… scientific consensus, with its tendency toward the antithesis of scientific method, is deserving of our skepticism.

So by this criterion, we ought also to be skeptical of general relativity, the theory of evolution, and the law of universal gravitation, just because those theories are held by consensus. Sorry, but that’s not Popper, either.

So we must combat climate change because the kind of warming the planet is projected to undergo is going to have disastrous consequences? This isn’t science; it’s crystal ball gazing. It’s the concept of preventive war applied not just to individual regimes and countries but to the entire planet.

As I’ve said before, I’m perfectly willing to debate whether any of the various “combat” strategies on the table are good ones, or even whether it’s worth trying to combat climate change at all. (I think it is.) But predicting long-term planetary trends and analyzing the causal processes behind them just is what science is – by your reasoning, should we also have dismissed the ravings of those “crystal ball gazers” who rightly predicted that the Iraq invasion would be a fiasco? Is conforming our actions to what we have good – and not merely pretend, as in the “regime change” case – reason to believe about the future always unwise? Something seems to have gone badly wrong here …

Apologies, my brain must have wandered. I should have attributed that clarity to Karl Popper; but I had Kuhn on the mind. Whoops!

Briefly: Kuhn argues that consensus does not quickly change in the face of opposing evidence, and thus has an inertial state resistant to new interpretations and new theories; but as the evidence mounts, rapid change can occur (long calm – violent upheaval – long calm).

Popper’s adherence to falsification (ie, counter-evidence must always and immediately cast doubt on any conclusion), when taken with Kuhn’s understanding of scientific progression, led me to the point I was attempting to draw: that the inertia of the scientific community leads them to dally over countervailing evidence (hence, “halting” scientific thought), when under the rules of scientific inquiry, they should be more malleable.

And thus I reach an explanation of my previous post – that scientific consensus, with its tendency toward the antithesis of scientific method, is deserving of our skepticism.

Sorry for the confusion. As usual, the fault is mine.

… consensus is the first sign that scientific thought has halted.

Sorry, but I know my Kuhn and he made no such thing clear.

either climatology is a science or geology, evolutionary biology, and astrophysics are not.

Insofar as they produce results that can be tested and retested, then yes, they are science. Every time you drill a core, or take a reading off a passing comet, you generate proofs or disproofs of your theses. Climatology as a discipline may be science, but “reaching consensus” is manifestly not scientific behavior. Indeed, as Kuhn made clear, consensus is the first sign that scientific thought has halted.

At best, according to your interpretation of the evidence, 2 of Derr’s 3 points are actually wrong.

And the other one is at best misleading, and in any case no evidence at all that global warming isn’t real.

I share your skepticism of the proposed solutions and (to some extent) the predicted outcomes, and I think such an attitude is entirely warranted. But there’s a responsible case for that attitude, and then there’s the kind of denialist silliness that Derr goes in for; it seems to me that thinking conservatives ought to police the boundaries pretty strictly.

Now having said that, I’m not a denier, and I’m not really even skeptical of anthropocentric global warming. But I am skeptical with the proposed solutions and predicted outcomes of climate change. For me it’s an issue that receives far too much attention at the expense of more serious environmental problems that are threatening us right now, as opposed to 100-150 years in the future (ie, the widespread use of chemical fertilizers, electronic waste, etc).