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Failure

Even worse is the fact that Georgia is no longer the focus of NATO’s and the European Union’s interests. Georgia failed as a democratic state. It failed to have free media or an independent justice system. The country did succeed in locking up political prisoners, taking over private properties from independent business owners, and having […]

Even worse is the fact that Georgia is no longer the focus of NATO’s and the European Union’s interests. Georgia failed as a democratic state. It failed to have free media or an independent justice system. The country did succeed in locking up political prisoners, taking over private properties from independent business owners, and having the most corrupt government in the Caucasus.

According to Human Rights Watch, there are 86 political prisoners in Georgian jails. The recent arrest of Archil Benidze, who donated money to the strongest opposition movement for justice, the Georgian Labor Party, sent shockwaves through political circles. Benidze has since been sentenced to seven years in jail.

Then came the bailout: $4.5 million from U.S. taxpayers sent to Georgia for recovery and relief. Knowing Georgia’s history of corruption, it is doubtful that the money will actually go to those in need.

Georgians deserve a better future. Unemployment is at 68 percent. The best and the brightest have fled the country. Joining NATO now seems like an impossibility given Saakashvili`s international war crimes, hot and unpredictable temperament and disregard for the democratic ideals he once so fervently supported. ~Tsotne Bakuria

It is worth revisiting the question of how we determine what constitutes friendship and hostility towards another country. For the better part of the four years I have been blogging here at Eunomia, I have been a harsh critic of Saakashvili and U.S. support for him, and I strongly opposed bringing Georgia into NATO. This was primarily because I believe NATO no longer serves any useful purpose and because there is no American interest in guaranteeing the security of a state with contested borders, and also because it could do Russo-American relations no good. However, it became clear fairly quickly that Saakashvili represented a danger to Georgia, and it also seemed clear that everyone who wanted to see Georgia prosper would want to see him out of power. Naturally, when I made these arguments I was accused of wishing Georgia ill, much as anyone who points out that certain U.S. or Israeli policies are foolish is deemed anti-American or anti-Israel. Granted, Georgia’s welfare was not my top priority, but it never ceased to amaze me how the greatest “pro-Georgia” boosters were backing a government that seemed sure to damage the country irreparably.

In retrospect, I see that Saakashvili was playing the role of Deliyiannis, who led Greece to an utter, humiliating defeat in a lopsided, unnecessary war with the Ottoman Empire in 1897. Greece was saved from occupation then, much as Georgia was last year, thanks mainly to the intervention of the great powers. Greece and the Ionian Greeks later suffered an even worse disaster thanks to Deliyiannis’ heir, Venizelos, who was enabled in his reckless policies by Western backing. In fact, Saakashvili might be more like Venizelos. After the start of WWI, the Allied powers were pro-Venizelos, not necessarily pro-Greece. They defined Greece’s interests as Venizelos defined them, in part because he was willing to subordinate Greek interests to serve the Allied cause, but Venizelos proved badly wrong in foreign policy judgements on several critical occasions. The parallels with Saakashvili, the U.S. and NATO are fairly close.

Despite some genuine success in economic reforms, Saakashvili’s government was preoccupied with the separatist regions to an unhealthy degree, which caused him to engage in provocative rhetoric and actions that were designed to worsen relations with Moscow. One need only have observed how Karabakh became a consuming and costly obsession for the Armenian political elite since independence to understand that a poor, newly-independent country’s development can be badly stunted by efforts to claim or reclaim territory. (An important difference in Karabakh’s case is that at least the Armenian inhabitants wanted Armenia’s assistance.) Saakashvili’s bellicosity and authoritarian instincts were bound to lead to a bad end, and now that they have it is important to remember that the people who claimed to be Georgia’s best friends, such as Bush, McCain, Biden and, yes, Obama, had been instead Saakashvili’s best friends and had enabled his worst behavior to the ruin of Georgia. This is applicable in many other situations. Mr. Bush backed Musharraf in Pakistan fully (and so the general earned the sobriquet Busharraf) despite Musharraf’s increasingly untenable position and misrule, and ultimately Musharraf could not remain in power. Nonetheless, the U.S. had been tied right up until the end to a profoundly unpopular and failed leader, and Pakistan suffered for years under the U.S.-backed ruler to the detriment of all involved long after he should have stepped down.

At best, Washington enables bad behavior by client governments that reflects poorly on them and us, and at worst it actively aids client governments in the ruin of their own countries, which serves only the interests of those states and groups that are genuinely hostile to the client and to our government. With such American friends, our clients need no enemies.

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