Peter Spiliakos argues for a Ryan candidacy for the sake of advancing the cause of reformist conservatism:

If Ryan does run, his campaign shouldn’t be the kind that folds up if he does badly in the Iowa Caucuses (never mind the Ames Straw Poll) or the New Hampshire primary. If he can get the votes, great. If he can’t, the campaign should be an exercise in public education. Even if he can’t win the nomination, he should be in every debate until the last. At the very least such a campaign would prepare the way and make a straighter path for a responsible and reformist conservatism at some later date.

I’m not sure why Ryan would want to do this, but I can see why it could be attractive to people sympathetic to Ryan’s ideas. The kind of campaign that folds up if it does badly is a conventional presidential campaign focused on competing for votes. It would be interesting if Ryan chose to run an entirely different sort of campaign. That could make many of Ryan’s disadvantages less important, and it would free him up to hammer away on entitlements for months on a national stage. If it was clear from the beginning that Ryan was making no effort to win, poor results at the polls would not matter as much, and any success that he did have would be an added bonus. Instead of his candidacy being a great disappointment, it could be presented as the beginning of a long struggle to shape public opinion. It probably wouldn’t do much for Ryan’s career, but it could be a public service. There is nothing wrong with a presidential campaign designed to promote a set of policies or to draw attention to issues that a faction in the party believe have been mistakenly neglected, but running that kind of campaign presupposes that the primary electorate isn’t yet prepared to support the candidate’s proposals.

It seems that this is not to be. I can’t believe that there will be a Ryan presidential bid, but if there is one it will not be the kind that Spiliakos wants. All reports indicate that the only reason he would run is if he were running to win. As Daniel Foster put it, “No symbolic run to advance the agenda.”