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Predictable

Andrew Nagorski indulges one of the worst habits of Russia watchers in this new article in Newsweek, framing his entire analysis around the supposed crazy unpredictability of the Russians. I’m not sure what it says about all those “closest observers of Russian foreign policy” that they cannot make sense of fairly straightforward acts of bluster […]

Andrew Nagorski indulges one of the worst habits of Russia watchers in this new article in Newsweek, framing his entire analysis around the supposed crazy unpredictability of the Russians. I’m not sure what it says about all those “closest observers of Russian foreign policy” that they cannot make sense of fairly straightforward acts of bluster (threatening to put Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad) and accommodation (welcoming the “reset” in relations), but it is just about as reassuring as hearing Secretary Gates brag that he and former Secretary Rice were two Russia experts at the top levels of government who had no clue what was going on in Russia. I could have told them that many years ago. Russian actions are not hard to understand, and they are not unpredictable. In fact, one can predict what Moscow will do with surprising frequency by paying attention to what the Kremlin says it will do in response to provocations or conciliatory gestures. Much of the rest of Russian policy can be understood by recognizing the power structures in the Russian government, paying attention to Russian history and understanding that Moscow sees its relations with its former satellites much as Washington has traditionally regarded Latin America. That is, as an area in which we may meddle at will, but where foreign meddling, no matter how minimal, is viewed with deep suspicion as a threat to our influence.

All the hemming and hawing about Manas assumes that the Russians have some stranglehold over Bishkek and that our lease of the base would have been renewed without Russian involvement. If we can believe the former Kyrgyz ambassador who served under Bakiyev’s rival (hardly a cheerleader for the new regime), this is doubtful. More to the point, everyone who brings up Manas as a piece of evidence in indictments of Russia has failed to notice or mention the SCO Afghanistan conference going on right now at which the Russians, the central Asian states, SCO observer nations in the region, and observers from NATO and the United States, among others, are discussing possible resupply alternatives. Alexander Lukin explains:

The SCO includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as full members, and India, Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia as observers. One of the key objectives of the Friday SCO conference is to team up with the West and international organizations to address the Afghanistan problem. Among the participants will be: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon; Mark Perrin de Brichambaut, secretary-general of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Patrick Moon; and NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. In addition, there will be representatives from the Group of Eight countries, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the European Union and the Organization of The Islamic Conference.

The participation of NATO and its allies at the SCO conference indicates a significant shift in their approach to the Afghanistan problem. There is a good reason for this. NATO understands that it has a better chance of getting what it wants from Russia and other SCO members by cooperating with them rather than by confronting them. The U.S. and NATO wish list includes finding an acceptable format to somehow bring Iran into the dialogue [bold mine-DL]. It also includes securing transit routes for nonmilitary — and ultimately military — supplies to coalition forces in Afghanistan through SCO countries and placing NATO troops on the territories of SCO member states.

It’s almost as if making some effort to accommodate and heed Russian concerns might have significant, concrete benefits for U.S. interests! It’s as if needlessly alienating Russia for all these years was actually harmful to our own war effort, but then that might mean that the confrontational, anti-Russian posture of the last decade was deeply misguided and informed by hubris and ideological hang-ups left over from the Cold War. That couldn’t be right, could it? Note that line about bringing Iran into the mix. As I suggest in my forthcoming column on Iran for The Week (now online), involving Iran in Afghanistan policy makes sense for the purposes of our war effort and serves as a good way to begin rebuilding relations with Iran. As Lukin notes, Moscow has already agreed to allow the transport of non-military freight, which is a beginning for cooperation in central Asia.

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