Many observers are arguing that instability in Egypt and the Middle East could cut against U.S. and Israeli interests in the region over the short term, but will contribute to an opening of those societies that will ultimately be better for U.S. and Israeli interests than the stability of authoritarian governments. It still remains to be seen whether what is true in theory will in fact be true in practice, but I am inclined to agree that over the long term that is probably true. ~Jim Antle

One reason that I am skeptical about this is that many of the people making this argument don’t believe that there the definition of U.S. interests will have to change. U.S. interests properly understood have not been jeopardized by greater democratization and civilian control in Turkey, but don’t tell that to the American hawks cheering on Egyptian protesters. It is now common for democratists to denounce the AKP government not only for its demagoguery and authoritarian habits (which they mistakenly confuse with its effort to bring the Turkish military under civilian control), but for any foreign policy decision that does not align with the most confrontational policies towards Iran. Some conservatives have started identifying the government of a formal NATO ally as having gone over to the “other side” with Iran, and all because it is pursuing a policy of economic and diplomatic engagement with a neighboring country that Washington would celebrate if it were happening in Europe. The changes in Turkey could be good for U.S. interests properly understood in the long term, but that would require some pretty dramatic changes in U.S. policies and in how Washington defines our interests.

That isn’t what most people in the U.S. talking about “the long term” mean. They mean that in the long run democratization in the region will actually help consolidate or support U.S. hegemonic policies, or at least not conflict with them. Perhaps they have Cold War-era democratic allies in mind, and perhaps they are making a foolish assumption that democratic “values” will bind these countries more closely to the U.S. than ever before. Whatever the reason, they are mistaken. After the experience of democracy promotion in Iraq, Gaza, and Lebanon, one thing should be clear. In the short and medium term, the forces opposed to U.S. hegemony grow much stronger thanks to democratization, and there isn’t much reason to expect that to change in the decades to come. The democracy promotion fetish that hegemonists picked up and retained from the closing years of the Cold War is entirely at odds with the policies they prefer.

Each time democratism prevails, Iran and its allies have become stronger and more assertive, and the political forces aligned with the U.S. have been weakened or routed. The reality in the region is that U.S. influence typically retreats when majority rule takes hold. This is natural enough, since nations have divergent interests, and democratic polities are supposed to reflect the interests of their citizens, and those interests don’t usually involve being turned into a front-line state to fight someone else’s wars. In the process, legitimate U.S. interests are in danger of being thrown out along with the maintenance of regional hegemony that the U.S. doesn’t need and shouldn’t want.

It should give us some pause that many of the same people arguing for the “right side of history” and “long term” views of regional democratization were some of the same people promoting the “demonstration effect” and “drain the swamp” theories of the last decade. (For the record, I am aware that Jim has obviously not been making any of these arguments, and I’m not referring to him here.) One of these people has been calling for a Freedom Doctrine to combat Iranian influence after famously erring in his assessment of the effect the Iraq war would have on Iranian influence and internal Iranian affairs. In February 2002, Krauthammer wrote:

But Iran is not a ready candidate for the blunt instrument of American power, because it is in the grips of a revolution from below. We can best accelerate that revolution by the power of example and success: Overthrowing neighboring radical regimes shows the fragility of dictatorship, challenges the mullahs’ mandate from heaven and thus encourages disaffected Iranians to rise.

As we all know, what encouraged disaffected Iranians to rise as much as they did was electoral fraud and civil rights violations that took place over seven years after Krauthammer wrote this and had nothing to do with Iraq. In the meantime, Tehran’s influence inside Iraq has grown significantly because of the democratization he continues to advocate.

Reflecting on this sorry record, Dr. Hadar asks a good question in his new article for the forthcoming April issue of TAC:

The autocrats ruling Egypt and other Arab states were bound to face opposition at home. Why is it in the American interest to hasten the day of reckoning?