Andrew made a curious comment on the Palestinian Authority’s U.N. maneuver:

All of which explains the hilarious/tragic spectacle of the US government furiously attempting to prevent the UN from recognizing the two-state solution that the United States has supported for as long as one can recall.

U.N. recognition of Palestine as an independent and full member state would not create a two-state solution in any meaningful sense. Even if recognition had U.S. support, it would be rejected out of hand by the one party whose agreement is essential to making a two-state solution work, and it could mark the end of any hope for a negotiated settlement. The reason why Palestinian leaders have been contemplating this risky move is that they have reached the conclusion that negotiations leading to a lasting two-state solution are not going to happen. A bid for recognition would be a desperate gamble that would almost certainly backfire on the Palestinians, and it would provide the Netanyahu government with a pretext for taking provocative actions that it might not risk taking otherwise.

Hussein Ibish described some of the serious risks that a recognition bid involved earlier this summer:

There are other risks. Israeli retaliation could include annexation of parts of the West Bank, for example, or abrogation of the Oslo agreements. A failed UN initiative, or one that “succeeds” without improving the daily lives of Palestinians under occupation, could lead to an explosion of popular anger in the West Bank.

As Ibish said, a bid for recognition at the U.N. would have “largely symbolic value and very harmful practical consequences.” U.N. recognition would not provide any part of Palestine with independence, and the eventual hope of statehood would actually recede. It may not be the administration’s intent, but blocking a Palestinian U.N. recognition bid might be the biggest (and maybe only) favor it has done for the Palestinians so far. Ibish also argued that there needs to be an alternative that will give the Palestinian leadership an incentive not to take the U.N. route, and that still seems to be elusive. Regardless, the only ones who will benefit from an impasse at the U.N. are the ones most opposed to Palestinian statehood.

Andrew concludes his post this way:

The foreign policy is set by US public opinion, and sustained by elite media grandstanding for the Christianist imperial and apocalyptic project in the Middle East.

This greatly exaggerates the influence of public opinion on the setting of foreign policy. The vast majority of Americans would prefer that the U.S. not take sides in the conflict. Their views are largely unrepresented in Washington. There are organized activists focused on this issue to the virtual exclusion of all else. They do not represent public opinion. However, most of the public is not very engaged or concerned about this issue, so the most energized and active groups tend to prevail and define the nature of the debate.

P.S. The “Uniting for Peace” option that Rogin reports on here isn’t likely to yield any better results. As Ibish argued, a “Uniting for Peace” maneuver might technically succeed, but it would accomplish nothing:

It is very difficult to see how such a resolution would advance the cause of Palestinian membership in the UN. Boycotts and sanctions have been in place in many contexts, including the Middle East, without such a resolution, and there is no indication that it would have any practical impact on either Palestinian UN membership or coercive measures aimed at Israel by other member states.