Instead, the administration needs quickly to move off the sidelines, declare its full-fledged support for the aspirations of the Syrian people, and develop a serious strategy to expedite the collapse of Assad’s rule and a peaceful transition to a new, more democratic order. ~John Hannah

After that, Obama can win the war in Libya using the same magic wand that he just used on Syria. In fairness, Hannah does a better job than many administration critics in outlining some specific things that he wants the administration to do:

The key to a soft landing will be fracturing the regime’s elite, particularly by convincing prominent figures in the Alawite community, especially within the security services, that their interests lie not in continuing to support Assad and his family in the commission of their crimes against the Syrian people, but in abandoning them and throwing their weight behind the popular movement for peaceful change. Such an effort would require assembling a diplomatic coalition of states most capable of influencing Syrian events, including the United States, France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and perhaps Egypt. The office of the United Nations’ Secretary General might come in handy as well, particularly in the form of its shrewd and energetic envoy, Terje Larsen, the Norwegian diplomat who proved such a useful ally in helping coerce Syrian troops out of Lebanon in 2005.

The network of contacts, political, military, and intelligence, that these states possess across the Syrian elite would need to be discretely [sic] tapped. Inducements — financial, political, and otherwise — would need to be offered. Assurances — both in terms of a future role in the post-Assad order and security protections for the broader Alawite community as well as other minorities — would need to be provided. Punishments in the form of economic sanctions, travel bans, and international prosecutions would need to be threatened and, as necessary, imposed.

This is a bit more developed than the usual hawkish plan for responding to foreign political unrest, which goes something like this: 1) Take A Stand; 2) ???; 3) Success! That said, Hannah’s proposal relies entirely on convincing core elements of the current regime that their interests do not lie with the current regime. That doesn’t just strike me as “enormously challenging,” but nearly impossible. Who will be providing the bribes, er, inducements? How much are “we” willing to pay, and once the bribes have been paid what will stop a post-Assad regime from reorganizing as an authoritarian state under a different leadership? What would give Syrian minority groups any confidence that outside security guarantees will mean anything? Perhaps they will be inspired by the shining example of protections afforded to religious minorities in Iraq? Speaking of Iraqis, what is going to happen during all this regime-collapsing to the roughly one million Iraqis who have taken up residence in Syria after they were driven from their homes in the last decade?

Assuming that the administration is interested in doing this, what incentive does Turkey have to support this regime change effort? Regardless of the party in the power, the Turkish government has traditionally been opposed to moves that would destabilize countries that border Turkey, and it has been extremely wary of anything that could affect stability in Kurdish areas of the country. What assurances can the U.S. credibly give Turkey on this, and why would Turkey believe those assurances after the experience of the Iraq debacle? Turkey is one of the states with the most to lose if Syria suffers from prolonged instability, but it is also one of the states that has gone out of its way to cultivate good relations with the current regime. Why is Erdogan going to break with Syria and make controversial moves to facilitate regime change in a Muslim country? In any case, Erdogan will be reluctant to do much of anything until after next month’s election.

The brutal crackdown in Syria is an event to which there are no ready-made answers. If Hannah is serious about desiring the collapse of the Assad regime, he can’t expect that there will be a peaceful transition to follow. If the administration’s response has largely been cautious and limited, that is because there is not much that the U.S. can do without jeopardizing many of the other states in the region and jeopardizing the population of Syria as well.