?

Sibal also sees a flaw in the Indian response to the Bush administration’s initiatives on the nuclear deal:

As a country desiring and capable of playing a larger international role a prospective global power and a pole in a future multi-polar world public expressions of gratitude to any foreign leader, especially one so unpopular in many parts of the globe where we have interests, are self-diminishing.

This error of personalizing international relations and identifying too strongly with particular foreign leaders is one that Americans should recognize, as we do it all the time with leaders of governments all over the world. Rarely do we prefer to think in terms of governments and their interests, which may help explain why we tend not to discuss parts of the world that cannot be readily defined by references to familiar political leaders. If we like Sarkozy, suddenly France is our close ally again, and if we find Ahmadinejad offensive then negotiating with Iran, even when it is in our interest to do so, becomes much worse than it would have been when Khatami was in office. More than almost any other nation, we take the electoral results in other countries as referenda on America and relations with the West, which sometimes even leads our government to take sides more or less openly in foreign elections.

Of course, like so many others in India, Sibal is not pleased with Obama’s agenda for India:

Obama has announced an acceleration of the US non-proliferation agenda. So long as India is not pressed to assume obligations ahead of internationally negotiated non-discriminatory treaties, the situation can be managed. But if the provisions of the nuclear deal are used as pressure points and concepts of regional strategic stability are actively resuscitated, tension will surface in India-US relations. Far more problematic is Obama’s advocacy of a quick resolution of the Kashmir issue in order to free Pakistan to conduct the war on terrorism on its western front to greater US satisfaction.

This is retrograde thinking. The US will once again be seen as seeking to reward Pakistan for doing what it must at India’s expense [bold mine-DL]. His toying with the idea of appointing former president Bill Clinton as special envoy on Kashmir is “old think”. Such a move will embarrass New Delhi and deplete the high levels of goodwill Washington currently enjoys in India. The government has already reacted negatively. Some may see in this move to satisfy Clinton’s thirst for a subcontinental role, [or] the potential costs to India of the nuclear deal.

Just as Sibal understands the consensus that prevails in Washington, the next administration needs to understand that when it comes to India’s nuclear program and Kashmir there is a fairly broad consensus in Indian politics that includes the two leading parties. No matter which coalition is in power after elections next year, India is not going to be receptive to having the nuclear deal used as leverage against it and will certainly not respond well to any initiatives on Kashmir.