John Noonan evidently read a very different version of the new CAP report, as his characterization of it is full of errors. Noonan writes:

First, CAP argues that the United States, not Russia, worsened the conflict with a series of bad policy moves, while asserting the Russian occupation is “stabilizing.”

The U.S. comes in for criticism on several points, but it isn’t true that the authors believe that the Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is “stabilizing.” On the contrary, they make de-militarization of the conflict zone one of the main recommendations for U.S. policy, and they make a return to pre-2008 force levels one of their objectives. As far as I can tell, Noonan is simply making this up.

He continues to misrepresent the report:

Second, the report seems to buy into the Russian notion that Moscow is not party to conflict and is absolved from obligations to work towards a solution to Georgia’s crisis.

In fact, the authors state quite clearly:

Indeed, Washington discussions often seem to ignore the fact that while there is a Russia-Georgia conflict there are also Georgian conflicts with the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians. This is not to cleanly separate the external and secessionist conflicts conceptually or practically. But we should acknowledge that there are three Georgia conflicts (with Russia, the Abkhaz, and the South Ossetians) that exist on two levels (interstate and internal).

They say elsewhere:

An effective conflict policy must thus begin by acknowledging that Russian cooperation is necessary for progress. In other words, Russia needs to be a willing partner in conflict resolution if that resolution is to succeed. Russia is certainly part of the problem. But it is equally part of the solution.

And again:

Making Russia a partner does not imply a change in U.S. support for Georgia or dropping demands that Russia fully comply with its international commitments. It does, however, mean doing more than treating Moscow as exclusively a norm-violator.

They are well aware that Russia is actually a party to the conflict, and call on Russia to fulfill its cease-fire obligations. It is impossible to read this report and not see that. In the context of calling for a Russian non-use of force statement, the authors make clear that their position on Russia’s military presence in South Ossetia in particular is that it should be drastically reduced:

In the context of such a statement, the United States should encourage the Russians to modify their force posture in South Ossetia accordingly. The most obvious contributing factor to Georgian insecurity is the deployment in South Ossetia of long-range missile systems (Smerch and Tochka-U) that can strike Tbilisi at any time. Georgian officials also emphasize the threat that comes from a Russian buildup of units and hardware in South Ossetia that are highly mobile and therefore could only be used for a rapid forward assault.
The United States should ask Russia to lower the numbers of rapid-assault vehicles, tanks, and drivers stationed at forward outposts in South Ossetia or at least move them to the main base in the north of South Ossetia, which would not diminish Russia’s capacity to defend it. In the future Moscow should consider replacing some of the combat troops stationed there with noncombat personnel.

The positioning of long-range artillery in South Ossetia only increases Georgian insecurity without enhancing South Ossetian security. The U.S. government should push for removal of such weapons from South Ossetia. But in the interim greater transparency about the nature of the buildup in South Ossetia would be an
important step forward.

The authors do not claim that onus of conflict resolution is on the U.S. This is another invention. On the contrary, they take for granted that conflict resolution is impossible without Russian cooperation. It is true that most of the report is focused on making recommendations for how U.S. and Georgian policies can and should be changed. Americans are more likely to be able to affect U.S. and allied policy than they are going to be able to affect Russian policy, but the authors also understand that current U.S. policy is inadequate and Georgian policy is sometimes counterproductive. That doesn’t stop them from making recommendations on how Russian policy would have to change, most of which were constructive and reasonable. Notably, Noonan has nothing to say about any of this.

It is telling that Noonan really has nothing to say about past, current, or future U.S. policy on this question. Essentially, his post is little more than an extended complaint that the authors are not sufficiently hostile to Russia. Of course, the authors’ interest is in facilitating conflict resolution, which involves taking Russian interests into account even if they do not like them. Noonan’s interest seems to be in tiresome point-scoring about who supports freedom more. This CAP report is worth reading and discussing. It’s a shame Noonan hasn’t bothered trying to do either of those things.

Update: For those interested in hearing more about this, here is the authors’ presentation and discussion of their findings from earlier in the month. Charap’s opening remarks couldn’t be more clear about the position that he and his co-author take on these questions. It’s absurd to conclude from this report that the authors have sided “with the Kremlin over democracy,” and it’s a measure of how intellectually bankrupt Noonan’s criticism is that this is how he reads the report.