Eric Martin explains why the argument that a Libyan war will deter authoritarian crackdowns elsewhere and re-align the U.S. with popular political movements doesn’t make sense:

Let’s grant Shadi’s premise for the sake of argument: US support for brutal autocratic regimes in the region has fostered resentment and, at times, a virulent strain of anti-Americanism that has produced violent manifestations.

But if that’s the diagnosis, how exactly would launching military attacks on Libya provide the cure? After all, Qaddafi’s is most definitely not one of the autocratic regimes that the US has funded, armed and otherwise helped to maintain power. Quite the opposite.

A similar argument was made in anticipation of the invasion of Iraq, with a similar logical disconnect separating premise and conclusion. Again, Iraq’s was not a regime supported by the United States (at least, not since the 1980s, after which the US fought a war and maintained a no-fly-zone and other punitive measures), so how would its ouster convince denizens of the Middle East that the United States was not conspiring with autocracies when it suited US interests?

If anything, it reinforced this notion by stressing the disparate treatment certain regimes received (Iraq) under the putative justification of spreading freedom and democracy, while US client-states remained in good favor despite their blatant disregard for human rights and democratic norms (not even so much as a reduction in aid or other forceful ultimatum requiring reforms).

Similarly, our muscular action in Libya, while we turn a blind eye to Saudi Arabia’s activities in Bahrain (at the Bahrain regime’s request and with its assistance), and events in Yemen, will drive home the point that “friendly” dictators will continue to receive US support, even if less accommodating regimes will be targeted in furtherance of our highly malleable and selective (though universal?) support of “freedom and democracy.”

This is one of the many reasons why the strategic argument for a Libyan war is so unpersuasive. The argument is twofold: authoritarian regimes throughout the region have to know that there are consequences for brutal crackdowns, and the U.S. has to be seen re-aligning itself against authoritarian governments and on the side of popular uprisings throughout the region. Because of the nature of the political coalition behind the intervention and because of the arbitrary nature of the intervention, the Libyan war achieves neither of these. If intervening in Libya is intended as a gesture of support to popular movements in the region, it will have the effect of serving as a diversion from demands for internal reform. The GCC positions on Bahrain and Libya are diametrically opposed, but from the perspective of the GCC governments they make sense: distract Western attention and resources, divert public outrage at their Bahrain intervention, and align the GCC with the rebels of Libya, and strike at a Libyan ruler they all hate anyway.

Judging by the administration’s actions, the U.S. seems to be playing along with what GCC members want, or it could be that the administration is actually trying to work at cross-purposes with them and happens to be doing a supremely bad job. Regardless of whether the administration wants this outcome or not, what seems likely to happen is that largely peaceful political protests in some strategically significant countries are going to be suppressed with minimal protest from Washington while the U.S. and allied governments expend considerable resources to produce a stalemate or prolonged civil war on behalf of a violent rebellion in a strategically unimportant country.

To the extent that the administration’s public rhetoric and the arguments of Libyan war supporters associate this policy with the vindication of popular protest movements and the “Arab spring,” they seem likely to repeat some of the mistakes of proponents of the “freedom agenda” in the previous decade and will end up linking support for democracy to ongoing civil strife in yet another Arab country. Just as the Iraq war’s connection with democracy promotion set back the cause of internal political reform throughout much of the region, the Libyan war seems likely to reinforce suspicions that pro-democracy rhetoric is matched with actions only in historically anti-Western states and that Western interventions are aimed at weakening or dividing Arab states.

Keeping popular protest movements alive is what democratist supporters of the Libyan war say that they want, but the price of the Libyan war seems to be allowing those movements to be stifled elsewhere in exchange for backing a poorly-understood armed rebellion that could end up fragmenting Libya. Just as it is a mistake for humanitarian interventionists to link their cause with the bad idea of a Libyan war, supporters of democracy promotion are likely to look back on their encouragement of Libyan intervention with deep regret for what the war cost the political movements they said they wanted to support.

If U.S. interests really dictated that supporting Arab authoritarian governments needs to end, we could debate how to best go about ending that support, but essentially what Libya interventionists are arguing is that the U.S. should use action in Libya as a proxy to send a message about what it could do in allied countries, but which it has no intention of doing anywhere except Libya. The U.S. can’t or won’t pressure the Gulf states and Yemen more than it has, and relations with many of these governments have already deteriorated badly on account of their perception that Washington abandoned Mubarak, but somehow we’re expected to believe that starting a war against Libya is supposed to make up for the lack of pressure in these other states. I submit that this is a fantasy.