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The New Choice in Libya: Sham or Capitulation

Now that Britain and France have started publicly entertaining the “internal exile” option for Gaddafi as a way to end the Libyan war, the idea is coming under harsh criticism from all sides. Simon Tisdall writes this for The Guardian: Although some rebel spokesmen have expressed dismay at the perceived softening of Britain’s position, they […]

Now that Britain and France have started publicly entertaining the “internal exile” option for Gaddafi as a way to end the Libyan war, the idea is coming under harsh criticism from all sides. Simon Tisdall writes this for The Guardian:

Although some rebel spokesmen have expressed dismay at the perceived softening of Britain’s position, they do not speak with once voice on Gaddafi (or much else). Mustafa Abdel Jalil, leader of the Benghazi-based government-in-waiting, said recently that Gaddafi could remain if he accepted the rebels’ conditions, including the ceding of all military and political power. But others in the rebel camp strongly disagree, arguing that he will not do so and that his continued presence in Libya would be both disruptive and untenable.

This latter argument is wholly persuasive – for the bottom line, as Hague surely understands, is that if Gaddafi is to remain in Libya, he will never wholly surrender the military and other powers that protect him and his family from the retribution, judicial and extra-judicial, that Libyans would certainly pursue. To do so would be political if not actual suicide. Any deal allowing him to remain but supposedly stripping him of power will therefore lack credibility from the start. It will be either a sham or a capitulation.

It has taken just a few months for the leading NATO governments to move from unreasonable maximalism (i.e., Gaddafi must leave power as a precondition for a cease-fire) to rather desperate compromise position (Gaddafi must renounce power, but doesn’t have to “go” anywhere). So the ill-conceived, unnecessary Libyan war slowly wends its way to an embarrassing conclusion. Tisdall is right that Gaddafi’s continued presence in Libya at this point would be a source of instability for years to come, but this is an outcome that the U.S. and its allies virtually guaranteed by the manner in which they chose to fight the war. They (especially the U.S. and Britain) were forced to impose limits on how they fought the war because there was little or no political support at home for yet another war. The Libyan war has been a model in the kind of war that the Powell Doctrine was designed to avoid: it has been an exercise in using insufficient force for a cause that does not have broad popular support, and which serves no discernible security interest. The failings of the Libyan war are a reminder of why the Powell Doctrine’s requirements should be followed when deciding whether to take military action.

After the administration has gone to such absurd lengths to pretend that the U.S. not at war, it seems unlikely that Obama would agree to greater U.S. participation in the war as Britain and France start looking for the exits. What is scandalous about the Anglo-French shift on Gaddafi’s fate is that they could have accepted one of a number of cease-fire proposals put forward by Turkey and the African Union that would have had more or less the same result, but which could have halted the fighting months ago. The result might have been just as embarrassing, but it would have allowed for aid to reach the civilian population much earlier.

Commentary’s Jonathan Tobin concurs:

Although France and Britain may say this “scenario” would create a new government in which Qaddafi would not rule, this is nonsense. Even if these terms were accepted, it is more likely than not that Qaddafi would retain enormous influence. But more to the point is now that such generous terms are on the table, he knows he can hang tough and get far more. Indeed, with his ongoing presence in Libya guaranteed by his foes, there is no reason for him to do anything but keep fighting until his hold on power is assured.

Of course, once it became clear that Gaddafi was fighting to preserve his hold on power and to avoid being hauled before the ICC, he never had any reason to give up. He assumed that his determination to remain in power and stay in Libya was far greater than the intervening governments’ resolve to see him gone. The stakes could not have been higher for him, and they could scarcely be much lower for NATO. The Libyan war’s goal of “pressuring” the regime enough until Gaddafi finally did give up, which is another way of saying that the U.S. and its allies had no realistic plan for removing Gaddafi from power.

Bruce Crumley cuts Britain and France some slack:

To be fair to Western allies, there aren’t too many other realistic options to accepting Gaddafi remaining hunkered down somewhere in Libya’s future if they ever want to extricate themselves from the military operation they bounded into four months ago. Despite that, their pragmatism won’t protect them from accusations on all sides that their war costs lots of money, many lives, and much credibility in return for what in the end may not be a whole lot.

Crumley is right that there aren’t many alternatives to what Britain and France are now proposing, and his assessment of the costs is fair. Tobin’s is wildly exaggerated:

But the consequences of this astonishing turn of events will be felt beyond the borders of that unhappy North African country. While those who supported the Arab Spring revolts may have thought intervention in Libya put other dictators on notice their time was coming to an end, Qaddafi’s apparent victory sends the opposite signal.

Anyone who claimed that “intervention in Libya put other dictators on notice their time was coming to an end” was kidding himself or trying to sell the war to a skeptical audience. Attacking Libya was not going to have a deterrent effect on other authoritarian governments, and it has not had that effect. That would have been true regardless of the outcome in Libya. Wars should not be fought to send “signals.” The intended recipients rarely interpret the signals in the way we wish they would, and the war may send other messages that we did not intend to broadcast. In the case of Libya, the U.S. and our allies paid the price that no authoritarian regime will want to make deals with our governments that expose them to future attack.

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