(**) The only admissible positions are the ones that CAN (in principle) be endorsed according to the terms of any (or: any of the “relevant”) comprehensive doctrines.

… is one that I’d still dispute. But at least we’re clearer on where the disagreement lies.

However, I do indeed disagree with you regarding (*), in that I think it is _not_ something that a Rawlsian would have to endorse. (N.B. I’ve switched over to intentionally hedgy “Rawlsian” here, because I am less sure of this as a point of literal Rawls exegesis than I am of the earlier point we were discussing. But it seems to me entirely in keeping with the overall nature of his claims & arguments.) This is my point about other cds finding “parallels” to MLK’s arguments, which I have deployed several times upthread. It might be that many moral claims that are absolutely essential to properly organizing the basic structure of society cannot be meaningfully expressed, let alone defended, in a _form_ that partakes of no cd whatsoever. There may be no such splendidly, ascetically, antiseptically cd-free form of moral discourse available that can do the trick. I think we agree, in fact, that there just plain is no such usable cd-free form of moral discourse! What matters for the Rawlsian, though, is _not_ that the premises of public justification be cd-free. What matters is that they be ones endorsable by all the relevant cds. That was the intended import of my 1:26pm comment (which you may well have missed in our repeated cross-postings).

(Weak) means “M is justifiable on the basis of something other than B.”

At least as I read it, what the (Weak) schema would give you is just that it is not a requirement on M being justified that it be justified on the basis of B; it wouldn’t entail anything about whether it had other sorts of justification. I do agree, though, that if we assume that MLK’s views are justifiable somehow then (Strong) entails (Weak) and not v/v.

I also agree that the last statement in my 12:41 comment – that there’s “no duty” to present one’s arguments in a Febreezed form – isn’t one that a Rawlsian would have to disagree with. Rather, my disagreement with the Rawlsian is over this claim:

(*) The only admissible positions are the ones that CAN (in principle) be presented in such a form.

And this is something that the Rawlsian thinks, no?

John:

I do think there’s something amiss with arguing about public policy with the argument “because the Bible says it is wrong”, even though, from the standpoint of a believer, that is a pretty darn compelling argument.

I agree that there is something amiss with that, though in fact I don’t think that many believers actually find those sorts of arguments especially compelling! My point has more to do with the fact that, as you put it, “there isn’t an interesting neutral moral/political theory which we can appeal to so as not to beg any questions against our opponents”: because of this, I think that the desire to have one’s beliefs achieve such expression or justification is a misguided one.

… surely it would be good if we could, as much as possible, provide universally compelling arguments for our coercive public policy decisions.

Again, I agree with this! But what Eve and I are arguing is that in many cases the desire to be compelling to the largest number of people is exactly the reason why drawing on religious or quasi-religious language is the right thing to do. I’m not really disagreeing, then, that there’s something “special” about “public justification”, but only that the particular way in which Rawls conceives this specialness (as in (*) above) is mistaken.

I think I agree with this, but I’m not sure what “universal principles” is supposed to refer to. You and I agree on this important point (I think): there isn’t an interesting neutral moral/political theory which we can appeal to so as not to beg any questions against our opponents.

2. Many arguments that eschew religious or otherwise sacralized vocabulary aren’t, in fact, as widely convincing as the arguments that don’t do this.

This is probably true, but I do think we disagree here: I THINK you’ve indicated in the past that you think religious believers are putting too much effort into coming up with “secular” arguments. I don’t know how much effort they’re putting in, but I think they’re doing a crappy job and public discourse would be greatly improved if more believers spent more time advancing good “secular” arguments concerning, say, gay marriage and abortion.

3. There is no duty to present (or: be able to present) one’s moral arguments in ways that aren’t “tied to any particular religious outlook”, and that explicitly or tacitly conceding that there is such a duty is an unwise thing to do.

First, I think it depends if we’re talking about a “religious outlook” or something that appeals to (specially) revealed premises. I do think there’s something amiss with arguing about public policy with the argument “because the Bible says it is wrong”, even though, from the standpoint of a believer, that is a pretty darn compelling argument. But I think the duty language is distracting here: surely it would be good if we could, as much as possible, provide universally compelling arguments for our coercive public policy decisions. Sometimes things break down – the world is fallen – but I think often arguments about these matters are needlessly inflamed because people want to claim not just that “public justification” in Rawls’s sense is a pipe dream, but that there’s really nothing special about such public justification anyhow. Rather, I think we should admit that the dream is a sweet one – where people are coerced only insofar as they are irrational – but strongly insist that it is just a dream.

(Strong) It is not the case that MLK’s arguments on justice are justifiable on the grounds of a broadly shared doctrine.

(Weak) It is not a requirement on MLK’s arguments on justice being justifiable that they are so justifiable on the grounds of a broadly-shared doctrine.

Let “M” be MLK’s arguments, and “B” be the range of premises allowable in the broadly shared doctrine. (Strong) means “M is not justifiable on the basis of B”. (Weak) means “M is justifiable on the basis of something other than B.” Assuming — as we both are — that M is indeed justifiable, then (Strong) entails (Weak), but not vice-versa.

“I certainly didn’t, however, mean to say that “it is a _part_ of Rawls’ project that MLK should have shut up”…” Ok. But I really do hope you can see, though, how your initial jab at Rawls in the main post really does sound like what you are here disowning. The implication in your text was that merely reading (and endorsing) Rawls should have let MLK not to write the Letter.

“But this is exactly what I disagree with: I simply don’t think that failure to find justification in an overlapping consensus is sufficient to disqualify a political argument.” My point was that the way you stated that point in your 12:41pm comment was not, in fact, one that a Rawlsian ought disagree with. I think it’s worth getting persnicketedly careful here. Much of what has annoyed me by the many of the recent postings on this general topic here at C11 has been the blurring of a lot of important distinctions. There are weaker and stronger formulations, and some arguments that are good for rejecting stronger ones fail as arguments against the weaker ones. Going back to the main post, you stake out the claim that “a range of inescapable facts about human (un)reason and the nature of our ethical and otherwise normative concepts make the concept of an essentially irreligious moral discourse a philosophical non-starter.” If I weaken the claim slightly by changing “irreligious” into “not participating in any cd”, then I think that your claim is one that a Rawlsian could accept! And that this is so, in no small part, because that sort of claim does not, in fact, entail the claim of yours that I quoted at the beginning of this paragraph.

One should not at all disqualify another’s arguments framed in Christian (or Hindu, or Kantian, or…) language _on the front end_, but one should be prepared to accept one’s own locally-framed argument as disqualified _at the back end_ if after due consideration & discussion it fails to find a place in the overlapping consensus.

But this is exactly what I disagree with: I simply don’t think that failure to find justification in an overlapping consensus is sufficient to disqualify a political argument.

If I am right in my earlier claims about looking for appropriate parallels in the comprehensive doctrines of others, then actually the Rawlsian doesn’t need to disagree with this. Rather, one has the twin duties of (1) looking for such parallels in one’s own cd when confronted with another’s arguments, and (2) accepting that a sincere & considered reply by another reasonable member of the society that there just is no such parallel in their cd, is in fact a good reason for you to no longer offer that particular argument in the context of justifying a particular policy. One should not at all disqualify another’s arguments framed in Christian (or Hindu, or Kantian, or…) language _on the front end_, but one should be prepared to accept one’s own locally-framed argument as disqualified _at the back end_ if after due consideration & discussion it fails to find a place in the overlapping consensus.