About The Taliban

It’s crucial to recall that the Taliban was not just a religious movement, but also an expression of Pashto [sic] nationalism, and that that the Taliban had a lot of trouble expanding into areas where other ethnicities predominated. ~Matt Yglesias

Well, that’s sort of true, but it isn’t really, when you consider that the Taliban had quite effectively established control over 95% of the country by 1996 and was in no great danger of losing that control until the combined U.S.-Northern Alliance assault in October 2001.  I accept Yglesias’ other point that Al Qaeda is unlikely to prevail against Anbari Sunni tribesmen, provided that those tribesmen remain more or less united in their efforts to eliminate Al Qaeda.  One reason why this is right is simply raw numbers: as a foreign operation, Al Qaeda will not have the numbers or local connections to overcome solid local opposition by force of arms.  Where the comparison with the Taliban is useful is in the dissimilarity of the two situations.  Unlike the Taliban in the 1990s, Al Qaeda in Iraq does not actually have the backing of a major regional government, a natural recruiting base or the military means to conquer and hold very much territory. 

The Taliban was, first of all, not entirely foreign, though it was backed by the Pakistani government, and had a significant base of local support among fellow Pashtuns.  Its difficulty in dominating the rest of Afghanistan beyond the south and east was rooted partly in the hostility of Tajiks and Hazaras to their rule, but it had far more to do with the persistent military resistance of opposing warlords and the Northern Alliance, supplied by Russia and Iran.  When the military forces of the Alliance were driven to the north, local ethnic minorities did not engage in prolonged resistance.  In the end, the Taliban had military superiority and, even more crucially, successfully restored order to the parts of the country they controlled.  This was an important factor in solidifying their control over a country that had suffered from more or less continuous warfare for more than fifteen years.  Unlike the Taliban, Al Qaeda has been actively alienating its presumed natural constituency among Sunnis in western Iraq.  Unlike the Taliban, it has no means to offer any modicum of social or political order, and so has little or nothing to offer that would encourage locals to yield to their control.  The clear dissimilarity between Al Qaeda in Iraq today and the Taliban in the 1990s is one reason why claims that an Al Qaeda statelet will establish itself in Anbar province after we leave are ridiculous.