And this is yet another way Libya bears little resemblance to Iraq. As I argue in a recent Foreign Policy piece, where, in Iraq, we stood alone calling for war while most of the world opposed it, the dynamic, this time, was reversed. The United States – along with Russia, China, and Germany among the major powers – stood increasingly alone in opposing the emerging Arab and international consensus favoring intervention. ~Shadi Hamid

Shadi Hamid and I aren’t going to convince each other on our different definitions of American interests anytime soon, but I wanted to say a few things about this claim of “international consensus favoring intervention.” My point here isn’t to insist on an analogy with Iraq, because the better analogy is with Kosovo, which is already bad enough, but I don’t agree that there is a broad international consensus for intervention in Libya. There does seem to be less intense international hostility to intervening in Libya, but that is bound to change if the conflict escalates. According to Marc Lynch, the support in Arab governments and countries for this intervention is fairly shallow and may not endure a prolonged mission:

While Arab public opinion should not be the sole consideration in shaping American decisions on this difficult question, Americans also should not fool themselves into thinking that an American military intervention will command long-term popular Arab support. Every Arab opinion leader and Libyan representative I spoke with at the conference told me that “American military intervention is absolutely unacceptable.” Their support for a No Fly Zone rapidly evaporates when discussion turns to American bombing campaigns.

Does Lynch have that wrong? If he doesn’t, I am underwhelmed by the fact that the GCC wants intervention in Libya. There is something a little curious about mentioning past U.S. support for Arab authoritarian regimes as the mistake that needs to be corrected in the same breath that Hamid cites the support of those same regimes for intervening in Libya. Some of these governments are also eager to strike at Iran, but I don’t think very many are arguing that we should take their advice on that score. Typically, the foreign policy goals of these regimes and the views of the nations they rule over are not closely aligned, and sometimes they are diametrically opposed.

The Arab League and the GCC have provided the U.S. and our allies political cover for intervention, but presumably this will be at the price of allowing them to crush dissent in their own countries. What if building a coalition for intervention requires making a bargain in which the U.S. allows allied Arab governments to go back to ignoring demands for reform? Suppose winning the support of these governments on Libyan intervention leads to the continued stifling of protest movements throughout the region? On Hamid’s terms, would it still be worth doing?

When we look at the rest of the world, the picture is hardly more encouraging. In addition to Russia and China, India, Brazil, and Turkey have not supported taking military action in Libya. Along with Germany, the largest democracies in Asia and Latin America abstained on the recent resolution. In many respects, the international consensus against invading Iraq has been reproduced almost exactly. Many of the members of the pro-war coalition in 2002-03 are reprising their role, as Denmark and Spain have agreed to participate and Italy will allow its bases to be used. Earlier, the Polish government expressed skepticism about intervening, and it remains to be seen what, if anything, they would contribute to the mission. NATO appears to be as divided now as it was then. The only major power that opposed invading Iraq and now favors intervention in Libya is France, and I’m sure we all understand that this is a belated gamble on Sarkozy’s part to try to make everyone forget how much support France had given to Ben Ali.

Maybe international consensus and strong regional support are overrated, but neither of these seems to exist as far as American military action in Libya is concerned, or at least they are not significantly greater than they were in 2002-03. The difference this time is that there are no major powers intent on blocking authorization of a limited Libyan war. If the conflict escalates and some Western governments insist on pressing ahead with toppling Gaddafi, whatever consensus that does exist will almost certainly break down.

P.S. I don’t agree that the U.S. would be blamed for “letting Libyans get slaughtered.” The comparison with the Iraqi uprisings in 1991 is a misleading one, because in this case the Libyan rebels originally had no reason to expect U.S. support. The things that have understandably generated the most ill-will towards the U.S. have been those active interventions in the countries of the region through support for authoritarian governments and military action. The only way that I see a military action in Libya not contributing to general distrust and resentment of the U.S. is if Gaddafi actually accepts the cease-fire and the fighting in Libya doesn’t escalate. If that is what happens, that will be a very lucky outcome for the U.S., but we shouldn’t be making foreign policy decisions that rely so heavily on lucky breaks.

Update: Christopher Caldwell makes a similar observation about the lack of international consensus:

One must say “western” because the consensus for action against Libya extends only to a North Atlantic order that John Foster Dulles would have recognised. The five countries that abstained from the resolution vote – Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia – account for almost 3bn of the world’s people and are the core of tomorrow’s global economy.

Second Update: Mark Thompson explains the dissatisfaction at the Pentagon on Libya, and also mentions that regional support for intervention isn’t as great as supporters of the war are saying:

There remains concern in the Pentagon that the U.S. has little idea who these rebels are, and whether or not U.S. firepower should be enlisted in their support. There is also distress that despite the support of the Arab League for action against Gaddafi, the two most important Arab states — Egypt and Saudi Arabia — are opposed.

Of these two, Egypt’s opposition seems the most significant. Of course, the Egyptian authorities are concerned for the safety of Egyptians still in Libya, but it undermines the notion that there is broad regional support for this military action when Libya’s most important neighbor is unwilling to participate and the Arab governments most supportive of it are the ones farthest away from Libya.