Reading “Caritas in Veritate”: Notes on Chapter Two
I suppose it’s around this point that George Weigel started going wild with his red pen.
Here’s an example of the kind of claims that have got free market critics rather up in arms about the message of this document:
Profit is useful if it serves as a means towards an end that provides a sense both of how to produce it and how to make good use of it. Once profit becomes the exclusive goal, if it is produced by improper means and without the common good as its ultimate end, it risks destroying wealth and creating poverty. (sec. 21)
Can this really be controversial, though? That there are such things as improper means to profit, and that it is possible for the profit motive to realize itself in ways that are exclusively self-seeking and that do not serve the common good as fully as they could, are claims that any reasonable person should accept as axiomatic; we need look no further than the example of the Madoff scandal for a case in which the destruction of wealth was the direct product of the disordered and improper attempt to realize individual profits. So the crucial questions, then, are those of what forms the proper sorts of profit-seeking should take, and of how it is that the production of wealth can best be in service of the good of the whole of human society. And what could be more reasonable than the thought that the answers to these questions have got a lot to do with caritas?
By my lights, the key phrase of this opening paragraph is opportunity for discernment: the present situation gives us a real opportunity, inasmuch as it is often times of crisis that best enable us to pay attention to fundamental matters; but it must be, contra many of our pundits and political leaders, a time for careful and attentive thought before it is a time for action – let alone the kind of action that centers on rewarding favored political constituencies. Benedict offers a glimpse into the form that such discernment must take when he talks in sec. 21 about interconnection, and revisits this theme throughout the chapter, perhaps most notably in secs. 30-32. For example:
… moral evaluation and scientific research must go hand in hand, and that charity must animate them in a harmonious interdisciplinary whole, marked by unity and distinction. The Church’s social doctrine, which has “an important interdisciplinary dimension”, can exercise, in this perspective, a function of extraordinary effectiveness. It allows faith, theology, metaphysics and science to come together in a collaborative effort in the service of humanity. It is here above all that the Church’s social doctrine displays its dimension of wisdom. (sec. 31)
Benedict laments the “excessive segmentation of knowledge” that allows, for example, economics to be regarded by many as a purely descriptive science without a normative dimension of its own, and calls instead for us to “broaden[] our concept of reason”, and to see it as perfected by love.
If I were to offer a criticism of the vision of public policy that begins to take shape in this chapter, it would have much less to do with any of its supposed ignorance about the ways that modern economies “work” (for example, the claim in sec. 27 that hunger and starvation in poorer countries often have less to do with food shortages than with institutional failures and a lack of social solidarity interestingly mirrors Amartya Sen’s research on the mechanisms of famine), but rather with what feels like an insufficiently articulated recognition of the ways that the various means and ends stand in tension with one another. At times the holism is spot on: Benedict is right, I think, to argue in sec. 32 that societal dysfunction, such as that which arises from unhealthy levels of social inequality, has negative economic effects as well, and so to see social capital and ecological health as central to proper economic development; and there is also a lot to the argument of secs. 28 and 29 that respect for human life and of the right to religious freedom are central to the vision of humanity that integral development requires. But to take just one example that jumped out at me: being troubled by the effects of outsourcing (sec. 25), supportive of the rights of trade unions (ibid.), and opposed to the tariffs for which such unions often lobby as a means to labor stability but which come at the cost of “mak[ing] it difficult for the products of poor countries to gain a foothold in the markets of rich” ones (sec. 33), is a challenging line to walk; of course such internal tensions are going to arise for nearly any comprehensive political vision, but it is nevertheless important to acknowledge them as such.
This is, however, hardly a devastating problem. As we were reminded all the way back in sec. 9, this encyclical is not a document that is meant to offer technical solutions to specific political problems, but is rather a proclamation of fundamental truths about the nature and aims of human society. And read along these lines, the central challenge of Caritas in Veritate is to a range of overly narrow conceptions of what the state is for – as a commenter helpfully put it last week, the central idea that is being called into question is that of a state that is scrupulously neutral with respect to visions of what the common good entails. The question of how to realize the goals that a properly ordered state must strive after – of how, for example, to ensure an appropriate degree of labor stability without implementing damaging trade policies, or to identify and respond to those instances in which labor unions (or private corporations!) are not genuinely working toward the common good – remains in many ways an empirical one, and is likely to have a large range of plausible answers. But the striving for these answers cannot be done in a way that reduces persons to labor inputs, or measures output simply in dollars and cents; we need, in other words, to seek that truth that is also the embodiment of love.
There, I think I’ve touched on about two percent of what comes up in this chapter. Your turn.
P.S. Here is the text of the encyclical, and here are the previous entries for this reading group. Chapter three is up for next weekend.
Filed under: Caritas in Veritate, economics, reading groups, religion
One area of human activity conspicuous by its absence from Caritas in Veritate and this chapter in particular is that which encompasses war, militarism, sanctions, and intentional use of food deprivation against domestic or international enemies. The Vatican has often spoken out against these things both in general and in particular cases; e.g. Pope John Paul II’s protests against the devastating sanctions which were imposed on Iraq after the first US/Iraq war. (I confess that at the time, I paid far too little attention to these killer sanctions and to the Church’s stand against them – mea maxima culpa.) But when we are talking about hunger and obstacles to development, the worst cases are caused by war (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan), intentional use of hunger as a weapon against domestic political opponents or racial or tribal groups (Zimbabwe, Sudan) or sanctions and blockade (Gaza). None of these have much to do with economic globalization or inequality as such.
Perhaps the Holy Father thinks that Catholic teachings on warfare (whether military or economic) are so clear that a specific encyclical on these matters is not needed. IMHO, it is badly needed.
I agree entirely, Kirt – I’m quite surprised that the topic didn’t come up in this encyclical, and will be very disappointed if it doesn’t receive such a treatment rather soon.
May I chime in again on the theme of the “literate” (or not so much) English translation? In live conversation one calls the person transfering words from one tongue to another an “interpreter,” ( rather like a musical composition is “interpreted” by the performer, differing in some aspects from the intentions of the composer when first penned) since they aren’t able to guarantee perfect correspondence with the tone of the delivery, but cast their own tone on the delivery in the second tongue as fast as their brain parses the vocabulary into articulated phrases and emphases. The German vocabulary uses everyday terms to emphasize what a common man understands and parses them as intended, but the English “intepretation” was not so considerate: what in heaven’s name does “prescind* from his nature” (21) or “going beyond never means prescinding* from the conclusions of reason” (30) mean? Now it could be that the texts were bandied to-n-fro via latinists and we’ll just have to forgive ‘em their oversights, but IMHO a certain “passion” in the sense of love as caritas has been lost, and the appeal to the splendor of truth has been tarnished by lax redacteuring.
For example (29) may not be the articulation of “just war” teaching we would have wished for, but in German it stridently “chides” in unambiguous language:
“Gier” is strongly negative – in the sense of coveting with a rapacious voracity for Herrschaft (subordination, oppression) and Reichtum (oppulent affluence) while _desire_ is at best ‘neutral’ with regards to _domination_ and _wealth_ (for dominating evil could be seen as virtuous conduct, and sustaining a common’wealth’ a good thing, right, the neocon mind could turn this argument on the immorality of conflict on its head and make a case for ‘just war’ in almost any circumstance?)
Terms one might use to describe a car accident _grief_; _destruction_ and _death_ are all weaker than the dramatic nouns written with capital letters in German:
‘Leid’ = suffering, harm, affliction
“Verwuestung’ = havoc, depradation, devastation, desolation
‘Tod’ = killing
Indeed lingo worthy of a traffic cop is also applied to conflicts in foreign affairs:
_diverts_ for “abzieht” (a much more violently active, as in ripping a sticking plaster off)
_resources_ for “Geldmittel” (a candid referral to real personal funds accrued in taxes or reparation fees or — as in the case of US Fed funding for the permanent warfare state we find ourselves in — FIAT paper)
The Pope seems to be saying that the West has lost any moral authority to wage a ‘just war’ as the “State promotes, teaches or actually imposes forms of practical atheism . . it deprives its citizens . . and impedes them from moving forward with renewed dynamism as they strive to offer a ore generous human response to divine love”
concluding with this rather dire warning to those encirced by hubris:
“Das ist das Schaden den die “Ueberentwicklung” der echten Entwicklung anfuegt wenn sie von der >>moralischen Unterentwicklung<< begleitet ist.”
which I may humbly colloquialize so:
Such is the harm that ‘Superman’ing associates with real development once it is accompanied by >>moral immaturity<<
where ‘ueber’ from an earthbound perspective echoes Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical ideas about the “Übermensch” (“Superman”) he who would be God himself…
Transferring the social teaching “IN OUR TIME” would almost seem to imply that the world has turned on its head from 40 years ago, when the Vatican could trust the good guys to set the bad guys straight, now (28) we good guys export the bad stuff (abortion, 28 food insecurity, 27) like corruption (22) and bloc hegemony (23, where the third world was rid of the hegemony of Soviet blocs but ceded it to China, given a “pass” to exploit the African, Indian and South American continents in the name of “commercial progress”) culminating in our current global “crisis” (used 19 times in total, at least half a dozen times in this chapter alone) where the State (24) is limited in its sovereignty by international trade and finance, changing the context of the public authorities political power.
Chapter 2 would indicate we’re all adrift at see, on an odyssey confronting our sirens, seeking answers to challenges of metaphysical magnitude (30) requiring a commitment to foster the interaction of different levels of human knowledge (post-modernity’s polycentrisms — yet another weak translation, where the clarity of “polyzentrisch” (22) becomes obscured in _overlapping layers_) as “progress of a merely economic and technological kind is insufficient” (23) since the “primary capital to be safeguarded is man, the human person in his or her integrity” (25) and our re-exposure to jeopardy from serfdom (26, “run risks of enslavement” the poorly articulated conclusion lacking the heft of the original “Horigkeit” the kind of term one would use to describe the expected submission of a Nazi call to attention “ACHTUNG! ACHTUNG!” )
Yet the concluding paras 30 thru 33 indicate that the “social doctrine” plant still has roots and we can yet direct its growth towards the light to bear fruit, in due season: seasoned by the salt of charity (love of neighbor) which animates our thirst for knowledge (belaboring the “salt of the earth” metaphor, I know, and yet biblical chastisement has been know to involve “salting the earth” of ones foes, so there is a fine line to tread, where the tyranny of good intentions must be calibrated against the divine endowment of liberty to each and every man, lest we reap what we sow. The sense I get of the thrust of this chapter is that the human condition is a more deeply entangled one than 40 years ago and we must entertain a more comprehensive comprehension of perspective before arriving at policy prescriptions (continuing in the vein of fuzzy logic (31) _lack of thinking capable of formulating a guiding synthesis_ cut to the quick in German as “an einem Denken fehlt, das imstande ist, eine richtungsweisenende Synthese aufzustellen” (colloquilized as “deficient in an intelligence capable of constructing a synthesis that points the way forward”) in the spirit of John Henry Newman
“. . . The human mind … may be regarded from two principal points of view, as intellectual and as moral. … The perfection of the intellect is called ability and talent; the perfection of our moral nature is virtue. And it is our great misfortune here, and our trial, that, as things are found in the world, the two are separated, and independent of each other; that, where power of intellect is, there need not be virtue; and that where right, and goodness, and moral greatness are, there need not be talent.”
From the sermon ‘Intellect, the Instrument of Religious Training ‘ (1856) here
http://www.newmancause.co.uk/thought/thought-for-the-day-27-july-2009.html
Insufficient (or plain incompetent) intellect is the problem —
so how may we yield a greater harvest for the Commonwealth of Man?
Sow wisdom and water with Grace. Speak as logically as the Logos, and act as lovingly as the Imago dei.
(*) prescind: to separate or divide in thought; consider individually.
in the sense of “to be prescient”, to “foresee”, “predict”, “determine by calcule” or “dictate” as in the “dictatorship of relativism”
but in the German rendered, “absehen von” means
to disregard, neglect, overlook, repudiate, disown
colloquialized for (21) as “increasingly impact the autonomy of the human person himself, who for that matter cannot disregard/neglect/disown his own nature” or for (30) as “to drive progress further must never mean to disregard/neglect/overlook/disown/repudiate rational conclusions or to contradict their outcomes”