Chuck Todd and Andrew seem to think that the Russian response to news of Iran’s enrichment facility is a significant move. Todd says that the Russians seem to be “on board,” and one assumes that he means that Moscow is “on board” with a more punitive approach to Iran’s nuclear program, but this is not at all clear from the Kremlin’s statement. The Kremlin said that the Russian government wants the IAEA to investigate and that it will assist the investigation. This is not quite diplomatic boilerplate, but it is close. This is not, as Andrew says, a “breakthrough,” but a minimal statement expressing concern about reported violations of Security Council resolutions. At most the Russian government is saying that it has not officially decided how it will respond until the IAEA investigates. Russia has committed to nothing new, and it has not altered its stance on Iran sanctions, and there is little reason to think that this will change.

One of the things that worries me about trying to acquire Russian support for sanctions on Iran is that sanctioning Iran is already a counterproductive, foolish policy. It does not become a wiser policy when it has Russian backing. Significant Russian cooperation with a sanctions regime would make it more “successful” in that it would isolate Iran more fully, which would at least address part of the practical problem of imposing sanctions on Iran, but this would not lead to the result that sanctions advocates want. Most likely, China would pick up the slack and become even more heavily invested in trade with Iran than it has been. On the contrary, as opponents of sanctions keep saying, a tighter sanctions regime will harm internal political opposition to the regime, increase the political-military establishment’s hold on the economy and cause Iranians to rally behind their government in the face of outside hostility.

Another thing that worries me about pursuing Russian aid in pressuring Iran is that it leads Americans to judge the quality of our relationship with Russia and the merits of repairing relations with Moscow on the basis of Russian cooperation over an issue on which Moscow has no intention of cooperating. This makes sure that Americans conclude that there is no use in maintaining good relations with Russia because it does not get Washington what it wants. It won’t matter that Washington was never going to get what it wanted from Russia regarding Iran–the administration has held out the promise that this could happen, and the Russians will get the blame when it doesn’t happen. This is why I think it has been a mistake to frame the missile defense decision as a move designed to extract Russian help in pressuring Iran. This ensures that domestic critics can point to the “failure” to acquire this help as “proof” that the missile defense decision was misguided. The Russians have been quite blunt in saying that they see no link between the two issues, and they are right that there is no link. Instead of assessing policy options for European security on the one hand and Iran’s nuclear program on the other, and instead of judging these options on their merits, the administration has created a situation in which the quality of its decision on central European missile defense will be judged by a standard of whether it somehow advanced international pressure on Iran, which is a ridiculous standard to use.