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Treaty Trashing

It is becoming fashionable to declare that New START is “irrelevant” or the result of Obama being stuck in a “time warp.” These articles are useful mainly for reminding us that we shouldn’t take these authors too seriously when it comes to national security issues. Over at Arms Control Wonk, Michael Krepon points out another […]

It is becoming fashionable to declare that New START is “irrelevant” or the result of Obama being stuck in a “time warp.” These articles are useful mainly for reminding us that we shouldn’t take these authors too seriously when it comes to national security issues. Over at Arms Control Wonk, Michael Krepon points out another danger that failure to ratify this treaty presents:

Treaty trashing undermines norms protective of our eyes and ears in space. NTM [“National technical means”] will be placed at further risk by pursuing the space warfare capabilities that some treaty opponents seek. Instructing the Obama administration to go back to the drawing board to improve verification is a simple dodge; we all know that it may take years of logrolling to do so. In the meantime, there will be no inspections and no reaffirmation of the norm against harmful interference with NTM. Without treaties in force that allow on-site inspections and affirm norms protective of monitoring satellites, complaints about the need for better verification ring hollow.

Treaty trashing in the Senate has taken a significant toll. If irreconcilable Senators have their way, prohibitions against interfering with monitoring satellites will rest on a 37 year-old treaty that can be axed every five years and two treaties from which Moscow may seek to withdraw.

Bearing that in mind, it seems to me that ratifying the treaty does more than “provide minor increases in intelligence,” as Cote and Friedman argue here in an op-ed that should be read and taken seriously. On the whole, Cote and Friedman conclude that the arguments of treaty opponents are nonsense, and I recommend reading their entire piece. A large part of their objection is not to the treaty itself but to the negotiations designed to win over Kyl and reluctant Republicans. To the extent that they object to the treaty’s substance, they complain that it requires little in the way of arms reduction. Cote and Friedman object to the unnecessary and costly nature of the modernization demands Kyl has made and the administration has accepted, and they are right to object to this. It seems to me that this is a good argument for Kyl and his colleagues to support ratification without conditions and an ever-increasing price tag. Of course, we know that there is no chance of that.

At the end, Cote and Friedman outline their vision:

We can do without ICBMs and nuclear bombers, letting the U.S. Air Force exit the nuclear business. A submarine only force would provide all the deterrence we need at far less cost.

Needless to say, if this treaty fails, we will be that much farther away from Cote and Friedman’s goal. It’s not as if more ambitious arms reductions will be possible when a treaty as modest and limited as New START has this much trouble being ratified. Cooperating with the Russians to secure nuclear materials could be hampered and negotiating on tactical nuclear weapons would be delayed indefinitely. The U.S. gains something by ratifying the treaty, and loses a great deal if the treaty fails. The nuclear weapons complex is bloated, but there will be even less chance of reducing its size and cost in the future if the Senate does not support the so-called “distraction” of New START.

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