This Time article makes for depressing reading. It confirms my suspicions that meddling in Kashmir might very well figure into Holbrooke’s mission in South Asia, and it also makes me think that New Delhi is extremely insecure in its relationship with the U.S. after the change in administration. Three months ago when Obama was talking seriously about mediating in the Kashmir dispute, the Indian government and most media outlets there were horrified at the idea and also distressed that good relations with Washington were in jeopardy. Post-election enthusiasm for Obama in India in Indian political and media circles was not as great as in most other countries. Now after the reported success in keeping India off Holbrooke’s official agenda the Foreign Minister is cheering the closeness of the bilateral relationship and other government officials are crowing about the “respect” that New Delhi feels has been shown to its concerns.

That’s quite a swing in reactions and expectations in a fairly short time, and I think India is putting too much weight on its success in limiting Holbrooke’s official mission, and this is a point Ghosh, the author of the article, makes as well. For one thing, the administration has gone out of its way to claim, not all that credibly, that there was no Indian lobbying effort, which puts a bit of a damper on the idea that Washington is showing respect to Indian concerns. It’s not as if Singh went out and touted the success of Indian influence on U.S. decisions in Olmert-like fashion–to the extent that anyone in Singh’s government is talking about it, it is anonymously or in very vague terms. Indian concerns have at best been tolerated for the moment, and not necessarily heeded at all. If there was a serious chance that Kashmir might have fallen under Holbrooke’s mandate, that suggests a lack of understanding of and respect for the Indian position. This could lead to a very dangerous effort to insert the U.S. into the dispute at a moment when internal politics in Jammu & Kashmir, as shown by the recent state elections, are finally beginning to improve. (Interestingly, the Times of India editorial linked here cites the state elections as evidence that India can bear international scrutiny in Kashmir and should not necessarily fear internationalizing the issue.)

As I was trying to say in the column, we need a Pakistan policy that actually addresses the main problems in Pakistan, and believe it or not Kashmir is actually not near the top of this list, and it is also among the thorniest to resolve. There are far more immediate problems stemming from the financial crisis, popular discontent over our missile strikes, and separatist movements, and while it might satisfy elements in the Pakistani military to push some kind of Kashmir deal on India it is not going to contribute to the stability of Pakistan. That is the false promise of the “grand bargain” theories. On the contrary, trying to alter the current arrangements in Kashmir would precipitate conflict in Kashmir and possibly in the hinterlands of both countries. In the worst case, it could escalate a situation that is already very dangerous and sensitive, and given the arsenals of both states the dangers that result from failure are very great.

P.S. I did not have space in the column to dwell on bad Indian memories of the Clinton administration, which many Indians hold responsible for promoting the rise of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference and worsening the situation in Kashmir. To the extent that they see Holbrooke as a return to old Clinton ways of handling South Asian issues, it will not be good for relations between our countries.