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Most Syria Hawks Are Still Obsessed with Iran

Ray Takeyh argues against using “half measures” in Syria because they will not “intimidate” Iran: If a very reluctant Obama administration does becomes entangled in Syria, it is likely to treat Iran with the same degree of caution as the more hawkish Bush administration did — avoiding any direct confrontation with Iran and refraining from […]

Ray Takeyh argues against using “half measures” in Syria because they will not “intimidate” Iran:

If a very reluctant Obama administration does becomes entangled in Syria, it is likely to treat Iran with the same degree of caution as the more hawkish Bush administration did — avoiding any direct confrontation with Iran and refraining from issuing ultimatums about Iran’s nuclear program. The result would be an emboldened Iran willing to cross the nuclear threshold and assert its dominance throughout the region.

It’s unusual to hear “limited” intervention in Syria described as undesirable because it could distract the U.S. from conflict with Iran. Takeyh views most Syria hawks as being too timid in what they are willing to propose, and holds that only direct U.S. military action including the use of ground forces will be sufficient to overthrow the government. Like most Syria hawks, Takeyh focuses almost all of his attention on Iran and sees Syria’s conflict only in terms of what it means for Iran. Like almost all Syria hawks, Takeyh assumes that overthrowing Assad is worth doing because it represents a setback for Iran in the region, and like most of them he is obsessed with Iran. However, he differs from the rest in that he is so preoccupied with Iran that he doesn’t want to risk an incremental intervention in Syria that could make conflict with Iran less likely.

Takeyh’s preferred direct, “full-scale” U.S. intervention in Syria will almost certainly mean that American forces will be attacking and fighting Iranian proxies and Iranian forces sent to help Assad, and that would make open conflict with Iran much more likely. Even more limited U.S. involvement will commit us to the anti-Iranian side in a proxy war. Takeyh’s preferred “full-scale, decisive” U.S. effort to overthrow Assad is hardly going to make Iran’s government more inclined to make a deal with Washington on the nuclear issue. Iran’s leaders will reasonably assume that they are next on the regime change list, and their desire for a deterrent against attack will increase.

He concludes the op-ed this way:

Paradoxically, an intervention intended to persuade Iran’s leaders of the viability of American red lines could instead convince them that their nuclear program is safe from American retaliation [bold mine-DL].

That’s a very odd and significant choice of words, since it takes for granted that Iran’s nuclear program itself is some sort of assault against the U.S. that demands “retaliation.” In fact, the U.S. suffers no harm from Iran’s nuclear program, and is never likely to suffer any regardless of what Iran does with that program. If the U.S. attacks Iran because of its nuclear program, that will not be an act of retaliation, but one of simple, unprovoked aggression.

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