“Losing” Georgia

Unless Washington and Brussels believe that a Georgia, circa 1996, is in their best interests, they would be wise to rethink their Georgia policy. ~Michael Hikari Cecire

I hadn’t considered the dire consequences. A Georgia circa 1996! That really does call for drastic action. Whatever would we do if Georgia were in Russia’s orbit? It would be very much like it was before 2003. For all of the talk of Georgia as “the last truly Western-oriented country in a highly strategic, critical region,” its Western political orientation is almost entirely at odds with its economic relationship with Russia. If Turkey has become more “unreliable” (i.e., it pursues its own interests even when Washington does not like it) and Ukraine’s flirtation with integration into Euro-Atlantic structures has been put on hold if not abandoned entirely, why is a much smaller, poorer, more economically dependent country such as Georgia going to sustain its “Western” orientation? More to the point, why is it worth damaging a far more important relationship with Russia to make sure that Georgia continues pursuing the illusion of membership in Euro-Atlantic structures?

There are never answers for these questions. It is simply assumed that this is something that we have to do so that we do not “lose” Georgia. The truth is that the West should never have been trying to “win” Georgia. EU members have more reason to be interested in finding alternative sources of natural gas, and they are less willing to provoke Russia over Georgia than Washington is. The people who have to risk the most in damaged relations with Russia are not very concerned about “losing” Georgia, so why should the U.S. take an active interest in a region that matters even less to Americans?