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Politics Foreign Affairs Culture Fellows Program

A Foreign Policy Guide

Both neoconservatives and their foes, it’s worth pointing out, have a vested interest in inflating the current crisis: The neoconservatives because it lets them argue that defeat in Iraq means defeat for all time, the realists and liberals because it lets them suggest that their wise counsel is all that stands between us and a […]

Both neoconservatives and their foes, it’s worth pointing out, have a vested interest in inflating the current crisis: The neoconservatives because it lets them argue that defeat in Iraq means defeat for all time, the realists and liberals because it lets them suggest that their wise counsel is all that stands between us and a Bush-created abyss. But while this is a tough moment for America, no question, it’s still the case that we’ll probably leave Iraq with our long-term advantages – economic, military, geographic, demographic – over our rivals more or less intact. ~Ross Douthat

On behalf of non-interventionists, let me say that we are probably one of the few foreign policy factions that have little to gain and much to lose by making Iraq into the ultimate test of hegemony.  As I have suggested before, the Iraq war is terrible (elsewhere I have called it an abomination) and the nakedness of its aggression is almost unprecedented in our history, but it is not ultimately quite as significant for America as many people, both pro and anti, have claimed.  Many people seem to mistake their evaluation of the worthiness or rightness of the conflict for an assessment of its overall significance.  To show that you are really, really for being in Iraq, you have to say all sorts of untenable things about how epic and “cosmic” and elemental the struggle is and how central Iraq is to the struggle.  The Iraq war can’t just be the right war–it has to also be the most important front in the most important war ever fought by anybody ever.  To show that you are really, really against being in Iraq, you have to say how it will bring ruin to every house and cause the sun to darken in shame.  The immorality and injustice of the war are no less real when the war is not also the beginning of some dramatic contraction of American power.   

Iraq illustrates why hegemony is a bad idea in principle on moral, constitutional and strategic grounds, not proof that America is somehow suddenly in decline as a world power.  Viewed for the long term, hegemony does not endure in any case, but interventionism seems the surest way to make sure that whatever predominance America has had will vanish much more rapidly.  This is something that has never made much sense to me about interventionism.  The people who support interventionist foreign policy claim to taking pride in having America as the predominant power in the world, but theirs is the pride of the impatient child or Madeleine Albright: “What’s the point of having this superpower you keep talking about if we never use it?”  Smart strategists who want to keep their country on top first of all don’t talk about how predominant their country is (they would rather downplay the disparity of power most of the time and avoid encouraging rivalry or envy), and they certainly wouldn’t go around upsetting the status quo that keeps their country on top.  What hegemons don’t do, if they want to remain hegemons, is to start preaching revolution and starting wars.  Iraq signals danger for the hegemony only if Washington tries to imitate this war in the future.          

The National Journal article, for its many flaws, captured an important aspect of the foreign policy debate: the overwhelming consensus that American hegemony was endangered but was obviously desirable and something worth preserving.  The positions in the debate might be summed up this way:

Neoconservative: We are the only ones with the clarity and understanding to run the world properly, and if we ever weaken in our resolve for one moment we will all die or be enslaved by Islamofascists.

Interventionist (Liberal): Running the world requires cooperation with international institutions and an increased awareness of the interdependency and complexity of the world.  Every ailing chicken is our concern.  We have to care a lot about that chicken, too.

Realist: Everyone else is too ideological to run the world, but we will run the world through effective diplomacy, bipartisanship and a willingness to acquiesce in totally pointless wars from time to time to show the world our “leadership.”

Libertarian: The world will run itself–spontaneous order, baby!

Paleoconservative: Running the world is for fools who don’t know anything about history.  We can’t run the world and we shouldn’t try.  If we try, we will destroy ourselves or become slaves to our government.

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