While Western capitals were condemning the suppression of Iran’s Green Movement in 2009, Arab officialdom remained silent because they don’t subscribe to any democracy agenda. Worse, Washington’s pressure on Mubarak has already unsettled its Gulf allies who feel that the U.S. is foolishly pursuing a democratization agenda that has repeatedly worked to Iran’s advantage. ~Emile Hokayem

The good news is that the U.S. hasn’t been pursuing the foolish democratization agenda as much as it used to, but the problem is that democratist arguments are gaining influence again despite having absolutely no credibility. The least credible democratist argument circulating right now is that the U.S. must suddenly wash its hands of allied dictatorships and start backing popular protest movements, as if that will somehow erase the long history of cooperation and backing up until now. As Hokayem explains, this will do very little to help the U.S. with Arab publics that have been alienated long ago:

Thanks to repeated blunders, questionable relationships, pervasive interference, and failure to advance the Palestinian cause, the United States’ image and credibility in the Arab world are beyond repair. A greater Western commitment to democracy promotion would help only at the margin of Arab perceptions.

Meanwhile, democracy promotion will continue to undermine the U.S. position throughout the region, just as it has been doing for eight years:

Regardless of whether Mubarak goes (now or in September), the regime survives with the military at the helm, or the transition occurs along the lines wished by U.S. President Barack Obama, Egypt will be strategically paralyzed, operationally weak, and inward-looking for the foreseeable future. In zero-sum realpolitik terms, this is a net loss to U.S. regional policy.

Of course, many of the loudest critics of the administration’s cautious response to events in Egypt are also among the loudest critics of its handling of allies. Democracy promotion policies have advanced Iranian regional influence and helped to undermine America’s alliance system in the region, and yet democratists have the nerve to accuse others of “snubbing” allies.

Most of Hokayem’s article is quite good, and he makes a number of astute observations, which is why I was dumbfounded to read his recommendations:

In reality, Washington’s best bet is to hope that the Iranians will achieve soon and on their own what the Egyptians may be on the verge of doing. After all, the most potent challenge to the Khomeinist narrative came from within Iran in the aftermath of the fraudulent 2009 presidential election, and an inward-looking Iran would stop exporting its disruptive model of resistance.

If that’s Washington’s “best bet,” the U.S. should stop gambling. The hope that Iranians will force regime change from within as the Egyptians are trying to do is a vain one, and the confidence that a new regime in Iran would be “inward-looking” and no longer support proxies overseas is baffling. The U.S. has to adjust to a region in which Iranian influence continues to grow, and it cannot keep waiting until the Iranian opposition somehow acquires the means to take over. One thing that it shouldn’t do in the meantime is to aid in the collapse of any other governments that serve as bulwarks against Iranian influence.